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This thesis investigates the role of the principle of equitable and reasonable utilisation (ERU), as the 
core customary principle of international water law, in improving hydropolitical relations within 
anarchic geopolitical setting. By critically analysing the interactions between anarchy and the ERU 
principle, the study also provides an in-depth understanding of hydropolitical relations in the Helmand 
River Basin between Afghanistan and Iran. 
On the theoretical level, while arguing that anarchic geopolitical setting is a critical determinant of 
shaping hydropolitical relations, this study tackles the root causes of the failure to implement the ERU 
principle within such anarchic environment. Drawing upon the two frameworks of Interactional 
International Law and Transboundary Waters Interaction NexuS (TWINS), the study introduces the 
Universe of Hydropolitical Relations in order to provide a more nuanced explanation of the complex 
and interlinked legal and political circumstances surrounding international watercourses. The analysis 
shows how the interests and identities of states should be more carefully considered together if a 
“transformation” towards equity is expected in hydropolitical relations. The effectiveness of such 
transformation depends, in part, on the specific anarchic setting. This thesis, therefore, places a 
theoretical focus on the ERU principle, whether it has normative power to shape state’s interest and 
identity, its legitimate function to attack symptoms of anarchy and its potential for rendering 
hydropolitical relations equitable and sustainable.  
At the case-study level, the study assesses the existing treaty over the Helmand River with regards to 
the ERU principle. With its limited capacity to address the “life cycle of norms” through interactional 
international law, the analysis shows that the treaty rarely reflects the notion of equity. Despite limited 
cooperation between Afghanistan and Iran, both riparian states have continued to unilaterally utilise 
their shared waters. Within such an anarchic setting, the ERU principle serves rather as a bargaining 
strategy. While Afghanistan has been developing dams, a lack of a positive response to calls to consider 
environmental impacts and revive the Hamoun wetlands through mutual cooperation reflects a situation 
that is reminiscent of the “tragedy of the commons.” However, despite the situation in the basin 
remaining ad hoc for over a century, new developments in cooperation may contribute to creating a 
shared understanding between Afghanistan and Iran with regard to the utilisation of the Helmand River.  
The outcomes of the research will contribute not only to enriching the existing knowledge of complex 
hydropolitical dynamics but will also benefit policymaking on water diplomacy and peace building 
processes for international waters at the regional and global levels, such as the 2030 UN agenda. At the 
case study level, the research will provide in-depth and updated analytical insight into the Helmand 
River Basin which suffers from limited evidence-based research. In addition, it is expected that practical 
insights from the case study will help build guidelines for use in other transboundary river basins. 
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Hundreds of birds embark on a perilous journey across seven treacherous valleys in search 
of a king who can right the wrongs in their world. They are led by the poet Attar, who has 
been transformed into a sharp-beaked, crested hoopoe. The troubles that spur them into 
flight — “Anarchy — discontent — upheaval! Desperate fights over territory, water, and 
food! Poisoned air! Unhappiness!” — are of course all too familiar in our world. – from 
The Conference of the Birds – the poem by Farid ud-Din Attar (1145-1221) – translated 
by Peter Sis 
During my research, I have been witnessing several tragic faces of anarchy in this world; on top of all 
military invasions, occupations, and wars, it has been the COVID-19 pandemic followed by global 
political mess and rivalry to respond. However, the pandemic has also uncovered the inequalities and 
injustice and underlined the world’s fragility. While these dramas may trigger unilateralism and 
intensify inequalities, they may promote transformation towards equity and sustainability inspired by 
collective behaviour. 
For long time, I have observed such condition of living with inequalities, uncertainties and vulnerability 
though associated with strong social resilience of people of Sistan (in Iran) and Nimrooz (in 
Afghanistan) surrounding the Helmand River, who were a big family one time. I observed the painful 
symptoms of anarchy, the desire for equity and justice, and the image of common identity reflected in 
the Hamoun Wetlands. I owe much to the Iranian and Afghan people of this region, and I wish I could 
do something more meaningful for them than this little PhD. While Afghanistan, in particular, has been 
a case study for many international experts for long time, understanding of the socio-political dynamics 
of this region remains limited, or rests on ill-founded assumptions. Given the intense rivalry and central 
importance of ethnic identity, Afghanistan is very difficult and complicated case study for researchers 
to find the facts on the ground and spot fake and real news. International “experts” and “consultants” 
come and go without understanding the deep-rooted socio-political nature of Afghanistan. 
This brief background is just a part of my long story that led me to do my PhD, and I hope this gives 
even small contributions to having better understanding of the Helmand River Basin: firstly to promote 
the quality of the scarce existing research and secondly to produce and support a constructive dialogue 
for diplomats and politicians. I am very well aware that some, either Iranian or Afghans, may disagree 
with the conclusion or some parts of the thesis. I am also very well aware that charge of bias is common 
when writing about contentious issues in particular for those which may somehow subject to strong 
emotions in both sides. To me (and particularly in socio-political science), even being biased is not a 
serious problem that I think no one can escape from this but I believe that being fair with critical thinking 
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Introduction. Transforming hydropolitical relations under the myth of anarchy 
“We can’t help being thirsty, moving towards the voice of water.”                  
(Molana - Jalal al-Din al-Rumi)1 
1.1. International waters surrounded by anarchy, politics and law: change is inevitable 
Changes of all climatic, socio-economic, political, and legal kinds are becoming an increasing part of 
everyday life within the anarchic nature of the world politics, shaping not only the interests and 
identities of everyone but also targeting the inequality condition. If these changes perhaps create clarity 
and stability in one part of the world, they may cause confusion and uncertainty in another.2 Just as 
building a dam or a small canal on an upstream part of a river may influence downstreamers, a lack of 
access to water and basic sanitation in a small village of an upstreamer can have an effect on a 
downstreamer’s use of the same water – causing significant unexpected changes in hydropolitical 
relations.3 While conflict concerning international waters may evolve over time and tap into the deepest 
 
1 Molana (or Rumi) poetry book, “Masnavi”, poem no. 837: “We can’t help being thirsty, moving towards the 
voice of water. Milk drinkers draw close to the mother. Muslims, Christians, Jews, Buddhists, Hindus, shamans, 
everyone hears the intelligent sound and moves with thirst to meet it”. 
آید؛ شیرخوار کرمند و نگران، تا ست به وی، تشنه را بانگ سقا می ها همه تشنه آید؛ زانک جان سر و پا می خلق بین بی ، یدآهر کجا بوی خدا می
آید؛ خنک آن آید؛ از مسلمان و جهود و ترسا، هر سحر بانگ دعا می آید؛ در فراقند و همه منتظرند، کز کجا وصل و لقا می که مادر ز کجا می 
 هوش که در گوش دلش، ز آسمان بانگ صال می آید. مولوی - دیوان شمس -  غزلیات 
2 This also reminds a poem by the Persian poet Sa’adi (1210 – 1290): “Human beings are members of a whole, In 
creation of one essence and soul. If one member is afflicted with pain, Other members uneasy will remain. If 
you have no sympathy for human pain, The name of human you cannot retain.” 
درد آوَرد روزگار، دگر عضوها را نمانَد قرار؛ تو کز محنت دیگران آدم اعضای یک پیکرند، که در آفرینش ز یک گوهرند؛ چو عضوى به بنی 
گلستان  -سعدیغمی، نشاید که نامت نهند آدمی. بی  
   The realities of the contemporary world may create an impression of a space in which little seems to make sense. 
This is exemplified in the “butterfly effect” when a single, apparently very small action, performed by one state 
in one location, has wide-ranging effects and results in significant changes to another state, a phenomenon which 
is highly unpredictable. See Shu-Yun Ma, ‘Political Science at the Edge of Chaos? The Paradigmatic 
Implications of Historical Institutionalism’ [2007] 28 International Political Science Review 57. 
3 Such condition has been my own experience for long time that I have been trying hard to heal and relieve the 
pain from what people of Sistan (in Iran) and Nimrooz (in Afghanistan) have been suffering more than a century. 
While people in one side of the river may have relatively access to better services for drinking water and 
irrigating their lands, the other side is struggling with lack of basic water related service due to war, and poor 
socio-economic circumstances. One side of the border may be seen as “green”, while the other side, in just a 
few kilometers, may be most barren. This situation, however, is constantly changing in ‘favour’ of one side of 
the border, for instance, either in times of flood or drought. What is more painful is when you see these people 
who are now divided by the artificial border had been one time a ‘big family’ and still has many commonalities 
with each other. In my short experience of being with these lovely people on both sides, I observed the painful 
symptoms of anarchy, the desire for equity and justice, and the image of common identity reflected in the 
Helmand waters. 
INTRODUCTION                                              Transforming hydropolitical relations under the myth of anarchy 
2 
 
sense of riparian states’ identities,4 a new interest may emerge through socio-political and economic 
changes and different perspectives on equity. 
Legal and political scholars have been long struggling to find a rational explanation for such changes 
(or stalemates) and the causes and interactions.5 Issues concerning the relations among riparian states 
over “transboundary” or “international” watercourses6 are not exempt from the anarchic nature and 
essence of changes in world politics, inspiring many scholars to investigate such changes to better 
understand how to transform hydropolitical relations towards equity– which is the foundation of 
international water law and central to the attainment of sustainable development.7 
In seeking to understand the transformation of hydropolitical relations towards equity, two major factors 
find little or no place in the theoretical discourse surrounding international watercourses: the anarchic 
geopolitical setting and the normative role of legal principles and their interactions and impacts on 
shaping the interests and identity of states, thus, changing the hydropolitical relations.  
While any state can contribute to making a change, no other state has an absolute power to prevent the 
state in question from acting or entirely controlling the change that results from this action. This state-
centric fashion of world politics, represented by the absence of a supra-national authority, is 
characterised by anarchy. Such anarchy, whether labelled as the lack of a central authority in 
international society, chaos, horizontal relations between sovereign states, or even as “what states make 
of it”8, has been declared a fundamental assumption in international politics. Though the anarchism of 
international politics may paralyse the political processes in which states seek to control changes to the 
hydropolitical relations, therewith they can apply their “hegemonic” 9  or “counter-hegemonic” 10 
political strategies. Like anarchy that may influence the interests and identity of states, international 
water law has also had a particularly normative influence over these changes. Though the changes may 
 
4 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘The Transformation of Disputes by Lawyers: What the Dispute Paradigm Does and 
Does Not Tell Us’ [1985]  Mo J Disp Resol 25. 
5 Jutta Brunnée and Stephen J Toope, ‘International Law and Constructivism: Elements of an Interactional Theory 
of International Law’ [2000] 39 Colum J Transnat'l L 19. 
6 In this study, the terms of transboundary/international waters/rivers/watercourses refer to the same: a shared 
body of fresh water between two or more states. The term “watercourse”, here, is the same as what defined by 
the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention: “surface water and groundwaters constituting by virtue of their physical 
relationship a unitary whole and normally flowing into a common terminus”. 
7 Alistair Rieu-Clarke, International Law and Sustainable Development (IWA Publishing 2005). 
8 Alexander Wendt, ‘Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics’ [1992] 46 
International organization 391 
9 See Mark Zeitoun and Jeroen Warner, ‘Hydro-Hegemony–a Framework for Analysis of Trans-Boundary Water 
Conflicts’ [2006] 8 Water policy 435. 
10 Ana Elisa Cascão, ‘Changing Power Relations in the Nile River Basin: Unilateralism Vs. Cooperation?’ [2009] 
2 Water Alternatives. 
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not fully bring about an equitable and sustainable platform for the resolution of often long-standing 
disputes and discrepancies, international law may create a legitimate refuge within the anarchic nature 
of international water conflicts for states to express their interests and identities. However, while there 
is a lack of holistic cooperative legal frameworks in many transboundary river basins,11 it might be seen, 
in anarchic context, that “nothing” can stop the unilateral construction of the Grand Ethiopian 
Renaissance Dam (GERD),12 or Turkey’s Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) all grounded on their 
own sovereignty’s interests and identity; therefore, many may question the role of international legal 
norms to effectively influence the behaviour of the actors involved, and consequently transform the 
hydropolitical relations towards equity under highly-anarchic geopolitical settings. 
International law – dedicated to attaining humanity’s fundamental goals of advancing peace, prosperity, 
human rights, and environmental protection13– has sought to reflect on such changes and resolve the 
complexity associated with international waters in order to render hydropolitical relations equitable and 
sustainable. But, to what extent and how does this desired goal for change sound achievable and realistic 
considering the anarchic and geopolitical shadow over international watercourses? Within such 
complexity, how can different components of water conflict, e.g., technical, social, cultural, legal and 
political, be introduced more intelligibly to policymakers and to the public without reproducing and 
amplifying the conflict? How can the interests and identity of parties involved in water conflict – often 
controversial – be met while achieving an equitable solution? How can changes in hydropolitical 
relations be predictable? In what circumstances may a change in hydropolitical relations be made by 
legal norms that produce an equitable outcome?   
The purpose of this study, therefore, is to investigate the circumstances in which the evolution and 
implementation of international water law could be very much a game-changer. Among other legal 
principles, this study, in particular, aims to consider how and to what extent the equitable and reasonable 
utilisation principle, the core principle of international water law,14 contributes to the conflict resolution 
process and changes the nature of hydropolitical relations within the anarchic context of international 
 
11 The global community is mostly concerned by the lack of a holistic, co-operative legal framework for most of 
the world’s 276 transboundary river basins, which have experienced significant changes in politico-legal terms. 
UNEP, Atlas of International Freshwater Agreements, vol 4 (UNEP/Earthprint 2002) defines 263 basins. 
However, the United Nations now recognise 276 basins that supply water to 148 countries: See UN Water, 
‘Transboundary Waters’ [2013]  UN Water (http://unwater.org/ topics/transboundary-waters/en/). 
12 See APA- Addis Ababa, ‘Nothing can stop Ethiopian dam - PM’ African Press Agency (Ethiopia, 22 October 
2019) http://apanews.net/en/news/nothing-can-stop-ethiopian-dam-pm accessed 11 January 2021. See also 
BBC, ‘Abiy Ahmed: No force can stop Ethiopia from building dam’ BBC (22 October 2019) 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-50144451 accessed 11 January 2021.  
13 Mary Ellen O'connell, The Power and Purpose of International Law (Oxford University Press 2008). 
14 Alistair Rieu-Clarke and Christopher Spray, ‘Ecosystem Services and International Water Law: Towards a 
More Effective Determination and Implementation of Equity?’ [2013] 16 Potchefstroom Electronic Law 
Journal/Potchefstroomse Elektroniese Regsblad 12. 
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waters.15 Accordingly, the main research question which guides this study is: “How and to what extent 
does the equitable and reasonable utilisation principle (ERU) improve the hydropolitical relations 
of an international watercourse within anarchic geopolitical settings?”. In answering this question, 
the study will also examine whether the ERU principle leads to water conflict transformation. In so 
doing, it is necessary, therefore, to define what the “transformation” of water conflict means in this 
study. 
Drawing upon the integration theories of both disciplines of law and politics, in general, the study 
analyses the normative linkage between the legal power and political dimensions in the context of 
international watercourses, and contributes broadly to facilitating dialogue between different disciplines 
of law and politics in order to synergise anarchy, legal principles of equity and state behaviour. It will 
be shown how such interactions engage in shaping hydropolitical relations. Therefore, it is expected 
that such understanding not only will enrich the knowledge on the complex hydropolitical dynamics 
but also will exploit gaps for strengthening legal analysis and implementations over international 
watercourses. Ultimately, the study will investigate the interactions between anarchy and the ERU 
principle by looking at hydropolitical relations in the Helmand River Basin shared between Afghanistan 
and Iran. This will provide not only in-depth and updated analytical insights concerning the Helmand 
River Basin, which suffers from limited research based on evidence, but also more general insights for 
other basins. 
The purpose of this study is to further the debate and literature on transboundary water conflict and 
cooperation by critically examining the role of international water law as a soft power for shaping 
transboundary water interactions. This task will in itself distinguish the study from its predecessors, 
which have either focused predominantly on selected aspects of hydropolitics, or have not fully 
considered the normative influence of law within the context of international watercourses. The 
outcomes of the research will also have the potential to contribute to policy-making on water 
diplomacy16 and peace-building processes for international waters at the regional and global levels. 
Improving the understanding of political and legal dynamics of hydropolitical relations will enrich 
 
15 However, “because water is an inter-disciplinary resource, international legal norms cannot by themselves 
provide resolution to disputes over international watercourses. Equally important is the fact that there can be no 
resolution of water disputes without international legal norms on international watercourses” (Salman MA 
Salman and Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, International Watercourses: Enhancing Cooperation and 
Managing Conflict: Proceedings of a World Bank Seminar (The World Bank 1998) p. 119). 
16 Among various definitions, water diplomacy is understood as “the conduct of relationships between riparian 
states of shared water resources to enhance cooperation between them in relation to the joint management of 
those resources but with regard to goals beyond the water sector, namely regional stability and peace.” However, 
the focus of this study is the diplomacy that renders the hydropolitical relations with equity. See, for extensive 
discussion on the link between water diplomacy and legal institutions, Susanne Schmeier and Zaki Shubber, 
‘Anchoring Water Diplomacy–the Legal Nature of International River Basin Organizations’ [2018] 567 Journal 
of Hydrology 114 p. 114.  
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international agendas related to transboundary water cooperation, such as the 2030 UN agenda, and 
give a much better match to reality.17 At the case study level, the research will illustrate the ways for 
riparian states to strengthen their cooperation. In addition, it is expected that the practical insights from 
the case study will help build guidelines for use in other transboundary river basins.  
1.2. Moving towards water conflict transformation: equity in harmonious conjunction with 
interest and identity 
Policymakers and scholarly studies from various disciplines – e.g. natural science, social science and 
economics – have sought to analyse and promote the hydropolitical relations around international 
waters in an equitable and sustainable manner.18 Such endeavours have been made through a broad 
range of policies and approaches – from functionalist institutionalism with a focus on depoliticisation 
to a realist theory of politicisation and securitisation – in order to capture the essence and legacy of 
international water conflict.19 However, the development, progress and implementation of policies and 
approaches have resulted in differing degrees of equity in hydropolitical relations, and in some respects 
in a confrontation with the interests and identities of riparian states.20  
Many such efforts have directed their attention towards “preventive” water diplomacy, or an attempt to 
“manage” water conflict; and thereby give priority to the avoidance of a high-level political concern 
among riparian states, an approach which has mostly led, at best, to the “frozen conflict” of an 
inequitable or a low-level equitable hydropolitical relations.21 The fundamental question is whether or 
not these efforts can resolve water conflict and transform hydropolitical relations into equitable and just 
arrangements, by engaging with the interests and identities of the states involved. Considering the 
 
17 UN General Assembly, ‘Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.(21 October 
2015, a/Res/70/1)’ [2015]  UN, New York. 
18 For instance, see UNEP/MAP/MED POL, ‘Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis (Tda) for the Mediterranean 
Sea’ [2005]  UNEP/MAP, Athens 228; Claudia W Sadoff and others, Securing Water, Sustaining Growth 
(University of Oxford 2015); Jerome Delli Priscoli and Aaron T Wolf, Managing and Transforming Water 
Conflicts (Cambridge University Press 2009); For more critical analysis see, for instance, Mark Zeitoun and 
others, ‘Analysis for Water Conflict Transformation’ [2020] 45 Water International 365. 
19 For more intensive discussions, see for instance Lei Xie and Jeroen Warner, ‘The Politics of Securitization: 
China’s Competing Security Agendas and Their Impacts on Securitizing Shared Rivers’ [2021]  Eurasian 
Geography and Economics 1; Hussam Hussein, Ahmet Conker and Mattia Grandi, ‘Small Is Beautiful but Not 
Trendy: Understanding the Allure of Big Hydraulic Works in the Euphrates-Tigris and Nile Waterscapes’ [2020]  
Mediterranean Politics 1; See also Jeroen Warner, ‘Three Lenses on Water War, Peace and Hegemonic Struggle 
on the Nile’ [2012] 4 International Journal of Sustainable Society 173. 
20 See for instance Mark Zeitoun and others, ‘Transboundary Water Justice: A Combined Reading of Literature 
on Critical Transboundary Water Interaction and ‘Justice’, for Analysis and Diplomacy’ [2014] 16 Water Policy 
174; Mark Zeitoun, Naho Mirumachi and Jeroen Warner, ‘Transboundary Water Interaction Ii: The Influence 
of ‘Soft’power’ [2011] 11 International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 159. 
21 It is worth to note that there are differences between “conflict” and “dispute”, “resolution” and “settlement”, 
and “conflict resolution” and “dispute settlement”. See Mihir Kanade, ‘Role of International Adjudication in 
Conflict Resolution and Transformation’ in The Difficult Task of Peace (Springer 2020). 
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inevitability of changes to the status of hydropolitical relations, it is important in this study to distinguish 
the spectrum between conflict management, resolution and transformation.  
Here, conflict management is a set of policies and practices to handle, control or limit the conflict, often 
regardless of the equitability of the outcome. This approach might help to an extent, particularly in the 
geopolitical chaos of the basin, where even a minor dispute may escalate into full-blown conflict, by 
providing a forum for parties to communicate in a legitimate way to at least manage, even if they cannot 
resolve, their water conflicts. However, existing models of conflict management remain unable to 
effectively resolve water disputes in anarchic settings. While the frameworks of conflict management 
“regularly ignore the balance between rationality and spirituality”, 22  conflict resolution and 
transformation emphasise both the understanding of the conflict and working procedurally towards its 
remedy, and assessing the outcomes in terms of justice and equity. Thus, conflict 
resolution/transformation – procedurally and substantively – is expected to rather reflect respectively 
fairness and distributive justice in hydropolitical relations –23 something that may also be supported by 
international water law.24 In one sense, water conflict management focuses on the efficiency of “dollars 
per drop” over water conflict resolution that focuses on the equitability or “care per drop”.25  
Furthermore, while conflict resolution includes a number of methods to resolve conflict and thereby 
achieve a level of satisfaction for the concerned parties, conflict transformation emphasises the positions 
and perceptions of the parties, dealing more with the reasons for the conflict in order to engage with 
the parties and transform their interests, identities and discourses into a collective form. The framework 
of conflict transformation acknowledges the balance between the quantifiable and the spiritual, or 
transcendent, and there offers more “effective” negotiations and enhances the transformational process 
in its spiritual, ethical and moral dimensions.26 Water conflict transformation in fact is much more 
closely associated with the principles of fairness and justice than the concepts of management and 
 
22  Aaron Wolf argues that “[o]ver time, ‘rationality’ dictated the structure of subsequent paradigms, from 
economics to science to modernity, to where today we in the North/West are consistently satisfied to ask the 
‘what’ without the ‘why’… [that] turn to benefit–cost analyses as decision-making tools, where all factors must 
be reduced to economic value, explicitly excluding often profound, but intangible, considerations.”; Wolf also 
notes that “spirituality” is illustrated as “the idealized relationship between self and community, between justice 
and mercy, and between boundaries and expanse”. See Aaron T Wolf, ‘Spiritual Understandings of Conflict and 
Transformation and Their Contribution to Water Dialogue’ [2012] 14 Water Policy 73 pp. 79-80. 
23 Zeray Yihdego and Alistair Rieu-Clarke explore legitimacy and distributive justice within the context of fairness 
over international watercourses: Zeray Yihdego and Alistair Rieu-Clarke, ‘An Exploration of Fairness in 
International Law through the Blue Nile and Gerd’ [2016] 41 Water International 528. Borrowing from Thomas 
Franck (1995), they describe legitimacy as ‘procedural fairness’ and associate distributive justice with 
substantive principles of international water law: see, e.g., Thomas M Franck and Thomas M Franck, Fairness 
in International Law and Institutions, vol 51 (Clarendon Press Oxford 1995). 
24 Zeitoun ‘Transboundary Water Justice’ (n 20) 174. 
25 Zeitoun ‘Transboundary Water Justice’ (n 20) 175. 
26 Wolf (n 22). 
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resolution,27 and it seeks a balance between equity and riparian states’ interests and identities. In more 
concrete terms, “conflict transformation is not about making a situation of injustice more bearable, but 
about transforming the very systems, structures and relationships which give rise to violence and 
injustice”.28 
Considering equity in conjunction with satisfying the interests and reconstructing the identities of 
riparian states as part of conflict transformation forces a greater emphasis not only on the evaluation of 
structural conditions (e.g. the role of the state and systems of governance) and processes of power 
generation, escalation and distribution, but also on the assessment of outcomes – only then is 
transformation of conflict expected. This study suggests that conflict transformation, which, in this 
respect, rests on both attaining equity and social justice and while reconstructing normative foundations 
for interests and identities, may provide a more nuanced conceptual approach than conflict resolution 
and conflict management. Certainly, such cognitive transformation influences the power dynamics 
among the actors involved.29 Indeed, constructive cognitive changes in conflict transformation need to 
confront power imbalances and challenge the status quo.  
Based on the above definition, meeting two key interrelated objectives becomes essential for the 
attainment of water conflict transformation – improving the level of equity in water utilisation among 
riparian states, while ensuring that the hydropolitical relations correctly satisfies their interests and 
identities.30 A clear consensus has emerged that international water law makes a significant contribution 
 
27 For related literature, see John Paul Lederach, ‘Conflict Transformation in Protracted Internal Conflicts: The 
Case for a Comprehensive Framework’ [1995]  Conflict transformation 201; and, see also Hugh MIALL, 
Conflict Transformation: A Multi-Dimensional Task. Transforming Ethnopolitical Conflict (Wiesbaden: VS 
Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften 2004). For more discussion with specific focus on water conflict, see, for 
instance, Zeitoun ‘Transboundary Water Justice’ (n 20); Zeitoun, M., Cascão, A.E., Warner, J., Mirumachi, N., 
Matthews, N., Menga, F. and Farnum, R., 2017. See also Mark Zeitoun and others, ‘Transboundary Water 
Interaction Iii: Contest and Compliance’ [2017] 17 International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and 
Economics 271. 
28 Michelle Parlevliet, ‘Rethinking Conflict Transformation from a Human Rights Perspective’ [2009]  p. 3: “The 
conflict transformation approach perceives conflict as a catalyst for social change and places primary emphasis 
on the question of social justice”. 
29 Veronique Dudouet, ‘Transitions from Violence to Peace: Revisiting Analysis and Intervention in Conflict 
Transformation’ [2006] ; See also Veronique Dudouet and Beatrix Schmelzle, ‘Human Rights and Conflict 
Transformation: The Challenges of Just Peace’ [2010] ; John P Lederach, Conflict Transformation. Intercourse 
(PA: Good Books 2003). 
30 Notwithstanding this, while the different aspects and symptoms of water conflicts all around the world may be 
similar, they may be rooted in different layers of socio-political context. Water conflict is just one piece of a 
bigger picture and might show some effects of other underlying issues. The sense of injustice in water conflict 
may sometimes be a reflection of an act of injustice from a broader geopolitical perspective. In such cases, 
transformation of water conflict, will not be occurred unless the unjust bases are cured. For instance, water 
conflicts between Palestine-Israel reflect the broader unjust situation grounded on geopolitical history and 
occupation of apartheid regime that echo the imperialist ideology. Thus, isolating water conflict from its causes, 
particularly in such cases, is a false remedy. The fruit of a corrupt and poisonous tree is corrupt. As Christ says, 
“A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit” (Matt. vii. 18). Water 
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to the global politics surrounding transboundary water conflicts.31 International water law can play an 
important role in advancing hydropolitical relations towards conflict transformation, moving them 
beyond a state of conflict management alone. Consider, then: how can international water law support 
water conflict transformation, shed light on equity in hydropolitical relations, and reconstruct actors’ 
interests and identities in a legitimate way, while being applied within a complex geopolitical setting 
where anarchy reigns supreme in much of the river basin? 
1.3. The relevance of international water law in addressing water conflict transformation 
under the shadow of anarchy 
While international water conflicts are still surrounded by state-centric, often coercive and hegemonic 
compliance strategies, of which relative power determines the outcomes, there has often been a 
pessimistic “realist” view of the role that international law plays in bringing an equitable resolution, 
which has not carefully embraced the normative power of legal principles in the wider picture.32 
International water law, including the customary principles, establish the substantive and procedural 
“rules of the game” to build the foundations upon which international watercourses can be peacefully 
utilised.33 The law of international watercourses provides a framework to guide water conflict resolution 
within an “anarchical society”34, in which a group of states interacts with one another and are affected 
by a set of often contrary interests, rules and norms. The anarchic nature of international water conflicts 
heightens the complexity around international waters, because states may be reluctant to commit to and 
comply with any law that they believe might decrease their security with potential future 
adversaries. Anarchy influences the interests and identities of states and thus their behaviour. Anarchy 
feeds competition and conflict among states, and resultantly destabilises hydropolitical processes by 
 
conflict will not be resolved unless the roots are being treated. Thus, considering equity in water utilisation in 
conjunction with interest and identity of parties involved goes beyond that only focusing on water issues if 
transformation is desired. For specific related discussions concerning Palestine-Israel water conflicts, see, for 
instance, Mark Zeitoun and Muna Dajani, ‘Israel is hoarding the Jordan River – it’s time to share the water’ 
(The Conversation, 19 December 2019) https://theconversation.com/israel-is-hoarding-the-jordan-river-its-
time-to-share-the-water-126906 accessed 11 January 2021. See also Clements Messerschmidt, ‘Hydro-
Apartheid and Water Access in Israel/Palestine: Challenging the Myth of Water Scarcity’ [2013]  Mandy Turner 
and Omar Shweiki, The Palestinian People and the Political Economy of Development, London: Routledge.  
31 Joseph Dellapenna and Joyeeta Gupta, ‘Toward Global Law on Water’ [2008] 14 Global governance: A review 
of multilateralism and international organizations 437. 
32 See for extensive debate, e.g., Oona A Hathaway, ‘Between Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of 
International Law’ [2005]  The University of Chicago Law Review 469; Shima Findley Baradaran, Michael 
Nielson, Daniel Sharman, J. C., ‘Does International Law Matter?’ [2012] 97 Minn L Rev 743. 
33 Patricia Wouters, ‘The Relevance and Role of Water Law in the Sustainable Development of Freshwater - from 
"Hydrosovereignty" to "Hydrosolidarity"’ [2000] 25 Water International 202. See also UNEP (n 11) 12, where 
it identifies more than 3600 international water treaties dating from ad 805 to 1984, and shows that international 
water treaties date as far back as 2500 bc when Lagash and Umma resolved a water dispute along the Tigris 
River through agreement. 
34 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society : A Study of Order in World Politics (4th edn, Columbia University Press 
2012). 
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producing chaos and an inclination for states to strive for security and power, and in general think self-
interestedly.35 Yet the anarchic nature of international society is in fact reflected in the concept of 
sovereignty in international law. Sovereignty is a key term in international water utilisation doctrines. 
A state has sovereignty over its natural resources as well as the right to develop those natural resources. 
This being the case, one may ask how international water law can facilitate conflict transformation 
while states hold sovereignty over their territory.  
Within the context of international law, the sovereign right to exploit natural resources should not 
impose harmful effects on other states. As an accepted principle of international law, recognised by the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) and manifested in tribunals on several cases, such as the Lake 
Lanoux Arbitration,36 states have the sovereign right to utilise their natural resources.37 Therefore, 
unilaterally damming a shared watercourse, for instance, might be justified by the sovereign right of 
that particular state with “absolute territorial sovereignty”. However, the sovereignty of states is not 
actually absolute. The scope of its application is limited by specific circumstances.38 The ICJ in the 
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case held that the right of a sovereign state to unilaterally build a dam on a 
stretch of a shared watercourse situated entirely within its territory is still subject to certain limitations. 
There is, firstly, the duty not to cause “significant” transboundary damage and, secondly, the obligation 
to respect the “equitable and reasonable utilisation” of a shared watercourse.39 The principle of equitable 
and reasonable utilisation, which is the focus of this thesis, is the cornerstone of international water law 
and is further articulated in Article 5 of the 1997 UN Convention on the Law of the Non‐navigational 
Uses of International Watercourses (hereinafter UN Watercourses Convention).40  The principle of 
equitable and reasonable utilisation has the concept of “equity” at its heart. While equity plays a key 
role in achieving conflict transformation, the anarchic nature of global politics around international 
waters is recognised as being the main barrier to such transformation, by creating chaos and 
vulnerability and intensifying the risks to “constructive”41 forms of conflict and cooperation. 
 
35 However, anarchy, by itself, may be used to question the unfair distribution of power and resources, and may 
result in conflict transformation. 
36 Lake Lanoux Arbitration (France v. Spain), Arbitral Tribunal, 16 Nov. 1957, (1957) 12 Reports of International 
Arbitral Awards, p. 281. 
37 See Stephen C. McCaffrey, The Law of International Watercourses (Oxford University Press 2019). 
38 Yogesh K. Tyagi, ‘Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources’ [2015] 4 Cambridge journal of international 
and comparative law 588. 
39 See Stephen McCaffrey, ‘The Contribution of the Un Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses’ [2001] 1 International journal of global environmental issues 250. 
40 The 1997 Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses, Annex II, p.207. 
41 Zeitoun (n 18) p. 376 notes that “[l]ike a caterpillar morphing into a butterfly, ‘conflict’ can be a necessary step 
towards equitable and sustainable transboundary water arrangements. Openly expressed disagreement can be 
constructive, in other words, when it leads issues onto a stage where they can be dealt with.” 
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As already mentioned, despite the relevant literature on the concept of water conflict transformation 
from different views,42 its function within the concept of anarchy has received sparse attention in 
particular from legal scholars. Thus, this is crucial to show that how international water law plays its 
role in such transformation under the shadow of anarchy. Furthermore, while there is a rich history of 
discussion the link between international law and politics, it seems there are still numerous 
shortcomings of analysis of equity in the political context of transboundary waters from legal 
perspective particularly in situation of a “hydropolitical security complex”43. In one sense, there is still 
a semantic gap to explore how international water law works in international politics. Hence, there is a 
need for a “joint discipline” to bridge a gap between international relations theory (IR) and international 
law (IL) over international waters.44 In so doing, this thesis will show that international water law 
provides a balanced approach in an anarchic context which is reflected precisely in the concept of 
equitable and reasonable utilisation of international watercourse. Therefore, this thesis will examine 
how the principle of equitable and reasonable utilisation can transform the “self-help” nature emanate 
from anarchy to a collective interests and identities of riparian states. 
1.4. A summary of conceptual framework 
The major contributions of this study are two-fold. First, the study will focus on developing an 
interdisciplinary theoretical framework to analyse hydropolitical relations and international water law, 
and second, it will provide new insights into the hydropolitical and legal analysis of the Helmand River 
Basin. This study is therefore an inquiry into the legal and political interactions that have influenced the 
hydropolitical relations of an international watercourse situated in a complex geopolitical setting, where 
anarchy reigns supreme across much of the river basin, and where conflict has deep social and political 
roots associated with the interventions of outsiders. As mentioned before, the research question guiding 
this study is: How and to what extent does the ERU principle improve the hydropolitical relations of an 
international watercourse within anarchic geopolitical settings?”. This thesis is accordingly bound by a 
 
42 E.g., Zeitoun (n 18); Wolf (n 22). 
43  Michael Schulz profitably introduced the “hydropolitical security complex” as “a set of states that are 
geographically part owners and technical users of a water body, and that consider that water body to be a major 
national security issue” (See Michael Schulz, ‘Turkey, Syria and Iraq : A Hydropolitical Security Complex’ 
[1995]  Hydropolitics : conflicts over water as a development constraint 91). The (neorealist) concept of a 
hydropolitical security complex was taken up by, among others, Tony Turton for hydropolitics in the Southern 
African region. Applying the concept to the Euphrates-Tigris basin, Jeroen Warner highlighted the overlay of 
global political games, claiming “a change in the hegemonic relationships with respect to the global governance 
of water has ripple effects in the region”. J. F. Warner, ‘Contested Hydrohegemony: Hydraulic Control and 
Security in Turkey’ [2008] 1 Water Alternatives 271 p. 277. 
44 See, for instance, Kenneth W. Abbott, ‘Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International 
Lawyers’ [1989] 14 Yale J Int'l L 335. See also, and in particular, Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘International Law 
and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda’ [1993] 87 Am J Int'l L 205, and also Anne-Marie Slaughter, 
Andrew S. Tulumello and Stepan Wood, ‘International Law and International Relations Theory: A New 
Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship’ [1998] 92 Am J Int'l L 367. 
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theoretical focus on the ERU principle, its normative power to shape a state’s interests and identity, its 
legitimate function as a remedy to the symptoms of anarchy, and its legal implications for hydropolitical 
relations as they move towards water conflict transformation (Figure 1). In so doing, the nexus between 
moderating variable of the ERU principle and independent variable of anarchy, and dependent variable 
of state behaviour is explored. There are certain other factors that may indirectly impact on the 
relationship between anarchy, ERU and state behaviour, which will be addressed in this study: 
geopolitical pressure, institutional support and its contribution of procedural rules, and the robustness 
of political economy. 
 
Figure 1. Conceptual Framework 
Answering the main research question of this thesis reminds us the preeminent broader theoretical 
question of “does international law matter in shaping state behaviour? if yes, how?” that needs to go 
through different theories of IR and IL, e.g., neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism and constructivism. 
One key goal and theoretical contribution of this study is, therefore, to bring this question into the 
context of international watercourses and explore it within an interdisciplinary research.  
It seems each of such above IR and IL theories will shed lights on some parts of the complex puzzle of 
state behaviour in world politics and its relation to international law. Each may have a wide range of 
different analytical findings, differentiated principally by their emphasis on diversity of theoretical 
variables; for example, actors, power, interests, discourses, and norms/beliefs/values. Consider this, 
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there is still a theoretical gap between IR and IL reading of the behaviour of states within the anarchic 
nature of the world politics. In order to bridge such gap between IR and IL, the need for a “joint 
discipline” has been argued by several political scientists and international lawyers.45 By exploring the 
overlap between different disciplines through institutionalist approach, a set of research agenda has 
sought to provide a meaningful interpretation of IR and IL approaches to international rules.46 Both 
political scholars and international lawyers have separately engaged in more interdisciplinary 
scholarship by looking at different paradigms of IR theories: by emphasizing on the value of “regime 
theory”, Kenneth Abbott took stock of Institutionalism for international lawyers, for instance;47 Or, 
Anne-Marie Slaughter explained Neo-Realism and Institutionalism by focusing on liberal theory;48 
Constructivism has been explored by Harold Koh and Friedrich Kratochwil.49 On the IR side, also, a 
number of political scholars have illustrated the divisions of IR theories, reviewing Realism50, exploring 
Neo-Realism against Neo-Liberalism51, criticizing Institutionalism (“arguing that institutions cannot 
prevent war by changing state behaviour”)52, clarifying Liberalism53, and proposing “new thinking” in 
each category54.  
However, Slaughter emphasised on the need to moving beyond “canonical narratives” of how the 
disciplines evolved or interacted with each other. By examining the different uses of IR theories in 
international legal research, she has sought to critically illustrate how IR theory engage in IL 
discipline.55 Her argument is basically grounded on criticism of international legal scholars who have 
been rather as passive consumers of IR theory to strengthening their own discipline, calling for “active 
theorists and problem solver in their own right”. Nevertheless, she examined some efforts of 
international legal scholars who focused on the role of legal rules to shape the political outcomes, actors 
 
45 See Abbott (n 44). 
46 See, for instance, Robert J Beck, Anthony C Arend and Robert D Vander Lugt, ‘International Rules Approaches 
from International Law and International Relations’ [1996] ; See also Robert O Keohane, ‘International 
Relations and International Law: Two Optics’ [1997] 38 Harv Int'l LJ 487. 
47 See Abbott (n 44). 
48 See Slaughter ‘A Dual Agenda’ (n 44). 
49 See Koh (n 288). 
50 See, for instance, Michael Edward Brown Sean M Lynn and Jones Steven E Miller, The Perils of Anarchy: 
Contemporary Realism and International Security (MIT Press 1995). 
51 See David Allen Baldwin, Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (Columbia University 
Press 1993). 
52 See John J Mearsheimer, ‘The False Promise of International Institutions’ [1994] 19 International security 5. 
53 Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics’ [1997] 51 
International organization 513. 
54 See Michael W Doyle, New Thinking in International Relations Theory (Routledge 2018). 
55 See Slaughter ‘A New Generation’ (n 44). 
INTRODUCTION                                                                    Anarchy and the Law of International Watercourse 
13 
 
(e.g. state behaviour) and social structures;56 though, too much focus of political scientists on structures 
and not on process is criticised by legal scholars. Moving beyond, Slaughter arguably proposed a 
“collaborative research agenda” for an alternative “joint discipline” of IR theoretical paradigms onto IL 
by mapping three integrated subfields: 1- “international governance theory”57 (e.g. Institutionalism) 2- 
Examining social construction through shared norms (e.g. Constructivism)58 and 3- liberal agency 
theory which focuses on the relationship between international and regional/national law and politics 
to better mapping state behaviour (e.g. Liberalism) (see Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2. Collaborative IR/IL Research by Slaughter, 1998 
In the same vein, Oona A Hathaway suggests “integrated” theory of IL, grounded on both political 
science and legal scholarship, in order to explain the reciprocal relationship between state behaviour 
and international treaties. Seeking to respond the widespread criticisms to failure of international 
treaties or IL in today’s crisis, she argues that there are two key factors that influence how treaties shape 
state behaviour: 1- the role of domestic (intra-national) enforcement mechanisms and 2- “the collateral 
consequences of treaty membership” (see Figure 3). Hathaway emphasises the necessity of 
understanding the political interaction between countries emerged from their decision either to commit 
or to reject treaty in order to figure out how IL influence the state behaviour.59  
 
56 While some see IL as a patient and IR as the cure, some others see IL as equally professional colleague.  
57 This is what is described by Abbott (n 44): using rationalist methodology, “it focuses on organizational features, 
functions and purposes of the structures and institutions …are situated “above” the level of the states.” 
58 How norms and discourses impact on actors, identities, interests, social structure and state behaviour (position 
vs. their interests) in international system.    
















Figure 3. “Integrated” theory of Hathaway, 2005 
Hathaway provides considerable insight into the understanding and interpretation of the relationship 
between IL and state behaviour and the questions as those concerning the nature of international law: 
What makes states comply with international law and what persuades them to commit to international 
law? Do states only obey international law if it is backed by sanctions, or do states obey legal obligations 
without any enforcement and penalty? The contradictory theoretical perspectives of the nature of 
international law generally produce two paradoxical lines of thinking; one originating from the 
“interest-based” realist view, and the other from the “norm-based” constructivist view. Hathaway 
argues that both views remain ill-equipped to understand the nature of international law within the 
political interplay between states’ relationships, “taking an all-or-nothing approach”.60 She notes that 
“it [international law] differs from domestic law in ways that affect - but not eliminate - its ability to 
influence state behaviour”.61 International law is generally characterised by its voluntary nature - states 
are not bound by legal obligation unless they accede to it - and its lack of power to impose rules. 
International law is a “horizontal legal system”, where it is assumed that all the sovereign states are on 
the same equal level. Hathaway integrates both interest-based and norm-based views to interpret the 
states’ commitment to and compliance with international treaties where she argues “[c]ommitment and 
compliance are interwoven”. 62  She finally concludes that “[i]f the integrated theory contains one 
overarching lesson, it is this: International law is neither as weak as its detractors suggest nor as strong 
as its advocates claim. It is not mere window dressing nor is its power similar to that of domestic law. 
To view international law through either lens is to see international law through a glass darkly.”63  
By focusing on the process of changes, this study seeks to engage in above effort and contribute to 
those integrated approaches of understanding the relationship between state behaviour over 
international watercourses and international legal norms within an anarchic setting. The overarching 
theoretical foundation supporting this study rests upon entwining insights from both political science 
and legal scholarship, of the kind introduced by Jutta Brunnée and Stephen J. Toope (2000) in their 
 
60 Hathaway (n 32) 487. 
61 Hathaway (n 32) 487. 
62 Hathaway (n 32) 535. 
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concept of “interactional international law”64. This general theoretical framework is used to unlock the 
puzzle of how international law, within a horizontal normative order, and a consent-based system, 
influences sovereign states’ behaviour. This framework explains how international legal norms function 
within the context of power – which is, by itself, exercised by self-interested states against one other – 
and how international legal norms shape the interests and identities of states. The overarching 
framework thus provides the means for this study to examine the relationship between anarchy, the 
ERU principle, and state behaviour – which is a by-product of its interest and identity.  
In addition to the ERU principle as a substantive customary legal norm, anarchy and power are also 
interlinked concepts central to this thesis. The hydropolitical relations of an international watercourse 
is often characterised by a struggle for power to control water resources. Anarchy is another key factor 
in shaping riparian state behaviour in the course of generating hydropolitical relations, and intensifying 
the power struggle. While the study examines hydropolitical relations through a constructivist view of 
the concept of anarchy, a neorealist perspective, where riparian states struggle for power in a highly 
competitive nature, offers a complement to this study, as examined in Chapter 2. While anarchy differs 
from the concept of hegemony, the theoretical definition of the concept of power developed by Mark 
Zeitoun and Jeroen Warner (2006) will guide this research to understand the role of power in shaping 
hydropolitical relations and its configuration within an anarchic context.65 This will, therefore, illustrate 
on the one hand, how states use the ERU principle in order to attempt to gain power in forms of 
“bargaining” or “ideational”, and on the other, how the ERU, by itself, has power to influence states’ 
interests and identity, thus their behaviour.  
The exchange between the ERU principle and anarchy within dynamic power relations is expected to 
result in a change in the hydropolitical relations. The hydropolitical history of all transboundary river 
basins shows the continuous coexistence of conflict and cooperation within the hydropolitical relations. 
Naho Mirumachi developed a conceptual approach (Transboundary Waters Interaction NexuS- 
TWINS) to elaborate the dynamics of co-existing conflict and cooperation over transboundary waters.66 
TWINS provides a comprehensive understanding of how cooperation or conflict is constructed. More 
importantly, the approach describes the changes in hydropolitical relations in a historical perspective. 
Drawing upon TWINS, this study suggests that the change of a hydropolitical relations may be towards 
the spectrum of water conflict management, conflict resolution and conflict transformation with the 
goal of promoting the implementation of the ERU principle (Figure 4). Accordingly, the study 
introduces an analytical framework based on Mirumachi’s TWINS: “the Universe of Hydropolitical 
 
64 Brunnée and Toope (n 5). 
65 Zeitoun and Warner (n 9). 
66 Naho Mirumachi and John Anthony Allan, Revisiting Transboundary Water Governance: Power, Conflict 
Cooperation and the Political Economy (2007). 
INTRODUCTION                                              Transforming hydropolitical relations under the myth of anarchy 
16 
 
Relations”. The anarchic hydropolitical relations of an international watercourse has been constructed 
within a battle of “lawfare”. Riparian states use international law as a form of soft power to legitimise 
their preferred water allocation regime. Thus, while claiming over the ERU principle to challenge their 
rival’s interests, identity and thus behaviour over shared water utilisation in their own favour, the 
riparian states also seek to legitimise their acts or at least claim that their individual developments are 
in line with this principle.  
Such complex interactions within anarchic context will result in various grades of ERU, from low to 
high quality. Low equity may simply be an agreement for physical water allocation, which sets out how 
much water flows from one country to another. Higher equity may be recognised when countries 
manage shared waters with a whole-basin view, and look at benefit-sharing options (such as 
hydropower upstream, revenue/flow regulation for agriculture/flood control downstream, and other 
possibilities), with the aim of approaching water conflict transformation. 
This study seeks to analyse how the ERU principle can be greatly involved in constructing persuasive 
discourse and generating shared understanding among the actors, and accordingly, influencing states’ 
interests and shaping individual and collective identities. This will guide this thesis to understand how 
the ERU principle contributes to providing a legal and legitimate basis for making constructive dialogue 
between riparian states, which is the starting point for decreasing or neutralising the threat of anarchy’s 
effects. 
 
Figure 4. Moving towards water conflict transformation in the Universe (equity in 
TWINS)67 
 
67 The other two axes (conflict and cooperation intensity) will be described later in Chapter 5. 




The research approach is to develop a theoretical framework to critically analyse the role of legal norms 
in anarchic hydropolitical relations and to explore it through a specific case study. The overarching 
interdisciplinary approach is adopted to synergise the insights of international law with international 
relations theory concerning the behaviour of states. In so doing, the theoretical framework of this study, 
as will be shown later, sits mainly in constructivist epistemology. Focusing on uncovering the normative 
power of legal principles, the study rests on constructivist perspective of which “systems of shared 
ideas, beliefs and values also have structural characteristics and exert a powerful influence on social 
and political action”.68However, the study benefits from applying realist and critical IR theory to 
hydropolitics to grasp the main points of the complexity of realities surrounded water politics. By 
recognising the coexistence of conflict and cooperation, the study takes both realist reading of anarchy 
and what critical hydropolitics literature represents the concept of power in hydropolitical relations.  
Such integration of different disciplines influences the methodology of the research, the strategies of 
inquiry and the ways to collect data and analyse information.69 From constructivist point of view, 
knowledge is not as an objective,70 but as a social and subjective construction, and that the realities 
reflect the shadow of the past within a historical context. 71  The methodology and data analysis, 
therefore, to study the hydropolitical relations particularly those in a highly-anarchic geopolitical 
context where the interactions may often stand in the shadows and actors may often sit behind the dark 
scenes, facts may be manipulated and data may be exposed as a fake,72 should be used with very careful 
consideration. The study conducts a qualitative critical research method arguing for context-specific 
approaches in contrast to a one-size-fits-all approach. This will help go further than simply questioning 
the centrality of law, rather, by questioning “the law, the social and even the individuals that constitute 
both institutions”.73 Given the complex nature of hydropolitical relations and in seeking to answer the 
 
68 Christian Reus-Smit, ‘Constructivism’ in Scott Burchill and others (eds), Theories of International Relations 
(Macmillan International Higher Education 2013) p. 217. 
69  Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln, The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research (3rd ed.. edn, 
Thousand Oaks : Sage Publications 2005) p. 3. 
70 Elizabeth Murphy, Constructivism: From Philosophy to Practice (ERIC 1997) p. 5. See also Audie Klotz and 
Cecelia M. Lynch, Strategies for Research in Constructivist International Relations (Cecelia Lynch ed, Armonk, 
N.Y., London : M.E. Sharpe 2014) 
71 Reus-Smit (n 68). 
72 See, for instance, Mohsen Nagheeby, ‘The Ghosts around the Coasts: Anarchy and Equity in Transboundary 
River Basins’ [2020] 2(1) The Student Journal of Professional Practice and Academic Research. 
73 Chris Dent, ‘A Law Student-Oriented Taxonomy for Research in Law 2016 Alta Conference Special Issue’ 
[2017] 48 Victoria U Wellington L Rev 371 p. 379. 
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main research question, the study will move through the research process shown in Figure 5 including 
different sub-questions in each phase: 
Main research question:  
How and to what extent does the equitable and reasonable utilisation principle (ERU) improve the 
hydropolitical relations of an international watercourse within anarchic geopolitical settings?  
Sub-question 1: What is anarchy and its impact on state behaviour? 
Sub-question 2: How do legal norms work in anarchic world politics? 
Sub-question 3: What are the theoretical underpinnings in hydropolitical relations? 
Sub-question 4: What is the ERU principle and how does it place into TWINS framework under 
anarchic nature? 
Guided by above mentioned conceptual framework, and through integrated methodology of document 
analysis, case study, discourse analysis, ethnographic investigation and participatory observation, it is 
expected that this study can grasp the complexity of the interrelationship between anarchy and the ERU 
principle (see Table 1). The main methods for answering the research questions of this study are 
extensive available document analysis in order to grasp the variety of perceptions and ambitions 
represented in the case. The document analysis is along with discourse analysis which are important to 
analyse the historical trajectory of hydropolitical relations in the Helmand River Basin. In so doing, 
international and national reports, policies and strategies, including governmental and non-
governmental, are targeted for analysis of this study. Secondary documents including a large number 
of scientific articles and books with technical, political and legal basis either in English or in Farsi 
language are also used to examine the political and legal history of relations over transboundary waters 
with the focus on the Helmand River. However, the documents should not only be the main official 
ones, but also classified documents, if available, may give an altogether richer picture of the case. In 
this study, the available de-classified secret documents including governmental letters of US are used 
to unpack the hidden agenda over case study. It is also necessary to use critical reading and validation 
methods for data collection and document analysis in such sensitive topics to provide a richer and fuller 
picture of the case study. 
To better understand the political perspectives, interests, policies and strategies of the key parties 
concerned with the basin, discourse analysis can help explain the nature of transboundary water 
interactions and power struggles among the riparian states. Discourse analysis focuses on “how specific 
identities, practices, knowledge or meanings are produced by describing something in just that way over 
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another way.74 In so doing, the study looks for different types of speech act, from a constructivist point 
of view,75 to analyse the hydropolitical relations – cooperative and conflictive interactions – in the 
Helmand River Basin. This research employs three categories of speech acts: a) assertive, through 
which something is asserted, as in “our country is experiencing a difficult situation”; b) directive, 
through which something is demanded, as in “we need more water”; and 3) commissive, through which 
something is promised, as in “I will pay my debts”.76 
Table 1. Methods employed in the research 
Main Methods Data sources Complementary Methods 
1. Document analysis 
• Peer-reviewed articles and 
books (in English and Farsi) 
• National policies and reports 
published by Afghanistan and 
Iran’s governments (in English 
and Farsi) 
• International organisation (e.g., 
UN agencies like FAO, 
UNESCO, UNDP, etc.) 
• Newspapers, media and 
websites (in English and Farsi) 
1. Ethnographic investigation 
(15 years related experience) 
2. Participatory observation 
(including 2018/19 Hydro-
Hegemony Conferences at the 
Hague and the UNECE events 
in 2019) 
2. Discourse analysis 
3. Case study 
Several media sources (e.g. TV programs, online news websites and newspapers) alongside reports and 
headlines in press releases from international, Afghan (only in Dari-Farsi and English) and Iranian (in 
Farsi and English) sources during the last decade are used to analyse the related discourses. The political 
affiliation of these sources is closely examined to critically evaluate their discourses and narratives. 
This examination was achieved by analysing the patterns of argumentation, searching for the dominant 
agenda, and studying words and phrases in political linguistic terms in order to find a paradigm that 
shapes the basin actors’ and key policy makers’ positions, interests and identities. Such discourse 
analysis of press released concerning the case is conducted along with other methods e.g., document 
analysis and informal discussion to complement the puzzle of the complex conflict. In addition, the 
study will benefit from the UN Watercourses Convention and identified factors to analyse the ERU 
principle in historical legal arrangements of the basin specifically the 1973 Helmand Treaty. The 
analysis will be complemented by the historical debate surrounding the customary international law on 
 
74 Tim Rapley, Doing Conversation, Discourse and Document Analysis, vol 7 (Sage 2018) p. 147. 
75 Nicholas Onuf, ‘Constructivism: A User’s Manual’ in Vendulka Kubálková, Paul Kowert and Nicholas Onuf 
(eds), International Relations in a Constructed World (Routledge 1998). 
76 Onuf (n 75) p. 66. 
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other cases and the practice of states, the decisions of the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) and 
opinio juris. 
At the case level – which will be explained in full details in next section – this study will benefit 
participatory observations and ethnographic investigation to provide holistic insights into people’s 
views and actions, as well as an understanding of state interests, identities and discourses. These 
methods are used as complementary to document analysis and discourse analysis as main methods. 
Participatory observations during international meetings, conferences and seminars are helpful to get a 
better sense of reality. In particular, participating at two Hydro-Hegemony Conferences at the Hague in 
2018 and 2019 in which there was one special session on the Helmand River, and the UNECE events 
in 2019 where officials from Afghanistan and Iran represented their country on transboundary waters 
help this study to complement the insights over the topic. Such observations are helpful to provide better 
understanding of the positions, interests and perspectives of the different actors. In addition, having 
over fifteen years of experience in negotiations to promote transboundary water cooperation with the 
focus on Afghanistan-Iran water relations, a practitioner-oriented approach of the author also gives a 
realistic view to the hydropolitical complexity and helps to avoid and discover errors of facts and 
judgments. All in all, growing up Iranian and speaking Farsi (which is common language between Iran 
and Afghanistan) as my mother tongue have positioned me differently than other non-Iranian or non-
Afghan researchers. This is very helpful to better understand and differentiate between behaviour, 
language, and gestures while I analyse documents and discourses. This also helps to spot errors of fact 
or interpretation in related documents. I do, however, acknowledge that such positionality impacts my 
analysis and interpretation. 
Notwithstanding this, each methodology has some limitations. In the context of transboundary waters 
of which the nature is politicises and often sensitive, the data collection and analysis of the discourses 
and observations might be subject to misunderstanding and misrepresentation. Therefore, as already 
mentioned, it must be taken into careful attention. The charge of “bias” is also common when writing 
about contentious issues in particular for those which may somehow subject to emotions. However, 
being biased in telling a story may not be a serious problem – even no one can escape from it – but 
being fair and telling the whole story matter. It must be also said at the outset that while the use of 
interviews may seem appropriate for the case study, they were not used for this research because of 
security issues in Afghanistan, and difficulties imposed by the Covid-19 pandemic. However, there 
have been a few rich field studies and interviews conducted by other researchers that this thesis benefits 
from.  




Figure 5. The research process and sub- questions 
1.6. Case study 
The case of the Helmand/Hirmand77 River Basin is used in this study to employ the developed analytical 
framework of the Universe in order to analyse the hydropolitical relations and the impacts of anarchy 
and the ERU principle. But, why is the Helmand River selected and why is it relevant to the nature of 
this study and two key conceptual components of anarchy and equity principle? Basically the Helmand 
River Basin offers a very rich example with a wide variety of different factors needed for this study: 
e.g., long struggle for change to achieve equity; anarchy is readily apparent; geopolitical rivalry; global 
security and super powers; power asymmetry; the influence of identity and shadow of the past; and 
implication of legal principles. Compared to other international watercourses like the Nile and Mekong, 
the Helmand River Basin is also relatively an extreme case which has been understudied and less 
accessible.   
At the end of the 20th century, amid a complex chaotic world, international waters in most parts of the 
earth inherited ill-suited colonial-era arrangements. Such political and legal arrangements were drawn 
 
77 In Iran this river is called the Hirmand River. 
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in ways that mostly valued imperial interests, leaving riparian states alone to align their national 
interests with ecological reality and continuous change. These arrangements – among them the 1925 
exchange of notes between Great Britain and Italy concerning Lake Tana,78 the 1929 Anglo-Egyptian 
agreement,79 the 1959 bilateral agreement between Egypt and Sudan,80 and the 1905 British McMahon 
arbitration over the Helmand River between Iran and Afghanistan,81 while making a change in the 
hydropolitical relations in favour of some actors, reflected in fact an inequitable sharing of the waters 
in question. Within post-colonial era, international water basins across the world are already beginning 
to feel the effects of changes within international anarchic system – from different aspects of socio-
economic, political and climatic kinds – appeared in their respective policies, interests, identities and 
discourses of riparian states. Within the 21st century, the changes in the hydropolitical relations have 
been continuing all around the world, such as in evolution of international water and respective 
institutions at the global level, or in the Nile, the Euphrates and Tigris, the Aral Sea Basin, the Mekong 
and so on at the regional level.  
The complex struggle to achieve equity when faced with anarchy is readily apparent in the Helmand 
River Basin. The Helmand River is divided by political borders, with asymmetric and interdependent 
socio-economic relations between the riparian states, and affected by anarchic nature and geopolitical 
tensions in the region. Taking a wider perspective extending beyond water issues, Afghanistan is 
historically a classic example of development and conflict within international and regional geopolitical 
competitions.82 Afghanistan has been a buffer state for superpowers with security interests in the region 
during both colonial and post-colonial periods. The geopolitical competition for security in Afghanistan 
has been referred to as the “Great Game”, or the strategic rivalry and confrontation between 
superpowers, namely the British and Russian Empires and later the US versus the Soviet Union, as well 
as regional powers like India and Pakistan.  
The Helmand River is the only fresh water resources for the population in both Nimrooz province in 
the southwest of Afghanistan and Sistan region in the southeast of Iran, and is the only river of 
 
78 The agreement states “...Italy recognizes the prior hydraulic rights of Egypt and the Sudan... not to construct on 
the head waters of the Blue Nile and the White Nile”; the agreement that Ethiopia opposed. 
79 Agreement (1929) Exchange of Notes Regarding the Use of Waters of the Nile for Irrigation Purposes between 
Egypt and the United Kingdom [also called 1929 Nile Water Agreement]. Signed at Cairo, Egypt 7 May 1929. 
80 Agreement (1959) Agreement between the Republic of the Sudan and the United Arab Republic for the Full 
Utilisation of the Nile Waters. Signed at Cairo, Egypt 8 November 1959. [Online]. Available from: 
http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/documents/regionaldocs/uar_sudan.html [Accessed 12 Jan. 2021]. 
81  McMahon Arbitration Award (1905) concerning the question of rights to land and water of Persia and 
Afghanistan. Available from: https://jusmundi.com/en/document/decision/en-helmand-river-cases-award-of-
arbitrator-mcmahon-monday-10th-april-1905. See also Pirouz Mojtahed-Zadeh, The Small Players of the Great 
Game: The Settlement of Iran's Eastern Borderlands and the Creation of Afghanistan (Routledge 2004). 
82 Nick Cullather, From New Deal to New Frontier in Afghanistan: Modernization in a Buffer State (The Cold 
War as Global Conflict, International Center for Advanced Studies, New York University 2002). 
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Afghanistan among the others that has a bilateral treaty.83 Both states therefore depend heavily on the 
river for domestic water supply and agricultural irrigation (See photos in Figure 6 to get a little sense 
of the environment). In addition, the Helmand River is a critical resource for sustaining the 
transboundary Hamoun wetlands, which from an environmental perspective, are the most important 
parts of the river delta. The situation in the Hamoun wetlands is compared to the degradation of the 
Aral Sea.84  While no joint fact-finding studies exist, several natural and human-made factors are 
considered to influence this tragic environmental issue. 85  Afghanistan as a late developer country 
focuses on unilateral water development as strategic policy to overcome political and socio-economic 
failures. In addition to already constructed dams in upper Helmand River Basin (Kajaki Dam (1700 
MCM) on the Helmand River and Dahla Dam (478.6 MCM) on Arghandab tributary), Afghanistan’s 
development projects to build dams (Kamal Khan Dam on the Helmand River and the Bakhshabad Dam 
on the Farah River) and expand irrigation areas cause sever concern in downstream, Iran. Iran has also 
developed several projects like Chahnimeh reservoirs (1.5 MCM) to manage water resources in order 
to response its drinking (including out-of-basin water transfer to Zahedan) and irrigation water demand, 
and to control flood. Iran’s Sistan is totally dependent to water resources from the Helmand River. 
Considering anarchic situation in Afghanistan, Iran while recognising and supporting Afghanistan’s 
right to development is seriously worried about such unilateral and non-cooperative behaviour. This 
has been making historical disputes between two states associated with outside basin political factors 
within the context of the Great Game. Therefore, finding an equitable solution for the disputes between 
the upstream need of economic recovery and downstream demand for drinking, irrigation and ecological 
purpose is a problematic issue, especially when it faces with the complexity of regional geopolitical 
anarchy. Dealing with such complexity is becoming more difficult since the water is very sensitive 
issues in Afghanistan and the elite seeks to make water development as a mean to rebuild their national 
identity. Such way of “securitisation” in Afghanistan makes cooperation over water a taboo subject, 
 
83 There are mainly two rivers that flow from Afghanistan into Iran: the Helmand River and the Hariroud River. 
The 1973 Helmand River Water Treaty is the only agreement that Afghanistan has signed over all of its 
transboundary rivers which mainly flow into Central Asia, Iran and Pakistan. Almost all of these rivers are 
subject to a dispute due to unilateral dam projects in Afghanistan. However, the Helmand has the longest history 
of controversy, more blended with the geopolitical complexity of the region. 
84 See, for instance, Matthew King and Benjamin Sturtewagen, Making the Most of Afghanistan’s River Basins: 
Opportunities for Regional Cooperation (The EastWest Institute 2010). 
85 King and Sturtewagen (n 84). See also Z. Vekerdy and others, History of Environmental Change in the Sistan 
Basin : Based on Satellite Image Analysis: 1976-2005 (United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) 
2006); and, Rasoul Kharazmi and others, ‘Monitoring and Assessment of Seasonal Land Cover Changes Using 
Remote Sensing: A 30-Year (1987-2016) Case Study of Hamoun Wetland, Iran’ [2018] 190 Environ Monit 
Assess Environmental Monitoring and Assessment : An International Journal Devoted to Progress in the Use of 
Monitoring Data in Assessing Environmental Risks to Man and the Environment 1; Alireza Najafi and Jabbar 
Vatanfada, ‘Environmental Challenges in Trans-Boundary Waters, Case Study: Hamoon Hirmand Wetland 
(Iran and Afghanistan)’ [2011] 1(1) International Journal of Water Resources and Arid Environments 16; Eelco 
van Beek and others, ‘Limits to Agricultural Growth in the Sistan Closed Inland Delta, Iran’ [2008] 22 Irrigation 
and drainage systems 131. 
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creating many misunderstandings in both sides of the river either in times of flood or drought. Moreover, 
the river basin suffers a lot from a lack of trust, shared understandings and a line of constructive 
communication to reflect interests and more importantly the inequity and pains that people of both sides 
tolerate. Bound by mutual distrust and frustration, Afghanistan and Iran can do little but argue, which 
in turn, only causes an accumulation of widespread misunderstandings and the feelings of hate. 
 
Helmand River at the border (water flowing from Afghanistan (left) to Iran (right)) (photo taken by 
the author in 2017) 
 
Western Army crrossing the river in Afghanistan 
(photo by the US Army in Flickr, 2009) 
 
A vast opium poppy field in upstream, 
Helmand, Afghanistan (photo published by UN 
News, 2014) 
 
A farmer and drought in Helmand River (photo 
taken by the author in 2017) 
 
People caught in flood (photo published in 
Mehr News Agency in 2019) 




Dredging the chanals: local communities enact 
collective effort to mitigate flood and drought 
risks. High local resilience and social cohesion in 
times of disaster surrounding Helmand/Hirmand 
River (photo published by Tasnim News in 2014) 
 
People waiting long hours to have safe 
drinking water in Zarang-Nimrooz, 
Afghanistan (photo published in Tasnim News 
in 2016) 
 
Children around Hamoun Wetlands asking for 
international support (photo published by UNDP, 
2015) 
 
Hamoun Wetlands (photo published by 
AftabNews) 




Helmand River: the gunners view from a military helicopter as it flies over the Helmand River in 
Afghanistan (Copyright © 2019 Christian Als) 
Figure 6. Photos of the Helmand/Hirmand River 
Despite significant swings in the political regime of the region, and while the existing treaty and the 
Helmand River Commission provide a basis for bilateral cooperation, the story of the Helmand River 
Basin has remained largely unchanged since the mid-nineteenth century – with one country blaming 
the other for not respecting the treaty and consequently that country’s “water rights”. The Helmand 
River offers a classic example of the challenges faced when attempting to foster transboundary water 
cooperation. The dispute may indeed reflect conflicting views over the river’s political and legal regime, 
and differing views on the utilisation of shared waters between the riparian states. However, water 
disputes over the Helmand might more accurately reflect the anarchic symptoms within the basin, and 
in particular the geopolitical intervention of outsiders in Afghanistan. The persistence of disputes over 
the Helmand waters between Iran and Afghanistan is arguably for the most part influenced by 
geopolitical factors in the region and the anarchic setting of Afghanistan. This anarchic setting is a 
by-product of or combined with protracted foreign intervention and military occupation of outside-basin 
actors. Anarchy has produced a fear among riparian states that their fellow states will make relative 
gains, and this study examines how international water law can function against such symptoms of 
anarchy. Closely examining the normative role of the ERU principle in shaping riparian states’ interests 
and identities, and hence their behaviour, within the geopolitically anarchic nature of the Helmand River 
provides a more comprehensive approach to illustrating the complex interactions between international 
law and politics. It is expected that the theoretical analysis over the role of the ERU principle within 
this highly securitised basin could improve the understanding of the nature of the problem over the 
Helmand River for policymakers. 
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1.7. Outline of the thesis 
Structurally, the thesis is divided into seven chapters. Following this introduction, Chapter 2 discusses 
one of the main concepts employed in the thesis, i.e., anarchy. The chapter explains the interpretation 
of anarchy from different IR theories. By exploring how anarchy and the dominant nature of struggling 
for power shape state behaviour over international waters, this chapter identifies the challenges and 
obstacles for water conflict transformation emanating from anarchic nature. While anarchy has been 
one of the fundamental concepts of international relations theory and international law scholarship, it 
has yet received particular attention in debates surrounding international watercourses and its influence 
on legal discourse.   
Chapter 3 presents the overarching interdisciplinary theoretical framework. By bridging two disciplines 
of international law and international relations, this chapter provides a particular perspective, or lens, 
through which to examine the research question of the study. In so doing, this Chapter first, presents 
the different theoretical understandings of the linkage between international law and international 
relations, by way of various international relations disciplines. This chapter, therefore, elaborates how 
international law influences state behaviour and influences political relations within an anarchic 
context. This chapter introduces the framework of interactional international law by which the study 
seeks to analyse the effectiveness of the ERU principle within anarchic context. This will provide the 
study a theoretical platform to understand how legal norms can influence states’ behaviour.  
After presenting the overarching framework, Chapter 4 introduces the main theoretical underpinnings 
of this study for analysing hydropolitical relations. Building upon the existing critical hydropolitical 
literature, this chapter will emphasise the necessity of special attention to the concepts of equity and 
identity in hydropolitical studies. This part will provide basic theories for understanding the role of 
international water law under complex and dynamic hydropolitical processes. 
Chapter 5 presents the definition and the methods to identify the ERU principle. In addition, this chapter 
provides analytical insights to situate the ERU principle into the framework of TWINS. This part 
contributes to the analysis of operating the ERU principle as bargaining and ideational power in a basin 
context. Drawing upon the theoretical foundation, Chapter 5 will develop and introduce a conceptual 
framework, the Universe of Hydropolitical Relations, for critical analysis and assessment of the 
influence of the ERU principle on transforming hydropolitical relations. This part will define different 
degrees of equity, from low to high, and illustrates how each degree may be understood in a specific 
political and legal context. This chapter will also show how from a constructivist point of view various 
levels of hydropolitical relations are placed in different cultures of anarchy. Considering anarchy’s 
symptoms from a neorealist perspective, and how they are an impedimental to an equitable and 
sustainable cooperation over shared water utilisation, Chapter 5 also elucidates the normative power of 
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the ERU principle to relieve anarchy’s symptoms and thereby move hydropolitical relations towards 
water conflict transformation.  
Chapter 6 analyses the case study. Through an historical perspective the chapter examines the nexus 
between the ERU principle, anarchy and state behaviour within a hydropolitical relations, and its legal 
underpinnings, through the Helmand River Basin. Anarchy is one of the primary elements 
overshadowing all features of Afghanistan where the main area of the river flows. It is therefore 
worthwhile to examine the role of international water law and explore how it can alleviate the symptoms 
of anarchy and lead the hydropolitical relations towards conflict transformation and equity.  
Finally, Chapter 7 draws an overall conclusion in order to stress that international water law can be a 
powerful asset not only for managing tensions and peace-building, but also for promoting an effective 
hydropolitical relations. Furthermore, this concluding chapter points towards the future prospects of 
international water law in achieving conflict transformation, by proposing a research agenda for the 
epistemic community.  
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Chapter 2. Anarchy and the behaviour of states in world politics 
2.1. Introduction 
The main research question of this study is: “How and to what extent does the equitable and reasonable 
utilisation principle (ERU) improve the hydropolitical relations of an international watercourse within 
anarchic geopolitical settings?”. There is an initial need, therefore, to define “anarchic geopolitical 
settings” as employed in this study, and explore its impact on state behaviour and hydropolitical 
relations: What are the key features of anarchic geopolitical settings? What are the effects of anarchy 
on state behaviour? Who and what shapes hydropolitical relations where riparian states struggle with 
anarchic geopolitical tensions? While in some cases, strong potential from interdependency and broad 
cultural, socioeconomic, and political commonalities and rich social capital between riparian states exist 
(e.g. Iran-Afghanistan), why do states become mired in disputes over transboundary waters? To what 
extent do riparian states have the ability to reach an equitable solution in anarchic situations? Is equity 
attainable where conflict has deep social and political roots (e.g. Palestine-Israel), and if so, what type 
of equitable solution might riparian states hope to achieve? While there is a dearth of critical studies in 
hydropolitical literatures that consider the influence of anarchy on state behaviour,86 the purpose of this 
chapter is to critically examine the role of anarchy and geopolitical interventions in shaping 
hydropolitical relations concerning an international watercourse. The study thus acknowledges that 
context matters in understanding the processes, outcomes and the overarching nature of the interactions 
between states in shaping their hydropolitical relations.87 This follows by this argument that anarchy 
matters. The study, therefore, will involve an analysis of the impacts and causes of anarchy in the 
context of cooperation and conflict over international watercourses. 
While many different branches of international relations theory can shed light on certain parts of the 
dynamic complexity of hydropolitical relations, this section of the study builds on a neorealist and 
constructivist reading of the concept of anarchy to examine when, how, and why riparian states’ habits 
of rational self-interest are placed above the good of the whole, and, more importantly, for what 
purpose? In particular, this chapter seeks to explore under what conditions riparian states may act 
strategically in their own self-interest respecting transboundary waters. While “mainstream” 
hydropolitics literature has mainly endorsed a conflict-cooperation dichotomy and underestimated the 
role of power in shaping hydropolitical relations, recent “critical” hydropolitics literature has 
 
86  See Jeroen Warner and Neda Zawahri, ‘Hegemony and Asymmetry: Multiple-Chessboard Games on 
Transboundary Rivers’ [2012] 12 Int Environ Agreements International Environmental Agreements: Politics, 
Law and Economics 215; and Shlomi Dinar, ‘Water, Security, Conflict, and Cooperation’ [2002] 22 Sais 
Review.  
87 See also Zeitoun ‘Transboundary Water Justice’ (n 20); and, Hussam Hussein and Mattia Grandi, ‘Contexts 
Matter: A Hydropolitical Analysis of Blue Nile and Yarmouk River Basins’ [2015]  Social water studies in the 
Arab Region. 
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demonstrated how riparian states pursue a particular strategy to maintain or challenge the status quo 
within asymmetric power relations and hegemonic dynamics.88 Given that power is a major determinant 
of the behaviour of states concerning hydropolitical relations, however, and in addition, a part of this 
study, grounded on a neorealist perspective, argues that the anarchic structure of international systems 
should also be taken into account as a key driver in shaping state behaviour. Consequently, this study, 
rather and in particular, examines why the behaviour of riparian states in some transboundary river 
basins often moves into struggles for power, security, and survival, and how state behaviour is shaped 
under anarchy. In doing so, the study analyses the circumstances that lead hydropolitical relations to an 
intense competition and mutual distrust that create significant obstacles to equitable and sustainable 
cooperation. 
The circumstances in transboundary river basins also play out across different scales – international, 
regional, and domestic; and there are competing and overlapping networks of actors attempting to 
influence the outcomes of hydropolitical relations. Resultantly, this study argues that riparian states’ 
political conduct should be understood at the crossroads of international anarchy and geopolitical 
circumstances at the basin level, and in the light of existing political forces inside the states, particularly 
in the case of fragile, vulnerable, and failing states such as Afghanistan. Anarchy can be understood at 
an international level, which may be associated with regional geopolitical instability created by the 
intervention of “outside-of-basin” actors. Moreover, in some cases, the political divide inside one 
riparian state may not only weaken the state in question, but also result in anarchy and chaos in all 
diplomatic efforts at a basin level. A deeper understanding of these underlying circumstances is 
necessary to analyse why riparian states get bogged down in disputes without any positive change in 
their hydropolitical relations, which are often embedded in a highly politicised environment. The highly 
politicised situation of an international watercourse can be analysed through the notion of 
“hydropolitical security complex”. Michael Schulz introduced this notion as “a set of states that are 
geographically part owners and technical users of a water body, and that consider that water body to be 
a major national security issue”.89 Given the hydropolitical security complex and the circumstances at 
different above-mentioned scales, this study, then, seeks to understand how such an environment is 
produced and whom do such situations favour. Ultimately, the study will explore how the ERU principle 
influences such political nature of transboundary river basins. 
The arrangement of this chapter is as follows. In the first part (Section 2.2), neorealist assumptions are 
delineated, after which the meaning of anarchy for the purposes of this study is constructed. This is 
 
88 Zeitoun and Warner (n 9). See also Mark Zeitoun and Naho Mirumachi, ‘Transboundary Water Interaction I: 
Reconsidering Conflict and Cooperation’ [2008] 8 Int Environ Agreements International Environmental 
Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 297. 
89 See Schulz (n 43). 
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followed by an examination of the consequences of an anarchic setting for the conduct of states. This 
section will therefore critically evaluate neorealist “self-help” reading to better understand state 
behaviour and hydropolitical relations that are partly oriented by the anarchic structure of the basin. 
This kind of mostly imposed anarchic structure, it is argued, creates serious obstacles to equity between 
riparian states. Then, in addition to this neorealist lens, constructivist reading of the concept of anarchy 
will be presented in order to capture different circumstances surrounding international watercourses and 
offer the possibility of transformation in hydropolitical relations. Next, the nature and scale of this 
study’s analysis are described, and the relationship between international anarchy, regional geopolitics, 
and domestic anarchy is explained. This leads to a consideration of the function of anarchy within 
hydropolitical relations. This chapter will therefore not only provide a basic platform to analyse the 
behaviour of riparian states respecting international watercourses in highly anarchic geopolitical 
settings, but also illustrate the obstacles with which riparian states are confronted when attempting to 
adopt equitable legal principles within such settings. 
2.2. Making sense of state behaviour under the shadow of anarchy: unravelling the fears 
In exploring the “circumstances” that shape riparian state behaviour within hydropolitical relations, 
while considering the asymmetric power relations between actors, this study argues that one of the main 
driving forces of riparian states’ behaviour, within an often “highly charged” political environment, is 
the anarchic nature of the basin. This anarchic setting, which is often a by-product of or combined with 
protracted foreign intervention of outside-basin actors, results in geopolitical competition for security. 
Within such circumstances, transboundary river basins get embroiled into wider strategic conflicts 
where water may become a bargaining chip to achieve broader security interests of foreign 
interventions. Consequently, this anarchic setting presses riparian states into a struggle for survival 
during negotiations over transboundary waters, which are essentially imbued with power-seeking, 
driven by self-interest, heated by the fears of cheating and relative gains, and weakened by uncertainties. 
In such an externally imposed anarchic environment, the strategic foreign policies of outsiders which 
give preference to protecting their own interests potentially destroy constructive cooperation between 
the riparian states and, indeed, potentially damage the rich regional and local social norms and identities 
of the riparian states. 90  Therefore, understanding riparian states’ behavioural choices necessitates 
situating their hydropolitical relations at the crossroads of anarchy, both internationally and within the 
state, and in geopolitical overlay at the basin level. Such politicised anarchic circumstances and their 
constraints rationalise riparian states’ behaviour concerning transboundary waters. 
 
90 Nagheeby (n 72). 
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Anarchy is one of the fundamental concepts of IR theory and IL scholarship,91 and is an idea central to 
this study. Like many IR concepts, anarchy is perceived differently in the eyes of various IR disciplines. 
The distinctions rest firstly on how each approach views the anarchic nature (structure) of international 
politics, and secondly on how they perceive anarchy’s influence on the behaviour of states. In this part, 
the study wears neorealist glasses in order to shed light on the impediments to progress hydropolitical 
relations. From a neorealist perspective, anarchy naturally makes states fearful, as it creates unease and 
a feeling that something harmful will or might happen. Such fear may paralyse the cooperative 
behaviour of states, as neorealists argue, or, in opposition to neorealist thought, may be a driving force 
behind preparedness and the promotion of cooperation, as liberal institutionalists contend; or it may be 
just a social construction created through the actions of states, as constructivists mmaintain. 92 
Neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists assume that anarchy is simply a feature of the international 
system, irrespective of state actions. Neorealists believe that this pushes states in conflict; neoliberals 
believe that it pushes states into cooperation. In contrast, constructivists believe that anarchy is not a 
natural feature that exists as an objective truth, but that anarchy is created through the actions of states. 
Thus, while states create anarchy, they can also create non-anarchy (e.g. global governance institutions). 
The highly politicised transboundary river basins, for instance in Africa, Middle East and South Asia, 
which are characterised by hydropolitical security complex have often seen decades, if not centuries, of 
foreign invasions and other forms of outside interventions; inter-state disputes among the basin states; 
weak – if any – regional institutional frameworks that could manage conflict and guide hydropolitical 
relations towards equitable and sustainable cooperation; national elites that jockey for power where 
domestic political dynamics spill over into regional politics; and all this – or some of this – has an 
impact on the behaviour of states concerning transboundary water resources. The neorealist perspective, 
as argued here, offers a comparatively intelligible and explicit description of such a state of affairs in 
which states are confronted with constant uncertainties, and can thus suit the analysis of a highly 
anarchic geopolitical setting. Therefore, in the context of international watercourses, the rivalry among 
riparian states, the competition over natural resources, and the intervention of external powers for their 
own geopolitical interests, might be better explained through the theoretical premises of neorealism. 
The neorealist theory deployed in this study will reveal that how anarchy is the main explanatory factor 
of the hydropolitical relations in the Helmand River Basin. This neorealist interpretation of the impact 
 
91 There has been a tendency in international relations theory to consider anarchy as the cardinal organising 
category and the fundamental basis of international politics. See more in Helen Milner, ‘The Assumption of 
Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A Critique’ [1991] 17 Rev Int Stud Review of International Studies 
67. See also Seifudein Adem, Anarchy, Order and Power in World Politics a Comparative Analysis (Routledge 
2019).  
92 Milner (n 91). 
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of anarchy on state behaviour is therefore used in this study for testing the conditions of the Helmand 
River Basin, and challenged later when considering the influence of legal norms.  
2.2.1. The assumptions of neorealism in international relations theory 
Neorealists not only focus on explaining the behaviour of states within international politics, but also 
have a vision of world politics and predict the international-political outcomes of the interaction 
between states and the “international system”.93 Thus, in addition to explaining the behaviour of states 
(units), neorealists seek to find an answer to this question: “What is it that intervenes between interacting 
units and the results that their acts and interactions produce?”94 This study uses neorealist thought to 
examine and analyse merely the multi-causal behaviour of states relating to international watercourses 
in highly politicised anarchic settings. The outcome of hydropolitical relations, arguably, is context-
dependent influenced by the Westphalian anarchic structure (where neorealist can better illustrate it) 
while socially constructed in time influenced by the “shadow of the past” and “shadow of the future” 
(where constructivist can better capture it). Therefore, as already mentioned, the study does not argue 
which of these IR perspectives is the “truer”, but it aims to offer a combined reading of two above 
mentioned perspectives to provide a fuller picture of the anarchic geopolitical complexity surrounded 
hydropolitical relations. 
Neorealists offer a “systematic” explanation of international politics. The main issue for neorealists is 
discovering why states in international arena often display similar patterns of behaviour while they 
differ in their political, social, economic, and ideological views. This similarity in behavioural patterns 
is also manifested in the behaviour of most riparian states sharing international watercourses – who can 
be simply classified as upstreamers and downstreamers – and the historical trend within strategic 
hydropolitical relations. For neorealists, systems theory can provide an answer: “Systems theories 
explain why different units behave similarly and, despite their variations, produce outcomes that fall 
within expected ranges”. 95  Neorealists argue that this similarity must arise out of a systemic 
understanding of international politics: “A system is composed of a structure and of interacting units. 
The structure is the system-wide component that makes it possible to think of the system as a whole”.96 
Within this systemic theory, some part of the explanation for behaviours and outcomes is found in the 
structure of the system. As long as the political structure endures, it produces a similarity in process and 
 
93  For extensive discussions see Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York, London: 
McGraw-Hill 1979); and, Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations : The Struggle for Power and Peace 
(Kenneth W. Thompson and W. David Clinton eds, 7th ed. / revised by Kenneth W. Thompson and W. David 
Clinton.. edn, Boston : McGraw-Hill Higher Education 2006); John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great 
Power Politics (Updated edition.. edn, New York : W.W. Norton & Company 2014). 
94 Waltz (n 93) p. 79. 
95 Waltz (n 93) p. 72. 
96 Waltz (n 93) p. 79. 
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performance. Thus, similar structures cause similar effects. However, “similarity is not uniformity. 
Structure operates as a cause, but it is not the only cause in play”.97 In this regard, Joseph Grieco 
summarises the neorealist assumptions as follows. 98  The first assumption in neorealism is that 
international politics should be seen as part of an “international system” in which its structure is defined 
by “anarchy”. This anarchic structure, neorealists argue, manipulates all other features of international 
relations, e.g. the behaviour of states and the outcomes of this behaviour. International anarchy is the 
principal driver of states’ motives and positions, and confronting power and security issues impels states 
towards conflict and competition due to self-interest, rather than cooperation for common interests. 
Anarchy, being essential to the international structure, is therefore a condition for the possibility of, or 
a permissive cause of, war, pushing units (states) to rely on “self-help”. 
The second assumption is that states are rational and are the major actors in the international system as 
sovereign entities, autonomous of each other; and because of the anarchic setting, no other structure or 
society can order relations between them or bind them unless by coercion or their own consent. Third, 
power is the key and only variable of states’ interests. Only through distribution of the material capacity 
of power can states defend themselves and survive the anarchic setting. 
The fourth assumption concerns the neorealist vision of world politics. Neorealists argue that anarchy 
and the principal goal of survival lead states to compete for power and advance the material interests 
necessary for their survival. The world, in this sense, is dangerous and especially uncertain, and so from 
this position, two approaches are predicted by neorealism. Kenneth Waltz argues that “the balance of 
power” is the key to maintaining peace and stability (defensive realist).99 In contrast, John Mearsheimer 
contends that, in order to guarantee survival amid anarchy, states seek to maximise their relative power 
and become the strongest – that is, a “hegemon”100 – which per se is the best strategy for a country to 
pursue (offensive realist).101 In an environment with no hierarchical authority in place, neorealists argue 
that law and institutions can only be enforced through state power.102 This particular argument will be 
contemplated in the next chapter of this thesis. Considering the above-mentioned assumptions, and in 
 
97 Waltz (n 93) p. 87. 
98 Joseph M. Grieco, ‘Realist Theory and the Problem of International Cooperation: Analysis with an Amended 
Prisoner's Dilemma Model’ [1988] 50 The Journal of politics 600. 
99 Waltz (n 93). 
100 For neorealism a hegemon is defined “as a state that is so powerful that it dominates all the other states in the 
system”. See Peter Toft, ‘John J. Mearsheimer: An Offensive Realist between Geopolitics and Power’ [2005] 8 
Journal of International Relations and Development 381. 
101 Toft (n 100). 
102 Waltz (n 93). 
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order to discuss the neorealist perspective on state behaviour amid anarchy, the next section will define 
what anarchy means in this study. 
2.2.2. What is anarchy from neorealist perspective? 
Since Waltz’s seminal work on neorealism, Theory of International Politics (1979),103 the discipline of 
international relations has been associated with the concept of anarchy.104 Almost all IR disciplines, 
even those which challenge his interpretation of its symptoms, assert that the international system is 
anarchic.105 Waltz introduces anarchy as the structure of the international system.106 He argues that this 
structure manipulates all other aspects of international relations, in particular the behaviour of states 
respecting cooperation.107 Similarly, for Robert Art and Robert Jervis, “anarchy is the fundamental fact 
of international relations”, and international politics must be understood by comprehending this 
“fact”.108 Also, Robert Gilpin understood international relations as “a recurring struggle for wealth and 
power among independent actors in a state of anarchy”. 109  First among the characteristics of the 
international system in John Mearsheimer’s study of international politics is anarchy.110 Neorealism, 
then, presents a pessimistic analysis of the prospects for international cooperation among states in 
anarchic settings. But what does anarchy mean in neorealist schools of thought, and what definition is 
 
103 Waltz (n 93). 
104 Silviya Lechner, ‘Why Anarchy Still Matters for International Relations: On Theories and Things’ [2017] 13 
Journal of international political theory 341. 
105 For all IR disciplines – albeit less so for critical scholars – anarchy is taken to be the central criteria of 
international politics. For neoliberals, like Robert Keohane in After Hegemony, anarchy is also the fundamental 
fact of international politics, though they offer an optimistic vision of how cooperation may take place among 
anarchy. Robert Axelrod, for example, in The Evolution of Cooperation seeks to answer the question, “under 
what conditions will cooperation emerge in a world of egoists without central authority?” His analysis is shaped 
by the assumption that anarchy is the essential criteria of international politics, since “today nations interact 
without central authority”. Similarly, Kenneth Oye’s edited volume, Cooperation Under Anarchy views anarchy 
as the central condition of world politics, and he proceeds to explain what factors make cooperation possible. 
For constructivists, anarchy is a way of implementing ideas within the mutually constituted identities of states. 
They argue that this implication – not anarchy itself – should be the object of analysis of international relations, 
since “anarchy is what states make of it” through social interactions. Critical theorists of IR, contrastingly, focus 
on the role of structures such as capitalism and statism, which impose a particular social order in anarchic 
settings. For critical strands of international relations theory, these capitalist and state group structures, rather 
than anarchy per se, produce a superordinate social class over subordinate classes in the interests of the informal 
hierarchy (i.e., hegemony).  
See Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony : Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton 
: Guildford : Princeton University Press 1984); Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (London : 
Penguin 1990) pp. 3-4; Kenneth A. Oye, Cooperation under Anarchy (Princeton University Press 1986)  
106 Waltz (n 93) p. 88. 
107 Waltz (n 93). 
108 In Milner (n 91) p. 68. 
109 In Milner (n 91) p. 68. 
110 Mearsheimer (n 93). 
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used in this thesis to best reflect the predominant nature of international watercourses and in particular 
the case under study, the Helmand River Basin?  
Chaos and lack of order are not what IR scholars mean by the anarchic nature of the international 
system. For instance, from the English School of IR– different to neorealism, the international system 
is an “anarchic society”111 associated with international order, which includes a pattern of activity 
implying a common framework of rules and institutions regulating international practices,112 such as 
international law, diplomacy and sovereignty. In this sense, order is not what the international system 
lacks, since a set of patterned behaviour exists to promote various goals and norms. However, in some 
cases involving high geopolitical rivalry, e.g. Afghanistan, it might be an anarchic setting with a clash 
of orders, which forms a buffer zone between competing powers.113 For neorealists such as Robert 
Gilpin, the argument is that “the relationships among states have a high degree of order and that 
although the international system is one of anarchy (i.e., absence of formal governmental authority), the 
system does exercise an element of control over the behaviour of states”.114 In neorealist thought, the 
distribution of power among states creates the means for producing order in international politics – i.e. 
regularised, predictable patterns of behaviour.115 Here, power is used to create a structure within which 
the international system is organised. This distribution of power gives order to the system, which might 
be the formation of either balances of power as Waltz understands or inequalities in power as Robert 
W. Tucker emphasises.116 Thus, anarchy in international relations theory does not mean a lack of order 
in the international system. 
The nature of world politics being anarchic has two parallel meanings in international relations theory: 
the lack of an overarching power, such as a world government, in the international system;117 and a 
horizontal relationship between nominally equal sovereign states to be distinguished from a hierarchical 
ordering of subordinate and superordinate units.118 This first definition of anarchy – the absence of 
 
111 In Lechner ‘Why Anarchy Still Matters’ (n 104) p. 344, 348: “Bull’s theory … contains other basic concepts 
such as ‘society’, ‘system’, ‘order’, ‘institutions’ and ‘rules’ as well as statements that interlink such concepts 
(e.g. that even under anarchy, states recognise as binding common rules and institutions in their mutual dealings) 
… Bull’s normatively laden talk of society may appear to clash with Waltz’s scientific vocabulary of 
falsification, general laws and explanation, but both theorists are of one mind in viewing anarchy as the 
differentiating tenet of the international system (Waltz) or international society (Bull).” 
112 Milner (n 91). 
113 See in this respect, Rein Müllerson, Dawn of a New Order: Geopolitics and the Clash of Ideologies (2017). 
114 In Milner (n 91) p. 70. 
115 In Milner (n 91). 
116 In Milner (n 91) p. 70: “Robert W. Tucker … sees power differentials among Northern and Southern states 
creating a hierarchy of relations that make for an orderly system.” 
117 Lechner Why Anarchy Still Matters (n 104); Milner (n 91) pp. 69-70. 
118 Lechner ‘Why Anarchy Still Matters’ (n 104). 
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central government – derives from the concept of a “state of nature” developed by Thomas Hobbes 
in The Elements of Law (1640).119 The state of nature is a hypothetical condition of “statelessness”.120 
With regard to the first of the aforementioned definitions, Robert Art and Robert Jervis provide an 
explanation for the anarchic surroundings of international politics: 
No agency exists above individual states with authority and power to make laws and settle 
disputes. States can make commitment and treaties, but no sovereign power ensures 
compliances and punishes deviations. This – the absence of a supreme power – is what is 
meant by the anarchic environment of international politics.121 
Compared to domestic politics, which is structured as a hierarchy, international politics lack a formal 
world or common government:122 
Formally, each [state] is the equal of all the others. None is entitled to command; none is 
required to obey. International systems are decentralised and anarchic. The ordering 
principles of the two structures are distinctively different, indeed contrary to each other. 
Domestic political structures have governmental institutions and offices as their concrete 
counterparts. International politics, in contrast, has been called “politics in the absence of 
government”.123 
Thus, anarchy in its first definition signifies that there is no legitimate overriding authority higher than 
states. Here, authority or government, as Waltz argues, is associated with the means used to organise 
how and when force can be employed.124 While lack of government may mean the absence of law and 
a judiciary to enforce it, here it is accompanied by “the absence of a central authority to enforce states’ 
adherence to promises or agreements”. 125  Thus, the first definition relates anarchy to a lack of 
hierarchical rule enforcement. Hobbes’s international state of nature is the prevalent analogue of 
international anarchy today.126  The second definition, which is compatible with the first, presents 
anarchy as an international order. Anarchy, in this sense conceptually linked to sovereignty, is the 
ordering principle of international relations that defines the correspondences between sovereign states. 
 
119 Lechner ‘Why Anarchy Still Matters’ (n 104). 
120 Silviya Lechner, Anarchy in International Relations (Oxford University Press 2017) p. 2. 
121 In Robert Powell, ‘Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate’ [1994] 48 
International organization 313 p 330. 
122 Milner (n 91). 
123 Waltz (n 93) p. 88. 
124 Milner (n 91). 
125 Milner (n 91) p. 71. 
126 Lechner Anarchy in International Relations (n 120) 
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Once a state becomes sovereign internally as the highest authority in a realm, then, in this second 
definition of anarchy, its external relations to other states rest on “sovereign equality”.127 Under the 
Westphalian model of social organisation,128 states have complete sovereignty within an anarchical 
political order. 
Both definitions fit in with this interdisciplinary study of international relations and international law, 
since the former definition is deployed in a neorealist reading of anarchy’s effects on states behaviour, 
and the latter is, though subject to power relations, intrinsic to international law. 129  Within the 
definitions mentioned, anarchy itself is not a bad or good phenomenon; it might be an opportunity or 
threat to improve cooperation. The implication and outcome of anarchy may be differently assumed in 
a spectrum of war to peace. This study will benefit from the neorealist lens in understanding the 
behaviour of riparian states; as already argued, it is a better fit for describing state behaviour as respects 
international watercourses, the nature of which, in several cases, are highly politicised by geopolitical 
overlay and anarchy. The next section will define the symptoms of anarchy. 
2.2.3. Anarchy over state behaviour: the battle for power, survival and relative gains  
Since anarchy is an important concept in international relations and in this study, it is necessary to 
explore the impact of anarchy on the behaviour of states. This section of the thesis accordingly covers 
one main part of the conceptual framework concerning “the battle for power” (see Figure 1 in 
Introduction Chapter), which illustrates the link between anarchy and state behaviour. In so doing, this 
study adopts a neorealist reading of anarchy to explain the behaviour of states and the impediments to 
cooperation over international waters. The key question here is, what are the effects of anarchy in 
shaping state behaviour, and thus hydropolitical relations, particularly respecting an international 
watercourse of a highly politicised nature? 
A wide variety of theoretical approaches to study conflict and the possibilities for resolution and 
cooperation have been adopted by different schools of thought, with the most diverse viewpoints being 
expressed between neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists.130 This chapter does not argue which of 
the various IR perspectives is right or wrong concerning the analysis of the effects of anarchy. However, 
by particularly considering the transboundary river basins where geopolitical complexity and the fragile 
 
127 Embedded in the UN Charter, Article 2. Lechner (n 120). See also Thomas H Lee, ‘International Law, 
International Relations Theory, and Preemptive War: The Vitality of Sovereign Equality Today’ [2004] 67 Law 
and Contemporary Problems 147. 
128 Lechner Anarchy in International Relations (n 120) p. 2. 
129 Lechner ‘Why Anarchy Still Matters’ (n 104). 
130 Jervis Robert, ‘Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate’ [1999] 24 International 
security 42. 
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political system of at least one party overshadow hydropolitical relations entirely, the chapter argues 
that neorealism is perhaps better positioned to explain riparian states’ behaviour. 
Anarchic conditions breed competition and mistrust between states, which create obstacles to 
cooperation. This study, here, compares the perspectives of neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists 
on anarchic conditions. This is because they have much in common regarding their basic understandings 
of anarchy, and have been pioneering and remain prominent in the study of cooperation and conflict in 
international relations, while providing the contrast of pessimistic and optimistic views.131 These have 
been conceptualised in the neorealist perspective, which holds that states operate in an anarchic 
international system dictating certain kinds of priorities and behaviours,132 and that the neoliberal idea 
of “cooperation under anarchy”.133  
While the neoliberals’ proposed solution mainly focuses on the role of an institution in fulfilling the 
lack of authority in an anarchic world in order to foster cooperation, neorealists think this a “false 
remedy”.134 Without denying the possibility of cooperation, neorealists see cooperation more as a 
“puzzle” than an “anomaly” in an anarchical context.135 That is, although neorealists do not deny the 
existence of institutions in which cooperation abounds, they argue that institutions are rather tools of 
statecraft and largely a reflection of state interest. They see world politics as an international anarchic 
system involving far more complex and unavoidable conflict than neoliberal institutionalists might 
perceive.136  
For neorealists, anarchy is a significant impediment to cooperation because it intensifies competition 
and conflict between states, and institutions lack the capacity to mitigate anarchy’s constraining effects 
on inter-state cooperation.137 This study seeks to explore three key features of a neorealist understanding 
of cooperation in world politics particularly relevant to anarchy-affected international watercourses.138  
 
131 It is worth saying that the newest liberalism agrees with realists perspective over the centrality of states as 
unitary-rational agents. Also, the new version accepts ‘realism’s emphasis on anarchy to explain state motives 
and actions’. However, mainly grounded on interdependence theory and the fact that ‘states in anarchy often 
face mixed interests’, neoliberals still consider more practical role for international cooperation and the potential 
of institutions therein. See Grieco (n 98) p. 493. 
132 Waltz (n 93). 
133 Milner (n 91) p. 69. 
134 Robert (n 130) p. 54. 
135 Robert (n 130) p. 62. 
136 Robert (n 130). 
137 Grieco (n 98). 
138 For more extensive discussions concerning the three key features of a neorealist understanding of cooperation, 
see, for instance, Grieco (n 98); Robert (n 130).; Milner (n 91); Waltz (n 93). 
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Firstly, for neorealists, anarchy feeds competition and conflict among states, and resultantly, the 
dominant nature of political processes is striving for power and self-interest. Such anarchic conditions, 
from a neorealist perspective, compel states to fight for their survival and security to protect themselves. 
Accordingly, neorealists argue that cooperation becomes difficult to achieve, or as this study maintains, 
fails to result in conflict transformation, when the willingness of states to cooperate is driven by a 
struggle for power, self-interest, and survival. On the contrary, neoliberals are less concerned about 
competition for power, survival, and security in anarchy, believing instead that the incentives to 
cooperate to achieve greater interests outweigh any residual interest to remain foes. This neoliberal 
thought rests on an assumption that augmenting inter-nation economic relationships increases 
interdependency among states, and political processes are rather oriented towards “economic growth 
and social security” than power.139 As a result, from a neoliberal perspective, states seek their self-
interests in “strictly individualistic terms”, and in a “rational” way; thus, they consider the costs and 
benefits of their action and the state attempts to “maximize its individual long-term total payoffs”.140 
Notwithstanding this, for neorealists, the dominant interest of a state in an anarchic context is not 
individual, absolute gain, but rather survival in the face of any potential threat from other states. From 
this point of view, states may wish to cooperate to achieve “noble goals” like justice or economic 
development, but their efforts will be driven by a power struggle with other states. The struggle for state 
survival, as a main goal in an anarchic world, leads states to give significant attention to increasing their 
power and security; and at the least, on maintaining their position in the system (i.e. surviving) by 
preventing relative increases in their rivals’ power. Thus, striving for a “balance of power” dominates 
the anarchic setting, as neorealists argue, and it may result either in the inhibition of cooperation or the 
abuse of cooperation to maintain the status quo.  
Secondly, from the neorealist perspective, fear of relative gains is the main barrier to cooperation that 
emanates from anarchy. Neoliberals argue that states only “seek to maximize their individual absolute 
gains” particularly in a mixed-interest situation; and therefore, for neoliberals, states mostly fear being 
cheated out of the outcome of cooperation.141 From this point of view, institutions can assist states to 
overcome cheating, which is the greatest impediment to cooperation for neoliberals. However, 
neorealists observe a greater obstacle to cooperation than cheating and deception. They consider states 
as “positional, not atomistic, in character”.142 States therefore assess their performance not in isolation 
but against that of other states, and with attention to their relative strengths and weaknesses. With the 
perspective that states’ foremost interest is in survival and concomitantly relative power dynamics, as 
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independent actors in an anarchic context, neorealists contend that states are not concerned with 
absolute but rather relative gains from cooperation. Consequently, anarchy for states results not only in 
a lack of reliable agency to enforce promise but also an absence of “overarching authority to prevent 
others from using violence, or the threat of violence, to destroy or enslave them”; hence anarchy, from 
the neorealist perspective, produces much more fear and distrust.143 Resultantly, the major concern from 
a neorealist perspective is how the intervention of the neoliberal’s institution and any ensuing 
cooperation “might produce a more dangerous potential foe in the future”.144 This fear, that “today’s 
friend may be tomorrow’s enemy”, from the neorealist perspective impels the main goal of states: to 
prevent others from “achieving advances in their relative capabilities”.145  
Finally, considering the concern of states at survival and relative gains, another obstacle to a sustainable 
cooperation is the uncertainty that stems from anarchy: “States are uncertain about one another’s future 
intentions”; thus, they must give serious attention to any future relative capabilities affected by 
cooperation. The inability of states within an anarchic setting to predict or control the interests and 
behaviour of partners foments political uncertainty, and consequently makes states wary when pursuing 
diplomatic cooperation. Ultimately, while for neoliberal institutionalists the worst possible outcome of 
failed cooperation in an anarchic situation might be losing the opportunity to make progress, for 
neorealists, the achievement of cooperation might end in the much greater perceived risk of losing 
power, independence, or security. In anarchy, from a neorealist perspective, “minds can be changed, 
new leaders can come to power, values can shift, new opportunities and dangers can arise”.146 The 
ensuing “uncertainty results from the inability of states to predict or readily to control the future 
leadership or interests of partners”. In this way, the uncertainty of states, from a neorealist point of view, 
pertains again to this question: “which among them could achieve the greatest gains, and would 
imbalanced achievements of gains affect relative capabilities?”147 
Under these circumstances, states are unwilling to agree to a durable cooperative arrangement, 
preferring instead “to be more readily able to exit from the arrangement if gaps in gains did come to 
favour the other”. 148  Further, states behave in a highly cautious, sceptical, and conservative way 
throughout cooperation. Such a neorealist approach is considered here to be the most appropriate to 
explain and analyse the behaviour and perception of riparian states over international watercourses, e.g. 
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the Helmand River Basin, in the context of anarchy. This, then, will provide basic foundation to examine 
the role of the ERU principle in shaping and perhaps transforming hydropolitical relations. 
In sum, for the analysis of the international relations over transboundary waters, this study adopts the 
neorealist explanation merely for the anarchy’s effects on states’ behaviour. Neorealists do not focus on 
the behaviour of states within the international system, but rather on a causal link between states’ 
behaviour and outcomes.149 From this point of view, states in the international system see each other as 
a threat because there is no authority to protect them: “In essence, great powers are trapped in an iron 
cage where they have little choice but to compete with each other for power if they hope to survive.”150  
2.3. Constructivist reading of anarchy and identity 
As already noted, the study uses two neorealist and constructivist lenses to capture the complexity of 
hydropolitical relations and the relationship between anarchy and the ERU principle. Alexander Wendt 
developed a constructivist argument to build a bridge between two main IR streams, realism and 
liberalism. 151  In his Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics, 
Alexander Wendt argues against neorealist understanding that asserts that self-help is forced onto states 
by anarchic structure. Wendt argues that a self-help world is socially constructed through process, not 
structure. By giving more attention to process than structure, Wendt believes that anarchy does not have 
“logic” apart from the practices through which identities and interests of states are created: “Self-help 
and power politics are institutions, not essential features of anarchy. Anarchy is what states make of 
it.”152 
Within this line of thought, this study seeks to examine state’s identity in anarchy by bridging 
constructivist understanding of the state of nature and Waltz’s arguments about self-help and relative 
gains.153 In this respect, the study assumes state’s identity as a dependant variable which is made 
through historical and social processes, not given. However, it also accepts that there are structural 
constraints on how a state’s identity is formed. The focus on identity in social sciences has received 
growing attention in the last decade. A very basic definition of identity could be what Paulin Djité 
suggests, ie., “identity is the everyday word for people’s sense of who they are”.154 Just as Wendt defines 
 
149 Waltz (n 93). 
150 John J. Mearsheimer, ‘Structural Realism’ [2013]  International relations theories : discipline and diversity 77 
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153 For extensive discussion on the role of identity in anarchy, see Jonathan Mercer, ‘Anarchy and Identity’ [1995]  
International Organization 229. 
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identity as a subjective quality “rooted in an actor’s self-understanding”, the identity of a state is also 
one kind of identity as a social and relational conception referring “to the image of individuality and 
distinctiveness held and projected by the state within particular international contexts”. 155  In this 
respect, a state’s identity as a source of its behaviour is detected in the state’s foreign policy actions, 
generating “a specific value (a pro attitude toward a certain kind of action), which in turn determines a 
state’s preference for a particular foreign policy option”.156 Identity, in this line of thought, influences 
the behaviour of a state by both generating and shaping its interests. Wendt points out that identity 
“generates motivational and behavioural dispositions” of international actors.157 Unlike Waltz, who 
treats an identity as a given to self-interested states in self-help system, Wendt does not see self-help as 
a fixed component of anarchy. Therefore, a state’s identity and interests could be considered as 
endogenous rather than exogenous to the state.158 Such an understanding allows Wendt to suggest an 
alternate anarchy.  
Wendt (1999), then, conceptualises “culture of anarchy” in his Social Theory of International Politics 
in three types of interstate-level social structures: Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian.159 Grounded on 
“identity approaches”, “culture” here means the “socially shared knowledge,” and “knowledge” refers 
to “any belief an actor takes to be true”.160 Wendt’s cultures of anarchy are helpful to this study to 
develop the theoretical framework of the Universe to illustrate how each culture may involve in different 
degrees of ERU (see Chapter 5). Each culture of anarchy asserts an important role or “distinct posture 
or orientation of the Self toward the Other with respect to the use of violence” for transformation of 
states’ identity and interest.161 Within such constructivist perspective, identities and interests of state 
are constructed as “secondary products” through those “cultural” levels of roles.162 By examining causal 
claims of Wendt’s argument, Hidemi Suganami (2002) concludes that “a culture of anarchy is no more 
than a system-level description of a situation when states share a particular role as their identity”.163 
 
155 See, for instance, Kuniko Ashizawa, ‘When Identity Matters: State Identity, Regional Institution-Building, and 
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In a sense, Wendt introduces different anarchic systems in which various distinct cultures of anarchy 
exist. In each system-level there is a dominant “role relationships”, namely enmity, rivalry and 
friendship, that shape states’ identities and interests.164 The Hobbesian culture of anarchy refers to the 
posture in neorealist fashion as enemies, “threatening adversaries who observe no limits in their 
violence towards each other”.165 In this level of anarchy, states are constrained to observe cultural norms 
which might be quite negative: “kill or be killed” norm. The general orientation of Lockean culture of 
anarchy – which is the neoliberal explanation – is that of rivals, “competitors who will use violence to 
advance their interests but refrain from killing each other”.166 In such culture of anarchy, “state observes 
norms because it is in its self-interest”.167 Finally, states share the role of friends in Kantian culture of 
anarchy, “allies who do not use violence to settle their disputes and work as a team against security 
threats”.168 This level of anarchy corresponds to “constructivist hypothesis,” of which the cultural norms 
are perceived as legitimate by states.169 Such constructivist understanding of anarchy will be further 
employed in placing equity in TWINS framework in Chapter 5. The Hobbesian culture is most arguably 
evident in many international river basins in the world including the Helmand River Basin, though the 
other levels are also experienced. Therefore, the study seeks to unpack the nature of this level through 
what is already explained in neorealist perspective which is in accordance to the first degree of Wendt’s 
cultures of anarchy. 
In this regard, the study acknowledges the constructivists’ argument, and in particular Wendt’s, that 
states are “intentional and corporate actors whose identities and interests are in important part 
determined by domestic politics rather than the international system.”170 Therefore, the anarchic nature 
which neorealists consider as a “fixed” phenomenon is formed by actors that can change over the time. 
Such culture of anarchy, therefore, can be developed and transformed to another due to change in 
dominant norms, rules and ideologies. This is where this study finds it place to analyse how and to what 
extent the ERU principle can contribute to such transformation. Despite their different understanding 
of international system, neorealists, neoliberalists and constructivists share common explanation of the 
features of each culture of anarchy. For instance, the Hobbesian culture of anarchy is similar to what 
neorealists understand from the international ‘self-help’ system characterised with egotism, 
sovereignty, rationality and power, security and survival struggle. The Hobbesian culture of anarchy 
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speaks of a self-sustaining system of “the war of all against all” in which actors cannot rely on the help 
of the others. Hobbes’s interpretation of international relations is shared with neorealist theory, 
considering that sovereign states are not subject to any higher sovereign authority. Consider this, the 
study borrows Waltz’s analysis of anarchy and its consequences on state behaviour – that already 
explained, while remaining loyal to constructivist perception of international system.  
This may appear as paradox. However, the aim of this thesis is to provide more pragmatic and critical 
explanation of contemporary realities of the world politics surrounding international watercourses by 
engaging in both Waltz and Wendt’s theorisation of international relations. Looking at the “water box” 
and beyond that from these different theoretical lenses will help discover those parts of the box that 
have been often neglected. This will help to develop an in-depth understanding of the complexities of 
hydropolitical dynamics and fuller explanation of multi-causal phenomena. The next section will 
identify the level of analysis and discuss how hydropolitical relations at a basin level might be 
influenced by the international, regional and state levels. 
2.4. Merging the different levels of influence: international anarchy, regional geopolitics, and 
domestic anarchy 
One of the chief requisites of this study in analysing international relations and foreign polices 
surrounded international waters is answering the question of how to examine state behaviour. In so 
doing, one challenge of the study is determining the level of analysis. From the neorealist perspective, 
system-level analysis examines state behaviour by looking at the international system. Therefore, state 
behaviour is the effect of the international system, which is considered the cause. Since characteristics 
of the structure of the international system imposed upon states cause them to behave conditionally, any 
change in their behaviour depends heavily on change to the structure. 
In Waltz’s systems theory, therefore, some part of the explanation of states’ behaviours and outcomes 
is to be found in the system’s structure.171 However, “structures as causes” does not mean that states’ 
national interests – where neorealists contribute – and identities – where constructivists contribute, and 
the agreements or differences between them in international politics, are without value, power, and 
influence; but this thesis argues that the complex political structure of the international system 
influences the priorities of all units, including states, and its nature may influence their behaviour due 
to other circumstances at different levels, e.g. regionally or domestically. The interplay between the 
various forces involved in international, regional, and domestic situations may result in the shaping of 
states’ behaviour. The security interests within international anarchy may spill over into some specific 
regions and states; resultantly, the political nature of regional and domestic level is mainly 
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overshadowed by the anarchic setting within the international system. Such state of affairs might be 
much clear in fragile and collapsed states.  
Accordingly, a necessary part of this study is to identify the level of analysis. The aim of this study is 
the examination of legal and political interaction over the behaviour of riparian states at a transboundary 
river basin level. However, the basin level is at an in-between stage, reflecting international, regional 
and domestic affairs (see Figure 7). It is therefore a requisite to properly consider these inter-connected 
levels. Alongside an international system with an anarchic structure in which the striving for power is 
a key variable, there are two unit-level variables that influence world politics and state behaviour: a) 
geopolitical rivalry at the regional level and the role of state location; and b) the anarchy at the domestic 
and intra-state levels where there is a sense of chaos in national authority. This study does not assert 
that international anarchy alone makes cooperation difficult. International anarchy is everywhere. 
However, the outcome of political interaction between states differs from place to place. Among many 
socio-economic and political factors, there are two key variables, which are the focus of this Chapter, 
that directly intensify the anarchic nature of “self-help”: geopolitics and domestic anarchy. By 
compounding numerous variables together in the same theories, while clearly defining their 
relationship, the chances of understanding a multi-level, multicomponent phenomena are greatly 
increased.172  
 
Figure 7. Different levels of influence on transboundary river basins 
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In addition to the distribution of power capabilities, neorealist scholars (particularly proponents of the 
offensive realism theory) consider an intermediary variable at the unit level of the systemic theory, that 
is, the geographic location of states. “Geopolitics”, 173  therefore, plays a prominent role in the 
international system of neorealism.174 By adding geopolitics and state location to the distribution of 
power, it is possible to estimate the relationship between theories of international politics and theories 
of foreign policy.175 This method, originally from Mearsheimer’s offensive realism,176 can provide a 
theoretical explanation of both total international outcomes – for instance, the prevalence of wars and 
patterns of alliance-formation – and the behaviour of individual states at the unit level.177 However, 
neorealism gives priority to causes at the structural level rather than at the unit level to understand world 
politics. 178  Therefore, geopolitics and state location are wholly subordinate but necessary to the 
structural distribution of power variable.179 Thus, the behaviour of states and their respective foreign 
policy strategies depend on the anarchic nature of the international system and their geographical 
location.180 The geographical variable explains the impact of location on state behaviour, exploring 
when, why, and which states are likely choose a “defensive” approach of balancing power or an 
“offensive” approach of seeking hegemony. For instance, the closer a state is to its rival the more likely 
it is to balance and be less concerned about the relative power. However, the separation of a state from 
its rival with natural barriers or a buffer state leads the state to attempt to maximise its relative power 
and strive for hegemony.181  
Considering geopolitics is also important to the extent that it allows us to add actors from outside the 
region (or the basin) to the analysis, and to examine the impact of their respective foreign policies on 
different concerns in a particular region, such as water resources.182 The examination of the foreign 
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policies of outsiders, who often compete to take the role of mediator in times of disputes between 
regional states, is critical to an understanding of the behaviour of states in the region. Outsiders, who 
are often superpowers, tend to create a false illusion of fear (or overexaggerating a threat) in a region 
and put regional states’ security in imminent jeopardy by presenting a threat greater than exists in 
reality, all in order to first justify their presence, and second to manipulate the anarchic structure and 
the regional politics to suit themselves. In this sense, any issue in the region that is linked to outsiders’ 
security interests must be under their control within the broader international context. This outsider-
created fear may concern many issues, such as energy, health, poverty, or climate change; and water – 
which is a critical resource for states – is one of their favourite playgrounds.183 Such issues often risk 
the national security of states, and may also threaten outsiders’ security interests. The outsiders may 
maintain the status quo, whether this is chaos or stability in the region, as far as it accords with their 
security interests. Such this way of foreign policy has been exemplified in the Middle East where 
outsiders impose their hegemonic order to protect their interests.184 If regional political activities in 
respect of these issues threaten the foreign policies of outsiders in the international system, they seek to 
impose a new set of rules and a regime that work in their own favour. In so doing, they may take 
advantage of the anarchic structure to create chaos (sometimes by stirring war between regional actors, 
making a military intervention, staging a proxy war in the region, or supporting coup d’état and the like) 
and establish a new order (or a regional hegemon in their own favour). This state of affairs, while 
making hydropolitical relationships in this study more complex, influences all states’ behaviour in the 
region, including any buffer states (for instance, Afghanistan, as the case study of this thesis, struggling 
for survival between superpowers’ geopolitical rivalry), and must therefore be considered in the present 
analysis. In sum, geopolitical rivalry highlights the importance of considering international anarchy 
within the context of the regional/basin level, and likely intensifies the competitive atmosphere in which 
the striving for survival occurs.  
Another unit-level variable in this study is “domestic anarchy”, which often gives an unexpected shock 
to hydropolitical relations within a basin. International conflict and cooperation arguably depend on a 
state’s domestic politics. To merge the different scales of influence, it is necessary to link the systemic 
level and the domestic level together to capture the influence of not only the foreign intervention on the 
basin level but also the domestic politics. Robert Putnam in “two-level game theory” pays attention to 
the role of domestic players in international politics, arguing the state-centric literature is an uncertain 
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foundation for theorizing about how domestic and international politics interact”. 185  Diplomatic 
interactions, therefore, are interconnected with domestic politics. In a similar approach, the domestic 
anarchy within collapsed and fragmented states, particularly those where armed rival groups exist, is 
often connected to the international anarchic system.186 In the international anarchic system, external 
relations between states are not chaotic but rather based on a perceived pattern, or “law-like 
regularities”.187 In contrast, systemic theory assumes states to be hierarchical sovereigns that govern the 
internal relationships between sub-state actors. The question is how can we theorise the relationships of 
countries which are not yet sovereign with a hierarchal system, but are rather perceived as fragmented 
and collapsed states?188 In such cases, the government is either too weak or does not exist at all, and 
faces a struggle against aggressive competition between armed groups inside the country. In recent 
history there have been several such fragile states and regions, among them Afghanistan, Sudan, 
Somalia, Iraq, Syria, and the Balkans, where in addition to their “central government” there are other 
actors, often militias, who not only structure their own relationships internally, but also act “financially 
and politically in the international system without interference from the state in which [they are] 
based”.189 In all of the above-mentioned cases, there are transboundary river basins: respectively, the 
Helmand, the Nile, the Jubba, the Tigris–Euphrates, and the Danube and Sava rivers. In such cases, 
other questions concerning the systemic theory arise: Are those fragile states anarchic or hierarchic, and 
should those “independent” actors be perceived as units in anarchy or as political parties in hierarchy? 
To answer these questions, Anthony Vinci presents theoretical arguments and provides empirical 
evidence for applying neorealist systemic theory to the study of fragile states and armed groups.190  
Vinci argues that in cases of collapsed states, the hierarchic system breaks down to “domestic anarchy”. 
In a domestic anarchy, “multiple autonomous actors exist within a defined territory and relate with each 
other as equal units”.191 Vinci emphasises that “domestic anarchy is not a separate, ‘closed’ anarchic 
system, but rather it is ‘open’ and linked with the international system”; thus, autonomous actors inside 
 
185 Robert D Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’ [1988]  International 
organization 427 p. 433. For a practical application of the “two-level game” theory within a case-study analysis, 
see Hanifeh Rigi and Jeroen F Warner, ‘Two-Level Games on the Trans-Boundary River Indus: Obstacles to 
Cooperation’ [2020] 22 Water Policy 972.  
186 Anthony Vinci, ‘Anarchy, Failed States, and Armed Groups: Reconsidering Conventional Analysis’ [2008] 52 
International studies quarterly 295. 
187 Waltz (n 93) p. 116. 
188 For further discussion, see John Van Benthuysen, ‘In-between Anarchy and Interdependence: From State 
Death to Fragile and Failing States’ [2015] 36 Third World Quarterly 22 p. 23: “Fragile states lack the 
authoritative capacity to incorporate population and territory; failing states share this quality but also experience 
various forms of domestic instability”. See Charles T Call, ‘The Fallacy of the ‘Failed State’’ [2008] 29 Third 
World Quarterly 1491. 
189 Vinci (n 186). 
190 Vinci (n 186). 
191 Vinci (n 186) p. 296. 
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a fragmented state should be perceived as units in the international system.192 Within this approach, 
neorealist systemic theory is expanded in order to theoretically encompass the influence of domestic 
anarchy on regional geopolitics and the international system.193 By doing so, we can describe the 
relations and behaviour of fragile states through neorealist constructs such as the balance of power or 
security dilemma. More importantly for the purpose of the thesis, this method can provide a critical 
insight into how geopolitical interventions take place in such collapsed and fragmented states such as 
Afghanistan in the Helmand River Basin with the lens of a security dilemma, through which other states 
– particularly the ones with security concerns in the region – see a beneficial state of affairs that can be 
exploited for their own advantage, thereby taunting their “enemies” or otherwise agitating them at a 
regional or international level. Correspondingly, this study argues that the nature of international 
anarchy is similarly transplanted into the domestic situation of fragile and fragmented states, and 
consequently, any internal issues become the objective of outsiders and are overshadowed by 
geopolitical anarchy. The present study follows this line of thought. 
In sum, given the merging of international, regional, and domestic politics, this study investigates the 
impact of anarchy, geopolitical rivalry, and competition between actors over the control and utilisation 
of transboundary waters at the basin level. Thus, this study offers a framework to analyse hydropolitical 
relations within both the international and regional contexts, with consideration of the domestic politics 
and the intervening variables that shape the interactions of the states involved. While the internationally 
anarchic nature of the competition for power and control over a region is evinced by geopolitical rivalry 
and the resulting interventions and security dilemmas, it may produce or intensify any existing domestic 
anarchy inside a regionally fragile state. Such a state of affairs, as this study argues, hinders water 
conflict transformation. In this thesis, anarchy is understood in the same terms as Waltz and neorealism. 
The underlying argument is that the behaviour of riparian states over the utilisation of transboundary 
waters – particularly in a highly politicised environment – is influenced by the anarchic and geopolitical 
structure of the basin, which is often a by-product of outsiders. In addition to analysis of power, anarchy, 
this study argues, is a complementary explanation for why “acute conflict does not occur but, at the 
same time, makes cooperation difficult”. 194  In line with this argument, the study will testify the 
existence of anarchy’s symptoms – striving for power, survival, and relative gains, and the fear of 
uncertainties – in the behaviour of riparian states over the Helmand River Basin (see Chapter 6). After 
conceptualisation of anarchy and in the quest for answering the research question of this study, the next 
chapter will provide theoretical insights for the linkage between international law and anarchy and 
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particularly present the overarching framework to understand how legal norms operate in the world 
politics. 
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Chapter 3. Placing international law in anarchy: between interest and identity 
3.1. Introduction 
The underlying theme of the research question that this thesis sets out to examine is defining how 
change in hydropolitical relations may occur by the influence of the ERU principle within an anarchic 
setting. As Brunnée and Toope note, explaining behavioural changes and the role of law therein is one 
of the greatest challenges to theories of international relations and law.195 In order to provide theoretical 
foundation for this study, it is necessary to inquire into the interdisciplinary relationship between 
international law and international relations. In a system founded on an anarchic nature, where politics 
(associated with power and hegemony) and sovereignty are crucial drivers for states’ behaviour to 
control transboundary waters, how does international water law matter? Isn’t law rather a source of 
bargaining or leverage for states to take advantage in favour of their interest, in particular when water 
has been rather regarded as a matter of national security than as an economic good?196 Is there a role 
for law in shaping the interests, identities and behaviour of states over international waters, and 
accordingly transforming the hydropolitical relations, and if so, how?  
These are among the questions that a vast scholarly literature has focused on explaining changes and 
exploring the role of international law in shaping politics of international system. However, the major 
different theoretical camps in both international relations and international law – rationalists (and legal 
positivists) and constructivists –197 disagree fundamentally on how international law matters, works and 
influences within anarchic world of politics, where, from rationalist view, it is inevitably led to a 
situation based on striving for power and self-interest. There are still gaps and shortcomings for 
understanding how international law operates and contributes to changes of relations.198 
 
195 Brunnée and Toope (n 5) p.19. 
196 See, for instance, Marwa Daoudy, ‘Hydro-Hegemony and International Water Law: Laying Claims to Water 
Rights’ [2008] 10 Water Policy 89. 
197 However, some scholars have criticised the divisions of theories regarding IL and IR. See, for instance, 
Baradaran (n 32). There is a vast amount of literature focusing on the complex relationship between IR theory 
and IL from different political perspectives. See also, for instance, Kenneth W. Abbott, ‘Modern International 
Relations Theory : A Prospectus for International Lawyers’ [1989] 14 The Yale journal of international law The 
Yale journal of international law 335. And, particularly, Slaughter ‘A Dual Agenda’ (n 44), and also, Slaughter 
‘A New Generation’ (n 44). 
198 Slaughter ‘A New Generation’ (n 44). The need for a “joint discipline” to bridge the gaps between international 
relations theory and international law have been argued by several political scientists and international lawyers. 
With particular focus on international water law, Alistair Rieu-Clarke also emphasises on the need to a “nuanced 
approach” of “multi-level legal analysis” in order to response the former failure of the endeavour to study 
interdisciplinary issue of the linkage between international legal system and socio-political roots of 
transboundary water interactions. See, in this respect, Alistair Rieu-Clarke, ‘The Role of Treaties in Building 
International Watercourse Regimes: A Legal Perspective on Existing Knowledge’ [2010] 12 Water policy 822. 
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Interest-based approaches of rationalism (i.e. neorealism and neoliberalism) underestimate the role of 
international law in world politics. When it comes to the lenses of rationalism, where anarchy, power, 
and self-interest are the central drivers in world politics, international law is considered meaningless. 
The legal rules and principles may be overshadowed by the symptoms of anarchy and power struggle, 
and accordingly seem ineffective or meaningless, or function in favour of states’ interests. 
Notwithstanding this, moving to the contemporary world, there is an apparent paradox in questioning 
whether or not international law matters. Not only has there been a rapid growth in the number of areas 
in which international rules appear to play an important role, but states seem to take these rules 
seriously. It is even argued that, “almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law 
and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time”.199 
Criticising a rationalist emphasis on the role of interest in determining state behaviour, constructivism 
indicates that what has been the most theoretical gap is a lack of careful attention to the critical role of 
law, like other social norms, in influencing the identity of a state. 200  Constructivists argue that 
rationalists ignore the importance of states’ identity in shaping their behaviour. Accordingly, for 
constructivism, state behaviour and relations are rather influenced by the identity of states, even prior 
to their interest. Identities, as generator of interests, created by norms, cultures and institutions. 
Grounded on the normative role of legal rules, international law, therefore, can influence interest and 
identity of states, hence their behaviour.201 This thesis rests on exploring this socio-legal line of theory, 
and is therefore the primary purpose of this chapter. 
Upon these initial premises, the chapter unfolds in four parts. First, the chapter explores the pessimistic 
view of the role of international law in anarchic world politics, mostly presented by rationalists and 
legal positivists. Secondly, by questioning the assumptions of those pessimistic views, the chapter 
reviews in general the preeminent debate of whether international law matters in a system defined by 
anarchy or not. Third, the chapter sets forth the constructivist theories of understanding international 
law in world politics to analyse how states comply with international legal rules. By identifying the role 
of norms, this part of chapter, therefore, examines the question of how international law influences state 
behaviour and contribute to change. Finally, based on a study of the linkage between international law 
and international relations, the chapter will present an analytical framework – “interactional 
international law” developed by Brunnée and Toope – and a methodology through which to examine 
 
199 Quoted from Louis Henkin in Baradaran (n 32) p.745.  
200 Brunnée and Toope (n 5). 
201 To read more about how “socialisation” influence international relations of a state and why states cooperate 
when it is not in their power material, see Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘Social States : China in International 
Institutions, 1980-2000’ [2014] . 
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the research questions in the field of transboundary water governance by identifying the normative 
content of international law.  
3.2. Too blind, too paralytic: international law as a “slave” to power and state interest 
This section aims to explore those theoretical arguments and their assumptions that question the 
effectiveness of international law. There are two theoretical perspectives that challenge the significance 
of international law in the real world.202 One challenge to the standing of international law comes from 
rationalism in international relations theory, and another developed by legal thinkers known as 
positivism.  
Rationalism comes along with rational choice theory, which is rooted in a theoretical reflection of 
international relations, particularly neorealism and liberal institutionalism. Rationalism strongly 
highlights the role of the states as “rational actors” in world politics, where anarchy is a structural 
constraint on state behaviour.203 Rationalist theories, in general, underestimate the significance of local 
politics, norms and ethics. Rationalists see international law with no or a highly limited power in 
influencing state behaviour,204 because world politics is shaped on the basis of rationality assessed, and 
a state’s foreign policy is assumed through self-interested,205 goal seeking behaviour.206 In addition to 
the role of interest, (material) power is also assumed as a key driver in the contemporary world, 
reflecting, most of the time, the visible political figures that significantly supports the international 
relations neorealist theory.207 
Neorealist perspective rests on the observation of competitive rational behaviour of states in pursuit of 
their wills - that may have no proper legal status - within world politics. States behave in what they see 
as a rational manner, which ultimately depends on self-interest.208 It is a perspective that assumes states 
to be the principle homogenous actors in the arena of world politics, where they square off for greater 
power and security. 209  Neorealists conceptualise power as material factors, such as military and 
 
202 For a detailed analysis, see Slaughter ‘A New Generation’ (n 44). 
203 Waltz (n 93). 
204 See Hathaway (n 32); Baradaran and others also state that “[r]ealists are sceptical about cooperation among 
nations ... and [believe] that the little cooperation we see is fragile.” Baradaran (n 32) p. 746. 
205 Baradaran (n 32). 
206 Baradaran (n 32). 
207 For instance, Margaret Thatcher, former British Prime Minister, disagreed with the proposed International 
Criminal Court because it would undermine the West’s ability to use its military power through “customary 
international law”, which stresses that international law is codified through balance of power and political 
processes to meet states’ interests. David Armstrong, Theo Farrell and Hélène Lambert, International Law and 
International Relations (2nd ed.. edn, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press 2012). See also Sands (n 184). 
208 Armstrong (n 207) pp. 77-9.  
209 Armstrong (n 207). 
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economic might, far more than they do non-material factors, such as norms, institutions and 
international law.210 Realism argues that neither moral nor legal principles can constrain states in their 
struggle to gain power.211 Thus, from this interpretation, a legal system cannot be “effective” in shaping 
state behaviour within world politics, because there is no enforcement by a central power.212 Neorealist 
scholars believe that international law has only a very limited role, and one always restricted by 
prevailing power realities. 213  They argue that international law inevitably reflects the interests of 
powerful states in a way that makes it unlikely that it has the authority to constrain those states.214 More 
recently, sceptical neorealist thinkers argue that the reason for states’ compliance and employing legal 
rules in their international relations is evidently not because of their commitment to international law, 
but simply because of the potential for them to be used as legitimate weapons for their national 
interests.215 Besides, they conclude that international law is even dangerous in current international 
system with its anarchical order of power.216 In realism, changes in behaviour or adherence to rules and 
norms are only reflections of underlying material power and interests. Thus, even if this view 
acknowledges the existence of international law, it ignores the role that legal regimes play in shaping 
state behaviour and changing relations, and omits them from the story of real world of politics.217  
Neoliberalists (and in particular liberal institutionalism) offer a far more optimistic view of world 
politics and cooperation than neorealists (and positivists) in different version of thoughts. However, 
despite the fact that sates are not assumed as neorealists’ homogenous actors, liberal institutionalism218 
lies at the same roots in rationalist assumptions. Liberal institutionalism considers states’ behaviour in 
relation to the institutions. Both approaches analyse international relations based on rationalist logics, 
through which states act to maximise their interests. 219  Accordingly, an actor’s engagement in 
institutions does not influence its identity, but only shifts its behaviour in a formal and institutionalised 
pattern to serve its interests.220 Therefore, while neoliberal institutionalists admit the role of norms in 
shaping state behaviour, they treat international law “instrumentally as a signaling device or a product 
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of effective interest projection through explicit negotiation and formal adjudication”.221 In one sense, 
while neoliberals are open to norms, their understanding, being upon the rationalist approach, lacks “the 
intersubjective and constitutive ontologies of norms”.222  
In addition to rationalist debate (reflected in both realism and neoliberal institutionalism) over 
understandings of the real world, and the relationship between international law and state behaviour, 
legal positivism has also cast doubt on conceptualisations of the nature of international law, followed 
by another general question: Is international law really “law”? Positivists, accordingly, argue that 
international law cannot be understood as “law” because it lacks the essential components, e.g. the 
capacity for “independent” enforcement, without relying upon sanctions.223 The positivist approach, 
grounded on legal theory, argues that “law properly so-called” is the command of a sovereign backed 
by coercive sanctions.224 Positivists argue that international law cannot be considered true law and the 
respective rules do not have the obligatory character of true law since states deny any sovereign body 
other than themselves in the international system and states cannot be compelled to take or avoid taking 
actions against their will.225  
Just as realism gives priority to the role of states, and underestimates the significance of domestic 
politics, norms and institutions, so legal positivism does.226 Accordingly, international law includes 
those rules that states have consented to, either in explicit law-making treaties or in implicit customary 
law. Moreover, states are the only principal subjects of international law. It is true that some other, non-
state actors227 may create certain legal rules, and international law confers certain principles and rights 
on them. However, from a positivist point of view, non-state actors are “not truly independent actors in 
the law-creating process”, because they only received such authority and powers from states.228 Despite 
their different interpretation of law, “each was state-fixed, each found temporary solace in the facts of 
international life such as state practice or national interest, and each took a conservative approach to 
 
221 Jutta Brunnée and Stephen J Toope, ‘Constructivism and International Law’ in Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Mark A. 
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change.”229 For the positivist school of international law, the first core principle is the “separability 
thesis”, which posits that law differs considerably from morality: “Law, simply and strictly so called 
[is] law set by political superiors to political inferiors.”230 Accordingly, positivists distinguish “what is 
international law as opposed to what it should be.”231 The second core principle of positivism considers 
international law as “a set of binding rules”, which are created with states’ consent, and backed by 
sanctions.232 Thus, positivists see a problematic dichotomy between states as sovereign and as subjects 
of international law, and resultantly they consider international law a closed legal system in the real 
world offering limited opportunities for states to satisfy their own interests. Like realism, positivism, 
therefore, questions the role of international law, by amplifying the role of power relation in ruling the 
contemporary international order. 
In sum, for both rationalism and positivism, there is no place for norms and values in their visions of 
the world – “as a jungle for realists, and as a closed legal system for positivists”.233 Both have a common 
conceptual standpoint from which to offer an essential structure of international politics: the balance of 
power and the rules of international law restrict the freedom of states to serve their self-interests. 
International law, here, is limited to consensual rules created by states. Resultantly, consent is the main 
driver of state compliance. In addition, from the neorealist point of view, sanction and coercion are 
necessary to persuade a state to comply with the rules of international law. In addition to their emphasis 
on states and consent, both neorealists and positivists agree on a formal process of law-making and 
legal changes, primarily through treaty-law, which is state-dominated (with minor roles played by non-
state actors).234 
Notwithstanding the interest-based interpretation of the role of international law in anarchic world 
politics, rationalist and legal positivist reading cannot justify the rapid development and recent emerging 
legal pattern in different international watercourses e.g. the Nile and the Mekong, and the evolution of 
international conventions.235 Although one may correctly observe, through a neorealist point of view, 
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that such legal evolution might be a product of Western donors through a hegemonic Western-liberal 
enforcement, the growing volunteer participation of states in developing international legal principles 
cannot be fully explained by rationalist perspective alone. If a rationalist view of international law as 
being meaningless in world politics is to be justified, how can the recent growing of legal instrument in 
a wide range of political issues be described. Why do states pay so much attention to demonstrating 
their behaviour as being in compliance with international legal norms (e.g. Ethiopia and Egypt debate 
over the Nile waters based on legal norms, or in similar way, Turkey and Iraq over the Euphrates and 
Tigris Rivers, and, Afghanistan and Iran over the Helmand River)? Receiving financial support and 
dealing with donor conditionalities might be one persuasive reason, but it is not convincing enough. Is 
international law really meaningless and ineffective within anarchic nature of world politics? The next 
section analyses these questions. 
3.3. The importance of international law: battle for legitimacy within anarchic nature 
At a very basic level, international law primarily governs state (juristic person) behaviour and actions 
through the application of customary and treaty-based rules. Under anarchy, however, international law 
is generally characterised by its voluntary nature - states are not bound by legal obligation unless they 
accede to it - and its lack of power to impose rules. International law is assumed as a horizontal legal 
system,236 where “all the Sovereign States are on the same level and standing on an equal footing”.237 
States are mainly bound to the legal rules if they consent or sign the treaties.238 There are no authorities 
to compel states to take particular action. For instance, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has no 
jurisdiction or volition over states, unless they consent to co-operate on particular issues. Moreover, 
this legal system has been criticised as being vulnerable to the influence of powerful states.239 Thus, 
international law is accused of being “inaccessible, lacking in effect, too complex to be of practical 
value and subordinate to power”240, it leads, as argued particularly by realists, to the international 
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community enforcing international rules through power-oriented methods such as sanctions, shaming, 
and even legitimised use of force.241 
In practice, the tragedies of armed conflict within recent decades also underpin the sense of international 
law as being meaningless and ineffective in anarchic world politics. Major military actions and among 
them the US-led war against “terrorism” in Afghanistan and Iraq respectively in 2001 and 2003, or 
recently the missile strikes against Syrian government targets by the US, the UK and France in April 
2018, or assassinating a high Iranian military official in Iraqi’s territory by the US in January 2020, 
again initiated controversial debates questioning the applicability of international law in the 
contemporary world, and the justification of state behaviour under the United Nations Charter.242 There 
seems to be a consensus that the invasion of Iraq was manifestly illegal, and similar concerns arise 
regarding the lawfulness of the missile strikes in Syria and murdering Iranian officials.  
However, despite many uncertainties concerning the question, “how important is international law” the 
debates about recent events have shown that states have accepted it as being effectively inseparable 
from contemporary world politics. For instance, the states in question in above-mentioned military acts 
against Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and Iran went to great lengths to counter international criticism and 
justify their behaviour within international legal rules. Arguing based on international law, they insisted 
on persuading the international community of the legality of their act, by submitting their compliance 
with legal rules.243 Such political manoeuvring, aimed at legitimising or delegitimising state behaviour, 
introduced a new kind of battle, known as “lawfare” rather than warfare.244 Lawfare, the battle for 
legitimacy, sets a high value on international law and its potential role in the context of international 
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relations, and the ways in which it affects state behaviour demonstrates its potential to constrain and 
influence international political regimes.  
These struggles over applying international legal norms to constrain state behaviour are seen in many 
other international subject areas, like trade, human right, and in the context of international waters: e.g. 
the debates over Turkey’s Ilısu Dam,245 Ethiopia’s Grand Renaissance Dam,246 or Afghanistan dam 
development247. Such debates end up questioning whether the international legal regime, which can be 
seemingly openly flouted, is really worth preserving. 
In addition, international law has grown significantly through binding and non-binding international 
legal instruments, and fostered a shared belief within international society that gives greater weight to 
international law over world politics.248 For instance, the different legal regimes on the use of force, 
human rights, international crime, and trade and environment have all evolved through custom and 
treaty-law, demonstrating how international law and politics are integrated in shaping and changing 
relations. The controversial debates over “globalisation” within the legal framework of the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), and discussions over the environmental wellbeing of the earth, particularly with 
respect to the 2015 Paris agreement on climate change, have made international law an unavoidable and 
serious influencer within world politics. More importantly, while the Paris agreement has been 
controversial among states, it merits further research to explore the role of domestic political dynamic 
in determining states’ behaviour.  
Moreover, the architecture of global governance is highly dynamic and intermixed with a “rule-based” 
international order that itself is now complex and far-reaching.249 A political system includes “any 
persistent pattern of human relationships that involves, to a significant extent, influence, power, or 
authority”, and in which power is not equivalent among actors.250 This could be seen at an international 
scale. The inequivalent power that shapes the pattern of actors’ behaviour results in an asymmetric 
control of political resources within an anarchic nature.251 The study of politics is mostly a querying of 
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the distribution of power and the process of determining who gets what, when, how, and why;252 and 
law is a system of rules providing “equality of right”253 to determine who gets what, when, how, and 
why. Within such an understanding of the global governance, international relations is entwined with 
international law, and influences the global distribution of power among states. When considering 
historical discussions, many scholars suggest that “international law matters more now than ever 
before”, though global and regional political structures, anarchy and power struggles, along with social 
and economic criteria, have always played a significant role in determining the content, status and 
effectiveness of international law.254 Thus, understanding the world politics undoubtedly requires an 
understanding of international law, and of their interactions. 
The goal of this chapter is, in general, to examine the role of international law and its normative 
interaction within international system. In this respect, contrary to what rationalists claim, the most 
controversial argument of this study is that legal norms have the potential to influence state behaviour. 
In so doing, constructivists provide a theoretical foundation for this argument. In constructivism, norms, 
culture, institutions and identity are at the centre of theoretical analysis over the interest. Constructivists 
consider the material world of states and rational behaviour only as part of a social world and within a 
normative context. In contrast with rationalists that separate the formation of states’ interests from 
interaction in society, constructivists claim that identity formation is prior to interest formation.255 
Considering that interest is formed not only by material terms but also by non-material, constructivists 
examine the role of culture, institutions and norms in shaping identity and influencing states’ 
behaviour.256 Next part will elaborate the constructivist reading of international law in world politics, 
providing theoretical bases for this thesis to analyse how the ERU principle interacts with anarchy and 
influences state behaviour in an international watercourse. 
3.4. International law and the power of norms: identity as essential function of state behaviour 
Scholars from other international relations perspectives, particularly constructivism, have seriously 
challenged the rationalist readings of international law and politics. Their claims mainly rests, and 
fundamentally, on critics concerning the rationalist, interest-based understanding of the underlying 
roots and causes of state behaviour, and underestimating the power of principled ideas – ideas that are 
rather constructed through normative interaction among individuals, groups and states than given by 
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nature.257 While rationalists claim that states’ compliance with rules is because of their fear of sanctions 
and penalties, or losing their reputation or other benefits, or producing costs in case of violating rules, 
constructivists argue that states comply with rules because they follow norms.258 Another critic is that 
rationalist approaches, either in realism or neoliberal institutionalism, remain ill equipped to explain 
how states determine their interests.259 Rational choice theory seems to be circular because the theory 
defines state behaviour based on its interests, and determines the interests according to the behaviour 
of state.260 Another critique is that rationalist argument, which claim that states behave based on the 
“consequentialist” pursuit of self-interest, is not proved by the empirical evidence in states’ compliance 
and commitments to international law.261 While defining interest within an analysis of material cost and 
benefit, such this rationalist theory fails to adequately explain why some countries with the highest cost 
of compliance and less benefit are sometimes more likely to enter into and abide by treaties. 262 
Furthermore, despite the fact that states remain the significant actors in the world politics, a number of 
non-state actors play critical roles in shaping state rights and obligations, and in creating new forms of 
customary and treaty law.263  
In contrast with the rationalist assumption that states engage only in consequentialist pursuit of self-
interest, constructivists argue that states act in accordance with internalised norms.264 Moreover, the 
norm-based approach argues that actors’ interests are not such fixed assets, and rather are “constructed” 
by and through a dynamic interaction within society.265 In this respect, from constructivist perspective, 
international law can change a state’s interest and accordingly its behaviour. International law, 
accordingly, can influence a state’s behaviour “not by constraining states with a given set of preferences 
from acting, but by changing their preferences”. Thus, as Brunnée and Toope argue, “law is more than 
a ‘formalizer’ or a device for creating ‘hard’ entitlement and enforceable rules.”266 Grounded on the 
norm-based constructivist international relations approach, their understanding declares that 
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international law is an “ongoing generative activity”, which involves building and sustaining shared 
norms and legality. They argue that law undoubtedly has the potential to draw together states’ interests 
and identities, and thus their behaviours. 
Constructivism examines how the world is socially constructed. Constructivists argue that ideas – those 
actors have about the world, and what goes on in it – play a fundamental role in operating “all the way 
down” to influence other actors and their behaviour in world politics.267 Constructivism focuses on the 
role of non-instrumental action, including identities and norms, and of a vast range of normative actors 
in world politics. In the same way, it gives a new perspective on the creation and operation of 
international law. 
The philosophical foundation of this perspective of constructivism in international relations emerges 
from social and sociological theory. Particularly, constructivism is grounded on a sociological argument 
of Emile Durkheim and Max Weber, who in their concept of “ideational factors” put forward that “ideas 
become transformed through social interaction into ‘social facts’ – such as, language, religious beliefs 
and ethical norms – and that once so established these social facts influence behaviour”.268 The question 
of how ideas influence behaviour establishes the theoretical underpinning of constructivism; in a sense, 
ideas make great strides in contextualising social explanations of meaningful action.  
While rationalists in international relations, either neorealists or neoliberals, argue that states behave 
according to their interests in order to serve their security and prosperity, constructivists believe that 
they flow from state identities. Constructivism supports the notion that “who we think we are” greatly 
determines what we want and how we act. Thus, from constructivist perspective, states behave in a way 
that they perceive of themselves and such perception is being constructed and challenged within the 
state, regardless of their actual relative material capabilities. As Ted Hopf points out: “In telling you 
who you are, identities strongly imply a particular set of interests or preferences with respect to choices 
of action in particular domains, and with respect to particular actors.” 269  Rational neorealists and 
neoliberals explain why states decide to comply with or violate legal rules, or choose war or cooperation 
with each other based on state interests and material capabilities. However, constructivism 
problematises these rationalist theories, arguing that they cannot explain the reason for “the content and 
source of state interests and the social fabric of world politics”.270 
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For constructivists, the social structure of world politics includes norms in addition to identities. Shared, 
challenged and accepted by majority of people and communities as “social facts”, norms are those 
beliefs about the social and material world that lead actors to behave how they think they can and should 
in particular circumstances. These beliefs are not only limited to social rules and conventions, but they 
concern also the physical world and the laws of science. Thus, norms are both shared beliefs among 
actors that determine what is right, moral and proper 271 , and “beliefs about what is doable and 
effective”.272 Norms include shared beliefs that “are enacted in social practice, embedded in institutions 
and embodied in artefacts”.273 Resultantly, norms are far more than behaviour regulators; beyond that, 
they serve as factual underpinnings of meaningful action. 
There are several possible reasons why actors follow norms or behave in a normative fabric. Since 
norms hold the dominant belief in a society, they are often supported by sanctions or punishments. 
Thus, the first reason for actors to follow norms is to avoid such sanctions or being isolated by the 
society. Secondly, actors may act in accordance with norms in order to serve their self-interests. The 
third reason addresses norm-compliant behaviour in the absence of any incentives or sanctions (either 
sticks or carrots), in a way that rationalists cannot explain. In this respect, constructivists focus on the 
process of socialising actors through the following of norms. Armstrong suggests that: “This 
socialisation process may involve elite learning of new norms, institutionalisation of norms in official 
policy, community laws and organisational structures, and internalisation of norms in community 
discourse and culture”.274 While elite learning occurs at a fairly shallow level (it may be led by sanctions 
or self-interest), institutionalisation is crucial for empowering norms in community practice, and 
internalisation takes place as a deep learning process in which norms become legitimised and 
appropriate to actors. If a norm becomes internalised, it will be followed by actors automatically even 
at the cost of self-interest.275  
3.4.1. Norms and international law construction 
There has been an emerging critical constructivist approach in international law. Slaughter and others 
explore constructivism within the two disciplines of international relations and international law. For 
them, the constructivist approach holds that legal norms “play a constitutive role in the formation of 
actors’ identities and interests and in the structure of the international system itself”. 276  Martti 
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Koskenniemi and Shirley Scott, as constructivists, examine how legitimating discourses strengthen 
power relations in world politics.277 Both Koskenniemi and Scott seek to search for the power of 
international law in world politics. In this respect, they can be considered akin to the critical legal studies 
approach to international law. David Kennedy – a leading scholar of this approach – notes that critical 
legal studies aim for an in-depth survey, to “concentrate upon discourse and upon the hidden ideologies, 
attitudes and structures which lie behind discourses, rather than the subject matter of legal talk”.278 
Armstrong and others suggest four key contributions of (conventional) constructivists approach to 
international law:279 
First, constructivism focuses on norms – ethical, political and legal – to explain how international law 
operates in world politics. In contrast to what is being considered within a normative context in legal 
positivism and realism and also liberalism – that norms are rational in origin and operation – 
constructivists have a very different view. From this perspective, norms shape the social situations in 
which the roles of actors and “rules of the game” are defined. Constructivism argues that the logic 
behind inter-state relations and an actor’s behaviour are rooted in the distribution of identities and 
interests, not in the distribution of interests and power between actors. Constructivists also have a 
different notion of norms in comparison with that of legal process theory. Norms are central to both 
perspectives, and are attributed to social power. However, while legal process scholars seek to control 
that power to promote norms within a sustainable world public order, constructivism seek to explain 
that power. 
Different perspectives on the concept of structure is the second key contribution of constructivism in 
international law. For realists, it is only the distribution of power in the world system that creates 
structure. From the positivists’ point of view, international law is a system of legal rules that organises 
and regulates relations between states. However, material power is also critical for this positivist 
structure, in that rules operate based on state support (i.e., consent) or sanctions. In contrast to realism 
and positivism, constructivism examines the social structures of world politics. Martha Finnemore, a 
well-known constructivist scholar, points out that customary international law is like such a social 
structure; that is, it “exists only when there is a norm”, or simply when opinion juris exists and is 
consistent with state practice.280 In a similar way, Christian Reus-Smit introduces the most detailed 
constructivist approach to international law as a social structure. Considering international law as 
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“fundamental institutions”, which regulate inter-state relations, Reus-Smit observes that these 
institutions are “generic structural elements of international society”. 281  The practice of these 
institutions goes further than the distribution of power and interests in the world system. Reus-Smit’s 
fundamental institutions lie on a normative structure of the international system as a “constitutional 
structure”; that is, they include the moral purpose of the state, the norm of sovereignty, and the norm of 
pure procedural justice. 
In addition to contradictory perspectives on the concept of structure, constructivism has a different 
theoretical lens to examine the concept of agency in the world system. Its conception of agency 
recognises “the social foundation of state primacy and the role of non-state actors in influencing 
normative change”.282 Realist and positivist state-centrism focus on material power, which enables 
states only to ignore international law and the role of non-state actors (realism), and to create and break 
international legal rules (positivism). Constructivist scholars give prominence to the role of the norm 
of sovereignty in empowering states, highlighting “the social power of states by denaturalising the 
power that states take for granted”: the power to tax citizens, to control domestic markets and in this 
study to control natural resources like water.283 The norm of sovereignty provides legal status to states 
to legitimise these activities, and thereby achieve these material powers. Constructivism also considers 
the role of non-state actors in structuring normative changes, specifically by focusing on the process of 
changes.284 
Finally, in contrast with rationalism, constructivism recognises the drastic constitutive effects of 
international law in world politics. From the constructivist perspective, world politics encompasses the 
interplay of rational and social behaviour. In this respect, norms and identities socially determine 
rational action, and “norms are in turn often deployed rationally by ‘skilled users of culture’”. 285 
Stephen Toope points to the process of determining norms in which different beliefs and interests are 
inevitably competing with each other. Thus, world politics includes such norm construction, enactment 
and change.286 Reus-Smit argues that reason and action in world politics reflect “social identities, actor 
interests, shared moral principles and preferred means of action”.287 The politics of international law 
involves all these forms of reason and action through a process of social interaction. Constructivism 
argues that these social interactions endue actors with the power to transform their identities in world 
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politics. Harold Koh, a constructivist scholar, considers international law “a process of involving 
transnational networks of governmental and non-governmental actors”288, and this “transnational legal 
process is normative, dynamic and constitutive”.289 Koh defines three stages in a transnational legal 
process: first, there is an “interaction” between transnational actors; then, it progresses to the 
“interpretation” of an international norm; finally, it ends with an “internalisation” of that norm in the 
sub-national legal system of states. Accordingly, when Koh studies “why do nations obey international 
law”, he points to “internalised obedience” as the main reason, rather than “enforced compliance”.290 
In one sense, constructivists consider international law’s power at a deep level of the normative process 
that influences and shapes state behaviour. 
The constructivist perspective provides this thesis a framework to analyze how the ERU principle 
influence state’s interest and shape its identity, accordingly its behaviour. The following sub-section 
explores the fundamental theoretical contributions and concepts of “interactional international law” as 
developed by Brunnée and Toope, which represent important contributions to this thesis’s study of the 
role of legal principles in shaping hydropolitical relations.  
3.5. Interactional international law: the overarching framework 
Understanding the normative role of law in shaping state behaviour is an essential concept central to 
this study. This study’s main research question is: “How and to what extent does the equitable and 
reasonable utilisation principle (ERU) improve the hydropolitical relations of an international 
watercourse within anarchic geopolitical settings?”. After critically reviewing the debate concerning 
the importance of international law and how it works in the world politics, there is an initial need, 
therefore, to outline the theoretical explanation of the nexus between legal norms, and interest and 
identity of states: how do legal norms shape identities and persuade states to change their behaviour? 
This study uses the idea of “interactional international law” 291  – constructivist conception of 
international law – to develop an understanding of the nature of legal norms in international waters in 
order to examine its influence on anarchy and hydropolitical relations towards water conflict 
transformation. 
As already explained, constructivism has the most important contribution in both international relations 
and international law: offering the insights into the social processes in which international law is created 
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and operated.292 First, constructivists provide a complementary explanation of states’ behaviour to 
rationalists. Secondly, because of focusing on interaction, communication, and discourse analysis 
among actors, constructivism can shed light on legal reasoning and legal justification, and their 
relationship to legitimacy while other international relations theories cannot. In this respect, 
constructivism has contributed a great deal to understanding state’s compliance with international law 
and changes in behaviour. 293  The main point is that constructivists focus on the actors’ identity 
formation which is assumed to be relational and generator of actors’ interest. 294  Identities are 
constructed through social interaction. Constructivists explain how structure such as institutions, norms, 
and rules can shape social interactions,295 and foster “shared understanding” among actors by which 
both the identity and evolution of the structures can be shaped and recast.296  
The interactional international law, developed by Brunnée and Toop, connects constructivist 
approaches to the legal theory of Lon Fuller to better understand the function of legal obligation, and 
illustrate how shared legal norms emerge and shape social interaction.297 Fuller sees law “as enterprise 
and a social practice - a continuing challenge rather than a finished product.”298 Moreover, law is “a 
construction dependent upon mutual generative activity”, not as hierarchical ordering.299 In order to 
apply norms in specific context, “relatively stable patterns of expectation”, such as shared 
understanding in constructivism, must emerge through interactions.300 When the rules are broadly 
congruent with the practices and shared understandings among actors, they are persuasive, and legal 
systems assumed as legitimate. 301  The interactive understanding of law is understood by Fuller’s 
concept from two important respects. First, law is considered as a continuing activity, where social and 
legal norms exist on a continuum.302 This perspective of considering norms on a continuum provide 
possibility of influence of emerging norms even those do not yet achieve legal status.303 Second, within 
the continuum of norms, there are certain factors to distinguish legal norms from other social 
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ordering.304 That means when a social norm meets these criteria, then it can be considered as legal norm 
and expected to have a sense of legality among actors. 
Brunnée and Toop suggest three inter-related factors by which legal norms are distinguished: shared 
understanding, criteria of legality, and a practice of legality (Figure 8).305 In order to generate and 
maintain the obligatory effect of international law and distinctive legal legitimacy, Brunnée and Toop 
argue that norms must meet these factors.306 Moreover, they note that commitment to law is promoted 
and legality is sustained over time if a legal norm can be practiced through these inter-related processes; 
otherwise, law does not have the obligatory effect.307 Therefore, law is “legitimate”, only when it is 
generated and maintained through the interactional approach. In sum, interactional law is built in three 
steps: 1) creation of social legitimacy through shared understanding, 2) providing the criteria of legality 
for norms in order to create legal legitimacy, and 3) reinforcing the emerging shared understanding and 
legal norms through a robust practice of legality.308 
 
Figure 8. The framework of Interactional International Law 
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In addition, interactional international law emphasises the processes of active participation for creating 
shared understanding. Social actors in this framework are not limited only to states, but other 
intergovernmental organisations and individuals. Therefore, a law effectively influences states’ 
behaviour and their interactions only if it is “broadly congruent with the practices and patterns in 
society”. 309  In this respect, shared understandings are the underpinnings of law. However, the 
enforcement of law and its effectiveness depend to the extent that those shared understandings “be 
intertwined with distinctive internal qualities of law and practices of legality”.310 In addition to shared 
understanding, a legal norm should meet the criteria of legality in order to generate “a distinctive legal 
legitimacy and a sense of commitment”.311 These features of legality are: generality, promulgation, non-
retroactivity, clarity, non-contradiction, not asking the impossible, constancy, and congruence between 
rules and official action. These features explain how a treaty which is formally binding on the parties 
may not generate a sense of obligation when the treaty fails to meet the above-mentioned criteria of 
legality. Therefore, interactional international law provides deep understanding of why a formal rule 
which fails to meet the legality and practice does not result in state compliance. In Chapter 6 of this 
thesis, the criteria of legality are practically explained and examined through the analysis of the case 
study.   
In order to study changes in state behaviour and hydropolitical relations of an international watercourse 
within an anarchic context, the framework of interactional international law will be employed to 
understand the influence and role of the ERU principle. Considering it merely within formal concept, 
while there might be a prevailing thought that international water law has little contribution to shaping 
the hydropolitical relations, interactional understanding of law shows the opposite. Drawing upon this 
framework of interactional international law, the ERU principle comes to shape the hydropolitical 
relations of riparian states if it rests on above mentioned three factors of “the life cycle of norms”. 
Interactionalism explains that the process of creation of shared understandings between riparian states 
about what they want to achieve through the ERU principle, even if it is very time-consuming, is vital 
necessary to establish an effective regulatory framework.312 Therefore, the effectiveness of the ERU 
principle is seen through how it shapes collective identity and how it promotes compliance by producing 
persuasive international discourses about what is legitimate concerning water utilisation of international 
watercourses. Shared understanding, therefore, is the first crucial step in building interactional law, and 
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it creates the platform of knowledge or norms that shape the perception of actors about themselves, their 
interests and priorities, and their arguments. Creation of shared understanding, unavoidably, requires 
processes of active participation and cooperation.  
The aforementioned constructivist reading of international law will be combined with three cultures of 
anarchy – already explained in Chapter 2 – and placed into TWINS framework to capture the influence 
of the ERU principle on conflict and cooperation surrounding international watercourses. This thesis 
will test this understanding through the historic hydropolitical arrangements of the Helmand river Basin, 
and influence of international customary law in shaping riparian states’ behaviour of the Helmand. The 
underlying idea is to examine the extent to which the ERU principle can reconstruct the interest and 
identity of riparian states within a particular set of criteria, and it accordingly has capacity to influence 
the power relations and anarchy’s symptoms and transform water conflict. 
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Chapter 4. Making sense of hydropolitical relations: theoretical underpinnings 
4.1.  Introduction 
The main original contribution of the thesis, as already explained, lies in its focus on the underlying 
anarchic geopolitical structure (detailed in Chapter 2), and on the role of legal norms to shape the 
interests and identities of states within that structure (see Chapters 3). The study attempts to analyse 
critically hydropolitical relations under anarchic settings. As described in Chapter 2, anarchy plays a 
crucial role in shaping the behaviour of states and thus the hydropolitical relations concerning 
transboundary river basins. It is also acknowledged that the behaviour of states and the hydropolitical 
relations at the basin level must be understood to be at the crossroads between international anarchy, 
and geopolitical and domestic circumstances at regional and state levels, respectively.   
This chapter focuses on understanding hydropolitical relations and defining the accordant theoretical 
underpinnings of this study. This leads to a consideration of the function of anarchy within 
hydropolitical relations. This part of the chapter opens with a review of hydropolitical literature 
concerning the analysis of conflict and cooperation in international watercourses, and distinguishes the 
approach of this analysis from those precedent studies. Subsequent to this, the chapter provides a 
discussion of the concept of power, which plays an important role in the analysis of how states utilise 
legal principles in anarchic settings to their own advantage. This chapter will therefore provide a basic 
platform to analyse the behaviour of riparian states respecting international watercourses in highly 
anarchic geopolitical settings, in addition to those already illustrated obstacles in Chapter 2 with which 
riparian states are confronted when attempting to adopt equitable legal principles within such settings. 
Expanding the focus of this study by closely examining the geopolitical history of the Helmand River 
(Chapter 6) provides a more comprehensive approach to the study of its water diplomacy, and illustrates 
the complex political dimensions and interactions between the riparian states concerned.  
4.2. The quest for understanding water conflict and cooperation 
The examination of hydropolitical relations over international watercourses, per se, while riding on 
varied theoretical waves, mainly rests on theories of international relations. 313  Any theoretical 
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examination of “hydropolitics”314 will centre mainly on four general questions: What is the nature of 
hydropolitical relations in the context of “water conflict” and/or “water cooperation”? What causes 
conflict and/or cooperation, and how? What is the relationship between state behaviour and 
hydropolitical relations? Finally, how can hydropolitical relations be improved and transformed towards 
equity and justice? Answering these questions requires an understanding of the natures, structures, 
processes, and outcomes of hydropolitical relations. This in turn requires knowledge of how, when, and 
in what contextual condition states engage in conflict and cooperation over transboundary waters: How 
conflict and cooperation over sharing waters of an international watercourse may be shaped by 
considering the influence of anarchy, and what will be the outcome of hydropolitical relations? The 
analysis may have a wide range of answers, differentiated principally by their emphasis on diversity of 
theoretical variables; for example, actors, power, interests, discourses, and beliefs. There have been 
various theoretical frameworks associated with the field of international relations seeking to 
comprehend how states conduct their behaviour within hydropolitical relations.315 From the pessimistic 
explanation of neorealism to the optimistic view of neoliberal institutionalism, and the cognitive and 
normative approaches of constructivism and critical theory, all can offer many insights into the issues 
surrounding transboundary waters.  
However, hydropolitical relations should not be treated as a simple version of conflict or cooperation 
over shared waters. Hydropolitical relations rather reflect part of a system of world politics so complex 
and interconnected, that even critical explanations – those criticising the mainstream approaches – may 
become part of its machinations. However, compounding different variables and using the various 
theoretical lenses adopted in this study may offer a fuller picture of the complex constituents of 
hydropolitical relations that are often ignored: anarchy, geopolitical history, normative power (here the 
power of legal norms), and the role of identity in shaping states’ behaviour. This multi-component 
approach prevents this study from treating the complexity of hydropolitical relations in a vacuum. 
To get a sense of the interconnected, complex, and dynamic hydropolitical system, the recent 
hydropolitical disturbances concerning the Nile can be used as an example. In October 2019, Russia 
offered to mediate a dispute between Egypt and Ethiopia (the latter of which may be considered weak 
in terms of material power particularly within an anarchic setting) concerning the Grand Ethiopian 
Renaissance Dam (GERD).316 A draft agreement was instead proposed by the US, but Ethiopia refused 
 
314 The term “hydropolitics” introduced by Waterbury (1979) is politics affected by the water resources. John 
Waterbury, ‘Hydropolitics of the Nile Valley’ [1979] . 
315 See n 313. 
316 Vladimir Isachenkov and Cara Anna, ‘Putin courts Africa, offers to mediate Nile dam dispute’ Putin courts 
Africa, offers to mediate Nile dam dispute’ AP NEWS (24 October 2019) 
https://apnews.com/article/22ed02597e9a415a9cc5cefe3ab48caf accessed 13 January 2021. 
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to sign it, and then skipped talks in Washington, D.C. in late February 2020.317 This resulted in an 
extensive diplomatic tour by Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sameh Shoukry of Arab, African, 
and European countries in an effort to shore up support for Egypt in the Nile dam dispute against 
Ethiopia.318 While as recently as 2016 some of Egypt’s historical Arab allies, including Saudi Arabia 
and Qatar, showed a political interest in supporting Ethiopia in dam disputes,319 which is argued by 
some to agitate Egypt,320 it now seems that they stand again behind Egypt. And, then just recently in 
October 2020, Ethiopia said that threats of any kind over the dam were “misguided, unproductive and 
clear violations of international law”, coming after US President Donald Trump’s shocking remark to 
“blow up that dam”.321 
Within the historical hydropolitical vicissitudes of the Nile, the behaviour and positions of the riparian 
states and external actors have seen radical changes in the context of conflict and cooperation over 
shared waters, which partly reflect the broader anarchic geopolitical circumstances of the basin. 
However, while the current diplomatic efforts of Egypt concerning the Nile dam disputes against 
Ethiopia remains far from the status of “water war”, it is still too early to foretell whether these shifts 
in the political atmosphere of transboundary water negotiations will end in equitable and sustainable 
cooperation. While legal principles manifest themselves more than before in political discourses 
between Egypt and Ethiopia, and cooperation at a technical level exists, national identities are also 
crucial influences on their behaviour. The dam itself has been described as a symbol of the national 
identity of Ethiopia, a revival of a great nation in defiance of its disregarded rights under former colonial 
agreements.322 For Egypt, the dam is contrastingly considered a serious threat to its national security 
and political survival.323 Consequently, the ideological perception of water and its role in building the 
identity of states (and societies) are the key drivers for the promotion or hampering of cooperation. This 
 
317 Africanews, ‘Ethiopia 'disappointed' with US mediation in Nile dam dispute’ Africanews (1 March 2020) 
https://www.africanews.com/2020/03/01/ethiopia-disappointed-with-us-mediation-in-nile-dam-dispute 
accessed 13 January 2021. 
318  Ayah Aman, ‘Egypt steps up diplomatic action in Nile dam dispute’ Al-Monitor https://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/03/egypt-international-support-ethiopia-nile-dam-dispute.html accessed 13 
January 2021.  
319  Middle East Eye, ‘Egypt-Gulf relations tested by Saudi visit to Ethiopia dam’ Middle East Eye 
https://www.middleeasteye.net/fr/news/egyptian-gulf-relations-take-new-dip-after-saudi-delegation-visits-
ethiopia-dam-30425904 accessed 13 January 2021. 
320 n 319. 
321 Reuters, ‘Ethiopia says it will not cave to 'aggression' in dam dispute’ Reuters https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-
usa-ethiopia/ethiopia-says-it-will-not-cave-to-aggression-in-dam-dispute-idUKKBN2790BY accessed 13 
January 2021. 
322 See, for instance, Ana Elisa Cascão and Alan Nicol, ‘Gerd: New Norms of Cooperation in the Nile Basin?’ 
[2016] 41 Water International 550. See also Hussein ‘‘Small Is Beautiful but Not Trendy’ (n 19). And, Ramy 
Hanna and Jeremy Allouche, ‘Water Nationalism in Egypt: State-Building, Nation-Making and Nile Hydro-
Politics’ in (Routledge 2018). 
323 n 322. 
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multi-causal mix of conflict and cooperation environing international transboundary waters is evident 
in similarly prominent examples that are generally treated in the same complex way as the Nile: such 
is the case with the continued presence of contested behaviour amid conflict and cooperation over the 
Danube (in particular, Gabcikovo-Nagymaros dispute), Euphrates-Tigris, Indus, Jordan, Mekong, and 
Helmand rivers, among others. 
A potentially significant change in the understanding international water politics has been the 
redefinition of hydropolitical relations as “conflict-cooperation coexistence”. 324  It is desirable to 
understand the motives of states that are conducive to the co-presence of cooperation and conflict over 
waters and the impellents behind changes to hydropolitical relations. But these motives are in turn 
determined by a wide range of variables, including national interests, identities and values, internal and 
external political and economic factors, the geographical position and the physical and hydrological 
features of the river basin, alternative water resources, and the nature of the international power 
structure, which determine the respective pay-offs from cooperation and conflict. These constitute the 
foreign policy of riparian states and thus the hydropolitical relations respecting transboundary river 
basins.  
Many substantial studies have been conducted to explore the extent to which freshwater issues affect 
the likelihood of violence and war, or of peace.325 From this research, since the 1980s, a controversial 
debate, largely originating from war and peace and environmental security studies, has arisen in the 
realm of hydropolitics concerning the conflict-cooperation dichotomy of transboundary waters, with 
two main groups focusing on the potential of water to either cause conflict or facilitate cooperation.326 
In contrast, over the last decade, interdisciplinary studies, in the field of “critical” hydropolitics, pay 
attention to the “co-existence” of conflict and cooperation, and explore the political interactions 
between riparian states and examine the role of power, discourses, and strategies in shaping 
hydropolitical relations and states’ behaviour in different river basins.327 The following sections will 
 
324 See Zeitoun and Warner (n 9). 
325 For extensive literature review, see, for instance, Mirumachi (n 194). See also Susanne Schmeier, ‘Governing 
International Watercourses-Perspectives from Different Disciplines: A Comprehensive Literature Review’ 
[2010]  Hertie School of Governance Working Paper. And, Jeroen Warner and others, ‘Transboundary ‘Hydro-
Hegemony’: 10 Years Later Hydro-Hegemony 10 Years After’ [2017] 4 WIREs Water Wiley Interdisciplinary 
Reviews: Water e1242. 
326 For more detailed analysis, see Warner ‘Three Lenses’ (n 19). 
327  For extensive discussion, see Ana Elisa Cascão and Mark Zeitoun, ‘Power, Hegemony and Critical 
Hydropolitics’ [2010] 27 Transboundary water management principles and practice 42. Among others, see also 
Zeitoun and Warner (n 9); Jan Selby, ‘Dressing up Domination as ‘Cooperation’: The Case of Israeli-Palestinian 
Water Relations’ [2003]  Review of International Studies 121; Hussam Hussein and Mattia Grandi, ‘Dynamic 
Political Contexts and Power Asymmetries: The Cases of the Blue Nile and the Yarmouk Rivers’ [2017] 17 
International environmental agreements: Politics, law and economics 795; Filippo Menga, ‘Reconceptualizing 
Hegemony: The Circle of Hydro-Hegemony’ [2016] 18 Water policy 401; Jeroen Warner and Neda Zawahri, 
‘Hegemony and Asymmetry: Multiple-Chessboard Games on Transboundary Rivers’ [2012] 12 International 
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review three main theoretical narratives concerning water conflict and cooperation and then call for the 
significance of the focus on the concepts of equity and identity in hydropolitical relations.  
4.2.1. “Water war” narrative: water as a “causative” or “contributive” factor of “war”  
To answer the question, “do disputes over water cause conflict?”, one group of scholars, whose ideas 
mainly derive from neo-Malthusian and neorealist state-centric security theories,328 regards water as 
especially problematic. This group, which emerged out of the early post-Cold War era, believes that a 
scarcity of water (and environmental degradation) in unstable political conditions may lead to armed 
conflict, or “water wars”. Considered in the light of population growth, economic development, and 
climate change, transboundary waters, mostly within a deterministic approach, have also been seen by 
this group as a threat to cooperative actions, diplomacy, and international security and stability, making 
states “vulnerable”.329  
Research into the causal pathway of “water scarcity” to conflict and instability has also found a common 
basis in what is known in security studies as a defence or “security dilemma”, which has related fields 
such as “environmental security” and “climate change security”.330 Most such narratives have been 
selectively focused on arid and semi-arid regions, mainly the Middle East and North Africa. 
Accordingly, some scholars argue that competition over a physical scarcity of water resources, which 
are vital to these “overpopulated” regions, leads to inter-state conflicts, instability, and war. Such 
“problem-oriented” narratives of “water wars” – which continually appear in conjunction with climate 
and environmental problems – have also been picked up by some think-tanks, appear a lot in the 
headlines of several media, drive some foreign policies, and shape politicians’ discourses.331  
Thomas Homer-Dixon, while analysing several transboundary rivers, defined the links between 
different types of natural resources and conflict.332 He argued that of all situations in which there is 
insufficiency of some collective means of support for a country or countries, a scarcity of water 
 
Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 215; Mohsen Nagheeby and Jeroen Warner, ‘The 
Geopolitical Overlay of the Hydropolitics of the Harirud River Basin’ [2018] 18 International environmental 
agreements : politics, law and economics 839. 
328 Neo-Malthusians believe that a natural resource scarcity such as water scarcity makes states vulnerable. Such 
vulnerability, especially if it depends on outside of their national borders, is perceived as threats, requiring urgent 
state action. Such actions on shared water resources lead to conflict which is called “water wars”. See Schmeier 
(n 325).  
329 See Schmeier (n 325). 
330 Jennifer Veilleux and Shlomi Dinar, ‘A Geospatial Analysis of Water-Related Risk to International Security: 
An Assessment of Five Countries’ [2019]  GeoJournal 1. See also Dinar (n 86). 
331 See Cascão (n 342) for further discussions and some contemporary examples in “water war” narratives. 
332 Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, ‘On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict’ [1991] 16 
intesecu International Security 76.  
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resources is the leading cause of armed conflict within states.333 For Homer-Dixon, decreases in quality 
and quantity of freshwater resources lead to environmental scarcity, that lead to social and economic 
conflict, which in turn lead to violence.334 For “water war” narrators, “the world is sinking like the 
Titanic while the band merrily plays on”.335 When Malthusian theory is applied to recurring “water 
crises”, the expectation is that population growth will inevitably outstrip food and water availability, 
which will likely lead to instability and war.336 Homer-Dixon then refines his initial argument, and notes 
that scarcity is “mainly an indirect cause of violence and this violence is mainly internal to countries.”337 
However, water scarcity plays, in this view, a significant role as security threats (“securitisation”)338 
which is prone to violent conflict. 
Building upon this, then, the line of Malthusian thought over “water causality” and war, which sees 
water scarcity more as a threat to security, has developed in response to its numerous critics. Being still 
influenced by the “water war” discourse, some scholars and water policy analysts seek to answer the 
query, “How do we prevent water wars?” Rejecting the “water causality” assumption (i.e. water scarcity 
as the main cause for insecurity), the water “securitisation” trend tends to position water scarcity as a 
“contributive” element which often interacts with other variables in relation to violence, instability, 
conflict, and war. The proponents of this interpretation argue that water scarcity is an integral part of 
security when it threatens the long-term political viability of a state or regime, or when it weakens their 
capacity to act effectively, which if not remedied, leads to political instability or even war.339 Violent 
conflict, in this sense, does not emerge because of water alone. Related scholars, however, blame social 
and political systems for a rise in water-related tensions because of their failure to provide the basic 
services of water provision/allocation between actors, and therefore, to resolve water related 
 
333 Homer-Dixon, however, in another further research, argued that scarcity is “mainly an indirect cause of 
violence, and this violence is mainly internal to countries”. Thomas Dixon-Hommer, Environment, Scarcity and 
Violence (New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1999) p. 18. 
334 See n 333. 
335 Quoted in Warner ‘Three Lenses’ (n 19) p. 175. 
336 “Water crisis” has been used to explain the conflicts in Darfur, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. Such idea has been 
criticised by some scholars like Jan Selby. See, for instance, Jan Selby, ‘Climate Change and the Syrian Civil 
War, Part Ii: The Jazira’s Agrarian Crisis’ [2019] 101 Geoforum 260. 
337 Homer-Dixon (n 333) p. 18. 
338 Over the last few decades, growing attention to environmental issues within the political agenda has led to an 
increased “discursive construction of [these] particular issues as security threat[s]”. The move to 
“securitisation,” which demands “extraordinary measures in order to deal with that specific challenge,” 
ultimately results in “depoliticisation” since it represents “a failure to deal with issues of normal politics”. 
Hussein and Grandi (n 327) p. 797. 
339 For more information, see Veilleux and Dinar (n 330). 
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disagreements.340 By making a long list of the social, political, geographical, and economic variables 
that shape national objectives and demands, advocates of this way of thinking also note that the 
argument “water scarcity causes conflict” must be filtered through a number of variables.341  
One leading scholar of this contributive approach in the context of international river basins is Peter 
Gleick. One of Gleick’s contributions has been to present the knowledge that enables a forecast of when 
and where conflict and instability are likeliest to occur due to a “water crisis” and environmental 
degradation, however, in an approach similar to that of Homer-Dixon and from an “environmental 
security” perspective. While Gleick’s basic assumptions and conclusions are aligned with the neorealist 
view, his call to find solutions to water “problems” through international law, institutions, and data 
exchanges may place his ideas in the bounds of liberal institutionalism.   
Notwithstanding, many scholars criticise the “water war” narrative together with all versions of the 
“causative” or “contributive” nature of water scarcity – and those “predictive” or “preventive” – as 
being not only overly deterministic in their approach but also problematic.342 Jeremy Allouche, for 
instance, challenges the causality of water scarcity, and notes that disputes arise rather from the 
allocation of water resources than the water alone. 343  Sceptics of this trend also argue that the 
deterministic picture of “water causality” of hydropolitics disregards both other local drivers and the 
importance of geopolitical context.344 Their concern is that water securitisation puts pressure on the 
existing international order, negatively affecting on other connected global issues, such as terrorism and 
intercontinental migration. They believe that a biased selection of case studies of this trend has negative 
effects on understanding the complexities of hydropolitics, by ignoring or undervaluing the presence of 
cooperative actions. In addition, such a “selective use of evidence and/or the disproportionate and ill-
informed attention to specific complex and contested rivers” leads to the over-securitisation of water 
resources, and sends wrong messages to policy makers.345 Water might be a big card in the both regional 
and global political settings and games, and even might be used as a military target. Therefore, one gets 
 
340  See, for instance, Peter Gleick, ‘Water Resources, Climate Change, and the Destabilization of Modern 
Mesopotamia’ in Water, Security and Us Foreign Policy (Routledge 2017). Peter Gleick and Charles Iceland, 
‘Water, Security, and Conflict’ [2018]  Issue Brief: World Resource Institute and Pacific Institute. 
341 See Veilleux and Dinar (n 330). Peter H. Gleick, Water and Conflict : Fresh Water Resources and International 
Security (President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1993). 
342 See in this respect, Ana Elisa Cascão and others, Why Are Water Wars Back on the Agenda? And Why We 
Think It's a Bad Idea! (FLOWs. The Water Governance Blog at IHE Delft Institute for Water Education 2018). 
343 Jeremy Allouche, The Governance of Central Asian Waters: National Interests Versus Regional Cooperation 
(2007). 
344 See Cascão (n 342). 
345 Cascão (n 342). 
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the impression that water might be mainly a tool of political pressure and control, and not exactly what 
the countries are “fighting” for.  
Even in “contributive” discourses, while they may correctly address the “failure of social and political 
systems” for a probable water violent conflict, find that their analyses are seriously flawed due to several 
reasons. The analytical priority of their “multi-causal” models still remains shackled by the stress on 
“water causality” and “war” over other factors. In a sense, that such models of thinking highly give their 
attention to finding a link between “conflict” and water “crisis” in their selected cases may ultimately 
create an imminent threat even if none exists in reality. Thus, any such undue and exclusive attention 
misinforms the analysis. The important point is that analysing the causality of water scarcity certainly 
must not distract from addressing the root causes of conflict. One way of capturing the root causes is to 
examine how these mostly non-violent water conflicts contribute to the broader (international) and geo-
political context, and then how we address them. Furthermore, the analysis and interpretation of these 
multivariables is questionable due to doubts at the accuracy of coding and ambiguity of the terminology 
used.346 While there might be efforts among this kind of analysis worthy of use as “early-warning tools” 
to predict conflict and accordingly pre-act before further escalation, they fall into a similar theoretical 
trap as the causative discourse. Since this alternate paradigm is fixated with “conflict”, “violence”, and 
“war”, water scarcity is again placed as a major factor in their selective “conflict hotspots”.347 Further, 
the data and sources used are arguably of doubtful credibility in addition to the case studies employed 
being limited by their partial selection.348 Such a modern, tool-based analysis is in fact unable to account 
for the realities in local resilience, social solidarity and cultural cohesion of those traditional societies 
in the selected arid and semi-arid case studies, which often become apparent in times of disaster and 
conflict.349 As a result, too pessimistic an outlook on water scarcity may even destroy constructive 
cooperation with regard to transboundary waters and, indeed, damage the socio-economic, multi-level, 
interdependent norms of the riparian states.350 Such misinformed understandings may result in overly 
subjective judgements, which appear to mainly serve either the security interests of certain outsiders’ 
foreign policy agendas or political interests of some groups of insiders, might be highly dangerous in 
 
346 See, for instance, Asit K Biswas and Cecilia Tortajada, Water Crisis and Water Wars: Myths and Realities 
(Taylor & Francis 2019). See also Kristine Eck, ‘In Data We Trust? A Comparison of Ucdp Ged and Acled 
Conflict Events Datasets’ [2012] 47 Cooperation and Conflict 124 
347 There have been growing “global” tools for prediction of conflict with the focus on water conflict. For instance, 
the Dutch government-funded Water, Peace and Security (WPS) has established “global early warning tool” and 
presented it to the UN Security Council. With selected case studies, with a focus mostly on “South” and 
invalidated data base, the results may look questionable. 
348 See footnote n 346. 
349 My personal experience in particular in the regions struggling with poverty like Sistan (in Iran) or Zaranj (in 
Afghanistan) shows that people relatively deal better with problems like water scarcity and collaborate with 
each other more than those regions with less problems. 
350 See Cascão (n 342). 
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practice if linked to global politics within international anarchic system, being far from the stated intent 
to prevent war and bring peace.  
4.2.2. “Water peace” narrative: water as a way towards “peace”  
This second group, being more optimistic in their outlook, introduce the idea of “water for peace” and 
the potential for regional hydropolitical cooperation, rather than looking at water as a threat to 
security.351 They assume that conflict over water resources, even in regions where these resources are 
scant, eventually leads to joint efforts based on a network of common interests and benefit-sharing 
respecting water.352 Looking at “water crises” as both a threat and opportunity, they believe that an 
“impeding crisis triggers systems to become more resilient, flexible and sustainable”.353 Now, the 
questions shift to: “What explains cooperation between states? Is there an intermediary variable that 
disrupts the causal relation between scarcity and violence?”354 
After having contemplated historical conflicts and theoretical approaches, they believe that water and 
its specific characteristics hold the potential for regional and international cooperation for shared water 
resources.355  Aaron Wolf is a well-known, leading scholar in this group. Wolf, in his pioneering 
historical study, correctly asserted that “war over water is neither strategically rational, 
hydrographically effective, nor economically viable”.356 Since then, there have been numerous grounds 
on which the claims by “water war” scholars have been open to challenge. Significant studies in vast 
numbers and with different focuses have been conducted not only to criticise but also to present the 
very opposite of what “water war” fans argue. 
Many studies have sought to show how technological and diplomatic efforts concerned with the “low 
politics” of water scarcity could lead to cooperation rather than conflict. 357  In addition, when 
 
351  See, for instance, Aaron T Wolf, ‘“Water Wars” and Water Reality: Conflict and Cooperation Along 
International Waterways’ in Environmental Change, Adaptation, and Security (Springer 1999). 
352 See Claudia W Sadoff and David Grey, ‘Beyond the River: The Benefits of Cooperation on International 
Rivers’ [2002] 4 Water policy 389. See also Claudia W Sadoff and David Grey, ‘Beyond the River: The Benefits 
of Cooperation on International Rivers’ [2002] 4 Water policy 389. 
353 Quoted in Warner ‘Three Lenses’ (n 19) p. 179. 
354 Warner ‘Three Lenses’ (n 19) p. 179. 
355 See Wolf (n 351). See also David Phillips and others, Trans-Boundary Water Cooperation as a Tool for 
Conflict Prevention and Broader Benefit-Sharing (Ministry for Foreign Affairs Stockholm 2006); Anders 
Jägerskog, ‘Why States Cooperate over Shared Water: The Water Negotiations in the Jordan River Basin’ 
(Linköping University Electronic Press 2003). 
356 Wolf (n 351) p.261. See also Anthony Turton, ‘Water Wars: Enduring Myth or Impending Reality?’ [2000]  
Hussein Solomon et Anthony Turton (sous la dir), Water Wars: enduring myth or impending reality 165; Lucia 
De Stefano and others, ‘Tracking Cooperation and Conflict in International Basins: Historic and Recent Trends’ 
[2010] 12 Water Policy 871. 
357 Sadoff and Grey (n 352). See also Undala Z Alam, ‘Questioning the Water Wars Rationale: A Case Study of 
the Indus Waters Treaty’ [2002] 168 Geographical Journal 341. 
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endeavouring to challenge the message that “water scarcity leads to war”, some scholars show that 
virtual water trade,358 new technologies,359 cultural similarities,360 and benefit-sharing in both water and 
non-water matters,361 are effective ways to reduce water scarcity, and therefore promote cooperation. 
They understand that, “as much as water may divide groups of people and pit countries against each 
other, water as the most basic human need appears to mobilise countries [...] toward common thinking 
and a common agenda”.362 This line of thought, often but not always and mainly through a “solution-
oriented” approach, gives the priority to the opportunities that provide “peace” (and equality) over 
waters regardless of (or with less attention to) equity and fairness. Originated mainly from “western” 
social justice of utilitarianism,363 some scholars of this group - and not all - believe that even “bad law 
is better than no law”. Accordingly, any water related solution that can bring “peace” is likely acceptable 
and is not labelled unfair or inequitable, even if it does not appear very reasonable.364 
In the quest for inducing peace, scholars of the water as peacebuilder idea argue that potential conflict 
can be replaced by the cooperative potential of shared water resources,365 and provides political benefits 
and “win-win” outcomes.366 In this regard, Wolf points out that, in spite of the inherent disputes over 
international waters, some “creative approaches” can bring a positive-sum, i.e., integrative water 
allocation. 367  Claudia Sadoff and David Grey propose four kinds of cooperation benefits 
(environmental, direct economic, political, and indirect economic) derivable from international 
rivers.368 They weigh up the benefits of cooperation and costs of non-cooperation over international 
rivers. They argue that conflict is unlikely to issue from international rivers; rather, international rivers 
 
358 See John Anthony Allan, ‘Virtual Water-the Water, Food, and Trade Nexus. Useful Concept or Misleading 
Metaphor?’ [2003] 28 Water international 106. 
359 Wolf (n 351). 
360 See, for instance, Jack Kalpakian, ‘Identity, Conflict and Cooperation in International River Systems’ [2018] . 
See also Lawrence Susskind and Shafiqul Islam, ‘Water Diplomacy: Creating Value and Building Trust in 
Transboundary Water Negotiations’ [2012] 1 Science & Diplomacy 1. 
361 See n. 356 and n. 357. 
362 Quoted in Hubert HG Savenije and Pieter Van der Zaag, ‘Conceptual Framework for the Management of 
Shared River Basins; with Special Reference to the Sadc and Eu’ [2000] 2 Water policy 9 p. 12. 
363 Zeitoun ‘Transboundary Water Justice’ (n 20). 
364 Zeitoun ‘Transboundary Water Justice’ (n 20). 
365 There was also one programme in UNESCO named PCCP referred the Potential Conflict to Cooperation 
Potential. “PCCP is an associated programme ... to facilitate multi-level and interdisciplinary dialogues in order 
to foster peace, cooperation and development related to the management of transboundary water resources” 
(source: www.unesco.org). 
366 Such ideas have been mainly grounded on “interdependency” theory with a focus on the economic value of 
water. See Sadoff and Grey (n 352); Wolf (n 351). 
367 Wolf (n 351). See also Aaron T Wolf, ‘Shared Waters: Conflict and Cooperation’ [2007] 32 Annu Rev Environ 
Resour 241; Jacob D Petersen-Perlman, Jennifer C Veilleux and Aaron T Wolf, ‘International Water Conflict 
and Cooperation: Challenges and Opportunities’ [2017] 42 Water International 105. 
368 Sadoff and Grey (n 352). 
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facilitate peace and cooperation among states. Yoffe and others (2003) provide indicators for analysing 
the extent of potential risk in an international basin, and identify the degree of conflict or cooperation.369 
Grey and Sadoff argue that although achieving basic “water security” may lead to competition over 
water and form a source of conflict, there have been other regional non-water assets (e.g. roads and 
energy) that facilitate water cooperation and sustain water security.370 Moreover, Hubert Savenije and 
Pieter van der Zaag present a conceptual framework, based on integrated water resources management, 
to turn potential conflicts into constructive cooperation. 371  Mostafa Dolatyar and Tim Gray, by 
challenging the “water war” discourses in the Middle East argue that “water scarcity has invariably 
been a platform for cooperation in the region” and conclude that mutual interests have resulted in more 
instances of cooperation with regard to water scarcity.372  
These discourses on water cooperation and peace-building originated in parallel with the liberal peace-
building paradigm, which have blossomed since the end of the Cold War.373 In a similar way, some 
other scholars, working with neoliberal institutionalism, suggest that institutions can promote 
cooperation among riparian states. 374  Susanne Schmeier’s research contributes greatly to our 
understanding of the effectiveness of River Basin Organisations (RBOs) in improving water resources 
management.375 Oliver Hensengerth looks at how transboundary water cooperation can be strengthened 
through participatory governance. 376  Furthermore, water law scholars emphasise the role of legal 
principles and norms to promote institutionalised cooperation. 377  Global international Water Law 
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Selby, ‘Oil and Water: The Contrasting Anatomies of Resource Conflicts’ [2005] 40 Government and opposition 
200. 
373 And chiefly from functionalist theory. See Karin Aggestam and Anna Sundell-Eklund, ‘Situating Water in 
Peacebuilding: Revisiting the Middle East Peace Process’ [2014] 39 Water International 10. 
374 See, for instance, Jägerskog (355). 
375  For extensive discussion, see Susanne Schmeier, Governing International Watercourses: River Basin 
Organizations and the Sustainable Governance of Internationally Shared Rivers and Lakes (Routledge 2013). 
See also Anoulak Kittikhoun and Susanne Schmeier, River Basin Organizations in Water Diplomacy (Routledge 
2020). 
376 See Oliver Hensengerth, ‘Transboundary River Cooperation and the Regional Public Good: The Case of the 
Mekong River’ [2009]  Contemporary Southeast Asia 326. 
377  See, for instance, Eyal Benvenisti, Sharing Transboundary Resources: International Law and Optimal 
Resource Use, vol 23 (Cambridge University Press 2002); Owen McIntyre, ‘The Role of Customary Rules and 
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frameworks such as the UN Watercourses Convention and the 1992 Water Convention on the Protection 
and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes have also been cited as influencers on 
transboundary water relations (hereinafter Water Convention).378  
This approach underlines the possibility of fostering cooperation and trust-building, beginning in areas 
of low politics and spreading to matters of high politics. Further stressed is the importance of 
depoliticising the disputed issues and working, first and foremost, towards cooperation on technical 
issues and the sharing of scientific knowledge.379 In this view, cooperation on depoliticised issues as 
the independent variable could positively influence dependent variables like trust, certainty, and 
confidence among the hostile actors.380 Likewise, some studies have focused on the intra-state level and 
have illustrated the significance of the impacts of enhancing knowledge and education systems,381 and 
local discourses and identities on hydropolitical relations.382 
4.2.3. “Co-existent” water conflict-cooperation 
Inherently emanating from different neorealist or neoliberalist understandings of the concept of 
“security”,383 both of the above-mentioned groups theoretically isolate conflict from cooperation by 
exclusively focusing either on conflict or on cooperation as a result of transboundary water utilisation. 
This set of dichotomous narratives has been examined specially from the critical perspective. The 
leading scholarly group among this branch of critical thought belongs to the London Water Research 
Group, and in particular, Mark Zeitoun, Jeroen Warner, Naho Mirumachi, and Ana Cascão. Zeitoun 
observes that “not all [water] cooperation is pretty” i.e., leading to equitable water allocation 
outcomes,384 and it has been contended that focusing overmuch on water war or water peace lacks 
 
Principles of International Environmental Law in the Protection of Shared International Freshwater Resources’ 
[2006]  Natural Resources Journal 157; Alistair Rieu-Clarke and Ruby Moynihan, Transboundary Water 
Governance and Climate Change Adaptation: International Law, Policy Guidelines and Best Practice 
Application (UNESCO Publishing 2015); Dinara Ziganshina, Promoting Transboundary Water Security in the 
Aral Sea Basin through International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2014). 
378 McCaffrey (n 39); Rieu-Clarke (n 235); Ruby Moynihan and Bjørn‐Oliver Magsig, ‘The Rising Role of 
Regional Approaches in International Water Law: Lessons from the Unece Water Regime and H Imalayan a Sia 
for Strengthening Transboundary Water Cooperation’ [2014] 23 Review of European, Comparative & 
International Environmental Law 43. 
379 Jägerskog (355). 
380 Jägerskog (355).  
381 Léna Salamé and Pieter Van der Zaag, ‘Enhanced Knowledge and Education Systems for Strengthening the 
Capacity of Transboundary Water Management’ [2010]  Transboundary Water Management: Principles and 
Practice 171. 
382 Juha I Uitto and Alfred M Duda, ‘Management of Transboundary Water Resources: Lessons from International 
Cooperation for Conflict Prevention’ [2002] 168 Geographical Journal 365. See also Florian Krampe, ‘Water 
for Peace? Post-Conflict Water Resource Management in Kosovo’ [2017] 52 Cooperation and Conflict 147. 
383 Dinar (n 86); Warner ‘Three Lenses’ (n 19). 
384 Zeitoun and Mirumachi (n 409) p. 305. 
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nuance and a critical understanding of hydropolitical dynamics.385 Moreover, there is high risk to make 
the analysis “apolitical” by the characterisation of water conflict and cooperation on a linear scale.386 In 
their effort to improve cooperation there is often a tendency to depoliticise water conflict and 
cooperation and break them down into a series of technological solutions, while being blind to power 
asymmetry.387   
The hydropolitical relations of transboundary river basins across the world have been historically 
shaped by the continuous co-existence of conflict and cooperation. 388  Separation of periods 
characterised by either conflict or cooperation cannot sketch the full picture of complex hydropolitics. 
In addition, power, which is the main explanatory factor in the development of hydropolitical relations, 
is either ignored or focused only on in its material forms by both groups of “water war” and “water 
peace”. In contrast to the dilemma of conflict-cooperation discourses, Mirumachi in her co-authored 
article with Allan (2007) argued that conflict and cooperation are co-existent.389 These authors stress 
that “considering conflict and cooperation as opposing concepts misleadingly simplifies the complexity 
of interactions”.390  
Considering conflict and cooperation separately on a single axis (as in Yoffe and others, 2003) leads 
one to overlook significant political aspects. For instance, in the case of Palestine and Israel, or Ethiopia 
and Egypt, both riparians cooperate on technical level and data-sharing, bound by a treaty, while 
political tensions, which are somehow excluded from discussions, arise from hydropolitical relations.391 
Criticising such dualism, Zeitoun and Mirumachi say that “[t]he examination of either conflict or 
cooperation, we argue, refutes the reality of the vast majority of contexts where cooperation and conflict 
actually co-exist, and perpetuates the paradigm that any conflict is ‘bad’, and that all forms of 
cooperation are ‘good’”.392 They, for instance, critically examine how treaties that may codify an 
existing, asymmetrical status quo in favour of hegemon are often seen as a good instance of 
 
385  For instance, Selby in his critical analysis illustrates that how Israel is “dressing up domination as 
‘cooperation’” over Palestine’s water rights. See Selby (n 327). 
386 See Zeitoun and Warner (n 9); Zeitoun and Mirumachi (n 409). 
387  Nagheeby and Warner (n 327) show that how “functionalist” approach of water diplomacy may not be 
effective. 
388 Critical hydropolitics scholars, therefore, mostly prefer to analyse the transboundary water “interactions” than 
conflict and cooperation as referred by Zeitoun and Mirumachi “to [political] relations of co-existing 
cooperation and conflicts among communities, groups or states over international or sub-national waters, with 
a focus here on inter-state interaction” Zeitoun and Mirumachi (n 409) p. 3. 
389 Mirumachi and Allan (n 66). 
390 Mirumachi and Allan (n 66) p. 4. 
391 Zeitoun and Mirumachi (n 409); Cascão (n 10). 
392 Zeitoun and Mirumachi (n 409) p. 298. 
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cooperation.393 Accordingly, they argue that analysis of the power structure dynamic must be taken prior 
to any support of transboundary water arrangements, even the cooperative ones; otherwise, it may 
misinform policy measures and decisions making processes, and therefore may damage the equitable 
and sustainable cooperation in the long term. By addressing inequity and power differentials, Zeitoun 
and Warner point out that treaties can become the source of conflict and uphold what Selby describes 
as “dressing up domination as cooperation”, as in case, for example, of the Oslo Agreements between 
Israel and Palestine.394 Accordingly, Mirumachi and Allan recognise the co-existence of conflict and 
cooperation through a political process and present their concept of “transboundary water interactions”, 
which they define as the co-existence of conflict and cooperation within a political process, whereby 
power is the main determinant factor.395 Mirumachi introduces the Transboundary Water Interaction 
Nexus (TWINS) matrix to analyse the hydropolitical relations within conflictive and cooperative 
behaviour between riparian states.396 Mirumachi’s TWINS will be detailed later and adopted in this 
study to analyse equity in hydropolitical relations (see Chapter 5). 
With a similar way of thinking, Warner also provides a quite different interpretation of water conflict, 
by focusing on regime-formation and the role of hegemons therein. He labels this third narrative as 
“water hegemony”, “one exposing and resisting the hegemony of globalising hydrocapitalism”.397 He 
looks at “how local forces express global hegemonic struggles”, and argues that “the continued policy 
discourse of interstate water wars serves a purpose as a hegemonic concept”.398 Drawing upon the 
critical strands of IR, Warner notes that “the absence of international water wars does not evidence an 
absence of struggle, but rather that open antagonism is displaced by structural conflict between 
hegemonic market capitalism and state exploitation dispossessing their marginalised victims”.399 He 
rightly concludes that, “[n]o matter which hypothesis may prove to be correct, each of the above 
 
393 See, for instance, Shlomi Dinar and others, ‘Do Treaties Matter? Climate Change, Water Variability, and 
Cooperation Along Transboundary River Basins’ [2019] 69 Political Geography 162; See also Neda A Zawahri, 
‘Designing River Commissions to Implement Treaties and Manage Water Disputes: The Story of the Joint Water 
Committee and Permanent Indus Commission’ [2008] 33 Water International 464. 
394 Zeitoun and Warner (n 9); Selby (n 327).  
395 See footnote n. 388. Mirumachi and Allan (n 66). 
396 Mirumachi and Allan (n 66). 
397 Warner ‘Three Lenses’ (n 19) p. 174. For extensive discussion on the concept of “hegemony” in transboundary 
water politics, see, for instance, Zeitoun and Warner (n 9); Jeroen Warner and Neda Zawahri, ‘Hegemony and 
Asymmetry: Multiple-Chessboard Games on Transboundary Rivers’ [2012] 12 International Environmental 
Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 215. Filippo Menga, ‘Reconceptualizing Hegemony: The Circle of 
Hydro-Hegemony’ [2016] 18 Water policy 401; J. F. Warner, ‘Contested Hydrohegemony: Hydraulic Control 
and Security in Turkey’ [2008] 1 Water Alternatives 271.  
398 Warner ‘Three Lenses’ (n 19) p. 173.  
399 Warner ‘Three Lenses’ (n 19) p. 183. 
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narratives has had serious consequences, globally but also for the basins under review. The three tales 
[...] are lenses on the same phenomenon, each with considerable explanatory power”.400 
4.3. Power in hydropolitical relations 
Some academics argue that not only do politics influence water-related processes, but also that any 
activities concerned with water resources influence on politics. Erik Swyngedouw proposes that any 
social and physical environmental activity (for example, dam construction) may benefit some people, 
but negatively affects social and physical conditions for others. Thus, these socio-environmental 
changes lead to a degree of political instability in the society.401 Swyngedouw considers that “the 
mobilisation of water (through dams, canals, pipes, and the like) for different uses in different places is 
a conflict-ridden process [...] and shows how social power is distributed in a given society”.402 In this 
regard, he recognises three significant factors – geographical conditions, technical choices, and politico-
legal arrangements– and argues that control over water the inevitable outcome when these three factors 
are combined. In other words, any hydro-social configuration results from hegemonic political, social, 
and cultural conditions.403 Thus, political power is recognised by some scholars as a major factor 
influencing the outcome of transboundary water relations between riparian states; as Swyngedouw 
expresses it, “when two equal rights meet, power decides”.404 
Sceptics of the enquiries into the conflict-cooperation dichotomy argue that the dualistic categorisation 
of hydropolitical relations as good/bad, conflict/cooperation, and war/peace have ignored the role of 
power and political dynamics involved in water-related issues.405  It is asserted that a majority of 
conflict-cooperation researches underestimate the important role of power as a main factor in shaping 
the hydropolitical relations between riparians.406 These critics point out that even if there is cooperation 
in a transboundary river basin among the riparians, it does not mean that an equally beneficial, “win-
win” situation results for all riparians: the cooperation process may be created in favour of the strongest 
riparian (hegemon)407, and accordingly, cooperation might co-exist with conflict by way of political 
 
400 Warner ‘Three Lenses’ (n 19) p. 188. 
401 Erik Swyngedouw, ‘The Political Economy and Political Ecology of the Hydro‐Social Cycle’ [2009] 142 
Journal of contemporary water research & education 56. 
402 Swyngedouw (n 401) p. 57. 
403 Swyngedouw (n 401). 
404 Swyngedouw (n 401) p. 58. 
405 Zeitoun and Warner (n 9). 
406 Zeitoun and Warner (n 9); See also, Zeitoun and Mirumachi (n 409); Cascão and Zeitoun (n 327). 
407 For instance, it is mentioned by many scholars that even there is cooperation in Nile, Jordan and Euphrates 
Rivers among riparian states, the water utilisation and allocation is much more in favour of Egypt, Israel and 
Turkey as hegemon respectively. See Warner ‘Contested Hydrohegemony’ (n 397); and, Ana Elisa Cascão, 
‘Ethiopia–Challenges to Egyptian Hegemony in the Nile Basin’ [2008] 10 Water Policy 13.  
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power relations.408 They further argue that when some scholars consider power relations, they focus 
only on economic and military power and consequently ignore other forms of power.409 However, in 
critical hydropolitics, power is a determinant factor in hydropolitical relationships. But what is power 
in politics as respects transboundary waters? 
Politics, in general, has been defined as “who gets what, when, and how”. Politics signifies processes 
and relationships that engage with power and authority.410 In political science, power, among other 
definitions,411  is generally defined as the ability to influence the behaviour of people, norms and 
institutions. As discussed earlier, power plays an important role in determining the outcome of 
competition over the control of shared water resources among riparian states, particularly when these 
resources are scarce; as Zeitoun and Warner observe, “power relations between riparian states are prime 
determinants of the degree of control over water resources that each riparian attains”.412  
On this basis, Zeitoun and Warner have also developed the framework of hydro-hegemony (FHH) to 
analyse power relations among riparian states and the impact of these relations on the control of water 
resources. Water resources control is referred to strategies and mechanisms to “attain, maintain and 
consolidate control over shared water resources”.413 These strategies are defined by Zeitoun and Warner 
as 1) “Resource capture”, 2) “Containment” and 3) “Integration”. Resource capture strategy as creating 
"facts on the ground" refers to technical and physical control of water resources through construction 
of hydraulic infrastructures (dams, dykes, reservoirs, irrigation networks and like that). Containment 
strategy refers to the coercive measures (for instance it could be an agreement in favour of hegemon- 
the powerful state) taken by one riparian usually hegemon in order to prevent the other riparians from 
developing infrastructures. And finally, integration strategy refers to the incentives and benefits (for 
instance it could be an agreement with some sort of incentives provided by hegemon for others) 
 
408 Zeitoun and Warner (n 9); See also, Zeitoun and Mirumachi (n 409). 
409 Ana Elisa Cascão points out that “power is not simply about actors’ visible, material capabilities (measured in 
economic or military terms for example); often more important are the less visible dimensions of power which 
include their capacity to influence ideas, agendas, discourses, knowledge and institutions”. Ana Elisa Cascão, 
‘Political Economy of Water Resources Management and Allocation in the Eastern Nile River Basin’ 
(University of London 2009) p. 23. See also Sumit Vij, Jeroen Warner and Anamika Barua, Power in Water 
Diplomacy (Taylor & Francis 2020); See also Jeroen Warner and Rens de Man, ‘Powering Hydrodiplomacy: 
How a Broader Power Palette Can Deepen Our Understanding of Water Conflict Dynamics’ [2020] 114 
Environmental Science & Policy 283. Warner and de Man analyse the different styles of used by actors in 
negotiation process over water resources. 
410 Quoted by Harold D Lasswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When, How (Pickle Partners Publishing 2018). 
411 See the three faces of power (i.e. overt, covert and structural) in Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View 
(Macmillan International Higher Education 2004). 
412 Zeitoun and Warner (n 9) p. 436. 
413 Cascão (n 10). 
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provided by one of the states (usually hegemon) for the other states to encourage compliance with an 
agreement.414 
Hegemony is a relational process in which different types of power (material and non-material) are 
exercised. Simultaneously, hegemony is an outcome of material, bargaining and ideational power in 
combination.415 As Zeitoun and Warner point, “hegemony at the river level, achieved through water 
resources control strategies such as resource capture, integration and containment that are enabled by 
the exploitation of existing power asymmetries”.416 From among many different definitions of power, 
Zeitoun and Warner understand power as multi-dimensional. Power not only relates to the visible, 
material capabilities of actors, such as their economic or military capacity, but also to the less visible, 
non-material capabilities of actors, including their ability to influence ideas, discourses, knowledge, and 
institutions. Such multiple aspects of power and thein impacts have manifested themselves in 
hydropolitical relations of many international watercourses like the Nile, Jordan, and Aral Sea Basin, 
recognising by several scholars.417 Thus, power is thought of as “emerging from social [and political] 
processes rather than taken for granted in the form of accumulated material capabilities”.418 
Power is not evenly distributed among the states and actors, which creates asymmetric power 
relations.419 The asymmetric distribution of power influences water interactions and, in particular, water 
allocation. Asymmetrical power greatly contributes to shaping the water flow regime among all riparian 
states and identifying who gets water and how much.420 Thus, each riparian state struggles to gain power 
and, accordingly, the capability to control water resources for their own benefit. 
Zeitoun and Warner identify four dimensions of power influencing the competition for transboundary 
water resources: geography (riparian position), material power, bargaining power, and ideational power. 
The first and second of these are visible, the third and fourth much less so. In these terms, upstream 
riparians are considered to have power position in terms of geography in comparison with those 
 
414 Zeitoun and Warner (n 9). 
415 See also Mark Zeitoun and JA Allan, ‘Applying Hegemony and Power Theory to Transboundary Water 
Analysis’ [2008] 10 Water policy 3. 
416 Zeitoun and Warner (n 9) p. 435. 
417 See, for instance, Cascão and Nicol (n 322); See also, Ahmet Conker and Hussam Hussein, ‘Hydropolitics and 
Issue-Linkage Along the Orontes River Basin: An Analysis of the Lebanon–Syria and Syria–Turkey 
Hydropolitical Relations’ [2020] 20 International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 
103; Filippo Menga, Power and Water in Central Asia (Routledge 2017); Kai Wegerich, ‘Hydro-Hegemony in 
the Amu Darya Basin’ [2008] 10 Water Policy 71. 
418 Robert W Cox, ‘Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory’ [1981] 10 
Millennium 126 cited by Cascão (n 409). 
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420 Zeitoun and Warner (n 9). See also John Anthony Allan, Water Security in the Middle East: The Hydro-Politics 
of Global Solutions (Columbia University Press 2002). 
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downstream, albeit the study by Zeitoun and Warner shows that geography rarely plays much of a role 
in the asymmetric control of water (as for example with Ethiopia in the Nile river basin). Material power 
refers to economic strength, military and technological development, and access to external political 
and financial support.421 Bargaining power concerns the degree of capacity to influence and control the 
rules, agenda, the terms of negotiation and agreement by means of providing incentives or producing 
sanctions. Bargaining power also pertains to the ability of actors to bide their time during negotiation 
and postpone political decisions.422 Ideational power refers to the “power over ideas”, which includes 
the ability of an actor to form and influence ideas, knowledge, and discourses.423 
Consider this, there is relatively limited research to examine the linkage between legal principles of 
international water law and power with some notable exceptions.424 International law is argued to be 
used as bargaining power in hydropolitical relations.425 This study borrows Zeitoun and Warner’s 
identification of the concept of power to understand bargaining and ideational power relative to the 
adoption of legal principles by riparian states. Distinguishing different types of soft power enables this 
study to investigate the bargaining and ideational function of legal principles in shaping the interests 
and identities of states in the Helmand River Basin. 
4.4. “Equity/identity” orientation: the need for a sharp analytical focus 
This study follows the latest critical line of thought by assuming the coexistent of water conflict and 
cooperation shaped by power relations, which will help analyse the influence of anarchy on state 
behaviour while exploring how states engage in conflict and cooperation over shared waters. However, 
in order to transform hydropolitical relations, conflict and cooperation respecting transboundary waters, 
the thesis argues, should be filtered through examining equity and by addressing the identity of riparian 
states; otherwise they perpetuate the contemporary futile stereotype. In one sense, conflict and 
cooperation concerning transboundary waters are not only shaped around power asymmetry and the 
anarchic settings, but also, arguably, influenced by the identity of actors involved and their perceptions 
about equity. Thus, the study suggests another group thinking of ideas by emphasising the important 
role of equity and identity and the need to bring these concepts into sharp focus of analysing 
hydropolitical relations. The focus on equity and identity aspects of water must be recognised to bring 
a paradigm shift in analysis of transboundary water politics. Such a paradigm shift in focus, in particular 
 
421 Zeitoun and Warner (n 9). 
422 Zeitoun and Warner (n 9). 
423 Lukes (n 411) p. 28. 
424 Farnum (n 241); See also Hawkins (n 241). 
425 Zeitoun and Warner (n 9); See also Daoudy (n 196); Woodhouse and Zeitoun (n 239). 
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from achieving “security and peace”426 to “equity”, will lead policymakers to go through a set of new 
priorities within the context of “water justice”.427 
The critical hydropolitics literature in the third narrative explained in Section 4.2.3 is divided between 
those focusing on “the geostrategic and political economy nature” by analysing power asymmetry and 
hegemony,428 and those examining the role of norms, discourses and ideas,429 in shaping hydropolitical 
relations.430 This study assumes that while the conflict-cooperation dichotomy paradigm is unable to 
understand the political dynamics of the anarchic structure of hydropolitical relations, it also has limited 
explanatory potential to explore the different positive and negative roles of legal principles in the 
context of conflict and cooperation, such as the ERU principle. The anarchic geopolitical settings that 
reflect global hegemonic struggles and associated with the double standard are seemingly a strange 
paradox under which riparian states conduct their counter-hegemonic behaviour in the context of 
cooperation and conflict. Consequently, the single-axis paradigm, by focusing on the outcome, narrowly 
frames hydropolitical relations, and underestimates the circumstances and driving forces shaping states’ 
behaviour. 
This study, therefore, rejects the causality of water scarcity in the “water war” narrative, and instead 
argues that it is rather the anarchic geopolitical structure of the transboundary river basin that imposes 
its nature on riparian states and therewith influences their behaviour in the context of conflict and 
cooperation. In this line of thought, the behaviour of states is partly generated by a system of imposed 
forces or structures. In a way, this study argues that conflict and cooperation, mainly and especially in 
highly-politicised basins, are either symptoms of the nature of a hydropolitical structure or a series of 
states’ strategic manoeuvres within power relations to respond the structure. If a focus was made on the 
context of conflict-cooperation, it may make the fatal flaw of missteering the analysis and missing the 
full picture. Thus, an overemphasis on water conflict or cooperation may misguide the analysis of 
understanding hydropolitical relations targeted from out of “water-box”, identifying causes of state 
 
426 The term “water security” has received global attention, however, there is controversial debate around its 
definition and the approach to achieve. “Water security” (and in the same line, “environmental security”) in two 
first narratives of “water war” and “water peace” is similarly grounded on realist perspective, framing it in a 
deterministic approach as the national security threat. 
427 See also Farhana Sultana and Alex Loftus, Water Politics: Governance, Justice and the Right to Water 
(Routledge 2019). 
428 Zeitoun and Warner (n 9); Selby (n 327). 
429 See for instance, Majed Akhter, ‘The Hydropolitical Cold War: The Indus Waters Treaty and State Formation 
in Pakistan’ [2015] 46 Political Geography 65; Filippo Menga and Naho Mirumachi, ‘Fostering Tajik Hydraulic 
Development: Examining the Role of Soft Power in the Case of the Rogun Dam’ [2016] 9 Water Alternatives 
373; See also Jeremy Allouche, ‘The Multi-Level Governance of Water and State Building Processes: A Longue 
DuréE Perspective’ in Kai Wegerich and Jeroen Warner (eds), The Politics of Water: A Survey (Routledge 
2010). 
430 See Jeremy Allouche, ‘Nationalism, Legitimacy and Hegemony in Transboundary Water Interactions’ [2020] 
13 Water alternatives 286; See also Hanna and Allouche (n 322). 
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behaviour, and examining (in)equitable circumstances. In particular, understanding the relationship 
between water and conflict-cooperation should not distract from the necessity of searching for equity 
in hydropolitical relations. Critical hydropolitical analysis provides a way of examining the underlying 
patterns of hydropolitical relations in terms of power asymmetry and (in)equity. Critical hydropolitics 
scholars see power asymmetry as a main driver to enable or disable the efforts for justice and conflict 
resolution.431 As also noted by Zeitoun and others (2014), hydropolitical analysis rarely grapple with 
equity and justice issues, nor provide an explicit and firm theoretical underpinning in equity (and social 
justice) in the international level.432 This study, therefore, seeks to shed light on the concept of equity 
by analysing the role of the ERU principle in hydropolitical relations. 
Given the importance of equity, there is another serious flaw in conflict and/or cooperation narratives 
that merits further remark. All three narratives mentioned above provide a conceptualisation of 
hydropolitical relations in the context of conflict-cooperation. However, while this study adopts the 
latter narrative of co-existent conflict-cooperation, it must be noted that these representations have 
rarely sought to define exactly what conflict and cooperation means from a philosophical perspective 
and how they might be interpreted by different states in relation to their identity, ideology, and social 
orientation. In addition to the influence of structure on state behaviour, the analysis of hydropolitical 
relations must be considered, this study argues, by taking account of the identity influence.  
Marwa Daoudy analysed the interplay between context, identity and policy factors for the Turkish–
Syrian relationship to capture the interactions at multiple levels, “specifically relating to the weight of 
ideational and material factors in determining foreign policy choices.”433 Daoudy adopted a framework 
of the “structure-identity nexus” to examine the structural changes at regional and international levels. 
Morover, Jeremy Allouche in Nationalism, Legitimacy and Hegemony in Transboundary Water 
Interactions argues that the “analysis of discursive and ideological dimensions of identity and power 
provides insights into strategies and tactics of water control under conditions of power asymmetries 
between basin states.”434 Allouche explores the interplay between identity and legitimacy through case 
 
431 Zeitoun ‘Transboundary Water Justice’ (n 20). 
432 Zeitoun ‘Transboundary Water Justice’ (n 20). 
433 Marwa Daoudy, ‘The Structure-Identity Nexus: Syria and Turkey's Collapse (2011)’ [2016] 29 Cambridge 
review of international affairs 1074 p. 1075. 
434 Allouche (n 430) p. 287; See also Filippo Menga, ‘Building a Nation through a Dam: The Case of Rogun in 
Tajikistan’ [2015] 43 Nationalities Papers 479; For extensive discussion over the linkage between “regional 
identity” and conflict around hydropower dams, see Oliver Hensengerth, ‘Regionalism, Identity, and 
Hydropower Dams: The Chinese-Built Lower Sesan 2 Dam in Cambodia’ [2017] 46 Journal of Current Chinese 
Affairs 85; Filippo Menga, ‘Domestic and International Dimensions of Transboundary Water Politics’ [2016] 9 
Water Alternatives 704. 
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studies of the Merowe Dam in Sudan, the Rogun Dam in Tajikistan and the Southeastern Anatolia 
Project (GAP) in Turkey to examine how norms are being shaped at the river basin level. 
Moreover, states’ interpretations of conflict and cooperation may differ from one basin to another and 
within the “East-West” or “North-South” dichotomy depending on national identity, ideology, and 
geopolitical history. 435 Likewise, Allouche asks a crucial question: “how do national sentiments about 
water or rivers shape the nature of transboundary water interactions?”.436 Inherently social concepts 
have different, sometimes even opposite values, meanings, definitions, and understandings between one 
country to another and generally between the “West” and “East”, reflecting their identity and theoretical 
philosophy, and the ideology behind them. 437  Rutgerd Boelens and others assert that “territorial 
struggles go beyond battles over natural resources as they involve struggles over meaning, norms, 
knowledge, identity, authority and discourses”.438 What “water” by itself means in one place or for 
certain people may differ in another place or for others, resulting in different attitudes and behaviour 
concerning water utilisation. For instance, “cooperation” may be understood by riparians of the Danube 
Basin as a mean to strengthen their national identity, however, the same “cooperation” may be 
interpreted by Afghanistan – that will be discussed later – as loosing national independence. Such 
different understandings may result in neglecting the important role of identity in relation to the legal 
norms of water conflict transformation towards equity, and therefore, it is essential to be taken into 
consideration. 
Consider, then, understanding how these definitions might reflect particular cultural values or give a 
sense of collective identity is significant in order to offer proper solutions in certain regions. When 
employing a “Western model” of governance,439 it is a tendency to make story “about two worlds called 
them and us, where the “us” is the West ... and the “them” is everywhere else”.440 Within such this 
cognitive model that is surrounded by cultural constraints, the Western story is “to depict large parts of 
the world as dangerous places for us and ours.”441 This is exactly what Gregory Bankoff notices that 
 
435 For general discussion, see, for instance, Rafael X Reuveny and William R Thompson, ‘The North–South 
Divide and International Studies: A Symposium’ [2007] 9 International Studies Review 556. 
436 Allouche (n 430) p. 286. 
437 Rutgerd Boelens and others, Hydrosocial Territories: A Political Ecology Perspective (Taylor & Francis 
2016).  
438 Boelens (n 437) p. 1. 
439 Hensengerth (n 376). Hensengerth shows that the Western concept of sustainable development does not reflect 
the governance experiences and development concerns of national governments of the Mekong River Basin. 
440 Gregory Bankoff, ‘Rendering the World Unsafe:‘Vulnerability’as Western Discourse’ [2001] 25 Disasters 19 
p. 20; See also an interesting article related to COVID-19: Steven Friedman, ‘COVID-19 has blown away the 
myth about ‘First’ and ‘Third’ world competence’ The Conversation (13 May 2020) 
https://theconversation.com/covid-19-has-blown-away-the-myth-about-first-and-third-world-competence-
138464 accessed 16 January 2021. 
441 Bankoff (n 440) p. 20. 
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how the West renders the world unsafe in order to not only perpetuate its cultural hegemony but also 
“provide further justification for Western interference and intervention in others’ affairs for our and 
their sakes.”442 In this sense, for instance, it is argued that the lack of robust institutions to manage water 
results in heightened risk of conflict between riparian states, mainly in the Global South where water is 
scarce;443 and the solutions are often, in a similar mindset, offered according to western liberal technical 
and economic approaches.444 However, conflict and cooperation, by definition, might have different 
values and meanings in the Nile or the Helmand – flowing through traditionally collectivist societies – 
from what is understood in the Rhine or suchlike industrial, individualistic societies influenced by the 
Anglo-European liberal regime, for example. However, researchers and policymakers – mostly those 
with the Western mindset that they are part of the global hegemony – seek to analyse the hydropolitical 
relations of Eastern basins without realising fundamental social differences. The differences in social 
resilience and identities, which are often hidden, and only appear in times of violence and conflict, may 
result in different behaviour in eastern and western societies.445 This westernised, hegemonic thinking 
dismisses variances in knowledge, identity, reasoning, and vision concerning “water” resources. 
Therefore, conceptualisations of conflict and cooperation (and even of “water” by itself) in different 
basins that arise from a similar way of thinking (mostly dominated by an Anglo-European knowledge 
hegemony), and conclude in a single policy, may cause serious misunderstandings of states’ 
behaviour.446 
 
442 Bankoff (n 440) p. 20. 
443 See, for instance, Aaron T Wolf, Shira B Yoffe and Mark Giordano, ‘International Waters: Identifying Basins 
at Risk’ [2003] 5 Water policy 29. 
444 See, beyond the scope of this study, but extensive discussion of Frances Cleaver on how Ostrom’s framework 
of ‘crafting institutions’ is based on concepts that ill-reflect the complexity and diversity of multiple identities 
in Usangu, Tanzania. Frances Cleaver, ‘Reinventing Institutions: Bricolage and the Social Embeddedness of 
Natural Resource Management’ [2002] 14 The European journal of development research 11. 
445 With over ten years of experience concerning water management in Sistan, the strong social resilience of the 
local community has been a significant factor for encouraging people to work together at the time of confronting 
with “water crisis” which merits further research. 
446 Additionally, and far more dangerous, is the approach of some western analyses, which are often conducted 
over previous colonised countries or the regions that have security importance for the West, that are heavily 
orientated towards broader western security and (geo)political interests, prioritised by the fundamental goal of 
keeping the West safe. Equity, and the interests and identities of the target regions are, therefore, likely sacrificed 
for those priorities. The western security priorities have already led to launch a “global” counter-“terrorism” 
strategy by waging war in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, Libya and the like or 
engineering/supporting coup d’état to protect the West. As a result, undoubtedly, the related research projects 
must serve such foreign policy agenda. For instance, the 2017 US Global Water Strategy focuses on water as 
the core of US foreign policy agenda, to the end of protecting “US national interests”. In similar approaches to 
that of the United States, countries like the Netherlands, Switzerland, Germany and Sweden have included water 
as a core foreign policy issue in their national interest. This kind of strategic foreign policy which gives 
preference to protecting western interests, over the longer term, not only destabilises the target region and 
perpetuates anarchy's symptoms, and destroys constructive cooperation with regard to transboundary waters, 
but also threatens the West’s security by itself. Therefore, such western studies and strategies, in part, potentially 
damage the socio-economic, multi-level, interdependent norms and identities of the riparian states, and, indeed, 
equity in the whole basin. See footnote n 835. 
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This study, therefore, seeks to bring a sharp focus into the equity/identity orientation and calls for further 
critical analysis of hydropolitical relations within this line of thought. Following this line of thought, 
Chapter 5 will show how the development of hydropolitical relations occurs towards higher degrees of 
equity and within three cultures of anarchy. With this backdrop, the study seeks to explain how state’s 
behaviour may reflect related identity formation over the Helmand River and ERU principle. In 
particular, the study will examine how cooperation and conflict over the Helmand River have been 
influenced by water related identity which is by itself affected by geopolitical anarchic setting. 
Capturing the influence of identity formation surrounding transboundary waters in an interconnected 
international, regional and domestic context will shed lights on the complexity of hydropolitical 
relations and may answer the question of why cooperation over river basins and application of the ERU 
principle is stuck in ad hoc.  
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Chapter 5. The Equitable and Reasonable Utilisation principle in anarchic 
hydropolitical relations 
5.1. Introduction 
Equitable water allocation has been a particular focus of controversial debate between downstream and 
early-developing states, who may seek to maintain the status quo by justifying it under the concept of 
“historical water rights” or “existing water rights”,447 and upstream and late-developing states who may 
wish to advance their development projects. The best settings in which to address such conflicts of 
interest are visualised in the historical issues surrounding transboundary water interactions in the Nile, 
Jordan, Mekong, Helmand, and Aral Sea Basin. The concept of equity in international transboundary 
river basins is considered a critical issue within hydropolitical relations. Although equitable and 
reasonable utilisation of shared waters may not be an overriding concern within one specific anarchic 
geopolitical setting, where all actors primarily strive for “self-help”, it plays an important role in shaping 
an overall pattern of hydropolitical relations and riparian states’ interests and identity concerning water 
conflict and cooperation. Equitable water utilisation might also have various grades, from low to high 
quality, where low equity may only be subject to unilateral development and very limited level of 
cooperation with sole objective and high equity may go towards advanced cooperation through an 
integrated basin-wide approach and even beyond the “water box”.448 Such circumstance has arisen from 
the perception, cognition, and behaviour of riparian states as influenced by anarchic hydropolitical 
structures and power relations.  
Amid the anarchic nature of international politics, which is characterised by a “battle for power”, states 
exercise their right to sovereignty over their territory. Such anarchic circumstances may compel states 
to wage “lawfare” against each other, in order to legitimise their behaviour concerning the utilisation 
of international watercourses. Resultantly, the “battle for power” may manifest itself as a “battle for 
legitimacy” (see Figure 1) among riparian states, whereby the operation of legal principles through 
bargaining and ideational power may hinder water conflict transformation. While this may offer a 
conflicting picture of the complexity of global water security among international anarchy, an important 
part of obviating this obstacle to transformation is establishing how and to what extent international 
water law can be employed to prevent or resolve conflicts and provide an effective platform for the 
 
447 These are doctrines in the context of water law and particularly under the law of prior appropriation, arguing 
that the one who is the first person to get the water for its own beneficial use has priority to water allocation. 
See, for instance, A Dan Tarlock, ‘Prior Appropriation: Rule, Principle, or Rhetoric’ [2000] 76 NDL Rev 881. 
448 Mirumachi (n 194) p. 33 also points out that, “the management and governance of shared basins need to 
contend with factors outside of the ‘water box’”. 
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equitable and sustainable use of international waters – the principle foundations of transboundary water 
cooperation449 – within an often “highly charged” political environment.450  
The international community, in order to avoid conflicts over transboundary water utilisation – which 
may partly reflect the anarchic geopolitical overlay (see Chapter 2) – and seek to resolve them, 
establishes principles, rights, and responsibilities upon states, through a set of interrelated substantive 
and procedural norms. Of these principles, equitable and reasonable utilisation represents customary 
international law, and is undoubtedly now recognised as the pre-eminent rule respecting the utilisation 
of an international watercourse.451  Accordingly, the equitable and reasonable utilisation of shared 
watercourses is not only one of the fundamental principles of international water law for upholding the 
concept of equity,452 but also takes a place at the centre of transboundary water politics, where states 
engage in conflict and cooperation for their own interests and identities. 
Although law scholars have sought to identify the concept of “equity” in the context of international 
water utilisation,453 and some scholars of critical hydropolitics open an avenue to the examination of 
inequitable circumstances of water allocation through the analysis of power asymmetry while others 
explore the role of international law in global environmental/water “justice”,454 analysis of equity as an 
important driver of states’ behaviour and a principal source of antecedent conflict conditions in 
hydropolitical relations has received less attention. As discussed in Chapter 4, hydropolitics literature 
(with a few exceptions)455 has focused mainly on the attitudes of conflict and cooperation over water 
 
449 Rieu-Clarke (n 7). 
450 See footnote n 15. 
451 It is reflected in the UN Watercourses Convention and Draft Articles on Transboundary Aquifers. See Joseph 
W Dellapenna, ‘Treaties as Instruments for Managing Internationally-Shared Water Resources: Restricted 
Sovereignty Vs. Community of Property’ [1994] 26 Case W Res J Int'l L 27; See also Owen McIntyre, 
Environmental Protection of International Watercourses under International Law (Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. 
2007). 
452  For discussion about concept of equity in international law see Owen McIntyre, ‘Utilization of Shared 
International Freshwater Resources–the Meaning and Role of “Equity” in International Water Law’ [2013] 38 
Water international 112. 
453 See for instance, Ximena Fuentes, ‘The Criteria for the Equitable Utilization of International Rivers’ [1997] 
67 The British Year Book of International Law 337. 
454  See, for instance, Zeitoun ‘Transboundary Water Justice’ (n 20). See also Jekwu Ikeme, ‘Equity, 
Environmental Justice and Sustainability: Incomplete Approaches in Climate Change Politics’ [2003] 13 Global 
environmental change 195; Lyla Mehta and others, ‘Global Environmental Justice and the Right to Water: The 
Case of Peri-Urban Cochabamba and Delhi’ [2014] 54 Geoforum 158; Jess McLean, ‘Water Injustices and 
Potential Remedies in Indigenous Rural Contexts: A Water Justice Analysis’ [2007] 27 The Environmentalist 
25; Gordon Walker, ‘Globalizing Environmental Justice: The Geography and Politics of Frame 
Contextualization and Evolution’ [2009] 9 Global social policy 355; Margreet Z Zwarteveen and Rutgerd 
Boelens, ‘Defining, Researching and Struggling for Water Justice: Some Conceptual Building Blocks for 
Research and Action’ [2014] 39 Water International 143. 
455 Ikeme (n 454); Mehta (n 454); See also Mark Zeitoun and Karis McLaughlin, ‘Basin Justice: Using Social 
Justice to Address Gaps in River Basin Management’ in The Justices and Injustices of Ecosystem Services 
(Routledge 2013). 
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utilisation, ignoring any preceding causes rooted in issues concerning equity and how these shape 
perceptions, cognitions, and behaviours of riparian states. In addition, while the role of the ERU 
principle in promoting water resources management has been well-researched,456 the questions of how, 
to what extent, and under what conditions the ERU principle can mediate water conflict in anarchic 
contexts remain unanswered. 
This Chapter is situated at the heart of this study’s main research question: “How and to what extent 
does the equitable and reasonable utilisation principle (ERU) improve the hydropolitical relations of an 
international watercourse within anarchic geopolitical settings?”. This is followed with a consideration 
of two interlinked questions: For what purpose may riparian states adopt the ERU principle in an 
international watercourse within an anarchic context (“Battle for legitimacy” in Figure 1)? Under what 
condition may the ERU principle influence riparian states’ behaviour within the anarchic hydropolitical 
relations of an international watercourse in a way that can transform water conflict (“Mediation” in 
Figure 1)? Answering these questions requires uncovering the power of legal norms and principles in 
international water law, with a special focus in this study on the ERU principle as a customary norm, 
and to examine how this principle may influence state behaviour and change hydropolitical relations in 
certain geographical basins characterised by highly contentious geopolitical settings and anarchy, 
exemplified by the Helmand River Basin. In so doing, as explained in Chapter 3, this study uses a 
constructivist reading of international law (i.e. one of interactional international law as presented by 
Brunnée and Toope), and benefits from neorealist reading of anarchy outlined in Chapter 2 (or 
Hobbesian culture of anarchy in constructivism) and critical hydropolitics perspective of power 
described in Chapter 4. 
Within these terms, this chapter is structured as follows: First, the chapter provides a general overview 
of how international water law may be situated and employed in hydropolitical relations. Second, the 
major political contestations and pressures over international water law will be explored, by illustrating 
some related heated controversies surrounding, in particular, the right to development, principles of 
sovereignty and equity, and “securitisation” emerging from anarchic setting. Third, the definition and 
an assessment of the ERU principle will be given. Forth, the ERU principle will be situated in the 
Transboundary Waters Interaction NexuS (TWINS) framework in order to develop the Universe of 
Hydropolitical Relations and explore how coexisting conflict and cooperation may result in differing 
degrees of equitability. Finally, the possibility of transformation of hydropolitical relations by the 
influence the ERU principle within interactional international law will be examined. 
 
456 See, for instance, Andrew Allan and Alistair Rieu-Clarke, ‘Good Governance and Iwrm—a Legal Perspective’ 
[2010] 24 Irrigation and drainage systems 239; Rieu-Clarke (n 14); Patricia Wouters, Sergei Vinogradov and 
Bjørn-Oliver Magsig, ‘Water Security, Hydrosolidarity, and International Law: A River Runs through It…’ 
[2009]  Hydrosolidarity, and International Law: A River Runs Through It 97. 
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5.2. Situating international water law in hydropolitical relations 
As seen in Chapter 3, while the rationalist perspective provides theoretical explanations for why states 
might comply with rules under anarchic circumstances in particular, constructivists offer additional, 
profound insight into the normative dimension of states’ behaviour.457 The norm-based constructivist 
scholars declare that international law is an “ongoing generative activity”, which involves building and 
sustaining shared norms and legality. They argue that law undoubtedly has the potential to draw together 
states’ interests and identities, and thus their behaviours.  
The interpretation and implementation of legal principles without acknowledgement of political intent 
would be onerous. The controversial issues guide the debate over transboundary water utilisation to the 
two main principles, these being equitable and reasonable utilisation and sovereignty. Gabriel Eckstein 
states that substantive rules of international water law have been used rather as a political tool in world 
politics than as a legal regime.458 He shows that a legal rule may manifest differently if it is employed 
for judicial application or for state relations. Since the nature of international water negotiations is 
identified as ex ante (based on predicted or anticipated results), substantive international water laws are 
subjectively used by actors as tools in a political process to further relations. However, they may 
objectively be applied in an adjudicatory process as ex post (based on or decided by actual results).459 
Eckstein proceeds to argue about different interpretations of terms, for instance groundwater, which are 
rooted in political interests rather than law or science.460 Further, Rene Uruena has pointed out that the 
three main ways to make law strongly politicised are: a) reasonability, as depicted in the ERU principle; 
b) “disciplinary neighbours”, as interactions among different spheres of international law, such as 
economic development and human rights or trade issues, with international water law ; and c) the 
procedural shape, e.g. the self-interpretation of states to prior notification of a project that might have 
significant adverse effects on other states.461 Zeitoun and others observed that in practice, law has been 
used by states to strengthen their negotiating position, mostly to the advantage of the powerful 
 
457 See, for instance, Baradaran (n 32).  
458 Gabriel E Eckstein, If Water Respects No Political Boundaries, Does Politics Respect Transboundary Waters 
(2008). 
459 This is well understood when comparing the case of Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project with the negotiations 
around the Nile basin, for instance. 
460  That could be argued based on constructivism in IR that that “the structures of human association are 
determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces, and that the identities and interests of purposive 
actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature” (Wendt (n 161) p. 1). This, here, is 
manifested in that how states purposively emphasise on specific definition of groundwater based on sovereignty 
doctrine to use legal norms in their own favour, subjectively in ex ante political process rather than objectively 
judicial case.  
461 See Eckstein (n 458) p. 367. 
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(hegemon), in spite of being intended to protect the weak.462 Thus, Zeitoun and others suggested that 
the role of power asymmetry in the legitimisation of transboundary water arrangements should be 
considered in critical hydropolitical studies. In this regard, Farnum and others studied the extent of 
international water law’s impact on the hydro-hegemonic water discourses and distribution, through the 
analysis of interaction between three issues: a) transboundary aquifers; b) virtual water trades; and c) 
human rights.463 They showed how respective legal principles are as source of bargaining power for 
states that can be used in “weaker” parties’ counter-hegemonic strategy to challenge the status quo. 
Notwithstanding, they argued that “the structural hegemony of international law, created and sustained 
by powerful states through ideational power, may limit the extent to which bargaining power is 
effective”.464  
However, there remains particular importance attached to the gap between the theory and practice of 
international water law, and significantly, how substantive principles of international law can shape 
state behaviour and restrict their use of power. As already expounded, power and equity should be 
considered as interrelated concepts in hydropolitical analysis.465 Both power and equity are socially 
constructed phenomena that place at the centre of shaping transboundary water interactions and 
impacting on the distribution of water, and significantly contribute to the transformation of water 
conflict. Under the compromise between power and equity, states act and the outcome will emerge. As 
previously argued, the analysis of power relations and equity should not be performed separately. While 
the perception of equity is one coloured by the dominant power structure, the interpretation of the 
concept of equity by itself constrains the use of power and influences the ability of states to shape and 
control the “rules of the game”. The influence of international law on hydropolitical relations was 
brought to light by Ana Cascão and Mark Zeitoun when they emphasised the significant role of soft 
power.466 While it seems that law in practice often serves the interests of the powerful,467 the anarchic 
 
462 This could be well described in “Law and order exist for the purpose of establishing justice and when they fail 
in this purpose they become the dangerously structured dams that block the flow of social progress.” (Martin 
Luther King). 
463 Farnum (n 241). 
464 Farnum (n 241). 
465 Some researchers state that there has relatively been little attention given to the analysis of the linkage between 
power and equity or justice processes which “are fundamentally social structural phenomena”. See Karen S 
Cook and Richard M Emerson, ‘Power, Equity and Commitment in Exchange Networks’ [1978]  American 
sociological review 721. 
466 Cascão and Zeitoun, ‘Power, Hegemony and Critical Hydropolitics’ (n 327). See also Farnum (n 241). 
467 Zeitoun ‘Transboundary Water Justice’ (n 20); Zeitoun and Warner (n 9). 
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nature of international politics provides a chance of survival for less powerful (e.g. non-hegemonic) 
states to make use of norms and principles to question or maintain the status quo.468 
This study has described how anarchy is another significant factor in shaping the hydropolitical relations 
of an international watercourse, alongside asymmetric power relations (Chapter 2). From neorealist 
perspective (or Hobbesian culture of anarchy), anarchy feeds competition and conflict among states, 
and resultantly, the dominant nature of hydropolitical relations is striving for power and self-interest 
(the battle for power). Such anarchic conditions compel states, looking after their own interests and 
identities, to fight for survival and the security to protect themselves. Anarchy also raises the fear of 
relative achievements among the riparian states, as they find themselves rivals in transboundary water 
interactions. This fear is itself affected by the uncertainty of the future that makes states wary when 
seeking to progress hydropolitical relations towards water conflict transformation. Under these 
circumstances, states are unwilling to commit to a durable cooperative arrangement, and the outcome 
of hydropolitical interactions often results in the absence or a low level of equitable and reasonable 
utilisation. 
Power is not measured by material resources alone, e.g. the water resources of one state in the basin. 
Rather, the extent of one state’s influence on shaping the respective views of other states regarding 
equity is critical. Accordingly, powerful states are those who can exercise ideational power to justify a 
greater part of the outcome in their own favour. In anarchy, states have different relationships based on 
their capacity to respond to the symptoms thereof, a capacity reliant on their independence, self-reliance, 
identity, and political economy. If an unjust situation favours one party, that party fights for a strategic 
position to reduce the sense of injustice felt by other parties. In this way, other parties behave based on 
what they perceive as injustice, and they may adopt a different strategy to sustain or change the 
established state of affairs. Notwithstanding this motive, all of these behaviours depend on how power 
and the perception of equity shape states’ interests and identities.   
Anarchy leads hydropolitical relations to be constructed on the battleground of “lawfare” (or the battle 
for legitimacy). In particular, customary international water law such as the ERU principle operates as 
bargaining and ideational power in the basin. Thus, while using international water law to their own 
advantage by challenging their rival’s behaviour towards shared water utilisation, the riparian states 
also affect to legitimise their acts or at least assert that their individual developments are in line with 
legal principles.469 While one party may avail of the ERU principle in order to maintain the status quo, 
 
468 Zeitoun ‘Transboundary Water Justice’ (n 20); See also Alistair Rieu‐Clarke and Flavia Rocha Loures, ‘Still 
Not in Force: Should States Support the 1997 Un Watercourses Convention?’ [2009] 18 Review of European 
Community & International Environmental Law 185. 
469 States’ use of international law as described in Chapter 3 is a component of bargaining power in order to either 
legitimise their act or challenge the practice of other states. Moreover, states seek to use their ideational power 
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another may use the same principle to resist and challenge the status quo and thereby promote an 
alternative hydropolitical arrangement in its own interest.470 To this end, riparian states seek to control 
the rules of the game as they pertain to the parameters for identification of specific principle in 
international water law, in order to increase their bargaining capability to their own benefit.471 Along 
the same lines, the principle may serve as ideational power, which can shape behavioural norms. For 
instance, riparian states may share their goal to achieve ERU, however, they intend to impose and 
legitimise particular ideas, perceptions, knowledge, and discourses respecting the definition, formation, 
interpretation, identification, and maintenance of the ERU principle in a way that satisfies their own 
interests and identities. Therefore, influencing the way in which the ERU is perceived and understood 
might be one strategic goal of riparian states to use in the form of soft power. Thus, the implementation 
of the ERU principle cannot be excluded from the analysis of the anarchic political nature bearing on 
transboundary waters, which causes states to exercise different forms of power. While the ERU 
principle is unanimously recognised as a customary rule of international law in for instance, South-
North relations, the political use of equity in general and the use of the ERU principle in particular are 
always contentious, and disputed specifically in respect of international cooperation.472 This must be 
noted, however, that in interpretation of the ERU principle, there are certain factors (like physical 
factors) that are less controversial, at least from a scientific point of view, than others.473 
5.3. Political contestations over international water law arising from anarchy: security, 
development and sovereignty 
Anarchic setting of world politics where the nature of “self-help” leads the behaviour of states to focus 
more on power, security and survival puts too much pressures on the implementation of international 
law. To better get a sense of respective pressures, in the discussions that follow, the most important 
 
in order to influence international law by their ability to draft, write and create legal ‘rules of the game’. See for 
instance Joseph W Dellapenna, ‘Water Rights and International Law’ [2003]  The Iraqi Marshlands: A Human 
and Environmental Study Clark, P and Nicholson, E(eds), Politico’s, London, UK. See also Farnum (n 241). 
470 Dellapenna (n 469). See also Woodhouse and Zeitoun (n 239). 
471  See Daoudy (n 196) where she explains how Syrian-Turkish hydropolitical relations are influenced by 
bargaining power in this sense and using international legal principles as ‘soft’ power.  
472 For instance, Trilochan Upreti points out that equity as political concept has been used “to get unconditional 
financial resources from the North” while the North has not seen this as a legally binding concept to help the 
South. See Trilochan Upreti, International Watercourses Law and Its Application in South Asia (Pairavi 
Prakashan 2006) p. 113; Moreover, the definition, interpretation and the way to implement the ERU principle 
has been challenged by some scholars. While Aaron Wolf criticises the generality of the UN Watercourses 
Convention and questions the lack of its practical guidelines for allocation, the ambiguity of related terms to 
interpret the ERU principle like ‘sustainable development’ and ‘beneficial use’ have been also challenged by 
others. See Aaron T Wolf, ‘International Water Conflict Resolution: Lessons from Comparative Analysis’ 
[1997] 13 International journal of water resources development 333. See also Dellapenna (n 526); Woodhouse 
and Zeitoun (n 239). 
473 See Fuentes (n 453). 
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fundamental controversies within the political sphere of international waters that influence legal 
negotiations will be described. The heated controversies surrounding the utilisation of international 
watercourses that arises from anarchy can be categorised in three main disagreements concerning the 
interpretation and understanding of the relation between water and a) security; b) development; and c) 
sovereignty. Each of these inter-related different category of attitudes leads states to take specific 
strategy and policy concerning the utilisation of international watercourses. Understanding the root 
causes of state behaviour from this perspective is necessary for this study to have a better picture of the 
positions of riparian states of an international watercourse over different respective legal principles. 
The first serious concern for a state might be categorised in security issues associated with the struggle 
for survival in anarchy. Over the last few decades, growing attention to environmental issues within the 
political agenda has led to an increased “discursive construction of [these] particular issues as security 
threat[s],” which is associated with the “securitisation” buzzword.474 Given the anarchic nature of global 
politics, while the existing international order mainly rests on the dominant powers’ strategy to maintain 
“international security” in their own favour, by securing their own national interests, water (alongside 
climate and environmental) issues also play a more critical role in this expanding process of 
“securitisation”. This is why the examination of hydropolitical relations simply within a matter of “low 
politics” and apart from “foreign affairs and state survival” misrepresents the facts.475 As discussed in 
Chapter 4, with their pessimistic narrative of the “water war” of the early 1990s, security and military 
actors, whose ideas mainly derive from neo-Malthusian and neorealist theories, believe that the scarcity 
of water (in addition to the negative impacts of climate change and environmental degradation) in 
unstable political conditions leads to armed conflict. This kind of focus on “a simple dyad of resource 
scarcity-conflict” to detect “water causality” misleadingly simplifies the complexity and multi-causal 
nature of the “hydrosocial” interaction. 
Water securitisation means that decision-making goes beyond the usual political processes and urgent 
measures are needed to deal with water issues.476 The over-securitisation of water (which is considered 
a form of radical and superficial sensationalism), especially in international waters, results in the 
framing of states’ behaviour as a competitive form of controlling waters for their own national security 
while looking at other states as enemy, which puts pressure on the existing international order. 
Consequently, once water becomes a geostrategic matter, it proceeds from the foreign policy agendas 
of super powers, like the US Global Water Strategy,477 and ends in the increasingly politicised nature 
of water. This water is politicised, it can overshadow other issues like migration, ethnic complexity, 
 
474 Hussein and Grandi (n 327) p. 797. 
475 Mirumachi (n 194) p. 8. 
476 See Barry Buzan and others, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Lynne Rienner Publishers 1998). 
477 See footnote n 835. 
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and local stimuli, which are important factors in the geopolitical context and socio-historical 
interdependency among riparian states. 478  Some also argue that securitisation makes water “non-
negotiable” between parties, by stirring “nationalistic feelings”.479 Such securitisation manifests itself 
in many hydropolitical relations, for instance between Nepal and India over the Ganges tributaries, for 
instance.480 
Such a securitised nature emanating from anarchy, with a combination of external forces, creates a 
“perfect storm”481  to put high pressure on the legal regime of international waters and hinder its 
effectiveness to enhance equity. This is where the legal discourses of transboundary river basin also 
become a place for political battle and shift to an extreme nature of emphasising over the principles 
relating to “absolute territorial sovereignty” or “absolute territorial integrity” rather than equitable and 
reasonable utilisation. McCaffrey points out that: “Both doctrines are, in essence, factually myopic and 
legally “anarchic”: they ignore other states’ need for and reliance on the waters of an international 
watercourse, and they deny that sovereignty entails duties as well as rights”.482 In such impassioned, 
securitised conditions, international water law is dangerously disregarded by states wishing to meet 
their own geostrategic interests over transboundary waters, these being too far removed from the 
interests and identity of other parties to provide “equity”. As long as the geopolitical anarchic nature of 
a transboundary river basin is securitised mostly influenced by destructive role of outside-basin foreign 
policies, legal discourses are either frozen or merely used to serve self-interest. 
Considering two main fears of “relative gains” and “uncertainty” in anarchic context, the second 
greatest challenge for international water law is making a balance between the right to fair water 
development among riparian states and reconcile their competing economic, social and environmental 
interests.483 The emergence of international water law coincided with an era in which most downstream 
states had already achieved the “hydraulic mission” pursued across international waters.484 Irrigation 
development along the Nile in Egypt in the early 1900s and 1960s, or along the Tigris and Euphrates 
 
478 Cascão (n 342); See Nagheeby and Warner (n 327). 
479 Aysegül Kibaroglu, Anthi D Brouma and Mete Erdem, ‘Transboundary Water Issues in the Euphrates-Tigris 
River Basin: Some Methodological Approaches and Opportunities for Cooperation’ [2008]  International Water 
Security: Domestic Threats and Opportunities. 
480 Mirumachi (n 194). 
481 e.g., in addition to the above-mentioned ‘over-securitisation’, there are climate change impacts, population 
growth, urbanisation, ‘poor governance’, the financial crisis, and the new era of the ‘war on terror’, all of which 
are associated with global energy and food crises. John Beddington, the United Kingdom (UK) Government 
Chief Scientific Adviser, refers these combined forces to the ‘perfect storm’. Quoted in Bjorn-Oliver Magsig, 
International Water Law and the Quest for Common Security (Routledge 2015) p. 5. 
482 McCaffrey (n 37) p. 124. 
483 Rieu-Clarke (n 7); Tarlock (n 447). 
484 Mark Zeitoun, ‘The Relevance of International Water Law to Later-Developing Upstream States’ [2015] 40 
Water International 949. 
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throughout the 1950s and 1970s, and the illegal damming of Lake Tiberias by Israel in 1950s,485 are 
some examples of the early development of downstream watercourse states/regimes several decades 
ahead of upstream efforts. While the hydraulic mission provided a way for downstream watercourse 
states to rule their societies, the dependency on the utilisation of waters led to their vulnerability to 
upstream water development. Unlike the downstream states, who seek to maintain the status quo by 
justifying it under the concept of “historical water rights” or “existing water rights”,486 upstream states 
advance their development projects by maintaining sovereignty over their territory. However, because 
the upstream states were expected to take into account the needs of other riparian states in accordance 
with international law while securing their domestic imperatives (especially economic, social and 
environmental concerns), they found themselves in a “dilemma”.487 In this respect, international water 
lawyers have long discerned that the states’ practice of unilateral water development and their 
subsequent maintenance of the status quo have been at the heart of many international water conflicts.488 
The long-running conflicts in the Nile, Tigris, Euphrates, and Mekong exemplify these unilateral 
actions. Though the unilateral behaviour of states reflects more the anarchic geopolitical climate, 
international water law also shoulders some blame for the conflict, due to vagueness in its language, 
particularly on equitable and reasonable utilisation, which is associated with a lack of enforcement.489 
Although violations of international law often prevent a unilateral project from getting international 
finance, it cannot hinder states unilaterally developing the project and legitimising their unilateral water 
development. The main problem resulting from these unilateral developments is that states seek to 
nationalise the benefits and internationalise the burden.490 Such this unilateralism either in the context 
of “water security” or “food security” may reflect the “self-help” anarchic nature where states struggle 
for survival. 
The right to development is more robust when supported by the sovereignty principle, which states may 
wish to interpret it as absolute rights over their own natural resources. One main debate over the right 
to development basically originated from environmental discourses. The debate – still ongoing – 
 
485 Clemens Messerschmid and Jan Selby, ‘Misrepresenting the Jordan River Basin’ [2015] 8 Water Alternatives. 
486 See footnote n. 447. 
487 Patricia Wouters, ‘The Yin and Yang of International Water Law: C Hina's Transboundary Water Practice and 
the Changing Contours of State Sovereignty’ [2014] 23 Review of European, Comparative & International 
Environmental Law 67 p. 74. 
488 A Dan Tarlock, ‘Four Challenges for International Water Law’ [2010] 23 Tulane Environmental Law Journal 
369 p. 372. 
489 Tarlock (n 488) p. 378. See also Patricia Wouters and others, Sharing Transboundary Waters: An Integrated 
Assessment of Equitable Entitlement: The Legal Assessment Model (International Hydrological Programme 
(IHP) of the United Nations 2005). 
490 Benvenisti (n 377); See also Frederick W Frey, ‘The Political Context of Conflict and Cooperation over 
International River Basins’ [1993] 18 Water international 54; and, Esther Schroeder-Wildberg, ‘The 1997 
International Watercourses Convention–Background and Negotiations’ [2002]  Working Papers on 
Management in Environmental Planning Berlin: Technical University. 
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between pro-development and pro-environment interests suggests recourse to “sustainable 
development”, ensuring that we “meet the needs of the present without compromising the ability of 
future generations to meet their own needs.”491 While the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development acknowledges the “right to development”, the Rio Conference also points to “sustainable 
development”. The concept of “sustainable development”, which had been a core feature of Brundtland 
Report (1987), is an attempt to reconcile the conflict between development and environmental 
protection.492 However, the reality of current global challenges in anarchic context – for example, 
famines, biodiversity destruction, a potential “development trap” for the “bottom billion”, and global 
climate change – reveals that the prospect of realising “sustainable development” remains distant.493 
Although the right to development has legal limitations imposed by “no-harm rules” and states’ 
obligation not to cause “significant” harm to other riparian states, the anarchic nature and the fear of 
uncertainty of future relations may not give satisfactory guarantee concerning the responsibility of 
securing the probable damage and the socio-economic costs thereof. 
The third challenge faced by international water law lies with the concept of sovereignty. Both above 
concerns and interests of states over security and development issues in an anarchic nature are reflected 
in the concept of sovereignty which is a fundamental principle of international law and gives states –at 
least under certain conditions – the right to exercise sovereignty over their territory without 
interference.494 Sovereignty is often the starting point for addressing the utilisation of international 
waters. This idea holds that a state has sovereignty over its natural resources as well as the right to 
develop them. Following the post-colonial movement, developing countries claimed the right to 
(re)assert their sovereignty in light of the principle of permanent sovereignty over their natural 
resources, in order to compensate for the “unfair” exploitation by the colonisers. The principle of 
permanent sovereignty provides developing countries with a legal status equal to developed countries, 
since international law is underpinned by the notion of “sovereign equality”. 495  However, state 
sovereignty is not absolute. Sovereignty over natural resources is conditional on regard being paid to 
the sovereignty to other states. The sovereign right of a state to exploit their own resources is limited 
by their responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage 
to the environment of other states, or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. As an accepted 
principle of international law, recognised by the international court and by tribunals in several cases, 
 
491 World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (Oxford University Press 1987) 
p. 43. 
492 Armstrong (n 207) p 274. 
493 Magsig (n 481) p. 2. 
494 James Crawford and Martti Koskenniemi, The Cambridge Companion to International Law (Cambridge 
University Press 2012); See also Armstrong (n 207). 
495 Embedded in the UN Charter, Article 2.  
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such as the Lake Lanoux arbitration 496 , states have the sovereign right to utilise their natural 
resources.497 The scope of its application is however limited to specific circumstances.498 The ICJ in the 
Gabčikovo-Nagymaros case held that the right of a sovereign state to unilaterally build a dam on a 
shared watercourse situated entirely within its territory is still subject to particular limitations. First, 
there is a duty to take all appropriate measures to prevent the causing of significant transboundary 
damage and second, a duty to respect the equitable and reasonable utilisation of a shared watercourse.499 
A riparian state will therefore have the right to build a dam on a shared watercourse, but such a right is 
limited and the state must comply with its international obligations.  
In addition, international water law cannot be based on an interpretation of water as a natural resource 
over which a state can have absolute sovereignty. Water has always been considered distinct from other 
natural resources, simply because of the unique dependence of humans on water. The literature 
concerning international water law therefore refers to a limited, but not to an absolute sovereignty over 
a shared watercourse.500 The contemporary theory of rights and obligations in international water law 
is defined within Limited Territorial Sovereignty,501 or to some extent a Community of Interests.502 In 
other words, there is an increasing list of international obligations that limit a sovereign state’s power, 
and accordingly a state cannot exercise their sovereign rights when these rights are limited by their 
international obligations.503 Therefore, the state in which the watercourse originates will have the basic 
right to utilise the shared watercourse, but this utilisation must be in compliance with the international 
 
496 See footnote n 36. 
497 See McCaffrey (n 37) p. 111, where he point out that the concept of sovereignty “worked the most mischief.” 
Also, see, Art. 3 Biodiversity Convention. 
498 The concept of sovereignty is understood today with “the responsibility that it be exercised in a way that it is 
not harmful to neighbouring countries.” McCaffrey (n 37) p. 111; See also Chris Armstrong, ‘Against 
‘Permanent Sovereignty’over Natural Resources’ [2015] 14 Politics, Philosophy & Economics 129. 
499 For extensive discussion, see McCaffrey (n 39). 
500 Dellapenna (n 451) p. 27; see also Chinthaka Mendis, ‘Sovereignty Vs. Trans-Boundary Environmental Harm: 
The Evolving International Law Obligations and the Sethusamuduram Ship Channel Project’ [2006]  Division 
for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Office of Legal Affairs, United Nations, New York, NY(USA) 67 
2006. 
501 McCaffrey (n 37). 
502 McCaffrey (n 37); See also Owen McIntyre, ‘The Proceduralisation and Growing Maturity of International 
Water Law: Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina V Uruguay), International Court of 
Justice, 20 April 2010’ [2010] 22 Journal of Environmental Law 475. 
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obligations of the state of origin. This balanced approach is precisely reflected in the concept of 
equitable and reasonable utilisation of the watercourse504, which is discussed below.505  
5.4. The ERU principle in international water law: how it works and how to evaluate it 
International water law consists of substantive and procedural norms that are completely interrelated. 
The substantive norms can be listed briefly as equitable and reasonable utilisation, the no-harm 
principle, and obligation to protect the ecosystem which are operationalised through the general 
obligation to cooperate,506 including rules of procedure, such as the exchange of data and information, 
prior notification of planned measures, further consultation on the potential effects of such planned 
measures, and the mechanisms for dispute settlement.507 The equitable and reasonable principle is 
adopted as the main concept, with the other substantive principles employed as secondary concepts.508 
Procedural norms set out a binding process by which to facilitate the implementation of substantive 
obligations. All of these principles form part of the corpus of customary international law, which means 
that they are binding upon all states.509 This argument is supported by decisions of the ICJ in, for 
instance, the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros (Hungary/Slovakia) case510, the San Juan River (Nicaragua v. 
Costa Rica) cases511 as well as in Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay).512 
 
504 See in this respect also Ludovica Chiussi, ‘United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational 
Uses of International Watercourses 1997’ in Elgar Encyclopedia of Environmental Law (Edward Elgar 
Publishing Limited 2017) who argues that the ERU principle mediates between the absolute terrirorial 
sovereignty of the upstream state and the absolute territorial integrity of the downstream state to use and 
consume the waters of the international watercourse. 
505 See further on this concept of “limited territorial sovereignty” in the framework of international water law, 
McCaffrey (n 37); and see also Sundhya Pahuja, Decolonising International Law: Development, Economic 
Growth and the Politics of Universality, vol 86 (Cambridge University Press 2011). 
506 Christina Leb, ‘One Step at a Time: International Law and the Duty to Cooperate in the Management of Shared 
Water Resources’ [2015] 40 Water International 21.  
507 These core principles have formed the bedrock of bi- and multi-lateral agreements. See Christina Leb, ‘One 
Step at a Time: International Law and the Duty to Cooperate in the Management of Shared Water Resources’ 
[2015] 40 Water International 21. The principles are also centred on the 2008 ILC Draft Articles on the Law of 
Transboundary Aquifers (Draft Aquifer Articles) and the Water Convention and also Watercourses Convention. 
508 Rieu-Clarke (n 235). 
509 McCaffrey (n 37). 
510 Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), Judgment (Merits), 25 Sept. 1977, ICJ Reports (1997), 
p. 7. 
511 Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua); Construction of a 
Road in Costa Rica Along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v. Costa Rica), ICJ (Dec. 16, 2015). 
512 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment, 20 Apr. 2010, ICJ Reports (2010), p. 14. 
The support for the principles in international courts and tribunals also include Jurisdiction of the International 
Commission of the River Oder (UK, Czechoslovak Republic, Denmark, France, Germany and Sweden v Poland) 
(Judgment) [1929] PCIJ (ser A), No 23; Diversion of Water from the Meuse (The Netherlands v Belgium) 
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The literature with respect to the management of international watercourses has addressed the 
relationship between substantive and procedural norms.513 International water law, and particularly the 
UN Watercourses Convention, demonstrates a significant correlation between these functions. For 
example, Zeray Yihdego and Alistair Rieu-Clarke, while describing legitimacy as “procedural fairness”, 
associate “distributive justice” with substantive principles of international water law.514 The authors 
argue that “procedural fairness (legitimacy) and distributive justice (substantive rules), as normative 
standards, constitute two sides of the same coin, which, in turn, demands that both are considered 
together when analysing the merits of transboundary treaty frameworks”.515 Mohsen Nagheeby and 
others employed this line of thought to examine the international legitimacy of unilateral dam 
development in an international watercourse, a case between Afghanistan and Iran, from the perspective 
of international water law.516 
The principles of international water law have been devised to not only alleviate conflicts and resolve 
probable disputes, but also to respect essential needs and equitably allocate shared waters among the 
riparian states. To solve the difficulties facing states in utilising shared water resources, several 
doctrines have been adopted by states and by international instruments. 517  Among them are four 
theoretical principles – absolute territorial sovereignty (which often favours upstream states), 518 
absolute territorial integrity (which often favours downstream states),519 limited territorial sovereignty 
(as expressed in the principle of equitable and reasonable utilisation), and common management – 
which have been used when allocating the assets of watercourses. Of these principles, equitable and 
reasonable utilisation is the main substantive rule of the law of international watercourses, and 
represents customary international law.520  
 
513 See, for instance, Attila M Tanzi, ‘The Inter-Relationship between No Harm, Equitable and Reasonable 
Utilisation and Cooperation under International Water Law’ [2020] 20 International Environmental 
Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 619. 
514 For a detailed discussion, see Yihdego and Rieu-Clarke (n 23). 
515 Yihdego and Rieu-Clarke (n 23) p. 545 (added text inside parentheses). 
516 Nagheeby (n 247). 
517 For more information, see Dinar (n 235). See also Ken Conca, Fengshi Wu and Ciqi Mei, ‘Global Regime 
Formation or Complex Institution Building? The Principled Content of International River Agreements’ [2006] 
50 International Studies Quarterly 263. 
518 Based on this doctrine, a state is allowed to unlimitedly use an international watercourse in its territory 
regardless of the needs and concerns of other watercourse states. See, in general, McCaffrey (n 37). 
519 In sharp contrast with previous doctrine, the doctrine of absolute territorial integrity gives the complete freedom 
to the downstream state. Based on this doctrine, a state in upstream is prohibited from interfering with the natural 
flow an international watercourse that might affect the downstream flow. See, in general, McCaffrey (n 37). 
520 It is reflected in the UN Watercourse Convention (Article 5) and 2008 Draft Articles on transboundary aquifers 
(Article 4) and evidenced by international agreements, non-binding instruments, decisions of courts and 
tribunals, and in the writings of publicists. See for more information Dellapenna (n 451). See also McCaffrey (n 
37); Rieu-Clarke (n 7). 
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The equitable and reasonable utilisation of shared watercourses is one of the fundamental principles of 
international water law. According to the UN Watercourses Convention, this principle implies that the 
utilisation of a shared watercourse should take into account a list of factors, which allow the assessment 
of, and respect for, the interests of all watercourse states involved.521 Accordingly, the ERU principle 
requires the implementation of a regime, under which various aspects of the utilisation of a shared 
watercourse must be examined to reconcile the substantial interests of all riparian states in the most 
effective way. In addition, the principle of equitable and reasonable utilisation of a shared watercourse 
has been expressly considered part of customary international law following the ruling of the ICJ in 
several cases including the case of the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project (which had led to a disagreement 
between Hungary and Slovakia over construction work on a stretch of the Danube),522 and the Pulp 
Mills case (Argentina v. Uruguay). 523  This principle is also articulated in Article 5 of the UN 
Watercourses Convention,524 1992 Water Convention, and in Article 12 of the Berlin Rules on Water 
Resources adopted in 2004.525 Hence, there is no doubt that, unless otherwise agreed by riparian states, 
such states are obliged to use shared watercourses in an equitable and reasonable manner.526 The ILC’s 
commentary to its 1994 Draft Articles states that the ERU principle is to be applied only in the case of 
a “conflict of uses”.527 In such cases where the needs of one or more riparian states are not met as a 
result of another state’s use of an international watercourse, the ERU principle has a potentially 
important role to play in reconciling states’ interests in the utilisation of international watercourses.  
The question that may arise is how such equitable and reasonable utilisation should be defined and 
agreed upon by the riparian states. 
5.4.1. How to define and assess the ERU? 
As McCaffrey rightly asks, how can an upstream state be sure it is using an international watercourse 
in an equitable manner? 528  It could, particularly in the absence of joint management of a shared 
 
521 See Article 5 of the UN Watercourses Convention. See also Rieu-Clarke (n 235). 
522 See n 510. 
523 See also other related cases in footnote n 512.  
524 Flavia Rocha Loures and Alistair Rieu-Clarke, The Un Watercourses Convention in Force: Strengthening 
International Law for Transboundary Water Management (Routledge 2013). 
525 The Berlin Rules on Water Resources were approved by the International Law Association’s Water Resources 
Law Committee in 2004. These Rules set forth customary international law relating to fresh water resources. 
International Law Association, Report of the 71st Conference 3 (2004); 71 ILA 337, 385 (2004). 
526 See for more information, Joseph W Dellapenna, ‘The Customary International Law of Transboundary Fresh 
Waters’ [2001] 1 International journal of global environmental issues 264. 
527 Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-sixth Session, [1994] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. 
Comm'n, pt. 2, at 89, UN Doc. A/49110 (1994). 
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watercourse, be difficult to determine whether a shared watercourse is used in an equitable and 
reasonable manner. What is the relationship between equitable use and reasonable use? Which of them 
needs to be addressed first in the case of a “conflict of uses”? The ILC’s commentary explains that the 
rule of equitable use is applied only to those “reasonable and beneficial” uses of international 
watercourses.529 With this approach, accordingly, after recognising a “conflict of interests” over the 
utilisation of an international watercourse and deciding that there is a significant harm,530 states must 
first determine whether their use is “reasonable and beneficial”.  
For this purpose, a “beneficial use” refers to those of some economic, social or cultural value.531 
However, if one use, though potentially beneficial, offers a low economic or social value, it may not be 
considered reasonable. In such a case, therefore, to evaluate the benefit (economic, social, or cultural 
value) of one use, it should be considered whether the use in question is reasonable. What, then, is a 
“reasonable” use of an international watercourse? 
Studies make reference to the definition of a “contemporary conception of rationality” for determining 
what is reasonable. 532  Further, although what constitutes a “reasonable” use may vary by case, 
depending on their particular circumstances, in many instances, literature refers to the “vital needs” of 
states and “sustainable” uses when determining reasonableness.533 The unsustainable exploitation of 
water resources would therefore not fit the criteria of a reasonable use as declared, for example, by the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the 2030 UN agenda for Sustainable Development.534 
However, while what is reasonable use reflects the concept of rationality and also sustainability, other 
factors concerning the degree of a state’s development should be considered. This entails a particularly 
interesting yet demanding task: considering the development level of a state and how this may affect its 
reasonable use of an international watercourse. As the ILA Commentary to the Helsinki Rules notes, a 
developing state should be expected to have more time to improve its utilisation of an international 
watercourse than should developed states.535 If so, setting up a hydro-electric project, for instance, in 
one less-developed upstream state when attempting to advance its economy, without considering the 
 
529 See n 527. 
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interests of downstream states, may cause conflict. This dichotomy has prompted the course of action 
proposed by Owen McIntyre, who suggests that there should be a proportionate distribution of benefits 
from the use of a shared resource.536 This approach could be used to ensure a proportional balancing of 
legitimate state interests in international watercourses. To develop this avenue, states’ current 
circumstances, development level, economic capacity, and needs should be taken into consideration 
when determining what is “equitable”.537  
Article 6(1) of the UN Watercourses Convention lists, non-exhaustively, a number of factors that should 
be considered when balancing the interests of states and evaluating equitable and reasonable utilisation: 
Utilisation of an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner within 
the meaning of article 5 requires taking into account all relevant factors and circumstances, 
including: 
(a) Geographic, hydrographic, hydrological, climatic, ecological and other factors of a 
natural character; 
(b) The social and economic needs of the watercourse States concerned; 
(c) The population dependent on the watercourse in each watercourse State; 
(d) The effects of the use or uses of the watercourses in one watercourse State on other 
watercourse States; 
(e) Existing and potential uses of the watercourse; 
(f) Conservation, protection, development and economy of use of the water resources 
of the watercourse and the costs of measures taken to that effect; 
(g) The availability of alternatives, of comparable value, to a particular planned or 
existing use.”538 
Consequently, in cases of a conflict of (reasonable) uses, the resolution is made on the basis of equity 
after considering all relevant factors and circumstances. Vital human needs and the ecosystem of 
 
536 McIntyre (n 452). 
537 In this respect, for instance, Nepal should get priority over India in the case of the allocation of resources 
according to the rule of equity. See Thomas M Franck and Dennis M Sughrue, ‘The International Role of Equity-
as-Fairness’ [1992] 81 Geo LJ 563; See also Upreti (n 472) pp 123-4.  
538 Article 5 of the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention; For extensive discussion, see Fuentes (n 453); See also, 
in general, Aaron T Wolf, Criteria for Equitable Allocations: The Heart of International Water Conflict (Wiley 
Online Library 1999).  
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international watercourses should always be protected when establishing a regime for equitable 
utilisation.539 Thus, human and ecological security must be guaranteed through a legitimate process. 
Such a process must clarify different views on the principles of equitable utilisation, to provide a 
common platform and accepted norm among all actors. Riparian states must therefore utilise shared 
water by considering these factors and by taking into account the interests of other riparian states, as 
well as that of ecosystem of the shared watercourse.  
For instance, some authors express their concerns about the function of respected factors when assessing 
equitable and reasonable utilisation in reality.540 Moreover, each riparian state may differ in their 
evaluation of these factors. This can lead to some disagreement among riparian states. Trilochan Upreti 
alternatively suggests that equitable utilisation is based on fairness and norms of distributive justice.541 
Therefore, the interests of riparian states should be taken into consideration when evaluating these 
factors. This requires that such evaluation should not be made without particular attention being paid to 
the special needs of the less-developed states. Furthermore, one may argue that distributional equity 
requires richer states to provide recourses to poorer states, therewith enabling them to utilise shared 
watercourses in a more efficient manner.542 
Such concerns constitute an important cause of the necessity to implement procedural obligations. Only 
through an effective implementation of procedural commitments could substantive obligations be fully 
complied with by riparian states.543 The sovereign right of a state to exploit their own resources is 
limited by their responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause 
damage to the environment of other states, or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. For the 
purposes of this thesis, and because the weight given to a particular use will ultimately depend on a 
particular case, Chapter 7 will carefully consider the above-mentioned conditions as they pertain to the 
Helmand River Basin between Iran and Afghanistan, to assess how these states’ interests could be 
balanced under the ERU principle. 
As mentioned, questions concerning the equitable and reasonable utilisation have already found 
themselves at the heart of debates over many international watercourses. The discussion in Chapter 4 
illustrated that the focus of many studies has been on the analysis of the degree of conflict and 
 
539 Rieu-Clarke and Spray (n 14); A Dan Tarlock points out that the ERU principle aims to promote distributive 
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cooperation over international watercourses. However, understanding what degree of equity – low to 
high – is exercised by states over transboundary water interactions might offer yet more perceptive 
insights into the transformation of water conflict. The next part will deal with this issue by situating 
equity in the context of transboundary water interactions. Not only will it show that the concept of 
equity has something new to offer from legal perspective (i.e., the legal understanding and operation of 
equity through the ERU principle), it will also suggest that using it as a frame of reference for political 
issues of transboundary water interaction is beneficial for shedding light on the cause of the conflict or 
the underlying reasons for its persistence.  
5.5. Equity in TWINS 
This study has already argued that while hydropolitical relations among riparian states reflect the 
established power asymmetry, which has itself been well-considered by scholars from the London 
Water Research Group, geopolitical anarchic structure is a key driver that must also be contemplated 
(Chapter 2). As discussed in Chapter 4, this study has also reviewed the three narratives which seek to 
explore the hydropolitical interactions over international watercourses: “water war”, “water peace”, and 
“water conflict-cooperation coexistence”. While all of these narratives explain the politics of 
international waters through considerations of the surrounding conflict and cooperation, it is further 
worth examining what kind of transboundary water interaction exists among riparian states in terms of 
equity, which is at the heart of transboundary water politics. In addition, the identity of states that 
influences their interests and their interpretation of equity is a significant factor that merits further 
attention. Accordingly, equity, alongside identity, also matters in shaping the hydropolitical relations 
that almost treat as indeterminate from this sense. This study therefore argues that conflict and 
cooperation respecting transboundary waters should be understood through an examination of equity 
and by attending to the identity of riparian states. This state of affairs led the study to offer the 
“equity/identity-oriented” remedy for examining and improving existing hydropolitical relations 
towards conflict transformation (see Section 4.4). 
Given that any conflict is not inherently “bad”, and that all forms of cooperation are not necessarily 
“good”, the questions remaining unanswered are: how is it possible to assess the water allocation 
arrangements over international watercourses? What is “bad” cooperation and what is “good” conflict, 
and for who and why? Can a change in hydropolitical relations will improve those relations in a way 
that is truly “fair”, and if so, how? To answer these questions, it is argued that the assessment of water 
allocation arrangement by way of scrutinising the ERU principle is necessary. This is also important to 
discover how the various shades of equity may shape and evolve the pattern of transboundary water 
interactions.  
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Moreover, the interaction between the ERU principle and anarchy within dynamic power relations is 
expected – in certain circumstances evaluated by interactional international law – to result in a change 
in the hydropolitical relations.544 The hydropolitical history of all transboundary river basins shows the 
continuous coexistence of conflict and cooperation within their hydropolitical relations. Mirumachi 
developed a conceptual approach (Transboundary Waters Interaction NexuS, or TWINS) to elaborate 
the dynamics of coexisting conflict and cooperation over transboundary waters.545 The TWINS offers 
a comprehensive understanding of how cooperation or conflict is constructed. More importantly, the 
approach describes the evolution of hydropolitical relations from a historical perspective. The TWINS 
framework is formed by a matrix of different combinations of conflict intensity in one axis, and 
cooperation intensity in another, which allows the trajectory of the development of basin hydropolitical 
relationships in a transboundary river basin to be traced. TWINS is grounded on a constructivist 
interpretation of riparian interaction, in the sense that “interaction between states is worthy of detailed 
analysis for its reality-creating effects”.546 Interactions in this view “are not static but rather in constant 
flux, influenced by, and influencing, the broader political context in which they occur”.547  
This study considers the change of a hydropolitical relationship towards the realm of water conflict 
management, conflict resolution, and conflict transformation, with the goal of promoting the 
implementation of the ERU principle. Accordingly, this study offers another dimension to the TWINS 
matrix by adding a third axis to assess the degree of equity operationalised in hydropolitical 
arrangements (Figure 9). This newly developed version of the TWINS allows a better understanding of 
the nature of hydropolitical relations beyond a simply linear conceptualisation of either conflict or 
cooperation, or “bad/good” interactions. The equity axis is intended to improve the analysis of 
transboundary interactions and throw light on the way to transform hydropolitical relations within 
broader anarchic structures, without becoming hindered by too narrow a focus on the “outcomes” (i.e., 
“bad” conflict and “good” cooperation). Thus could transboundary water interactions/arrangements in 
every international watercourse basin be characterised by different degrees of equitable and reasonable 
utilisation, from low to high? The adapted version of the TWINS presented in this study offers the 
opportunity to ascertain how and to what extent an absence/low/high degree of equity may be 
experienced in transboundary water arrangements. The developed framework provides a broader scope 
 
544 However, it should be emphasised that other factors involved in emerging a change e.g., institutional supports, 
political economy of states, interdependency issues, and like that.  
545 Mirumachi and Allan (n 66). Some other scholars developed the TWINS framework from different aspects. 
See, for instance, Richard Grünwald, Yan Feng and Wenling Wang, ‘Reconceptualization of the Transboundary 
Water Interaction Nexus (Twins): Approaches, Opportunities and Challenges’ [2020] 45 Water International 
458.  
546 Naho Mirumachi, ‘Study of Conflict and Cooperation in International Transboundary River Basins: The Twins 
Framework’ (King's College London (University of London) 2010) p. 46. 
547 Mirumachi (n 194) p. 41. 
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not only for analysts but also for policy-makers to see where certain relations are positioned and the 
path ahead. This in turn leads to a more spacious understanding of the symptoms of anarchy in 
hydropolitical relations, helping to better observe why states’ behaviour concerning international 
watercourse utilisation becomes fixed in absent/low levels of equity (i.e., conflict management) without 
meaningful transformation. The new developed framework is named the Universe of Hydropolitical 
Relations (UHR). 
 
Figure 9. The ERU principle in the TWINS: the Universe of Hydropolitical Relations 
(UHR) 
Note: This diagram illustrates the various levels of ERU that might be expected in the differing 
intensities of conflict and cooperation over international watercourse (Original TWINS was devised by 
Naho Mirumachi, 2007). 
The different degrees of equity in a treaty and the effectiveness of the ERU customary principle depend 
heavily on the level of “cooperation” and active participation of actors in the process of decision-making 
in order to synergise the three factors of “life cycle of norms” – examined in interactional international 
law (see Section 3.5). From procedural and institutional aspects of international water law, the duty to 
cooperate is generally accepted as customary international law and is reflected in several regional and 
international instruments.548 The duty of notification is also an autonomous requirement of customary 
international law (and usually of conventional arrangements) and is equally central to an effective 
 
548 Christina Leb, Cooperation in the Law of Transboundary Water Resources, vol 102 (Cambridge University 
Press 2013) pp. 80-2. 
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implementation of both the principle of equitable and reasonable utilisation and no-harm rule.549 The 
duty is articulated in Article 8 of the UN Watercourses Convention and, as a result, watercourse states 
are obliged to cooperate on the basis of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, mutual benefit and good 
faith in order to attain optimal utilisation and adequate protection of an international watercourse. 
However, international water law, and the duty to cooperate, does not compel states neither to resolve 
a dispute nor to enter into an agreement. Considering the level of cooperation, the following sections 
will explain and discuss three possible degrees of equity and respective hydropolitical context in the 
UHR: “ERU contested/unilateral cooperation”, “ERU basic cooperation”, and “ERU advanced 
cooperation”.  
5.5.1. ERU Contested/Unilateral: a sense of self-help 
Content of treaty/custom and compliance with the ERU principle  
A situation of non-/low equity may simply be seen as a result of unilateralism, or there might be some 
limited cooperation of a contested nature, with only an agreement for physical water allocation (i.e., 
quantitative allocation), which sets out the fixed volume of water to flow from one country to another. 
This level of equity, which belongs to “water conflict management”, focuses merely on water issues. 
At this level, material factors (among other factors outlined in Section 5.4.1) of the ERU principle alone 
are considered to shape a water utilisation arrangement among riparian states, such as the geographic 
and hydrologic characteristics of international watercourses, the populations of the states (to tackle only 
drinking-water demand), and perhaps the water-related economic needs (e.g. of the agricultural sector). 
Even if there is some degree of cooperation on technical issues based on existing signed agreements, 
riparian states almost always act unilaterally under the terms of their own national policies for the 
management and utilisation of transboundary waters, and there is little interest in adopting basin-wide 
approaches to water management. Hydropolitical relations rarely incorporate substantive environmental 
rights to sustain ecosystem services, instead reflecting mostly the principle of sovereignty.550 
At this stage of non-/low equity, riparian states’ policies for international watercourses focus more on 
their substantive “rights” without admitting their legal obligations. Procedural and institutional aspects 
of international water law, for example the duty to cooperate and the duty of notification – primary 
requirements of an effective implementation of the ERU principle – are either not adopted or are easily 
broken, or favour one party (often the hegemon). Data- and information-sharing in international river 
 
549 Chiussi (n 504) p. 253. 
550 See Woodhouse and Zeitoun (n 239) p. 114 where they show that Israel, while recognising ‘Palestinian water 
rights’ (Oslo II, Article 40) and Jordanian ‘rightful allocations’, and being coincide with the principles of 
international water law in bi-lateral agreements, “there has been no quantification and implementation of 
‘Palestinian water rights’, and attempts to do so have proven unfruitful”.   
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basins falls short of expectations at this level. In this respect, hydropolitical relations at the point of non-
/low equity are often labelled as lacking River Basin Organisations, or any institutional arrangement 
has a severely narrow mandate.551 There is generally no set of regular meetings and data and information 
exchange; and when there is, it is subject to relative power and distrust, and stakeholder participation is 
at the lowest level. Most of the difficulties encountered in water negotiations at this stage result from 
the lack of a regional or common water agenda, without which there can be a failure to identify 
opportunities for constructive basin-wide approaches to cooperation.552 
Therefore, in this level of equity, even if there is an account for the indicative list of factors to consider 
the ERU principle by one riparian state, and respect for the duty to prevent significant harm, it would 
be arguably subjective and remote in manner. This manifests itself in unilateral approaches to assessing 
what is ‘equitable’ or what might constitute ‘significant harm’, see for example, Mekong dam projects 
(at least, some of them), Ethiopia’s GERD project, or the hydropolitical relations concerning the Aral 
Sea Basin. One another example of this level of equity might be the legal arrangements of the Indus 
River between India and Pakistan. While with the support of the World Bank, the Indus Waters Treaty 
had been established to institutionalise an equitable regime for the utilisation of the Indus waters 
between India and Pakistan, the treaty has only divided the geographical basin letting states to act 
unilaterally.553 In this level, a state may utilise an international watercourse unilaterally and in a way 
that does not affect the ERU right of another watercourse state. In theory, they might therefore be in 
compliance with international water law, though they would have to notify and consult on any planned 
measures that are at risk of causing a significant adverse effect to another watercourse state. However, 
here there is always the risk that a state in not-cooperating, misunderstands when ERU rights of other 
watercourse states are affected.    
Context 
In this level, the anarchic symptoms and geopolitical tensions strongly influence states’ behaviour, 
leaving them unwilling to commit to a durable cooperative arrangement.554 The dominantly political 
nature of this level is highly overshadowed by anarchy and geopolitical tensions, emphasising 
“absolute” sovereignty, self-help, and rivalry, and breeding distrust between the riparian states. The 
relationships mostly reflect a Realpolitik perspective, being characterised by historical border dispute, 
 
551 See, for instance, Schmeier (n 375); See also Kittikhoun and Schmeier (n 375). 
552 For instance, in the case of the Senegal River, a limited information exchange concerning the effects of dams 
between riparian states caused significant negative effects on ecosystems and populations in the basin. See 
Schmeier (n 375). 
553 For more information, see Fuentes (n 453). 
554 See Kai Wegerich, Jeroen Warner and Cecilia Tortajada, ‘The Dark Side of Governance: An Introduction to 
the Special Issue’ [2014] 2 International Journal of Water Governance 1. 
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regional/domestic conflict and civil war, and foreign interventions. States cooperate at this level of 
none/low equity only if it is necessary. They may have silent/limited cooperation, should it be in their 
own interest. They may collaborate on water management, but very conservatively. Water issues are 
often politically sensitive at this level of non-/low equity. Hydropolitical relations are locked in a zero-
sum distributional game in which one party gains what the other loses. As well-presented by Zeitoun 
and Warner,555 there is often “negative/dominative” form of hydro-hegemony – if there is any kind of 
hydro-hegemony – with consolidated control over water resources “at the expense of its co-riparians 
and the perpetuation of an un-resolved conflict.” The exercise of power by actors for self-interest alone 
perpetuates mistrust and anarchy, and negotiation remains at a standstill. “Positive” change in such 
hydropolitical relations seems to be very slow, and foreigners’ diplomacy often underpins the status 
quo or seeks to manipulate it to suit themselves. The goals of diplomacy are often set to reach any kind 
of “deal” to maintain “security and peace”, regardless of local opposition or its level of equity.  
It is worth noting that, as explained above, a riparian state may act in compliance with international 
water law to consider the ERU principle either in unilateral or collaborative/joint effort. Consequently, 
cooperation intensity at this level, as classified in the TWINS, might be expected to be “confrontation 
of issue”, where “the issue is acknowledged but there is no specific joint action or identification and 
sharing of goals”.556 In addition, this level of equity may appear at two other levels of cooperation 
intensity in the TWINS: either in “ad-hoc joint action” or in “common goal formation”. This low level 
of equity, therefore, may result in “joint action but no shared goals”, or there might be a shared goal, 
but states hold widely divergent opinions on how to approach that goal. In this case, achieving ERU 
itself might be the “shared goal”, however, it may go through unilateral approach faced with contested 
views, as will be shown later in the Helmand River Basin (Chapter 7). Amid anarchy, cooperation over 
utilisation of transboundary waters at this level is mostly of limited extent and without further 
constructive collaboration. Such cooperation may be well-named with John Galtung’s term “negative 
peace”.557 Thus, such conditions cannot be expected to achieve or implement high ERU with this 
minimal level of cooperation unless other underlying causes of conflict are tackled. 
While there might be some degree of cooperation at this level of non-/low equity, there are likely a 
number of ongoing conflicts over water utilisation happening concurrently, which are either hidden or 
controlled. Considering the nature of anarchy, however, these conflicts are often expected to break out 
and even be escalated in the times of crises like drought, flood, ecological disaster, economic crisis, or 
 
555 Zeitoun and Warner (n 9) p. 455. 
556 Mirumachi (n 546) p. 60. 
557 See Johan Galtung, ‘Violence, Peace, and Peace Research’ [1969] 6 Journal of peace research 167; See also 
Julie Elkins Watson, ‘Beyond Cooperation: Environmental Justice in Transboundary Water Management’ 
(Oregon State University 2015). 
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a unliteral act by one watercourse state. The TWINS level of conflict intensity with this measure of 
equity might appear as “politicisation”, “securitisation-opportunisation”, or “violisation”. 558  Water 
issues at this level may be politicised in the sense that they become part of the political agenda and 
therefore “part of public policy, requiring government decision and resource allocation”.559 Once a 
water-related concern “is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and 
justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure”, it is securitised.560 Threats may not 
be real or already existing, or may be discursively framed to construct a sense of urgency for the 
purposes of “special” politics when “normal” politics are not sufficient to achieve interests. In this way, 
an act of speech can potentially deliver a threat and construct urgency.561 In the case study to be 
presented later, a securitising speech act concerning the Helmand River Basin is found. At this level of 
conflict, however, there might also be opportunitising speech acts when “the issue offers such a great 
chance to improve a situation that it justifies actions outside the normal bounds of political 
procedure”.562 However, since both securitisation and opportunitisation in terms of the TWINS declare 
an act of emergency, the measures taken in response to them do not necessarily mean an improvement 
of the situation towards equity. Finally, the highest level of conflict intensity understood by the TWINS 
is when interaction goes beyond securitisation to the extent that violent action is seen as the necessary 
response.563 This may happen where “an already securitised issue such as identity becomes a casus belli 
over which blood must run”.564 However, as demonstrated by Aaron Wolf and his team at Oregon State 
University, states have rarely enacted violence against each other because of the utilisation of 
international watercourses.565 In sum, anarchy reigns at this level over the ERU principle, and such 
inequitable or low equity situations by themselves inflame the symptoms of anarchy within 
hydropolitical relations. Resultantly, hydropolitical relations often end in deadlock.566 As this study will 
 
558 Mirumachi deploys securitisation theory – developed by the Copenhagen school – for categorising the conflict 
intensity of TWINS in which “security is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game 
and frames the issues either as a special kind of politics or as above politics”. See Buzan (n 476) p. 23. 
559 Buzan (n 476) p. 23. 
560 Buzan (n 476) p. 234. Mirumachi (n 194). 
561 Mirumachi (n 194). 
562  JF Warner, Water, Wine, Vinegar, Blood: On Politics, Participation, Violence and Conflict over the 
Hydrosocial Contract (2004) p. 9. 
563 Mirumachi (n 194). 
564 Quoted in Filippo Menga, ‘Power and Dams in Central Asia’ (Università degli Studi di Cagliari 2014) p. 52. 
565 Yoffe (n 369). 
566 This may be similar to what Boris Kabanoff describes as “nondirected conflict”: “It represents behaviour that 
reflects frustration and resentment; it is detrimental to another party’s interests, but is not deliberately aimed at 
harming another party’s interests or at a specific conflict issue or remedy.” See Boris Kabanoff, ‘Equity, 
Equality, Power, and Conflict’ [1991] 16 Academy of management Review 416 p. 423. 
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show, geopolitical anarchy in the Helmand River Basin does not allow the riparian states to cope with 
each other to constructively cooperate over water resources and transform conflict. 
5.5.2. ERU Basic Cooperation: a sense of common interest 
Content of treaty/custom and compliance with the ERU principle  
In this level, states cooperate at the minimum level necessary to make sure that they co-ordinate their 
acts on the basis of ERU. This is basically saying, out of all the uses we have (existing/ potential) how 
do we allocate the waters? States might share basic data to reach such a determination, and may look at 
benefit-sharing options 567  (such as upstream hydropower, and revenue/flow regulation for 
agriculture/flood control downstream). While states may enlarge their share of benefits from 
transboundary rivers,568 this level of equity is still mainly limited to water issues; it does however 
consider the interests of riparian states from a more comprehensive basin-wide perspective by 
considering other associated issues outside the “water box”, such as ecosystem protection, land use, and 
food and energy security.569 Water conflict resolution may reside at this level.  
Consideration of the ERU principle and the indicative factors at this higher level goes beyond merely 
accounting for the geography, hydrology, population, and existing agricultural land uses of the basin. 
Thinking on the larger coffer of benefits – in terms of the economic and social needs of the watercourse 
states, the ecological factors and protection of the ecosystem, the potential uses of the watercourse, the 
availability of alternatives, and the efficiency, effects, and costs of the use and development of the 
watercourse by one state on another – might be helpful when proposing an equitable and reasonable 
regime of utilisation. In accordance with this, there should be a proportionate distribution of benefits in 
the use of a shared resource in an equitable manner. 570  Also, the “basket” of benefits would be 
maximised in a way beyond what is possible through unilateral action of the preceding level, e.g. 
through joint infrastructure projects. This maxim could be used to ensure a balancing of the legitimate 
interests of international watercourse states. To develop this approach, the states’ current circumstances, 
development level, economic capacity, and needs should be taken into consideration. To ensure 
 
567 See, for instance, Ilkhom Soliev and others, ‘Balancing the Discussion of Benefit Sharing in Transboundary 
Water Governance: Stressing the Long-Term Costs in an Empirical Example from Central Asia’ [2018] 6 
International Journal of Water Governance 19; For the categories of benefits, linked to security, economics and 
the environment, see also Marwa Daoudy, ‘Benefit-Sharing as a Tool of Conflict Transformation: Applying the 
Inter-Sede Model to the Euphrates and Tigris River Basins’ [2007] 2 The Economics of Peace and Security 
Journal. 
568 Sadoff and Grey (n 352); Daoudy (n 567). 
569 See, for instance, Rebecca L Teasley and Daene C McKinney, ‘Calculating the Benefits of Transboundary 
River Basin Cooperation: Syr Darya Basin’ [2011] 137 Journal of Water Resources Planning and Management 
481. 
570 McIntyre (n 452); see also Upreti (n 472) pp. 108-9. 
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effective implementation of ERU, procedural principles of international water law must also be in place. 
For instance, riparian states often cooperate through established river basin organisations, which carry 
out common study, monitoring, and data-sharing activities for international watercourses, as well as 
agree on joint or co-ordinated management plans and basin-wide development scenarios.  
Another example of this level of equity that merits further research could be found in the case of Araks 
(Aras) River Basin and the history of cooperation and benefit-sharing between Armenia and Iran, and 
Azerbaijan and Iran.571 Arguably, US-Canada and US-Mexico transboundary water cooperation could 
also be possible cases to be in this category that merit further study. 
Context 
This level also accounts for co-existing conflict and cooperation as it bears on the interests of riparian 
states in transboundary water management. The nature of anarchy is however still playing its role here 
of leading states to compete for self-interest. However, other factors, like the robustness of the political 
economy,572 can alleviate the situation, and accordingly, the ERU principle can find space to blossom 
and support states in the creation of a collective interest, and to maximise the benefits that are offered 
through cooperation vis-à-vis unilateral action. While states share a common goal, the fourth level of 
cooperation intensity in the TWINS is expected to be represented often here: “common norm 
formation”. This level of cooperation happens when there is agreed joint action, and common goals and 
norms among riparian states over the utilisation of an international watercourse. Notwithstanding this, 
changes of states’ interests in water utilisation or differing views on common norms may bring them 
into conflict at certain times. Therefore, it is expected that at this level, states experience either a “non-
politicisation” or “politicisation” intensity in conflict as categorised by the TWINS. Non-politicisation 
exists where water issues are not the concern of riparian states, nor are related issues part of the public 
debate. In such circumstances, the sources of conflict are perceived and the behaviour of states rests on 
remedying them, rather than underpinning or changing the status quo with a zero-sum mindset.   
In such an anarchic setting, whether or not there is an established hierarchical order, riparian states, 
hegemons or non-hegemons alike, may take advantage of the “de-politicisation”, “politicisation”, or 
“securitisation” of transboundary waters as a discursive tactic to legitimise their actions.573 This may 
even result in an agreement for sharing waters among riparian states; however, the degree of ERU might 
 
571 Michael E Campana and others, ‘Science for Peace: Monitoring Water Quality and Quantity in the Kura—
Araks Basin of the South Caucasus’ in Transboundary Water Resources: A Foundation for Regional Stability 
in Central Asia (Springer 2008). See also Farideh Mohammad Alipour and Hamed Talebian, ‘Shared Water 
Resources in Kura-Aras River Basin; the Promoter of Peace in South Caucasia’ [2018] 11 Central Eurasia 
Studies 231. 
572 Mirumachi and Allan (n 66). 
573 See also Zeitoun ‘Transboundary Water Justice’ (n 20). 
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be very low, as has happened with the Mahakali river (known also as the Sharda or Kali river) between 
Nepal and India, which joins the Ghaghara river, a tributary of the Ganges.574 While the degree of equity 
in these terms might be legitimised by the prerogatives of hegemon in the context of power 
asymmetry,575 in the anarchic context, nothing can prevent non-hegemons from enforcing their own 
agenda. In this respect, the geopolitical anarchic setting at the basin may also present a difficult choice 
that greatly limits the potential to improve hydropolitical relations.  
5.5.3. ERU Advanced Cooperation: a sense of collective identity 
Content of treaty/custom and compliance with the ERU principle  
A higher level of equity is possible when countries manage shared waters as if there were no sovereign 
borders, and principles of integrated water resources management are adopted with a view to 
maximising the benefits from the basin and apportion those benefits equitably. Rather than focusing on 
water sharing per se, transboundary water management here rests on the concept of sustainable 
development576 and the principles of “good water governance”,577 and finds its place in the established 
general consensus on broader related issues, particularly peace, security, and economy.  
This highest level of equity is subject to broader socio-political, economic, and security factors 
belonging principally to states’ senses of identity and creation of collective identity in the basin. States 
constructively cooperate based on commonly agreed policies of the same political agenda, and their 
cooperation to tackle disputes over water issues goes beyond the shared river. Transboundary water 
management not only attends to the collective interests of riparian states, but also reflects a shared 
identity built on their joint concerns within a particular basin. It must be noted at the outset that the 
creation of collective interests is a prerequisite for the success of transformation. 
At this stage of equity, pre-existing regional cooperation mechanisms, grounded on a common regional 
political and security agenda, persuade states to institutionalise basin-wide joint management. For 
instance, pre-existing cooperation structures in Europe and southern Africa are conducive to 
establishing and maintaining transboundary water management institutions.578 Even with hegemonies 
involved and in the context of anarchy, cooperation is likely exercised in compliance with the 
substantive and procedural principles of international water law.579 The Danube which may relatively 
 
574 For more information, see Mirumachi (n 194). 
575 Zeitoun ‘Transboundary water interaction II’ (n 20). 
576 Rieu-Clarke (n 7). 
577 Allan and Rieu-Clarke (n 456). 
578 Schmeier (n 375). 
579 Woodhouse and Zeitoun (n 239). 
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reflect a collective identity in European context might be at this stage, in that the ERU principle has 
room to serve the interests of riparian states in a way to maximise shared benefits and minimise the 
negative impacts of utilisation.  
Context 
The highest level of cooperation intensity in the TWINS, “collective identity formation”, can produce 
a corresponding level of equity, once that collective identity is completely formed. At this level of 
cooperation, “states do not differentiate between their domestic interests and their collective 
international interest”. 580  Anarchy at this level accordingly has less power to manipulate states’ 
behaviour. States have nevertheless found ways to serve their own interests and identities as part of a 
collective identity. This level of equity, therefore, occurs when states identify their self-interest, 
security, and national identity requirements in a common agenda for regional security and 
socioeconomic development. Achieving this level of course requires that other internal and external 
factors be promotive to collective identity formation, such as the political economy and broader 
geopolitical issues.  
As with the previous level, water conflict resolution, the conflict intensity here is also expected to 
manifest in the form of either “non-politicisation” or “politicisation”. However, the root causes of 
conflict are anticipated to be effectively confronted and resolved at this level of high equity. The 
previous two levels, water conflict and cooperation are mainly grounded on interest-oriented 
motivations. As described in Chapter 4, sources of conflict surrounding transboundary waters may be 
beyond simply material interests, and reflect a lost identity, or emotions and perceptions of a more 
spiritual nature, which cast shadows of the past.581 These kinds of water conflicts may be rooted in the 
colonial past, geopolitical crises, continued occupation/intervention or civil war, ethnic issues, religious 
and cultural identity, and territorial ideology, all of which are mostly created/escalated by outside-of-
basin interventions in the context of anarchy. The Israel-Palestine, Kashmir, and Afghanistan water 
issues are examples of such conflicts. This high level of equity, if achieved, may accordantly aim for 
water conflict transformation, mainly reflecting identity-oriented motivations. To transform a water 
conflict in an equitable and sustainable manner, the sources of that conflict should first be considered 
 
580 However, a ‘“complete’ collective identity formation is rare”. See Mirumachi (n 194) p. 50. See also Wendt 
(n 8). 
581 Over the past two decades, many scholars demonstrated that “issues of national identity, cultural values and 
world view are more likely to lead to conflict between states, than are disputes over water”. See Anton Earle, 
Anders Jägerskog and Joakim Öjendal, ‘Introduction: Setting the Scene for Transboundary Water Management 
Approaches’ in Anton Earle, Anders Jägerskog and Joakim Öjendal (eds), Transboundary Water Management: 
Principles and Practice (Earthscan 2010) p. 2; In addition, Miriam Lowi and Jay Rothmann show “the relation 
between water conflicts and non-water-related high politics issues (such as statehood, security or territory), 
making the solution of water conflicts only possible when high politics issues in the respective basin are solved 
as well.” See Schmeier (n 325) p. 6. 
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and remedied. A focus only on common interests in two former levels might be helpful for attaining 
efficient, optimal, cooperative solutions, perhaps even ones that appear equitable, but with the inherence 
of human suffering and damaged identity likely being neglected, this singular focus may not provide a 
sustainable and lasting solution in an anarchic setting, leading to, in a similar way, what has commonly 
being termed as “Brexit”.582 
Therefore, consideration of the ERU principle, in addition to the above-mentioned indicative factors 
present in earlier levels of equity (e.g., water conflict resolution), is applied to surveying other human 
rights. General Comment 15 – adopted in 2002 by the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, and which monitors the implementation of the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) – declares that “the human right to water is indispensable for 
leading a life in human dignity. It is a prerequisite for the realisation of other human rights”.583 Though 
adding these human rights dimensions may introduce new layers of complexity to the concept of 
equity,584 focusing only on solutions and benefit-sharing – even if they extend beyond the “water 
basket” – to resolve water conflict may not be enough to sustain relationships. If the sources of conflict 
– which are often non-water issues, situated outside of the “water basket” – are left unresolved, there is 
much potential to damage hydropolitical relations and for them to dramatically descend towards low 
equity, and thus perpetuate the pattern of non-/low equity. 
5.6. Change in hydropolitical relations by the influence of the ERU principle 
The original TWINS, while depicting the trajectory of interactions, highlights how power relations 
shape the evolution of co-existing conflict and cooperation. However, the adapted TWINS, i.e. the 
UHR, provides a 3-D image of hydropolitical relations and affords the opportunity to bring power and 
equity together in a single conceptual framework. While the outcome of transboundary water 
interactions is subject to power asymmetry in the basin, the normative concerns/knowledge about ERU 
which is subject to change in time can also influence the outcome. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, legal principles may support the hegemonic order in anarchic situations 
lacking central law-creating, determining, and enforcement mechanisms. However, they may also be 
potentially used to critique a hegemon’s foreign policy and shed light on the inequitable and unfair 
 
582  See, for instance, Peter Howley and Muhammad Waqas, ‘National Identity and Brexit’ [2020]  Leeds 
University Business School Working Paper, Forthcoming, Available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3464210 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3464210. 
583  Emphasised added. New York, NY (US), 16 Dec. 1966, in force 3 Jan. 1976, available at: 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CESCR.aspx. 
584 Paul G Harris, International Equity and Global Environmental Politics: Power and Principles in Us Foreign 
Policy (Routledge 2017). 
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distribution of resources. 585  According to the discussion in Chapter 3 concerning the association 
between legal principles, identity, and anarchy, and drawing upon “interactional international law”, this 
study argues that competition within a self-help system exists while it is being socially constructed.586 
Therefore, the notion of why and how states may pursue cooperation or conflict for self-help are 
constructed through social interactions. Conflictive or cooperative strategies are tactical maneuvers that 
in rationalist perspective may reflect the interests, but they may be, even beyond that, shaped by the 
identities of states from constructivist point of view. Once identities change, so correspondingly does 
self-interest. In this regard, the power of legal principles, the focus here being the ERU principle as the 
core customary norm of international water law, represents an important quality that can potentially 
affect the identity of states, provide a shared understanding of both collective security and a collective 
definition of “self” among riparian states, and, therefore, change hydropolitical relations. In this respect, 
Wendt’s cultures of anarchy from constructivist point of view – outlined in Chapter 2 – can be well 
situated in different levels of equity in UHR (see Figure 10). 
 
Figure 10. Change in the UHR within anarchy 
The lowest level of equity is expected in Hobbesian culture of anarchy where the neorealist reading 
leads the nature of hydropolitical relations surrounded by “self-help” behaviours. The ERU principle is 
contested here and may be applied unilaterally. States in such context have a conservative approach, 
“preferring looser and more flexible ‘framework’ agreements” with far-reaching binding 
 
585 See Jean Allain, ‘Anarchy and International Law: The Approaches of Hedley Bull and Noam Chomsky’ [2014]  
Review of Contemporary Philosophy 17. 
586 Mercer (n 153). 
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commitments.587 A compromise in this sense is seen by its limitation:588 weighing up the cost and 
benefit and in particular the relative gains. The next level is subject to Lockean culture of anarchy which 
is associated with neo-liberal reading of conflict-cooperation where basic cooperation grounded on 
common interests and benefit-sharing through establishing formal institutions (RBOs) may be 
experienced. Finally, the third level, where high equity is expected, Kantian culture of anarchy exists 
where the ERU principle is rather achieved through creation of collective identity. The “life cycle of 
norm” in interactional international law and the extent of the effectiveness of the ERU principle in UHR 
are assumed to be strengthened towards these cultures of anarchy. For practice of legality there needs 
to be a much improved shared understanding between riparian states, otherwise, transformation of 
conflict rarely occurs. It is important to consider that such creation of shared understanding is also 
influenced by power asymmetry and anarchic setting that merits further research. The more cooperation 
and active communication, the more possibility for initiating shared understanding over the ERU 
principle among riparian states. 
The new equity-based TWINS illuminates the issues at stake and illustrates how the improvement of 
transboundary water interactions can occur in different intensities of co-existing conflict and 
cooperation. This can be further useful for better depicting the driving forces involved in promoting or 
hindering water conflict transformation. At all of the above-mentioned levels of ERU, natural climatic 
variability, domestic and regional socioeconomic and political circumstances, and global security issues 
under anarchy may pressure the behaviour of states. Mirumachi’s framework and her analysis of the 
role of political economy of water-scarce basins (Figure 11) shows close similarity with UHR and its 
focus on equity principle. As seen in Figure 11, it is argued that “[a]dvanced economies with high GDP 
levels appear to be able to enjoy high levels of cooperation”. The different levels of political economy 
depicted in this figure perfectly match with what the UHR categorises hydropolitical relations into 
different degrees of equity and anarchy. 
 
587 Armstrong (n 207) p. 288. 
588 In author’s experience, a compromise over water issues has been highly inked to other non-water related issues 
beyond the authority of water negotiators, and particularly, in the case of high anarchy, it must be always 
checked with outside the negotiation room. 




Figure 11. Conflict and cooperation coexist in transboundary relations589 
A change in the hydropolitical relations of international watercourses towards equity can highly depend 
on how riparian states deal with the anarchic symptoms and power relations at the basin level. Thus, 
the extent to which the ERU principle can be effectively operationalised remains subject to anarchic 
geopolitical settings and power relations. It is argued that while the level of ERU has a direct linkage 
with the extent to which anarchic-geopolitical settings influence states’ behaviour, it has also the 
potential, by itself, to affect the interest and identity of states, and therefore influence the way that states 
act in anarchy. This may result in the long-term improvement of hydropolitical relations. 
Notwithstanding this, such influence of the ERU principle on hydropolitical relations to be effective 
needs to be evaluated through the framework of interactional international law to examine the creation 
of shared understanding, the criteria and practice of legality. 
5.6.1. Examining the “life cycle of norm” in the ERU principle 
Shared understanding 
As already discussed, there might be contested debate and confusion about the ERU principle and its 
implementation between developing and developed states or on its relation to “no-harm” rule. For 
instance, the right to development versus environmental protection in an international river basin is still 
a controversial debate, stuck between bargaining position of riparian states for their interests over 
 
589 JA Tony Allan and Naho Mirumachi, ‘Why Negotiate? Asymmetric Endowments, Asymmetric Power and the 
Invisible Nexus of Water, Trade and Power That Brings Apparent Water Security’ in Anton Earle, Anders 
Jägerskog and Joakim Öjendal (eds), Transboundary Water Management: Principles and Practice (Earthscan 
2010). 
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equitable and reasonable utilisation. While there has been a significant effort to level the playing-field 
by invoking the two core principles of “equitable and reasonable utilisation” and “no-harm rule”, it is 
far more difficult to get states to accept a breach of these rules, perhaps because the principle of 
sovereignty still holds sway in anarchic setting, and also these rights conferred in international water 
law are provided by states’ consent in the world of politics. However, there is a growing broad 
consensus about the general definition and understanding of an equitable and reasonable utilisation 
which is laid out and codified in the Water Convention, Watercourses Convention and the 2008 ILC 
Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers (Draft Aquifer Articles), and are mentioned in 
several cases of ICJ and regional arbitrations, agreements, and treaties. Considering that the ERU 
principle is recognised as the pre-eminent rule of international water law,590 and the backbone of the 
UN Watercourses Convention as “a global framework instrument that sets out rules and principles for 
governing international watercourses”591, this forms a legal umbrella under which water utilisation 
rules, states commitments, and compliance mechanisms are defined. 
It is also acknowledged that substantive and procedural rules of international water law are bound 
together in order to achieve “equity” and “fairness”. 592 As a general rule grounded on the theory of 
“limited territorial sovereignty”, states are entitled to enjoy equal rights to the utilisation of an 
international watercourse, but when so doing they are obliged to take all appropriate measures not to 
cause significant harm to other riparian states. However, the term “significant” can be tricky in practice, 
for it is declared that “some significant harm may be tolerated – in very limited circumstances – where 
it can be established to be equitable and reasonable” 593 . These substantive rules, alongside the 
procedural rules of international water law, seek to tackle fairness and equity in the utilisation of shared 
waters. 
Underpinning these rules, however, is a set of distinctly discursive issues concerning what constitutes 
“fairness” in transboundary water interactions. International water law-making has been a long ongoing 
process for, and in particular, over 38 years, since 1976 to 2014594; it provides an opportunity for states 
to develop the normative framework for legal rules over international waters, a process which is still 
underway. For instance, the UN Watercourses Convention enables states for deliberation and also 
encoding the rules of the game by a set of communication processes which were practised in several 
rounds of talk in the Sixth Committee. This kind of platform enables states to negotiate and agree (or 
 
590 Rieu-Clarke (n 7) p. 104. 
591 Rieu-Clarke (n 235). 
592 Yihdego and Rieu-Clarke (n 23). 
593 Rieu-Clarke (n 235) p. 100. 
594  When ILC started to study international water law to the time of entering into force of the 1997 UN 
Watercourses Convention. 
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reject) substantive rules on the utilisation of international waters through these norm-bound talks. The 
ongoing debates over rules of utilisation of international waters between poor vs. rich, developed vs. 
developing vs. least-developed, and downstream vs. upstream states indicate the importance of state 
discourse to international water law, and how much this can bring political influence and legitimacy to 
state behaviour in an international river basin, contributing to the promoting shared understanding of 
equitable and reasonable utilisation.595  The states’ discourses also present many controversies, for 
example those based on the states’ perception over sovereignty, right to development, and the like, as 
discussed in Section 5.3.  
The development of international water law, and in particular the entering into force of the UN 
Watercourses Convention, the opening of the Water Convention, and a commitment under the 
Sustainable Development Goals (2015) to improve water resources management through transboundary 
cooperation, provide further opportunities to synergise global- and basin-level processes of shared 
understanding.596 These synergistic processes “foster the ‘cross-fertilisation’ of establishment norms 
across a range of different cooperative frameworks, and also offer different venues by which to develop 
a shared understanding of the key legal rules and principles”.597 From this point of view, the change in 
hydropolitical interaction with regard to the development of legal rules is highlighted in the Nile river 
basin, where Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia, among other countries, have cooperated to launch the Nile 
Basin Initiative.598 It is further important to notice that the legal incorporation of some states into larger 
cooperative activities is a kind of political strategy to internationalise the issue and subsequently derive 
some advantage from it, of which the collaboration of Ethiopia in the Nile Basin Initiative is an example.  
Criteria and practice of legality 
The characteristics of the ERU principle, in particular the flexibility and vagueness, and its different 
roles, ranging from a substantive rule of water allocation to ensuring procedural fairness,599 might be 
the main reason for such above-mentioned debate and confusion concerning the creation of shared 
understanding. One may say that these features are in conflict with Fuller’s criteria of legality in 
particular ‘clarity’ and ‘non-contradiction’; however, they can be arguably understood under the criteria 
of ‘generality’ that plays a central role in the ‘promulgation’ of the ERU principle. These features of 
legality, therefore, have played important role to bring the ERU principle in legal and political practice 
 
595 See, for instance, Zeitoun (n. 484).  
596 Yihdego and Rieu-Clarke (n 23). 
597 Yihdego and Rieu-Clarke (n 23) p. 509. 
598 Yihdego and Rieu-Clarke (n 23). 
599 McIntyre (n 452). McIntyre examines a number of different roles – ranging from a substantive rule of water 
allocation to ensuring procedural fairness – to discuss the reason for confusion about equity in international 
water law. 
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and discourses of riparian states. The development on the notion of the ERU principle and in particular 
the “authorities guideline function” of the UN Watercourses Convention has significant normative 
effects on state behaviour, which accordingly may at least lead to the change in states’ discourse. The 
development of international water law should not be measured, for example, by the number of states 
joining the global convention. Instead, changes to legal rules and norms which are generally 
representative of an elite community in possession of scientific authority along with the contribution of 
states’ opinions have undoubtedly occurred within a gradual social process and practice under which 
represents the interests and identities of riparian states.  
The long history of making customary international water law, and in particular establishing its two 
main global instruments, has witnessed an ongoing discursive process in which transnational epistemic 
communities helped to develop scientific knowledge within a normative paradigm shift600 and bring it 
to the public domain. The discursive construction has been done particularly under the influence of 
NGOs, every year World Water Forums and related conferences and meetings. 601  The discursive 
construction and shift in legal principles over international water issues, alongside the development of 
knowledge in other subject areas, provide politicians a conventional pattern to argue through and 
reconcile their different interests before agreeing to substantive commitments. Legal scholars, in turn, 
have sought to pinpoint precisely these commitments and make them more “law-like”.602 Armstrong 
and others note that “in the course of any discourse, the arguments engaged in by the participants will 
lead them towards shared understandings of the facts (‘the external world’), the normative issues 
involved (the ‘social world’) and their own subjective responses (the ‘inner world’). In one sense, the 
process of a ‘social construction of reality’ is to encompass “all aspects of ‘reality’ from factual 
knowledge to normative structures, and from demonstration of political boundaries to rule making”.603 
However, discursive practice in constructivism is not in a one-way process. A counter-discourse, for 
instance against the right to development, has been involved in shaping the ultimate outcome of 
transboundary legal regimes. It is also important to consider other related discursive patterns around 
international waters – for instance, the “right for river” or the persisting debate over climate change. 
The content of international water law rests on this dynamic discursive process, and reflects the 
underlying political process.   
Consider this, the ERU principle is based on the notion that a “community of interest” among all riparian 
states exists.604 While there might be some critics about the lack of “clarity” and “practical guidelines” 
 
600 For example, how the Harmon doctrine shifted to the limited sovereignty. 
601 Armstrong (n 207) p. 290. 
602 Armstrong (n 207) p. 290. 
603 Quoted in Armstrong (n 207) p. 290. 
604 McIntyre (n 452). 
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for the codification of the ERU principle,605 the application of such norm in general and flexible terms 
is necessary “to accommodate the enormous range of conditions pertaining in different river basins and 
the diversity of disputes which might arise”.606 In addition, some criticise that the formulation of the 
ERU principle in Article 5 of the UN Watercourses Convention is “a diminution of the right of each 
state to share a common watercourse” while “focusing too much on procedural questions and not 
enough on substantive issues”.607 However, the ERU principle hugely rests on a normative framework 
to establish a balance between the legitimate interests of riparian states, and therefore, it is to a certain 
extent unavoidable for “intense procedural inter-State engagement”.608 
Such criteria and roles of legality, critically discussed by McIntyre in his Utilization of Shared 
International Freshwater Resources–the Meaning and Role of “Equity” in International Water Law.609 
Grounded on McIntyre’s discussion, the ERU principle is arguably expected to construct a persuasive 
discourse and a shared understanding among the actors; Accordingly, this will influence the practice of 
legality by reshaping states’ interests and creating individual and collective identities. Since active 
communication among riparian states is significant to promote shared understanding, the ERU 
principles’ characteristic of flexibility may, arguably, gives states a maximum sense of “freedom” to 
overcome the anarchic symptoms, in particular uncertainty, and cooperate with each other, while 
agreeing or disagreeing on how to achieve equitable and reasonable utilisation. Such flexibility also 
enables courts for issues with disparate claims.610 The implementation and practice of the ERU principle 
is procedural in nature, therefore, its initial ambiguity is expected to be removed through constructive 
participation and states’ practice of those procedural provisions. Accordingly, the ERU principle may 
meet, at least in part, the criteria of legality, however, the assessment and implementation of this 
principle predominantly depends on procedural provisions and the riparian states’ practice in each case. 
Such practice of legality can reinforce the compliance with the ERU principle.    
The ERU, therefore, can be expected to contribute to the provision of a legal/legitimate basis for 
supporting constructive dialogue between riparian states. Such contribution to change, by itself, heavily 
depends on the level of cooperation and the culture of anarchy in international watercourse basins. It 
 
605 McIntyre (n 452); See also Peter Beaumont, ‘The 1997 Un Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses 
of International Watercourses: Its Strengths and Weaknesses from a Water Management Perspective and the 
Need for New Workable Guidelines’ [2000] 16 International Journal of Water Resources Development 475; 
Wolf (n 538).  
606 McIntyre (n 452) p. 113. 
607 Dellapenna (n 526) p. 278. 
608 János Bruhács, The Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 
1993) p. 159. 
609 McIntyre (n 452). 
610 See also Upreti (n 472). 
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should be noted, however, that this is a only starting point for decreasing/neutralising the threat of 
anarchy’s effects, and it forms only one part of a complex puzzle. First, the ERU principle, by providing 
a forum to maximise the benefits and minimise any difficulties, can potentially change the nature of 
hydropolitical relations and thereby reduce the intensity of competition by introducing a legitimate 
alternative for water utilisation. It can alter the actors’ identities from rivals to partners, contributing to 
change the hydropolitical relations from Hobbesian to Kantian. The ERU principle can act as a mediator 
among riparian states, encouraging them with the promise of some benefit to their rights for shared 
waters. Resultantly, riparian states will have less concern at survival, relative achievements, and the 
uncertainty of the future that emanate from anarchic settings. Then can an examination of the ERU 
principle through an asymmetric power relation help level the playing-field in anarchic settings, and 
influence state behaviour (interest and identity) in a way that promotes the robustness of equitable and 
reasonable water utilisation in hydropolitical relations. As mentioned, to make effective use of the ERU 
principle, additional factors must be considered to meet the requirement of interactional international 
law, including the procedural and institutional principles of international water law in order to enhance 
the practice of legality and a sense of legitimacy over states’ obligations over equitable and reasonable 
utilisation of international watercourse. In fact, the extent of the effective influence of the ERU principle 
on hydropolitical relations partly bears on the culture of anarchy which exists in a basin and the level 
of cooperation and conflict to overcome anarchic symptoms. In the next chapter, such conceptual and 
theoretical matter will be applied and practically attested as it operates at the Helmand River Basin. 
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Chapter 6. The Helmand River Basin: anarchy and the quest for equity 
6.1. Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to analyse the selected case study, i.e. the Helmand River Basin which is 
shared by Afghanistan and Iran, through the theoretical context of this research. First, after giving an 
overview of the hydrological and geographical characteristics of the case study, the chapter is structured 
into three main parts. Part I, Hydropolitics, will analyse the hydropolitical trajectory and legal 
institutional history of the Helmand River Basin in order to situate them into the TWINS framework. 
In so doing, the interests, identity, positions, strategies and power relations of Afghanistan and Iran 
concerning the water utilisation of the Helmand River will be examined. Part II, The principle of 
equitable and reasonable utilisation, will critically analyse the extent to which the legal arrangements 
over the Helmand River reflect equitable utilisation, and how Afghanistan and Iran may adopt the ERU 
principle in order to meet their own interests and control the “rules of the game”. This will be followed 
by the examination of the ERU principle through interactional international law while placing the 
hydropolitical relations in the UHR in order to illustrate the effectiveness of transformation of water 
conflict over the Helmand River. Finally, in Part III, Anarchy, the obstacles for such transformation and 
the reasons for the possible “failing” of the ERU principle will be addressed. In so doing, it will examine 
how the anarchic nature at the international and domestic level and the geopolitical setting of the 
Helmand River Basin cast a shadow over hydropolitical relations, and how both riparian states, 
Afghanistan and Iran, suffer from such a dramatic setting. 
6.2. General overview 
After protracted conflicts and negotiations, influenced by the geopolitical interaction of the “Great 
Game”, 611  Afghanistan and Iran agreed on a treaty in 1973 612  to share the waters of the 
Helmand/Hirmand613 River. Despite significant swings in the political regime of the region, and while 
the treaty and the Helmand River Commission (HRC) provide a basis for bilateral cooperation, the story 
of the Helmand River Basin has remained largely unchanged since the mid-nineteenth century—with 
each country blaming the other for not respecting the treaty and its “water rights”.  
The Helmand River offers a classic example of the challenges faced in fostering transboundary water 
cooperation. These challenges are evident in the views of the media within both countries. Iran—as an 
earlier-developing downstream state—asserts a historical right over existing water uses for farming, in 
 
611 The Great Game is s a term referring to the strategic rivalry and conflict between the Russian and British 
empires in the nineteenth century as they sought geopolitical mastery of Afghanistan. 
612 See Annex I for the content of the 1973 Afghan-Iranian Helmand-River Water Treaty. 
613 In Iran this river is called the Hirmand River. 
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addition to claiming a basic human right to drinking water and an environmental right to protect the 
delta’s wetlands. Also, while recognising the Afghans’ right to development, Iran blames Afghanistan 
for “not providing the amount of water stated in the treaty for downstream”, therefore “violating the 
treaty”. Iran also accuses Afghanistan of “not taking care of the downstream environment”, and 
especially the delta Hamoun wetlands because of its “mismanagement”, “inequitable” and “unfair” 
sharing of water, expanding irrigation lands for opium’, and building several dams “without carrying 
out an Environmental Impact Assessment”.614 In response, Afghanistan - as a late-developing upstream 
state - while not answering the downstream calls for cooperation over the Hamoun wetlands, claims a 
right to development in order to overcome severe poverty. However, the views of all Afghanistan’s 
downstream neighbours (including Iran) have rarely been against the act of dam development itself.615 
In fact, what causes confusion for much of the Afghan population is that the criticisms are not over the 
act of dam construction and development in Afghanistan, but rather about the unilateral and non-
cooperative behaviour of Afghanistan for its seemingly ambitious and unclear plans that are apparently 
built upon the strong conviction of capturing “every drop” of water. There have also been accusations 
that Iran, by appropriating “more” water than is recognised in the treaty, is, along the same lines, guilty 
of “mismanagement” and “violating the treaty”.616 Within this historical context of counter-accusations 
that can be traced back to the 1870s, the sustainability of the entire river basin and in particular of the 
Hamoun wetlands has fallen victim to increased competition, unilateral water utilisation, and 
particularly an upstreamer reluctant to cooperate, and there is no sign of significant progress in resolving 
the dispute.  
6.3. Hydrology, geography, and the water development 
The 1,300 km Helmand River originates in the Hindu Kush mountains west of Kabul in Afghanistan. 
Near Qale Bist, the river’s major tributary, known as the Arghandab River, joins the Helmand River.617 
 
614 Tasnim News, ‘Hidden Realities of the Helmand River and the 1973 Treaty’ [in Farsi] Tasnim News (6 March 
2017) https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1395/12/16/1346429/ accessed 20 January 2021. 
615  See for extensive discussion on different hydropolitical aspects of Afghanistan, Vincent Thomas, Mujib 
Ahmad Azizi and Khalid Behzad, Developing Transboundary Water Resources: What Perspectives for 
Cooperation between Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan? (Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit Kabul, 
Afghanistan 2016). Also, among many official letters sent to Afghanistan, the two joint letters sent by Iran and 
Turkmenistan inviting Afghanistan for cooperation over the Harirud River (another transboundary river between 
Iran and Afghanistan) in 2006 and 2010, they did not complain about the dam construction by Afghanistan; 
However, they expect Afghanistan to join the whole basin cooperation effort. See Nagheeby and Warner (n 
327). 
616 Soltan Mahmoud Mahmoudi, ‘Historical Events after the Signing of the Helmand River Water Treaty’ [in 
Farsi-Dari] 8am Daily Newspaper (16 May 2017) https://8am.af/x8am/1396/02/26/historical-events-after-the-
signing-of-the-treaty-helmand-river/ accessed 20 January 2020. 
617 Matthew King and Benjamin Sturtewagen, ‘Making the Most of Afghanistan’s River Basins: Opportunities for 
Regional Cooperation’ [2010]  EastWest Institute, New York; A Favre and Golam Monowar Kamal, ‘Watershed 
Atlas of Afghanistan’ [2004] . 
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Crossing southwest, then north, it forms 55 km of the Afghan-Iranian border, and ultimately ends in the 
18,000 km2 Sistan618 delta, where it forms a large complex of three main interconnected wetlands, the 
Hamoun-e-Puzak, Hamoun-e-Saberi, and Hamoun-e-Hirmand, and subsequently, in exceptionally wet 
years, overflows to the south into the Gaud-e-Zirreh. While most of the river basin is located in 
Afghanistan, a large part of the delta, in particular the Hamoun wetlands, is located in Iran (see Figure 
12 below for a map of the basin and the main infrastructures and Table 1 for the population of the basin). 
While the flow of water is east-west in the Helmand River, from Afghanistan to Iran, a major climatical 
feature of the basin is a high-velocity wind blowing in the opposite direction of the water flow in the 
early summer, creating an environment referred to as the “most odious place on earth” by 19th century 
visitors.619 Locally known as “the winds of 120 days” and with a speed of 130 to 185 Km/hr, it brings 
a cool breeze to the whole delta in the case of the wet Hamouns, whereas in dried wetlands it causes 
hot, dry air mixed with sands to move not only around the delta but also towards the source of water, 
Afghanistan. The winds of 120 days combined with a high temperature is the main natural reason for 
intense evaporation of the sheets of water in the Hamouns (see Figure 13).620  
 
Figure 12. The Helmand River Basin and the main infrastructures621 
 
618 Or it has been seen in some texts as Seistan. 
619  John W Whitney, Geology, Water, and Wind in the Lower Helmand Basin, Southern Afghanistan (US 
Geological Survey 2006). 
620 See Najafi and Vatanfada (n 85). See also O Alizadeh-Choobari, P Zawar-Reza and A Sturman, ‘The “Wind 
of 120 Days” and Dust Storm Activity over the Sistan Basin’ [2014] 143 Atmospheric research 328. 
621 van Beek (n 85) developed by the author of this study. 
CHAPTER 6                                                                                                                     The Helmand River Basin 
136 
 
Table 2. Population data by country in the Helmand Basin622 






Figure 13. The direction of water and wind in the Helmand River Basin623 
The Helmand River, with an average surface water availability of 9,552 million cubic meter (MCM),624 
is considered the lifeblood of one of the poorest regions of the two riparian states. The water resources 
of the Helmand River Basin are used extensively for irrigation and are crucial for Afghan and Iranian 
farmers alike. In addition, the Helmand River is a critical resource for sustaining the transboundary 
Hamoun wetlands, which, from an environmental perspective, are the most important parts of the river 
delta. The livelihood of the people living around the Hamoun wetlands is highly dependent on the water 
resources of the Helmand River, supporting activities such as fishing, reed harvesting, and bird hunting. 
Only the Iranian side of the wetlands is listed under the Ramsar Convention and was recognised as a 
UNESCO Biosphere Reserve in 2016.625 Requests by Iran and international bodies for Afghanistan to 
join the effort to protect the Hamoun wetlands have not yet received a positive response.626 The Hamoun 
 
622 King and Benjamin Sturtewagen (n 617). 
623 Whitney (n 619). 
624  Vincent Thomas and Manijeh Mahmoudzadeh Varzi, ‘A Legal Licence for an Ecological Disaster: The 
Inadequacies of the 1973 Helmand/Hirmand Water Treaty for Sustainable Transboundary Water Resources 
Development’ [2015] 31 International Journal of Water Resources Development 499. 
625 While there have been some efforts to invite Afghanistan to join the international campaign to revive the 
Hamoun wetlands, their participation, so far, has not been forthcoming. 
626 There has been special effort to establish cooperation over the Helmand River and protection of the Hamoun 
Wetlands. For instance, UNEP facilitated several programs of “environmental diplomacy” between two sides 
by organizing technical meetings in 2005, recommending both parties to share information on water quantity, 
establish national advisory committees and develop joint restoration projects with the financial support from the 
Global Environment Facility (GEF). The effort that “has unfortunately been stalled by increasing insecurity in 
the region”. See, for more information, Richard A Matthew, Oli Brown and David Jensen, From Conflict to 
Peacebuilding: The Role of Natural Resources and the Environment (UNEP/Earthprint 2009) p. 27. In addition, 
within the framework of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) – an intergovernmental organization 
established in 1985 by Iran, Pakistan and Turkey for the purpose of sustainable socio-economic development of 
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wetlands, therefore, have gradually diminished, seriously threatening the ecosystem and livelihoods of 
local communities, which puts public pressure mostly on the Iranian government.  
Both Afghanistan and Iran have unilaterally implemented water development projects with the aim of 
achieving their respective “hydraulic missions” and regulating the Helmand water flow. According to 
Vincent Thomas and Manijeh Mahmoudzadeh Varzi, 627  Afghanistan currently uses surface water 
mostly for agricultural purposes (with an explosive growth in opium cultivation) 628 , yet the total 
irrigable 250,219 ha cannot be irrigated to its full extent while also suffering from a lack of proper 
infrastructure to secure drinking water. In addition to operating the Kajaki and Dahla Dams since the 
1950s, Afghanistan currently plans to develop several other dams like the Kamal Khan—which is 
upstream near the Iranian border—and increase the storage capacity of the Kajaki Dam in order to 
expand irrigated areas. A further dam which is under construction is the Bakhsh Abad on the Farah 
River. The dams are also considered for generating electricity.  
Such unilateral dam developments and irrigation expansion in Afghanistan, particularly for opium 
cultivation, along with a silent diplomacy (i.e. calling for a boycott of the talks with neighbouring 
countries over transboundary water issues) have always attracted sharp criticism from Iran, who blames 
Afghanistan for not respecting the treaty and downstream rights, and the needs of the Hamoun wetlands 
in particular. These concerns were expressed by the Iranian President, Hassan Rouhani, at a United 
Nations (UN)-backed conference on sand and dust storms in Tehran, who showed his deep concern by 
remarking that “building dams [in Afghanistan]629 without studying environmental aspects is damaging 
 
the member states that was expanded in 1992 to include Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – The first ministerial meeting high-level talks on transboundary 
environmental management was held in Tehran on 15 December 2002. “Tehran Declaration on Cooperation” as 
well as a plan of action were agreed among the ECO Member States. The participants agreed on various issues 
including “harmonization of environmental standards, environmentally sound technologies, urban 
environmental management, improving Environmental Impact Assessment systems, eco-tourism, establishment 
of an ECO Environmental College and developing an ECO Environmental Fund.” The participants have given 
pledges to support Afghanistan “developing and strengthening its environmental authorities and in establishing 
an Environmental Protection Agency”. See UNEP, Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment-Afghanistan 
(UNEP 2003) p. 102. 
627 Thomas and Varzi (n 624). 
628 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2016: Cultivation and Production 
(United Nations Vienna 2016) https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2018/May/last-years-record-opium-
production-in-afghanistan-threatens-sustainable-development--latest-survey-reveals.html. The United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) revealed that opium cultivation in Afghanistan hit a peak in 2017, 
showing a 63 percent increase compared with 2016, and particularly in the fertile Helmand valley where the 
British and American army fight with Taliban. Considering that the major consumer markets are mainly in 
Europe, some challenge the US-UK’s “fight” in opium war. See, for instance, Justin Rowlatt, ‘How the US 
military's opium war in Afghanistan was lost’ BBC (25 April 2019) accessed 20 January 2021. 
629 He also targeted Turkey’s dam development over the Tigris River, in particular the Ilisu Dam. 
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for the region.”630 In response to these criticisms, Afghanistan argued that, “Iran has no right for water 
more than the allocated amount in the treaty.”631 A few days after Rouhani’s speech, President Ashraf 
Ghani of Afghanistan said that “water is another major resource for Afghanistan,” and that “we are 
already investing in dams and irrigation infrastructure to raise agricultural productivity, and as technical 
designs are completed we will be accelerating investment in this sector that is key for both growth and 
poverty reduction.”632  
Iran started to develop reservoirs in the early 1980s in order to secure water for the livelihoods of local 
residents, particularly in harsh times of drought. Four reservoirs known as Chahnimeh were developed 
for drinking water and the agricultural demands of 120,000 ha. Despite the government’s efforts to 
conduct several projects to increase efficiency and decrease the total irrigated lands of the Sistan plain, 
in order to align the water demand with the allocated waters provided for in the treaty,633 it has not yet 
fully achieved the desired goals. The operation of the Chahnimeh reservoirs and inefficient agricultural 
development, in turn, have been criticised by Iranian environmental activists.  
In a similar vein, and in response to Iranian concerns, Afghanistan blames Iran for exceeding its 
allocation of water under the treaty and mismanagement that, the Afghan government argues, negatively 
affects the Hamoun wetlands. Iran has rejected this accusation and asked Afghanistan to commit to the 
treaty and cooperate over the protection of the transboundary Hamoun wetlands. 
The tragedy of the Hamouns 
The ecosystem of the whole Helmand River Basin and in particular the Hamoun wetlands in the delta 
has been drastically affected by civil war in Afghanistan, mismanagement and inefficient use of water 
on both sides and massive growth of irrigation and specifically opium cultivation and of course 
unilateral and noncooperative management of the Basin. While it seems that the irrigation lands have 
remained constant in downstream Iran, the irrigation areas have expanded considerably in upstream 
Afghanistan even during civil wars.634 Adding droughts and future infrastructures like the Kamal Khan 
 
630 Dominic Dudley, ‘War of Words Heats up between Iran and Afghanistan over Water Resources,’ Forbes (12 
July 2017) https://www.forbes.com/sites/dominicdudley/2017/07/12/iran-afghan-water-dispute/ accessed 20 
January 2021. 
631 Mahmoudi ‘Historical Events after the Signing’ (n 616). 
632 Dudley (n 630). 
633 Tasnim News, ‘Organizing and Establishing Rural Cooperative Unions in the New Irrigation Plan of Sistan 
Plain’ [in Farsi] (8 May 2019) https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1398/02/18/2007266/ accessed 20 January 
2021. 
634 See, for extensive case-study research with the focus on poppy cultivation in Afghanistan, David Mansfield, 
‘On the Frontiers of Development: Illicit Poppy and the Transformation of the Deserts of Southwest 
Afghanistan’ [2019] 1 Journal of Illicit Economies and Development 330.  
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Dam, Bakhshabad Dam and increasing the capacity volume of the Kajaki Dam within the non-
cooperative atmosphere of Afghanistan could lead to an environmental and human catastrophe.  
In 2000-1, following severe droughts in the region and significant reduction in water flow to the delta, 
the Hamouns completely dried up (see Figure 14), dramatically affecting the livelihood of the whole 
population surrounding the wetlands.635   
 
Figure 14. Landsat images of the Sistan delta and Hamouns in 1976 (left) and 2001 
(right)636 
Part I: Hydropolitics 
6.4. Historical trajectory of hydropolitical relations: coexisting conflict and cooperation 
The starting point for the discussion over the Helmand River Basin is to examine the question of how 
the surrounding transboundary water interactions have evolved over time: What is the pattern of 
relations and what are the main strategies, tactics, and mindset of the riparian states? The historical 
trajectory of hydropolitical relations between Afghanistan and Iran over the Helmand River Basin has 
witnessed almost no progress and is full of dead ends and unexpected twists overshadowed by massive 
political swings (see Table 3 for more detailed information). In such circumstances, both states have 
 
635  The respective reports alarmed that “millions of fish and untold numbers of wildlife and cattle died. 
Agricultural fields and approximately 100 villages were abandoned, and many succumbed to blowing sand and 
moving dunes”. See Whitney (n 619); See also Pirouz Mojtahed-Zadeh, ‘Lake Hamun, a Disaster in the Making. 
Hydropolitics of Hirmand and Hamun’ [1995]  United Nations Environment Programme, http://www unep or 
jp/ietc/publications/techpublications/TechPub-4/lake1-7 asp; Najafi and Vatanfada (n 85); Mohammad 
Sharifikia, ‘Environmental Challenges and Drought Hazard Assessment of Hamoun Desert Lake in Sistan 
Region, Iran, Based on the Time Series of Satellite Imagery’ [2013] 65 Natural hazards 201. 
636 John Weier, ‘From Wetland to Wasteland. The Destruction of the Hamoun Oasis’ [2002] 13 Earth Observatory 
https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/features/hamoun. The only water body in 2001 remained in Delta is the 
Chahnimeh reservoir which play key role to provide limited drinking water, while the reports confirmed that the 
gates of the Kajaki Dam in Afghanistan were closed at the time. Floods which play significant role in such 
unique freshwater ecosystem located in a closed basin later help partially restore the Hamouns, however, the 
environmental sustainability has yet remained vulnerable. 
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sought to serve their own interest and create their own identities as national entities. The long 
intermittent disputes over utilisation of the water resources of the Helmand River between Afghanistan 
and Iran dates back to the 1870s when the border was delineated by the British.637 Disputes over the 
Helmand waters have been heightened in periods of drought (and flood). Table 3 highlights how 
droughts (either caused by nature or human activities) have also played a crucial role in the history of 
conflict and cooperation in the Helmand River. Such events have driven legal and political interactions 
between the countries and influenced the states towards different (collective) behaviours and decision-
making. 
Studies of the hydropolitical relations over the Helmand River between Afghanistan and Iran still suffer 
from a lack of critical analysis of the cooperative effort, the role of the HRC, and the effects of the 
broader geopolitical factors. With the latest positive news about the possible improvement of the 
cooperative management of the basin between Afghanistan and Iran, it is necessary to shed light on the 
history of hydropolitical relations between the two countries in order to not only fill the gap in analysis 




637 Pirouz Mojtahed-Zadeh, Boundary Politics and International Boundaries of Iran: A Study of the Origin, 
Evolution, and Implications of the Boundaries of Modern Iran with Its 1 (Universal-Publishers 2007). See also 
Pirouz Mojtahed-Zadeh, The Small Players of the Great Game: The Settlement of Iran's Eastern Borderlands 
and the Creation of Afghanistan (Routledge 2004). 
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638 Additional events to be taken into consideration include 1828: Iran's loss of Caucasus to Russia; 1857: Treaty of Paris: 
Iran's loss of Herat to Great Britain; 1926: crowned Reza Shah Pahlavi; 1933: Zahir Shah becomes king; Major droughts 
as key drivers in legal and political interactions: 1871; 1902; 1939-40, 1946-7, 1950-1, 1960, 1970-1, 1999-2000-1, 2003-
4, and 2007. See Mohsen Nagheeby and Alistair Rieu-Clarke, ‘Water Diplomacy in the Helmand River Basin: Exploring 
the Obstacles to Cooperation within the Shadow of Anarchy’ in Anoulak Kittikhoun and Susanne Schmeier (eds), River 
Basin Organizations in Water Diplomacy (Routledge 2020). 
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One significant point here is that despite the fact that conflict over the Helmand River has often hit the 
headlines in media reports and research, relations between Afghanistan and Iran over water issues have 
been marked by the coexistence of conflict and cooperation, and more often in a cooperative manner. 
Therefore, regarding the “threats” to the Afghanistan-Iran relations and “escalation of conflict” such 
alarming reports, arguably as will be shown here, may not accurately reflect the complexity of the 
political dynamics of the basin. Considering the long history, conflictive events over the Helmand River 
have often occurred in limited periods of drought and only escalated on a few short occasions in the 
past 150 years. While conflict has existed in that time, it has often been controlled by both sides in a 
kind of cooperative approach. The reasons for this pattern, as will be elaborated in Section 6.6, may lie 
in the anarchic geopolitical complexity of the basin. However, as discussed in Chapter 4, not all 
cooperation is good, while disputes may even lead to improving the arrangement towards equity.639 As 
we will see here, cooperation over the Helmand River has even resulted in a legal treaty not being 
effective, leaving the underlying disagreement unresolved. The water conflict, in part, may arguably be 
more rooted in the “damaged identity” of Afghanistan, which has suffered from a lengthy war and 
Western invasions. This section describes the history of conflictive and cooperative events concerning 
the Helmand River Basin, putting them ultimately into the TWINS matrix while discussing the mindset 
and dominant strategies of the riparian states. 
6.4.1. Imperialism and the seeds of conflict: securitising water 
There is still a general strong belief that many of the fundamental crises and conflicts in most parts of 
the world are rooted in the colonial past, being “still in the empire’s shadow”.640 Afghanistan which 
was the buffer state for the British Empire who ruled much of South Asia is one such example.641 The 
first arrangements regarding water between Afghanistan and Iran were initiated due to imperialist 
rivalry over sovereignty and territorial boundaries in the late 19th century. By the end of the Anglo-
Persian War (1856-7) and under the rivalry of the Great Game between England and Russia,642 the 1857 
Treaty of Peace (the Paris Treaty) between Persia and Great Britain was signed. Accordingly, Persia 
was obliged to relinquish all claims over Herat by acknowledging the independence of Afghanistan 
 
639 As discussed in chapter 4, conflict and cooperation may be understood differently by various actors. As 
explained by Mark Zeitoun, for instance, the “cooperation versus conflict paradox” is evidenced in the case of 
the Jordan River Basin. See Mark Zeitoun, ‘Violations, Opportunities and Power Along the Jordan River: 
Security Studies Theory Applied to Water Conflict’ in Water Resources in the Middle East (Springer 2007). 
640 Roger Hardy, The Poisoned Well: Empire and Its Legacy in the Middle East (Oxford University Press 2016); 
See also Roger Hardy, ‘The Middle East: still in empire’s shadow’ THE IRISH TIMES (16 August 2016) 
https://www.irishtimes.com/culture/books/the-middle-east-still-in-empire-s-shadow-1.2758098 accessed 20 
January 2021. 
641 Nagheeby and Warner (n 327). 
642 See, for more information, Mansoureh Ebrahimi and Yusoff Kamaruzaman, ‘On Iran’s Eastern Borders: 
Origins and Consecutive Treaties with the British During the Nineteenth Century’ in Mansoureh Ebrahimi, 
Masoumeh Rad Goudarzi and Yusoff Kamaruzaman (eds), The Dynamics of Iranian Borders (Springer 2019). 
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under British suzerainty, and Britain agreed to serve as arbiter to resolve disputes between Persia and 
Afghanistan “in a manner just and honourable to Persia”.643 As a result, in 1872,644 British officer, 
General Sir Frederick. Goldsmid645 – on behalf of Britain,646 was responsible for arbitrating between 
Iran and Afghanistan about their dispute over the delimitation of the boundary in Sistan. In this regard, 
the main branch of the Helmand River in the delta region was defined as the border, with the principle 
irrigation areas and the major population at the time remaining on one side of the newly-established 
border, Persia, and the supply canals necessary for those Persian irrigations were assigned to the other 
side of the border, Afghanistan.647 The problem with Goldsmid's boundary award was the lack of any 
decision or recommendation about a mechanism for water division between the two new divided sides. 
In fact, he contented himself with only offering general advice that: “It is, moreover, to be well 
understood that no works are to be carried out on either side calculated to interfere with the requisite 
supply of water for irrigation on the banks of the Helmand”.648 Moreover, he also did not consider the 
natural impacts of changes in river morphology and accordingly their influences on the political border. 
While the question of the allocation of water remained unanswered, the disputes over the Helmand 
waters in the delta were apparently settled locally without intervention from central authority for thirty 
years, 649  and local residents, Afghans and Iranians, worked together using the same water in a 
cooperative manner. However, further disputes occurred in 1896 between the two countries, mainly 
because the river changed its course in the border area as a result of flooding, and subsequently a severe 
drought occurred.650 British arbitration once again assigned Colonel Sir Henry McMahon in 1903 to 
demarcate new boundaries and determine the water rights.651 Concerning the water allocation between 
 
643 The 1857 Paris treaty (Treaty of Peace) quoted by Mojtahed-Zadeh ‘Boundary Politics and International 
Boundaries of Iran’ (n 637) p. 180. 
644 Note that the first and second Anglo-Afghan wars between the British Empire and the Emirate of Afghanistan 
were from 1839 to 1842 and from 1878 to 1880. Ebrahimi and Kamaruzaman (n 642). 
645 In some sources, it is mentioned as Goldsmith. 
646 Based on the 1857 Treaty of Peace between Britain and Persia. 
647 Mojtahed-Zadeh ‘Boundary Politics and International Boundaries of Iran’ (n 637). 
648 Mojtahed-Zadeh ‘Boundary Politics and International Boundaries of Iran’ (n 637); For its extensive historical 
sources concerning the Helmand River Basin controversy, see Oregon Digital at 
https://oregondigital.org/catalog?. 
649 See, for extensive discussion, Pirouz Mojtahed-Zadeh, ‘Hydropolitics of Hirmand and Hamun’ in Pirouz 
Mojtahed-Zadeh (ed), Boundary Politics and International Boundaries of Iran (Universal Publishers 2006). 
650 Mojtahed-Zadeh, ‘Hydropolitics of Hirmand and Hamun’ (n 649); See also Mohammad Reza Hafeznia, Pirouz 
Mojtahedzadeh and Jafar Alizadeh, ‘Hirmand Hydropolitic and Its Effect on the Political Relations of Iran and 
Afghanistan’ [2006] 10 The Journal of Spatial Planning 83; and CIA (n 831). 
651 In this regard, Mojtahed-Zadeh point out that “[t]he original problem was that rulers of the British protectorate 
of Afghanistan at the turn of the twentieth century considered river Hirmand as an internal river of that country, 
reserving for Afghanistan the right to utilise its water in whatever way it wished. McMahon's Memorandum of 
25 September 1904 asserts: “The Afghan Government does not admit that there is any water question in dispute, 
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the two sides, it is said that he first ruled that the Helmand water should be divided equally between the 
two parties in the border area (in 1903-04).652 However, in 1905, McMahon decided to allocate two-
thirds of the Helmand water in the delta to Afghanistan and one-third to Iran.653 In addition, the 
Hamouns’ water demand was neglected in his arbitration (perhaps environment was not an issue at the 
time).654  
While the reasons for this change in his decision are not clear from the literature, the arbitration could 
potentially be questioned since the Iranian side at that time was apparently wider, more fertile and more 
populous than the Afghan side – district of Nimrooz –even without taking into consideration the needs 
of the Hamoun wetlands themselves. The arbitration could be seen as a purposeful British tactic to keep 
the buffer state in their own control. While the Afghans were satisfied with the water award, public 
opinion from the other side regarding the arbitration was that it was an “unfair” award. In the summer 
of 1905, when the Helmand waters become significantly low, the opposition Iranian newspapers abroad 
and the Russian newspapers published letters of complaint from the people of Sistan against McMahon 
and the British for what they call the “conspiracy” against their water rights.655 In particular, the 
Russians expressed their concern and displeasure to the Iranian Crown Prince about the British 
arbitration concerning the water rights of the people of Sistan.656 
Such political issues between the Russians and the British surrounding the Helmand waters could be 
considered in a bigger geopolitical picture of the region – the Great Game – which will be discussed 
later, and from this point of view, the unknown reasons behind the change in McMahon’s decision may 
also be derived. While both parties accepted the decision, Iran rejected McMahon’s arbitration on water 
allocation at the time.657 The interactions over the Helmand water in these periods may be considered 
as efforts to provide an ad hoc joint action; however, disagreements over water lay at the heart of 
disputes about land and territory, and any form of appeasement concerning water issues reflected 
concerns about the loss of sovereign control. Such imperial interventions in these disputes over water 
within the nature of the Great Game made a complex securitisation structure over the Helmand River 
 
as their geographical position makes them sole owner of the whole Helmand above the Band-i-Sistan.” 
Mojtahed-Zadeh ‘Boundary Politics and International Boundaries of Iran’ (n 637) p. 247. 
652 Mojtahed-Zadeh ‘Boundary Politics and International Boundaries of Iran’ (n 637). 
653 Mojtahed-Zadeh ‘Boundary Politics and International Boundaries of Iran’ (n 637). 
654 Nagheeby and Rieu-Clarke (n 638). 
655 Even local people in Sistan attacked the British arbitration headquarters followed by the Iranian government’s 
request for fresh arbitration. See Mojtahed-Zadeh, ‘Hydropolitics of Hirmand and Hamun’ (n 649). 
656 Mojtahed-Zadeh, ‘Hydropolitics of Hirmand and Hamun’ (n 649). 
657 Mojtahed-Zadeh, ‘Hydropolitics of Hirmand and Hamun’ (n 649). 
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in which the matter presented as a threat to the national security of Afghanistan and Iran, requiring 
urgent action outside the normal political domain (TWINS Sequence 1 in Figure 16). 
However, while the question of water division remained officially unsettled, once again there was 
apparently slightly more cooperation at local level or lack of serious disagreement at state level for 
almost a further thirty years over the utilisation of the Helmand water. From 1905 to 1930, an annual 
joint commission of primarily academics, appointed by the two countries, cooperated in jointly 
measuring and allocating the Helmand water at Band-e Kamal Khan.658 
6.4.2. Post-colonialism, nationalism, and politicising water  
In January 1949, President Harry S. Truman “hit the jackpot of the world’s political emotions” when 
he proposed a “bold new program… for the improvement… of under-development areas”.659 Shifting 
from the colonial era to the post-colonial era, development and modernisation, as new concepts, became 
the heart of the new policies of global powers in “new independent states”.660 This thinking persuaded 
the leaders of these newly independent countries to “modernise” and “nationalise” their governmental 
policies. Development was not simply the best but rather the almost unavoidable option; “there is only 
one-way traffic in time,” as Jawaharlal Nehru of India observed.661 Such development and modernity 
often manifested in dam projects, land reforms and planned cities.662 In this regard, a large-scale water 
project like the development of a dam was recognised “as a child of colonialism,” or a way to reshape 
and reform the colonised states to control space, water and people and centralise the power.663 This 
potential to rule people resulted in competition among the different stakeholders of a river to achieve 
the “hydraulic mission,” with which they can rule the other actors, providing political and geopolitical 
opportunity for the owners.664 Afghanistan and Iran’s leaders at the time were also persuaded to accept 
such offered development plans as a means of creating and promoting national identity.665 
In the 1930s, the relationship between Iran and Afghanistan became friendly through the newly 
centralised government of Reza Shah Pahlavi in Iran and the government of Mohammad Nader Shah 
and then Mohammad Zahir Shah in Afghanistan. This friendship was apparent in the commissive speech 
 
658 See CIA (n 831). 
659 Nick Cullather, ‘Damming Afghanistan: Modernization in a Buffer State’ [2002] 89 The Journal of American 
History 512 p. 513. 
660 Cullather (n 659) p. 513. 
661 Cullather (n 659) p. 513. 
662 Cullather (n 659) p. 513. 
663  Cullather (n 659) p. 513; See also François Molle, Peter P Mollinga and Philippus Wester, ‘Hydraulic 
Bureaucracies and the Hydraulic Mission: Flows of Water, Flows of Power’ [2009] 2 Water alternatives 328. 
664 Nagheeby and Warner (n 327). 
665 Nagheeby and Warner (n 327); See also Cullather ‘From New Deal to New Frontier in Afghanistan’ (n 82). 
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act of Mohammad Nader Shah regarding a land, dispute stating that “I would leave the decision up to 
the opinion of His Highness Reza Shah”.666 Such a speech of act may be understood as an attempt by 
both sides to normalise relations. This normalisation resulted in bilateral cooperation in trade and 
consular relations on several occasions. Amid this promotion of relations, the development upstream 
caused a shortage of water and thus local protests downstream, resulting in prioritising water issues in 
bilateral political discussions.667 Accordingly, attempts to achieve mutual consensus over the settlement 
of the Helmand water disputes triggered by such above speech acts from both sides resulted in the 
conclusion of the 1939 treaty.668 Article I of this treaty recognised that “the governments of Iran and 
Afghanistan agree to divide in equal shares all waters of the Helmand river which reaches to Band-e 
Kamal Khan (30 miles from the border inside Afghan territory) between Iran and Afghanistan”.669 The 
water issues, therefore, took on a politicised nature, associated with commissive speech act followed by 
ad hoc joint action (TWINS Sequence 2 in Figure 16). 
Despite several rounds of bilateral negotiation amid the newly established relations between the two 
states, the 1939 bilateral treaty also failed to put an end to the disputes, mainly because not all Afghans 
would consent, though there was significant improvement on McMahon’s water award from the Iranian 
point of view. It could not create a shared goal or a shared vision between Afghanistan and Iran 
concerning the utilisation of the Helmand waters, leaving unilateral and fragmented management of the 
basin. Signing the 1939 treaty was also overshadowed by the political swings in Iran during World War 
II, which resulted in Reza Shah being exiled in 1941 by the British and the Russians. Accordingly, the 
disputes were revived again, particularly after the US-funded Helmand-Arghandab Valley Authority 
(HAVA).670 The US pursued a similar geopolitical goal as the British within the “new Great Game” to 
maintain Afghanistan as a buffer state though with a different strategy of making it a “development” 
model for the whole world.671 The Americans’ project in the Helmand River included the construction 
of diversion dams and canals on the river as a result of contracts they concluded with the Afghans in 
1945.672 
 
666 Arfa Hassan, ‘Under Five Shahs’ [1964]  New York: William (Translated in Farsi by Ahmad Navab Safavi 
[1377] p. 284). 
667 Mojtahed-Zadeh, ‘Hydropolitics of Hirmand and Hamun’ (n 649). 
668 Mojtahed-Zadeh, ‘Hydropolitics of Hirmand and Hamun’ (n 649). 
669 Mojtahed-Zadeh, ‘Hydropolitics of Hirmand and Hamun’ (n 649) p. 249 . 
670 For more information about HAVA see Ghulam Farouq, ‘The Effects of Local, Regional and Global Politics 
on the Development of the Helmand-Arghandab Valley of Afghanistan’ (School of Oriental and African Studies 
(University of London) 1999). 
671 Nagheeby and Warner (n 327). 
672 Farouq (n 670). However, there are many issues and doubts concerning these projects pointed out in some 
research in terms of not only technical and economic perspectives but also environmental effects like 
waterlogging and salinization. See, for instance, Whitney (n 619). 
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Two major dams associated with HAVA to control flows were enough to cause great uproar in 
downstream Iran: the Dahla Dam on the Arghandab River (located north of the city of Kandahar, the 
largest river branch of the Helmand River) with a storage capacity of 478.6 MCM, and the Kajaki Dam 
on the Helmand River with a storage capacity of 1.7 BCM, over three times greater than the Dahla. 
These were finally inaugurated in 1952 and 1953, respectively.673 Iran opposed the HAVA project, 
fearing its negative impact, i.e. a decline in the natural flow of the river to the downstream, although 
the project was supposed to provide Afghanistan hydroelectric power and increase agricultural 
productivity.674 Despite the development projects still being in the initial stage, the low water flow in 
1946 and subsequently a long drought in Sistan in the summer of 1947 were believed by the local 
population to be a result of the construction activities on these American dams and canals in 
Afghanistan, reported by the British Consul General of Mashhad as follows: 
From Zabol a report has been received that no water from the Helmand has reached 
the town for a month and that outlying villages have been without it for some three 
months. The drought-stricken population will not believe that failure of last winter's 
snow is the reason and they have expressed their intent of crossing into Afghanistan 
and forcibly release the water on which they depend and which they are convinced 
the Afghans are illegally stealing or diverting by their new American engineered 
irrigation scheme in the neighbourhood of Girishk.675 
Following these events, Iran, whose national security was considered to be being threatened, decided 
to call on the United Nations Security Council to step into the water disputes with Afghanistan. 
However, finally, encouraged by the US, Iran renounced its decision.676 At this time the US offered to 
mediate the Afghanistan-Iran water dispute over the renewed securitised Helmand River.677 However, 
the validity of the mediation by the US could arguably be considered a conflict of interest, because one 
American interest was to support their interference by building dams and canals for the HAVA project 
for the Afghan government via an American company, Morrison-Knudson. 
The American proposal was based on the creation of a “neutral” commission of international experts 
from “disinterested countries” to study technical aspects of the problem concerning water allocation, 
 
673 Whitney (n 619). 
674 Mojtahed-Zadeh, ‘Hydropolitics of Hirmand and Hamun’ (n 649). 
675 Mojtahed-Zadeh, ‘Hydropolitics of Hirmand and Hamun’ (n 649) p. 249. 
676 GR Fakhari, ‘Dispute between Iran and Afghanistan on the Issue of Hirmand River’ [1993]  Book, 73pages, 
published in Kabul. 
677 One American interest was the fact that an American company Morrison-Knudson had been hired by the 
Afghan government to build dams and canals of the HAVA project, and therefore, American interest might be 
threatened by such disputes. See CIA (n 831).  
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with the aim of establishing an engineering basis for mutual agreement.678 Therefore, after several 
fruitless attempts to resolve the disputes, either by British arbitration or bilateral treaty, Iran and 
Afghanistan created the Helmand River Delta Commission in 1948 based on an American proposal. 
Focusing primarily on joint fact-finding, it presented its recommendation for water allocation between 
the two countries in 1951.679 The commission took the same position as McMahon, arguing that the 
core problem in the delta was actually due to “poorly constructed irrigation canals and unscientific 
diversion of available water”. 680  In addition, following the same approach, the commission’s 
representatives estimated water demands at the time merely for irrigation, livestock and human 
domestic use, without addressing the environmental requirements of the Hamoun wetlands (perhaps 
again it was not yet an issue at that time). While Afghanistan expressed its satisfaction almost 
immediately after the commission published its report, Iran rejected the results. The Iranian rejection 
was mainly based on the disagreement and different views on the estimation of the irrigation lands in 
Sistan, in a similar argument to that made against McMahon’s award.   
Thirty years after the failed 1939 bilateral treaty, negotiations between Afghanistan and Iran still 
continued, despite experiencing ups and downs due to international political competition between the 
West and East. During all these years, while the water allocation problem had not been officially settled 
between Afghanistan and Iran, it is not clear from the literature whether the local people cooperated 
with each other. The fact is that most of that time the problem of water division did not cause serious 
conflict (except perhaps in extreme events of drought or flood), due to the willingness of both states to 
cooperate and improve their relations.681 After several rounds of negotiations, and despite Iran’s initial 
rejection of the commission’s report, and once again following a period of severe drought in the 
downstream part of the river in 1970-1, the two countries signed the Helmand River Water Treaty in 
1973.682 The agreement centered on previous recommendations that were initially rejected by Iran—
namely to supply Iran with an average of 22 cubic meters per second, with an additional 4 cubic meters 
per second for “goodwill and brotherly relations” in a normal (or above normal) water year. This is 
 
678 CIA (n 831). 
679 For an extensive legal and political history of the Helmand River Basin, see Mojtahed-Zadeh, ‘Hydropolitics 
of Hirmand and Hamun’ (n 649). See also AHH Abidi, ‘Irano-Afghan Dispute over the Helmand Waters’ [1977] 
16 International Studies 357. 
680 CIA (n 831) p. 7. 
681 It is also said that there had been some negotiation to make a “package deal” between Afghanistan and Iran for 
sharing the benefits over water, energy and the Iranian port of Chahbahar. CIA (n 831) p. 11. See also the diaries 
of Asadollah Alam, the Shah’s minister of court, in 1969 where he notes that Afghanistan was offered to have 
better access to the Iranian ports at Chabahar and Bandar Abbas along with development assistance instead of 
providing more water to Iran. See Alam ‘Yad’dashtha-ye Alam’ (n 690). 
682 The 1973 Treaty contained twelve Articles along with two protocols related to Articles VIII and IX. Article 
I(c) identifies a “normal water year”: the year during which the total volume of water from the first of October 
to the end of the succeeding September, measured and calculated at the hydrometric station of Dehrawud, 
upstream of Kajakai Dam is 5661.71 MCM. See Annex I.  
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about 820 MCM per year or only 8.5 percent of the average surface water availability of 9,552 MCM 
in the whole basin; or 14 percent of 5,661.71 MCM measured at nearby Kajaki Dam, and less than 14 
percent of the overall water demand and requirement in Sistan; less water than any of the previous legal 
arrangements (see Table 4).683 This highly asymmetric water allocation has been one of the major 
sources of contention up to now with Iran complaining that this amount of water cannot meet the 
domestic and agricultural needs of one of its poorest areas, as well as the ecological demand of the 
wetlands. Yet, Afghanistan, itself struggling with poverty and poor living conditions, has repeatedly 
stated that it crucially needs the same water resources for its socio-economic development particularly 
for economic recovery after civil war. 
Table 4. Water allocation in the Helmand River between Afghanistan and Iran over time * 
Name of arrangement Date 
Water allocation (%) 
Afghanistan Iran 
Goldsmid Arbitration 1872 50 50 
McMahon Arbitration 1905 66.7 33.3 
Bilateral agreement on Helmand 
Water Division 
1939 50 50 
Delta Commission 1951 87.7 12.3 
Helmand River Water Treaty 1973 85.5 14.5 
* Note that the three first water division are based on water availability at the point of Kamal Khan 
Dam while the two last ones are at the Kajaki Dam.  
In order to address the conflicts over the waters of the Helmand and to implement the provisions of the 
treaty, Article VIII directs each party to appoint a commissioner and deputy commissioner. The first 
protocol to the treaty sets out the commissioners’ authority and functions.  
The signing of the treaty in 1973 (see Figure 15) was widely promoted by the officials of both countries 
once again through commissive speech acts. The Afghan prime minister, Mohammad Musa Shafiq, for 
instance, stated that the treaty “will solve the Helmand problem” and that “another 100 years of the two 
nations are [not] wasted on finding a solution for this difficulty.” Similarly, the Iranian prime minister, 
Amir Abbas Hoveyda, pointed out that, “there is no longer any question mark in relations between the 
two countries.”684  
 
683 Thomas and Varzi (n 624). See also Hamidreza Hajihosseini and others, ‘Hydrological Assessment of the 1973 
Treaty on the Transboundary Helmand River, Using the Swat Model and a Global Climate Database’ [2016] 30 
Water resources management 4681. 
684 Abidi ‘Irano-Afghan Dispute over the Helmand Waters’ (n 679) p. 372.  





Figure 15. Left: signing the 1973 Helmand River Water Treaty; Right: Covering the 
respective news by main national media newspaper685  
However, enthusiasm by the riparian states for the treaty quickly faltered, experiencing an exchange of 
assertive and directive speech acts, and did not enter into force until June 1977, when the instruments 
of ratification were exchanged.686 It is strongly claimed by some Afghans that the Helmand River is a 
“national” and “internal” river flowing in Afghanistan’s sovereignty,687 thus the delay in ratification 
could be explained by the discontent of the Afghan government and parliament, which perceived 
Afghanistan as acting as a “water dealer,”688 and “resented “giving away” what they regarded as 
precious Afghan water.”689 There was also disdain for the treaty by some Iranians who accused their 
signatory of being a “traitor.”690 Iranian views (which still exist) were shaped by the idea that the 1973 
treaty emerged from “hidden” talks and was a “gift” from the Shah and Americans to the Afghans to 
stand against the (Russian) communists.691 This is not surprising that a headline appears just next to the 
photo of US-backed signing the 1973 Helmand treaty: “Kosygin [the former Premier of the Soviet 
Union] arrives in Tehran” (Figure 15). Such superpowers’ footprint will be more elaborated in Part III. 
Coming from such a securitised nature of water issues overshadowed by the “new” Great Game in the 
1950s-1970s, the 1973 treaty was unable to address/create common norms or equity of benefit sharing 
in the whole basin, and was limited at best to controlling the conflict again through ad hoc joint actions 
 
685 The Institute for Iranian Contemporary Historical Studies (IICHS) at http://www.iichs.ir.  
686 Abidi ‘Irano-Afghan Dispute over the Helmand Waters’ (n 679). 
687 See note (n 651). 
688 Mahmoudi ‘Historical Events after the Signing’ (n 616). 
689 CIA, Iran-Afghanistan: Helmand River Dispute Still Sensitive (The Central Intelligence Agency, CIA Library 
1981) declassified report by the US Central Intelligence Agency, “sanitised copy,” approved for release 6 
September 2012, doc. no. CIA-RDP08C01297R000100130002-7, 16 December 1981, 1 
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP08C01297R000100130002-7.pdf. 
690 Quoted in Asadollah Alam, Yad’dashtha-Ye Alam: Virayesh Va Muqaddamah Az Alinaqi Alikhani (ML: Ibex 
Publishers 1992) pp.480-1; Or in Asad Allāh ʿAlam, The Shah and I: The Confidential Diary of Iran's Royal 
Court, 1969-1977 (IB Tauris 1991). Asadollah Alam, the former Iranian prime minister and the minister of the 
Royal Court at the time, shouted at signatories for being “cowards” and “betrayers”. 
691 See Alam ‘Yad’dashtha-ye Alam’ (n 690). 
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(TWINS Sequence 3 in Figure 16). Maintaining this status quo to retain the chaos, as is argued later in 
Part III may represent the geopolitical complexity of the basin which serves the interests of 
superpowers.692 The treaty remained in abeyance and neither official cooperation between the countries 
on water related issues nor serious conflict took place for some 20 years due to: 1) the great political 
upheaval in Afghanistan as a result of the Soviet invasion in 1979, the subsequent civil war, and the 
US-led invasion of 2001; and 2) the Iranian revolution of 1978-1979, and the subsequent war that Iraq 
waged against Iran from 1980 to 1988, initiated by the Western-backed Saddam Hussein. Again, during 
all these years, the water issues between Afghanistan and Iran were apparently abandoned by both sides, 
leading perhaps to a mix of cooperation and conflict at the local level. 
6.4.3. Civil war in Afghanistan, domestic anarchy, and moving back to water securitisation 
In 1996 the Taliban seized control of Kabul for five years. Several factors led the water issues in the 
Helmand River to the highest and most serious level of tension it had ever experienced. First, the 
relationship between Iran and the Taliban was hostile for a period after the Taliban attacked the Hazara 
Shi’as in Afghanistan and deteriorated further in 1998 after they killed many Hazaras in Mazar-i-Sharif, 
the northern Afghan city, and murdered Iranian diplomats and a journalist in the captured Consulate 
General of Iran.693 Second, there was a long period of extreme drought in the whole region between 
1999 and 2001,694 during which there was a 98% reduction in water flow to Iran and the whole Hamoun 
wetlands completely dried up which was associated with a massive displacement from Sistan.695 The 
Taliban was accused of closing the gates of the Kajaki and Dahla dams to put Iran under pressure within 
the growing political tensions.696 Iran, in response, tried to solve the issue using international and 
regional political channels. Surprisingly, under such apparently insoluble conflict, Iranian efforts 
resulted in a joint inspection committee of experts from both sides being created to visit the Kajaki dam 
in July 2000. The joint inspection team viewed the dam with “a considerable amount of water in its 
reservoir” (1000 MCM water storage at the time), and found that “the main cause of the water blockage 
was the closure of the gates at the Kajaki dam”.697 This resulted in Iran sending an official complaint to 
 
692 See Nagheeby and Warner (n 327). 
693 Mohsen M Milani, ‘Iran's Policy Towards Afghanistan’ [2006] 60 The Middle East Journal 235. 
694 See, for instance, Kai Wegerich, ‘Natural Drought or Human Made Water Scarcity in Uzbekistan’ [2002] 2 
Central Asia and the Caucasus 154. 
695 UNCT Iran, Un Inter-Agency Assessment Report on the Extreme Drought in the Islamic Republic of Iran 
(2001) https://reliefweb.int/report/iran-islamic-republic/un-inter-agency-assessment-report-extreme-drought-
islamic-republic-iran. 
696 Mohammad Reza Hafeznia, Pirouz Mojtahedzadeh and Jafar Alizadeh, ‘Hirmand Hydropolitic and Its Effect 
on the Political Relations of Iran and Afghanistan’ [2006] 10 The Journal of Spatial Planning 83. 
697 Letter dated 26 March 2001 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United 
Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, ‘The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international 
peace and security Environment and sustainable development: water supply and sanitation’ A/55/855–
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the United Nations in March 2001 about Afghanistan’s “ blockage of water flow in the Hirmand River, 
causing irreparable damage to the agriculture and animal husbandry in the Sistan region and the 
Ham[o]un wetlands in the Islamic Republic of Iran.”698 The water shortage continued while the second 
round of joint inspections occurred in early September 2002 – following the US invasion of Afghanistan 
and during the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan and after Iran’s President Muhammad 
Khatami’s official visit to Afghanistan – with the same conclusion, followed by Iran’s letter to the 
United Nations in December 2002 asking Afghanistan to comply with the 1973 treaty on the Helmand 
river.699  Therefore, this period once again highlighted the high securitisation of water issues that 
required necessary action out of the realm of normal politics while cooperation only remained ad hoc 
(TWINS Sequence 4 in Figure 16).  
6.4.4. Hopes for new era of progressive cooperation: yet lack of shared understanding 
Following the period of drought and civil war in Afghanistan, and after the collapse of the Taliban, in 
the newly progressive atmosphere of friendly relations between Iran and the new Afghan government, 
the countries held the first meeting of the Joint Committee of Commissioners700 (of the HRC) in Tehran 
in August 2004. These efforts may be seen as a willingness of the two states to scale back the 
hydropolitical relations from a securitised level which resulted in the beginning of formal cooperation 
through ad hoc actions based on the inherited 1973 treaty (TWINS Sequence 5 in Figure 16). However, 
triggered by specific incidents e.g., shortage of water and unilateral upstream water development plans, 
the Helmand River Basin has experienced the same continual fluctuations between politicised and 
securitised movement, apparently stuck in an endless loop up to now.  
Despite reaching an impasse and even the possibility of dissolving the HRC several times, subsequent 
meetings of the HRC often continued at a rate of around two per year. To date (at the time of writing 
 
S/2001/273 (26 March 2001) https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/436057?ln=en p. 2. It also notes that “the flow 
of water at the hydrometric station at Dehrawud was 46.8 cubic metres per second and that the Kajaki dam had 
1 billion cubic metres of water in reserve.” 
698 Letter dated 12 December 2002 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the 
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, ‘Environment and sustainable development’ A/57/644–
S/2002/1364 (13 December 2002) https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/481606?ln=ru. However, “However, a UN 
investigation found the drought to be the main cause, as the Helmand River was flowing at only 2 per cent of its 
annual average . In 2002 UNEP was informed that the lower reaches of the Helmand had experienced significant 
flows for 40 days in spring 2002. However, accusations have been made by local Afghan farmers that none of 
this water got past the Chanimeh diversion, leading to significant water shortages north of Zaranj, including in 
the Sistan basin. Nevertheless, Iran has again accused Afghanistan of not honouring the water-sharing 
agreement. In a gesture of goodwill, waters were released from the Kajaki dam on 25 October 2002. However, 
the flow stopped ten days later. High-level discussions to resolve the dispute are ongoing between the two 
countries.” UNEP ‘Post-Conflict’ (n 626) p. 58. 
699 See n 698. 
700 Under Article 7 of Protocol No. 1 of the 1973 treaty, the Afghan and Iranian commissioners constitute the 
“Joint Committee of Water Commissioners.” See Annex I. 
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this thesis), 22 meetings of the HRC have been held in either Iran or Afghanistan. Iranian and Afghan 
commissaries held their twentieth and twenty first meetings in Kabul and Tehran from 11-12 June 2019 
and 17-18 November 2019, respectively, during which there were calls to expand mutual water 
cooperation to better implement the treaty. The HRC’s administrative structure was changed at its 
nineteenth meeting (5-8 January 2019) by affording the commissioners the higher diplomatic level of 
deputy ministers; this change may be seen as another attempt to strengthen the role and influence of the 
HRC.701 The latest negotiations of the twenty first meeting took progressive steps by mutual agreement 
to carry out a joint study to determine the places for delivering Iran’s water rights,702 followed by an 
agreement on 5 February 2020 to conduct a joint geological survey from the Helmand river in the border 
area.703 Such progress might seem small, however considering the stiff hydropolitical pattern within its 
anarchic nature, which will be discussed later, it is actually impressive. 
Surprisingly, while there has been very little progress in water relations, cooperation in other issues, 
especially trade and economic areas, have seen significant growth in parallel to the hydropolitical 
relations. Following the 2013 signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) during the time of 
Afghan President Hamid Karzai, the two states have been engaged in a series of negotiations to conclude 
a major bilateral strategic cooperation agreement to expand their “cooperation on issues of counter-
terrorism, drugs, refugees, economic links and transit trade”.704 This trend has continued and January 
2016 was significant for hydropolitical relations between Iran and Afghanistan, at least on paper, as 
another MoU was signed between the two countries emphasising the boosting of cooperation in several 
areas. These included not only trade, transportation, education, health, culture, refugees, and security 
(which were all aspects of support, help and investment by Iran to Afghanistan) but also, and very 
importantly for Iran, cooperation over water and environmental conservation. Although the “no-harm” 
principle was finally removed by Afghanistan from the MoU, which could also be seen as part of the 
ongoing battle for legitimacy, it was seen by the Iranians as very important progress because they were 
finally able to persuade Afghanistan to agree to at least mentioning and signing water and environmental 
cooperation on paper. By providing such an incentives package, Iran hoped to improve the cooperation 
over the Helmand River, particularly to guarantee the Hamouns’ water demand beyond the Helmand 
River Water Treaty. However, Afghanistan views all these incentives as “nothing” v.s. what they 
 
701 Fars News Agency, ‘Tehran, Kabul to Expand Energy, Water Cooperation’ Fars News Agency  (7 January 
2019) http://en.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13971017000553. 
702  IRNA, ‘Tehran-Kabul Agreement on the delivery of Iran’s water right’ IRNA (20 Nov. 2019) 
https://www.irna.ir/news/83562735 accessed 21 January 2021. 
703 IRNA, ‘Joint geological survey from the Helmand river begins after a bout half a century’ IRNA (5 Frb. 2020) 
www.irna.ir/news/83661941/ accessed 21 January 2021.  
704 Ankit Panda, ‘Iran, Afghanistan Approach Strategic Cooperation Pact’ THE DIPLOMAT (22 January 2015) 
https://thediplomat.com/2015/01/iran-afghanistan-approach-strategic-cooperation-pact/.  
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assume as “strategic resource” in the “water scared” region.705 In addition, Afghanistan’s view has been 
shaped by a belief that Iran, struggling with economic sanctions and seeking not to lose its influence, 
has no other option than to invest and develop its economic relations with Afghanistan.706 Equitable and 
reasonable utilisation was set out clearly, based on international law (though only for the Harirud River 
– another transboundary river between Afghanistan and Iran – and not the Helmand) and a joint 
technical study was assumed to be conducted to consider concerns about the ecosystem condition in the 
Helmand River Basin, emphasising the implementation of the Helmand River Water Treaty mentioned 
in the MoU. However, the situation has almost remained a zero-sum game in which Afghanistan has 
received almost all its incentives and Iran has received almost nothing when it comes to its two main 
priorities i.e. security, and cooperation on water and environmental protection.  
Further progress in the relationship was followed by the signing of a trade corridor deal between Iran, 
India, and Afghanistan to turn the Iranian port of Chabahar into a transit hub which is strategically 
significant for all three states, particularly Afghanistan as a land-locked country.707 Finally, in 2017, 
and in parallel to a meeting of the HRC, higher-level negotiations between Iran and Afghanistan sought 
to establish a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership on several issues, including security and water, 
again with an emphasis on boosting economic cooperation between the countries.708 The respective 
negotiations continued just recently on a visit by Iran’s deputy foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, to 
Afghanistan in July 2020 when he emphasised the need to sign a comprehensive document to find 
common ground for cooperation, and noted the Iranian proposal for conducting a joint study, either 
bilateral or with an independent international organisation, 709  though it is not yet clear whether 
Afghanistan will accept it; at the same time, it seems there are some voices calling for “sanctioning 
cooperation with Iran on transboundary waters”.710 
 
705 For extensive field study about different actors’ view in Afghanistan about transboundary waters, see Thomas 
and others (n 615).  
706 Thomas and others (n 615). 
707  Al Jazeera, ‘Indian, Iran and Afghanistan sign trade corridor deal’ Al Jazeera (24 May 2016) 
https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2016/5/24/indian-iran-and-afghanistan-sign-trade-corridor-deal accessed 
21 January 2021.  
708 Iran Press, ‘Iran, Afghanistan to Finalize a Comprehensive Cooperation Document’ Iran Press (6 January 
2019) http://iranpress.com/iran-i131310 accessed 21 January 2021.  
709 Syed Zabiullah Langari, ‘Stability of Iran, Afghanistan 'Interconnected': Araghchi’ TOLOnews (16 JULY 
2020) https://tolonews.com/afghanistan/stability-iran-afghanistan-interconnected-araghchi accessed 21 January 
2021; See also Tehran Times, ‘Iran-Afghanistan’s comprehensive document to be finalized in three months’ 
Tehran Times (17 July 2020) https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/450125/Iran-Afghanistan-s-comprehensive-
document-to-be-finalized-in accessed 21 January 2021; Iran Press, ‘Tehran and Kabul to accelerate bilateral 
cooperation’ Iran Press (16 July 2020) https://iranpress.com/content/24141 accessed 21 January 2021. 
710 See for another extensive field study for the analysis of institutional challenges faced by Afghanistan over 
transboundary water issues Idrees Malyar, ‘Transboundary Water Institutions in Developing Countries: A Case 
Study in Afghanistan’ (Oregon State University 2016). In this respect, Malyar points out that how, for instance, 
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In addition to bilateral collaboration on the implementation of the 1973 treaty and in particular Iran’s 
effort to persuade Afghanistan for further cooperation, a number of international organisations 
particularly UNESCO, Ramsar Convention, UNDP, UNEP and GEF has sought to create an integrative 
regional/basin-wide plan for cooperation and management of the Helmand River.711 Such efforts have 
also been welcomed by Germany and the Netherlands who, in 2016, showed their interest in supporting 
and facilitating the establishment of a whole basin cooperation.712  
Although the HRC has a separate identity, these broader negotiations are assumed to provide hope as a 
catalyst to promote strategic collaboration between the countries over some related Helmand problems 
(and in general transboundary water issues between Afghanistan and Iran) and thus indirectly improve 
the HRC’s performance. However, it is too early to assess the impact of such unfinalised negotiations 
and analyze how they might overcome impediments that emanate from new waves of anarchy in 
Afghanistan, such as the re-empowering of the Taliban and the rise of Daesh. While significant progress 
has occurred in other areas of cooperation e.g., trade, transit, energy and refugees, Iran’s concerns 
relating to the possible decline of waters in delta and environmental degradation have yet remained high 
there due to the new unilateral water development and construction projects to divert the Helmand 
waters (and other rivers that irrigate the Hamouns e.g. the Farah River), expanding irrigation lands in 
the upstream, the continued growth of opium cultivation, with still no meaningful response from 
Afghanistan to even start a joint study.713 
 
the US halts Afghanistan to cooperate over water with Iran. Some Afghans also have very pessimistic view 
concerning water cooperation with Afghanistan’s neighbours before building dams and finalising development 
project. See also Thomas and others (n 615).   
711 See n 626. See also, among others, for instance, DoE and UNDP, Towards a Solution for Iran’s Drying 
Wetlands: International Technical Round Table on Drying Wetlands (2014) 
https://www.ir.undp.org/content/iran/en/home/library/environment_sustainable_development/Towards-a-
solution-for-Iran-drying-wetlands-Conclusions-and-Recommendations.html; UNDP, Restoration and 
Sustainable Use of the Shared Sistan Basin: A Baseline Situation Analysis (2005). The last report was produced 
in furtherance of a UNDP/GEF proposal to ensure the restoration and sustainable use of the Sistan Basin in 
collaboration with country stakeholders in Afghanistan and Iran; See also UNDP, Hamoun Wetlands Current 
Situation and the Way Forward (2006) 
http://www.undp.org/content/dam/iran/docs/News/2014/March%202014/Towards%20a%20solution%20for%
20Iran's%20dying%20wetlands/Hamoun%20Wetland/Hamoun%20Info%20Sheet.pdf. And recently, see 
Tehran Times, ‘Iran, UNDP sign MOU to revive Hamoun wetland’ Tehran Times (4 April 2020) 
https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/446454/Iran-UNDP-sign-MOU-to-revive-Hamoun-wetland accessed 22 
January 2021.  
712 Tehran Times, ‘Iran-Germany environmental cooperation to pick up steam’ Tehran Times (October 7, 2016) 
https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/407124/Iran-Germany-environmental-cooperation-to-pick-up-steam 
accessed 22 January 2021; Financial Tribune, ‘Iran, Netherlands to Expand Environmental Coop.’ Financial 
Tribune (22 August 2015) accessed 22 January 2021. 
713 As mentioned before, not only has Iran officially asked Afghanistan to start a joint study, but also Germany 
and the Netherlands have also suggested to contribute to resolve the disputes over the Helmand River. 
Reportedly, their effort to persuade Afghans for cooperation and conducting an international joint study has 
been yet stuck at the time of writing this thesis.   
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The current ad hockery – disappointing one party while orchestrating unilateral advantage for the other, 
is perhaps more in favour of Afghanistan than Iran. While the status quo swinging from politicisation 
to securitisation and vice versa may partly reflect the anarchic geopolitical nature – which will be 
discussed later – both Afghanistan and Iran, have individually sought to influence the circumstances 
with the use of material, bargaining and ideational power to serve their own national security interests 
over “controlling” waters.714 
 
Figure 16. Hydropolitical relations of the Helmand River Basin in TWINS 
Although there might be some critics of the 1973 treaty, generally speaking Iran is supportive at a high 
political level.715 Similarly, despite decades of skepticism toward the treaty in Afghanistan, it has just 
recently received the same official political support, and has even been described by Sultan Mahmoud 
Mahmoudi, a former Afghan commissioner, as “the best agreement in the region and the world.”716 
Both countries have recognised that recent activities of the HRC will provide a basis for the creation of 
a constructive dialogue, not only to implement the provisions of the 1973 treaty but also to ensure the 
equitable and sustainable management of transboundary waters, including the preservation of the 
Hamoun wetlands.717 The disputes, however, have continued in practice while both sides still accuse 
 
714 Zeitoun and Warner (n 9). 
715 Eghtesad News, ‘Zarif Answered the Question Raised by Parliament Member Regarding Iran’s Helmand 
Right’ [in Farsi] Eghtesad News (6 May 2018) https://www.eghtesadnews.com/fa/tiny/news-212097 accessed 
22 January 2021. 
716 Mahmoudi ‘Historical Events after the Signing’ (n 616). 
717 IRNA, ‘The Helmand [River] Promotes Iran-Afghanistan Cooperation’ [in Farsi], IRNA (7 October 2016) 
http://www.irna.ir/sb/fa/News/82259662 accessed 22 January 2021. 
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each other of violating their treaty obligations, and their wishes have remained on paper. Neither a 
shared goal, nor shared vision nor common norm has been created to address the interests and identity 
of Iran and Afghanistan over the Helmand River Basin. 
The TWINS matrix is used in this research to illustrate what the actual reality of the hydropolitical 
relations surrounding the Helmand River looks like through over a century of political ups and downs. 
The results are significantly helpful from both a theoretical and a practical point of view and are 
beneficial for researchers, policy makers and politicians wishing to get a better sense of the relations. 
One key finding is that what it has “predicted” in some “frightening statistics” and repeated in reports 
and the media and by some academics warning “deterioration” and “emerging conflict”718 or “war/fight 
over water”719 is not backed up by facts on the ground and the historical relations between Afghanistan 
and Iran. It is true that the relations have not significantly improved over water resources while 
reflecting as high politics for both Afghanistan and Iran, but this has always been overshadowed by 
other primary Iranian interests like security and stabilisation in Afghanistan. Therefore, both states have 
preferred to control their controversies over water issues with very limited cooperation. Accordingly, 
based on the historical evidence, it is most unlikely that the water related controversies between 
Afghanistan and Iran will go through an uncontrolled path. Another important finding is that the TWINS 
matrix for tracing the hydropolitical relations over the Helmand River offers an opportunity to better 
understand how different specific factors, e.g. drought, or a particular development project in upstream, 
or broader political issues, may lead to cooperative-conflictive relations and change the hydropolitical 
pattern here, often ending in a formal arrangement. The TWINS analysis is useful not only to illustrate 
the evolution of hydropolitical relations which here show a frozen cooperation and conflict without a 
meaningful progress, but can also warn the riparian states and other actors involved that possible severe 
irreversible damage beyond water relations might emerge if they continue with the same zero-sum 
pattern of mindset. Furthermore, the TWINS analysis sheds light on the complexity of the current 
destructive blame game and can potentially predict the future trend of relations over the Helmand River. 
While the 1973 treaty stands at the centre of the water negotiations between Afghanistan and Iran, the 
following critical questions need to be answered in order to understand the political dynamics and the 
rationale behind states’ behaviour: Why did both countries accept the treaty despite strong national 
resistance? Why did Iran agree to receive a much lower amount of water than it asked for, and yet 
maintain it? Why have there been changes in the Afghan government’s views about the treaty from the 
 
718 See, for instance, WPS, ‘WPS Global Early Warning Tool September 2020 Quarterly Update’ WPS (27 
October 2020) https://waterpeacesecurity.org/info/global-tool-update-September-2020 accessed 22 January 
2021. 
719 See Stefanie Glinski, ‘God, gas and heroin. Now, the fight’s over water’ The Los Angeles Times (6 Feb 2020) 
https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2020-02-06/afghanistan-and-iran-battle-over-water-with-spies-
bribes-and-threats accessed 22 January 2021. 
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“worst” to “best”? Why have the hydropolitical relations stalled? Before examining these questions in 
Part III, it is necessary to understand the interplay between identity, interests, and strategies of the states 
over the Helmand River.  
6.4.5. The states’ identities, interests, and strategies over the Helmand River 
In analysing the geopolitical overlay of Afghanistan’s transboundary waters, Nagheeby and Warner 
(2018) argue that the control and capture of water resources are not solely for economic development 
but also driven by security interests of actors within and outside the basin; sustainable interventions 
should therefore acknowledge the geopolitical nature of the basin, as well as the regional interests, 
identities, and commonalities of all the riparian states. In order to better understand the hydropolitical 
relations of Afghanistan and Iran over time, some key questions should be examined: What are their 
main strategies, tactics, and mindsets? How do the identities and interests of Afghanistan and Iran shape 
their hydropolitical relations? As discussed in Chapter 3, the behaviour of the states was indirectly 
determined by their identity.720 States’ identity along with their material power can shape and reshape 
their interests, and therefore, their foreign policy. 721  Thus, this identity-behaviour relation is 
fundamental when analysing hydropolitical relations over an international watercourse. State identity 
provides specific values and attitudes that influences state policymakers’ preferences–which in turn 
determines a particular foreign policy.722 
In this regard, “water nationalism”, for instance, is one visible strategic approach which reflects a sense 
of national identity and patriotism in order to justify and legitimise a specific state’s foreign policy 
towards an international watercourse.723 Water development may be used to create a national collective 
identity by one state to “establish its dominance and power over local authority and customs, through 
the control and management of water resources”.724 This may be achieved “first, through the integration 
of the water landscape and sites as symbols of national identity (the symbolic landscape aspect), and 
second, through the territorialisation of water resources (the spatial development aspect)”.725 With this 
backdrop, the following discussion explores the interplay between the riparian state’s identity, interest 
and behaviour over the Helmand River. The discussion is mainly grounded on the co-authored article 
 
720 See, for instance, Ashizawa (n 155). 
721 Ashizawa (n 155). 
722 Ashizawa (n 155). 
723 Menga ‘Building a nation’ (n 434); Allouche (n 430). 
724 Allouche (n 430) p. 53. 
725 Allouche (n 430) p. 53. 
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on the analysis of the hydropolitical dynamics of Afghanistan and Iran titled The geopolitical overlay 
of the hydropolitics of the Harirud River Basin.726 
Afghanistan 
The hydropolitical relations of Afghanistan should be seen through its struggle to build nation state for 
a long time since 1850s, and within many wars like Anglo-Afghan wars, Russian invasion, civil war, 
and US-allied invasion and the continued act of domestic violence up to now. One aspect of nation state 
building which is particularly evident in Afghanistan is evident in “linking domestic and transboundary 
water resources to national territory through “water nationalism”, specifically through the use of water-
related symbols and slogans.” 727  The national identity influencing the hydropolitical relations of 
Afghanistan with its neighbouring countries is arguably shaped by three factors: Afghanistan is a 
landlocked country that is hugely dependent on its neighbours to reach the broader economic network; 
Afghanistan is one of the most invaded countries in the world, suffering greatly from global political 
rivalry; and finally, as a result of this Afghanistan has lost many opportunities to recover its economy, 
and has been left with huge levels of corruption and no real hope for the future where the majority of 
people, unfortunately, locked in poverty while struggling with ethnic tensions. Therefore, Afghanistan 
may be considered as a failed or fragile state. Considering the social and political analysis in a broader 
context,728 Afghanistan’s hydropolitics has seen a long and brutal war and foreign interventions in 
which its identity has been constructed and its interests have been (re)shaped. With such a war imposed 
identity and fragile society, the main strategic goal of Afghanistan has been “nation-building”, which 
is defined here as “the set of policies aimed at creating a common national identity and a sense of 
patriotism and loyalty towards the state”.729 Accordingly, water development through dam building and 
“water nationalism”, in particular, has been seen as the only way for different groups in power in 
Afghanistan to not only stay in power and retain legitimacy but also recover their national identity and 
stabilise the nation. This approach has been much more integrated in the new Afghan government’s 
policies since Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah at the time observed at the High-Level Water 
Conference in Tajikistan on June 9, 2015: 
Water is no longer just a natural resource… but it is increasingly becoming a 
strategic resource. We want to use our geography, resource capacity, and regional 
 
726 Nagheeby and Warner (n 327). 
727 Allouche (n 430) p. 286. 
728 See, for instance, Louis Dupree, ‘Afghanistan in 1983: And Still No Solution’ [1984] 24 Asian Survey 229; 
See also Zalmay Khalilzad, ‘Anarchy in Afghanistan’ [1997]  Journal of International Affairs 37. 
729 Menga ‘Building a nation’ (n 434) p. 481. 
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as well as international obligations to maximise usage of water …We have made 
significant strides in order to catch up with national development.730  
Accordingly, the Afghan policymakers’ attitude towards creating national identity laid particular stress 
on “water nationalism”, which in turn pushed their economic interests above water resources to be 
shaped “on symbolic and imagined aspects of a nation state’s collective territorial sovereignty and 
geographical identity”. 731  Such an identity-interest nexus surrounding “water nationalism” caused 
Afghanistan to emphasise unilateral projects on its transboundary waters through a “silent” diplomacy 
approach and sanction any cooperation over water unless finalizing water development projects.732 
Considering the nation-building policy through water development, non-cooperative behaviour of 
Afghanistan may be seen as bargaining strategies to buy time with the aim at “worsening the opponent’s 
alternatives and affecting mutual perceptions”.733 Afghanistan sees its waters as strategic resources on 
which the neighbours, what they understand, “highly” depend. With this view, Afghanistan tends to use 
water, within a very realist perspective, as bargaining tool through a kind of “carrot and stick” approach 
in order to level off its power relations with neighbours and to seek grant over other issues. This might 
be very evident in recent tweet of Mr. Amrullah Saleh, first Vice President of Afghanistan, when 
Taliban was negotiating with Afghanistan’s neighbours: 
“Amrullah Saleh @AmrullahSaleh2 · Jan 28 
Pre @ashrafghani's vision to turn our waters to a credit card & a diplomatic card has 
gvn Afgh an unprecedented leverage in the region. Not one drop less. Not one drop 
more. Every drop per agreement is our moto. As an upstream citizen I always took 
it for granted. Not now.” 
Moreover, such national strategy based on no-cooperation policy is linked to broader issues concerning 
anarchy which will be discussed in part III. The role of “outsiders” is, therefore, very significant here. 
For instance, some “blame the international community, particularly the US, for manipulating the 
situation and not allowing Afghanistan to resolve its water issue with neighboring states”.734 Part III, in 
particular, will transfer one of the core messages of this study that how the anarchic geopolitical setting 
 
730 Tolo News, ‘Abdullah urges regional cooperation at high level water conference’ Tolo News (9 June 2015) 
https://tolonews.com/afghanistan/abdullah-urges-regional-cooperation-high-level-water-conference accessed 
22 January 2021.  
731 Allouche (n 430) p. 291. 
732 See, for instance, Nagheeby and Warner (n 327); Thomas and others (n 615). 
733 Marwa Daoudy, ‘Asymmetric Power: Negotiating Water in the Euphrates and Tigris’ [2009] 14 International 
negotiation (Hague, Netherlands) 361 p. 365. 
734 Malyar (n 710) p. 105. 
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mostly fueled by outsiders overshadows water diplomacy in the Helmand River Basin and undermines 
the efforts of riparian states for fostering bilateral cooperation. 
Furthermore, water development is one of the foremost security issues for Afghanistan, particularly due 
to its vulnerable political atmosphere. Since Afghanistan suffers from high political instability, poverty 
and unemployment, its water resources should contribute significantly to providing economic prosperity 
and security and rebuilding its “lost” and “damaged” identity. The water itself is seen as sacred property, 
equivalent to territorial property, shaping part of the national identity. As the former Afghan diplomat, 
Mahmoud Seighal, commented, “The water has been a holy subject in its highest level, particularly 
when we are talking about transboundary waters”.735 Water nationalism through dam development, 
therefore, is a source of great national pride. This makes water a very sensitive issue in public, labeling 
it as a “non-negotiable” issue. Such drivers push Afghanistan to take a position for a unilateral approach 
towards a complete “resource capture” strategy.736 Such water nationalism grounded on building nation-
state while having a vision of national identity at the centre has led the water development in 
Afghanistan to be challenged by neighboring countries like Iran. This way of tying identity to dam 
development has also led to smack of sensationalism causing an extreme view in the eyes of public that 
anyone criticises dam development is considered as an “enemy”. While Afghanistan’s right to water 
development, particularly dam construction, in itself has not been contested by its neighbours or the 
international community,737 its emphasis on overambitious unilateral plans, with an unclear agenda for 
cooperation, causes serious concern in the region, and has attracted criticism by Afghanistan’s 
neighbours, such as Iran. 
It seems those policy makers in Afghanistan with “a narrow view” on water development perceive the 
existing zero-sum game of the status quo as more advantageous in addressing their afore-mentioned 
interests and identity, ignoring the potential of expanding the benefits of water cooperation. 738 
Accordingly, despite Afghanistan’s “official” discourse having been changed to “equitable utilisation”, 
represented in its national policy over transboundary waters,739 its behaviour is still deeply imbued with 
a warrior stance and built on the “absolute territorial sovereignty” doctrine; and, therefore, it plays a 
significant role in shaping the country’s identity, discourses, interests and behaviour. The Helmand 
 
735  Tolo News, ‘BA REWAYATE DIGAR: Water resources of Afghanistan’ Tolo News (26 August 2013) 
https://tolonews.com/mehwar/ba-rewayate-digar-water-resources-afghanistan accessed 22 January 2021. 
736 Zeitoun and Warner (n 9). 
737 Thomas and others (n 615) p. 76. 
738 Thomas and others (n 615). 
739 According to a transboundary policy developed in 2013 with the support of USAID and Deutsche Gesellschaft 
fur Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ). However, as pointed out by Thomas and others (n 615), this policy 
development might be seen to have access to international financial support and not certainly a change in 
behaviour. 
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River is still seen by some Afghans as an internal and national river not international, and the right has 
been only given to Iran to utilise the defined fixed amount of water stipulated in the treaty.740 Such 
absolute water sovereignty pushes Afghanistan’s leaders to focus on controlling water in its territory to 
reflect its identity and interests. Controlling water, in turn, is presented as a matter of national pride, 
giving a sense of power, and symbolising a “victory” against long war. 
Under mostly vulnerable, often almost military circumstances, Afghanistan has tended to see 
cooperation over “its own waters” as a zero-sum security game, “where neighbours are viewed with 
acrimony, mistrust and suspicion”.741 When considering the riparians’ behaviour and discourses with 
respect to transboundary water interactions, it seems that Afghanistan’s leadership and its public believe 
they lost development opportunities during the Soviet occupation and civil war. They accordingly 
consider this war-imposed, relatively asymmetric hydraulic and socio-economic situation as an 
unbalanced power condition in comparison with their neighbours and are afraid of its negative impacts 
on the negotiation process. In one sense, the Afghan leadership sees little choice but to focus on realist 
policies during the post-conflict period, with the understanding that these could at least compensate for 
“damaged” identity/“lost” opportunities and delays while helping them to increase the geopolitical 
value and strengthen their negotiating position. Moreover, some Afghans appear to reason that 
negotiations may delay their current development projects; thus, they prefer to postpone the negotiations 
until at least after the completion of their own water control projects. Water politicisation/securitisation 
favours Afghanistan achieving its defined strategic goals; however, such zero-game strategy negatively 
affects the management of the whole river basin and the nature of cooperation. In in the long term, as 
will be discussed later, Afghanistan’s desired goals may not be achieved since Iran is not waiting for 
upstream response and has initiated several new projects, such as a desalination plant to transfer water 
out of the basin, to meet its water demands.  
Iran 
The identity and interests of Iran concerning the Helmand River are shaped more by the historical value 
of Sistan which reflects ancient Persia and Zoroastrianism, socio-economic importance, and security 
issues. The high demand of Sistan for water flowing from Afghanistan and lack of other alternatives 
ties water issues in Sistan to the national security of Iran. Accordingly, similar to Afghanistan, 
sensationalism is also observed in Iran’s public view that puts pressure on negotiations and the related 
foreign policy over the Helmand waters. This, in part, causes an incomplete understanding in which the 
root causes of the water and environmental problems in Iranian side, i.e. Sistan, are overlooked. 
 
740 See, for instance, Najib Agha Fahim, ‘Why did a treaty that ended a hundred years of conflict become 
controversial again’ in Pargar, BBC Persian TV (Last edited 26 February 2019) 
https://www.facebook.com/notes/pargar-bbc-persian-tv/2471442749550394 accessed 22 January 2021.  
741 Thomas and others (n 615) p. 71. 
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Therefore, it is obvious that in such ill-defined and blurred nature, Iran puts its finger almost often on 
the other side of the border, Afghanistan, as being responsible for all water and environmental problems.    
Notwithstanding this, war and instability in Afghanistan has pushed Iran to prioritise security over other 
interests.742 Considering the broader political and security complexity in the region, Iran has a long-
term interest in a stable Afghanistan.743 Iran’s interest in security and its willingness to have a stable 
Afghanistan takes priority over water issues. Within such circumstances, Iran faces an agonising 
dilemma in which interests over water have often been sacrificed for security and geopolitical issues.744 
Therefore, despite water development in Afghanistan potentially being a major concern for Iran, the 
stabilisation of Afghanistan through its development could, in fact, provide a more compelling reason 
for Iran to support water development. Such supportive policy of stabilisation and development in 
Afghanistan is evident in massive scale of economic and trade exchange. In such chaotic and insecure 
environment and bitter rivalry of Afghanistan, where there are many other issues that might be seen a 
threat to Iran’s national security e.g. the rise of Daesh (ISIS) or in the case of extremis, then both sides 
are largely insensible to water. This, of course, does not mean they ignore the controversies over 
transboundary water issues.    
From a broader perspective, considering the priority of Afghanistan’s stability, Iran has shown his 
forbearance over the chaotic nature of the Great Game. Against this background, Iran, has mainly 
assumed a functionalist stance in its hydropolitical relations towards Afghanistan, believing that 
depoliticising water issues can meet their interests in the face of complex geopolitical variables. 
Considering the historical efforts to establish a platform for benefit-sharing over the transboundary 
waters since the negotiations of the 1970s – in particular providing additional incentives to Afghanistan 
to benefit from Chabahar port – Iran has pursued an “integration strategy” to encourage Afghanistan to 
cooperate. Thus, although they have a unilaterally developed infrastructure, Iran sees urgent 
cooperation with Afghanistan as a way to firstly diminish the political sensitivity of the basin and 
secondly to at least decrease the potential damage of Afghanistan water development on downstream. 
While emphasising the need to implement the 1973 treaty and underlining “human security” and “no-
harm” rule, the principle of equitable and reasonable utilisation has been the main discourse of Iran in 
its water diplomacy towards Afghanistan.745 Such an Iranian view for cooperation in a “win-win” 
 
742 Nagheeby and Rieu-Clarke (n 638). 
743 Thomas and others (n 615); See also Milani (n 693) p. 235 where he notes that “Iran has consistently sought 
to see a stable and independent Afghanistan, with Herat as a buffer zone and with a Tehran friendly government 
in Kabul, a government that reflects the rich ethnic diversity of the country”; Kayhan Barzegar, ‘Iran's Foreign 
Policy in Post-Taliban Afghanistan’ [2014] 37 The Washington Quarterly 119.  
744 Nagheeby and Warner (n 327). 
745  See Tabnak News, ‘Afghans dry up Mashhad?’ Tabnak News (28 October 2013) 
http://khabarfarsi.com/ext/6977397 accessed 25 January 2021. See also Shargh Daily News, ‘Khoshki dar 
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approach through broader collaboration is seen in the tweet below of Dr. Rasoul Mousavi, Director 
General of West Asia at Iran's ministry of foreign affairs, probably in response to above-mentioned 
tweet by Mr. Amrullah Saleh: 
“rasoul mousavi @rasmou · Jan 29 
Independence and non-dependence is the most important goal of the Islamic 
Revolution. I'm sorry for the officials who chant the slogan of all-round 
independence from the United States, but do not think about not being dependent on 
neighboring water! 
Water is an arena of cooperation, not a political tool. If nature's water rights are not 
given, everyone will suffer.” 
Similar to what is seen by some Iranians that Afghanistan is responsible for the water and environmental 
problems in Sistan, within ambiguous nature over the Helmand River, there is a view in Afghanistan 
that puts the finger on Iran for its attempts to sabotage dam development, though it is not backed up by 
evidence.746 This echoes the highly chaotic and complex controversy that has positioned the Helmand 
River to be in a state of mutual distrust for centuries, restricted by mutual misunderstandings, illusions 
and counter-accusations. 
Part II: The principle of equitable and reasonable utilisation 
6.5. The ERU in the Helmand River Basin at the birth of shared understanding 
The previous section of this chapter outlined the trajectory of the hydropolitical cooperative-conflictive 
relations in the Helmand River Basin where the respective interactions between Afghanistan and Iran 
have remained ad hoc. This was followed by an analysis of the hydropolitical dynamics and an 
examination of the respective interests, identities and strategies of Afghanistan and Iran concerning the 
Helmand River. While Iran’s interests and identity have been shaped by historical, socio-economic and 
national security aspects, for Afghanistan, having been at war, the same river has a rather strategic value 
 
Kamin_e Shargh_e Iran’ (28 October 2013) http://www.sharghdaily.ir/fa/main/detail/23829 accessed 25 
January 2021. 
746 From a Realpolitik perspective, it is not far-fetched to assume that the actions or discourses of downstream 
states are not entirely altruistic when controlling shared waters by upstreamers threatens them. However, the 
findings of this study show that those few reports and articles in selective media sources concerning such claims 
have simply reiterated each other with no further sufficient evidence and, not surprisingly, the same root sources 
of such news could be seriously questionable. For instance, Salaam Times – sponsored by The United States 
Central Command – in a series of reports prepared by anonymous writer under the name of “Omar” or “Ali” 
accused Iran in some of these attacks over dams. Not surprisingly, also, some have given the source of these 
claims to US Intelligence service, which should be taken by careful attention in this chaotic battlefield. 
Therefore, apart from broader political reasons and those who might be behind such rumors (which are beyond 
the scope of this thesis), my interpretation is that such accusations from both sides are rather more connected to 
the state of deep mutual distrust existed in the basin. 
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to compensate what they believe as lost opportunities and to recover their damaged identity. In turn, 
interests and a subjective sense of identity have led Afghanistan and Iran to take specific competitive 
positions concerning transboundary water utilisation, where the upstream expresses less willingness for 
cooperation. This has brought about a highly sensitive and irritable condition around transboundary 
water issues between Afghanistan and Iran and accordingly has not only paralysed the hydropolitical 
relations but also negatively influenced the effectiveness of the ERU principle. In such circumstances, 
the ERU principle is used as a tool of self-help to intensify competition, rather than to create a collective 
identity over the basin. This part aims to illustrate the role of the ERU principle, if any, in shaping the 
behaviour of Afghanistan and Iran concerning the Helmand River over time and changing the 
hydropolitical relations towards water conflict transformation.  
While it seems that the 1973 treaty failed to resolve the water conflict between Afghanistan and Iran 
based on the ERU principle, the question, it is essential to ask who/what should be blamed. Should it 
be the treaty and ERU principle, the riparian states, the underlying circumstances, or something else? 
The following questions may come after: To what extent has the principle of ERU been considered in 
legal arrangements over the Helmand River? Does the ERU principle redefine the interests and 
identities of Afghanistan and Iran and influence the hydropolitical relations over the Helmand River 
Basin, and if so how? Does the ERU principle help or hinder the improvement of relations between 
Afghanistan and Iran? Given the broader “comprehensive” cooperation between Iran and Afghanistan, 
could ongoing nascent “promising” hydropolitical relations over transboundary waters with common 
emphasis on the ERU principle be understood as “constructive conflict”747 to move to a basin-wide 
legal framework over the Helmand River, acting in both riparian states’ best interests. Finally, has the 
ERU principle ever mediated a solution to initiate a constructive dialogue between riparian states, and 
to decrease the threat of anarchy, or has it failed to do so? In order to respond to these questions, in the 
second part of this chapter, the discussion will benefit from the framework of interactional international 
law, as explained in Chapter 3, to engage in analysing the role of the ERU principle in the evolution of 
the hydropolitical relations of the Helmand River over time. 
This section’s analysis proceeds in two parts. The first part assesses the legal arrangements and 
specifically the 1973 Helmand treaty, in light of the ERU principle, to analyse whether it addresses the 
equitable criteria and, if so, how it does so. Then, the second part focuses on analysing the effectiveness 
of the ERU principle in changing the hydropolitical relations of the Helmand River.  
 
747 Zeitoun (n 18) p. 376 where they point out that “[l]ike a caterpillar morphing into a butterfly, ‘conflict’ can be 
a necessary step towards equitable and sustainable transboundary water arrangements.” See also Mark Zeitoun, 
Naho Mirumachi and Jeroen Warner, Water Conflicts: Analysis for Transformation (Oxford University Press 
2020) p 48 that state that constructive conflict, as opposed to destructive cooperation, brings the issues of 
contention to be laid on the table rather than keeping them aside. 
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6.5.1. The 1973 Helmand River Water Treaty in light of the ERU principle: promise or peril? 
Establishing a legal arrangement on a harmful colonial basis 
The historical background of legal arrangements in the Helmand River was outlined in Part I. Despite 
the geopolitical shadow over the Helmand River, the notion of equitable utilisation was claimed to be 
the basis of the first attempts in the 1870s to resolve the water disputes between Afghanistan and Iran 
over the Helmand River.748 However, giving the potential of full control of the water to Afghanistan – 
who was under British suzerainty and served as a “buffer state” against its rival Russia – by separating 
the major water demand in Persia and the total water supply in Afghanistan – one could understand the 
Goldsmid arbitration as having been in favour of Great Britain in the bigger picture. The British, in fact, 
imposed a very narrow legal regime of “equitable” utilisation by putting the water tap in Afghanistan 
apparently to protect their security interest in the “jewel in the crown”. However, apart from this 
political interpretation, and from a legal perspective, as McCaffrey pointed out,749 at first glance, it 
seems that the Goldsmid arbitration was based on a “no significant harm” principle rather than the ERU 
principle in which it may give the priority to prior appropriations (in Persia). Notwithstanding this, to 
better understand and interpret the arbitration award, it must first be put into context. First, most of the 
water demand – irrigation and population – was on the Persian side at the time. Second, the arbitral 
award did not explicitly decide on water division between two sides and was only limited to a general 
statement to preserve all the existing uses and the “requisite supply of water for irrigation” of both sides 
of the Helmand. Accordingly, as McCaffrey and also Johan G. Lammers noted, the Goldsmid award – 
that was accepted by both parties – seems to have been mainly based on the equitable considerations at 
the time.750 However, such a semi-colonial and narrow view of ERU consideration soon ended in failure 
because it did not accurately and clearly address changes in circumstances including the future interests 
of Afghanistan’s development and the impacts on downstream Iran. Moreover, the arbitration did not 
provide a solution for parties to deal with specific times of flood and particularly drought – the extreme 
events that ultimately doomed the arbitration to failure. Therefore, this could neither meet the criteria 
of legality – in particular, clarity and constancy (or predictability) – nor contribute to creating a shared 
understanding.  
 
748 McCaffrey, ‘The Law of International Watercourses’ (n 37) p. 284. 
749 McCaffrey, ‘The Law of International Watercourses’ (n 37) p. 285. 
750  McCaffrey, ‘The Law of International Watercourses’ (n 37) p. 284; Johan G Lammers, Pollution of 
International Watercourses: A Search for Substantive Rules and Principles of Law (BRILL 1984) p. 505. In 
addition, McCaffery argues that the Goldsmid arbitration award seems to give priority to ‘no significant harm’ 
principle and prior appropriations. 
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Establishing a legal arrangement on misunderstanding or false representation 
The 1973 Helmand River Water Treaty – the only existing accepted arrangement concerning the water 
dispute over the Helmand River – is based on a report by the Helmand River Delta Commission. As 
explained before (Section 6.4.2), the Commission was established in 1948 with the sole purpose of 
recommending “an engineering basis for mutual accord regarding the apportionment of the waters of 
the Helmand River”.751 The function of the Delta Commission as a “fact-finding body” was to “collect 
and study available data” including: stream flow and natural characteristics – floods and droughts – of 
the river, past and present uses in the delta area, existing works and plans for new installations and 
methods for more scientific use of available waters. As also noted by McCaffrey, such a list of indicative 
factors “parallels strikingly the list of factors relevant to equitable utilisation contained in Article 6 of 
the UN Convention”.752 Key questions, however, are: How much does the 1973 treaty grasp the spirit 
of the ERU principle in the Helmand River Basin? Can the ERU that was understood in 1973 still be 
considered equitable from what is interpreted now? Due to misunderstanding and false representation, 
the findings below demonstrate that the legal results for the utilisation of the Helmand River is the 
outcome of a process that seems to have been not just deeply flawed but broken; accordingly, at best it 
contributed to a much shorter “life cycle of norms” than expected in interactional international law.  
As shown by Thomas and others, Afghanistan-Iran’s effort to establish a benefit-sharing platform have 
been shaped around the 1973 treaty, while the HRC has contributed more to a “a dialogue of the deaf”.753 
Both riparian states with different rationales have had to finally accept the treaty as it shapes the core 
reference of their interactions now. Iran views the treaty as a possible catalyst to not only guarantee 
what was ultimately achieved after 150 years, but also with the hope of developing future cooperation 
over the Hamoun wetlands. Afghanistan views the treaty as a means to an end in maintaining the status 
quo and continuing its unilateral development. Therefore, the treaty has been a “carte blanche” for 
Afghanistan’s development of the Helmand River,754 without the necessity to cooperate for the Hamoun 
wetlands, at least for now. There have been very few legal peer-reviewed studies in English on 
transboundary waters of Afghanistan and in particular the Helmand River. Among them,755 James C. 
 
751 Helmand River Delta Commission, Report of the Helmand River Delta Commission: Afghanistan and Iran 
(1951). 
752 McCaffrey, ‘The Law of International Watercourses’ (n 37) p. 285. 
753 Thomas and Varzi (n 624) p. 512. 
754 Thomas and Varzi (n 624) p. 512. 
755 For instance, see David Goad, ‘Water Law Be Dammed?: How Dam Construction by Non-Hegemonic Basin 
States Places Strain on the Customary Law of Transbound Watercourses’ [2019] 35 Am U Int'l L Rev 907; 
Farnaz Shirani Bidabadi and Ladan Afshari, ‘Human Right to Water in the Helmand Basin: Setting a Path for 
the Conflict Settlement between Afghanistan and Iran’ [2020] 16 Utrecht L Rev 150; see for extensive 
discussion on the role of no-harm principle in another geographical area, i.e. Central Asia, for instance, Dinara 
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McMurray, and A. Dan Tarlock examined how Afghanistan could assert possible claims under “the law 
of later-developing riparian states”, 756  and Mohsen Nagheeby, Mehdi Piri D, and Michael Faure 
examined the international legitimacy of unilateral dam development in an international watercourse, 
with the focus on the Harirud River.757  
Between the two competing models of equitable utilisation of an international watercourse e.g., a) 
“classic apportionment” and b) “shared benefits”,758 the 1973 Helmand River Water Treaty was built 
based on the former, leaving riparian states free to unilaterally use their own share. However, this does 
not mean that it lacks the ERU principle, and therefore, it needs further investigation. In addition, the 
1973 treaty was based on the recommendation of the 1951 Delta Commission which basically allocated 
water primarily for irrigation purposes. While the Delta Commission considered water for irrigation as 
“beneficial”, the water entering the Hamouns is described as “waste water”.759 Such an issue-specific 
policy is not explicitly stated in the 1973 treaty, however Article II acknowledges that the total amount 
of water from the Helmand River to be delivered to Iran by Afghanistan is in accordance with the report 
of the “Helmand River Delta Commission”. Nevertheless, the challenge is especially interesting since 
Article V of the treaty (the second paragraph) gives almost complete freedom to Afghanistan to utilise 
the Helmand water by acknowledging: 
Afghanistan agrees that it shall take no action to deprive Iran totally or partially of its water 
right to the water of the Helmand River as fixed and delimitated by the provisions of 
Articles II, III and IV of this treaty. 
Afghanistan shall retain all rights to the balance of the water of the Helmand River and 
may make such use or disposition of the water as it chooses.  
Iran shall make no claim to the water of the Helmand River in excess of the amounts 
specified in this treaty, even if additional amounts of water may be available in the 
Helmand Lower Delta and may be put to a beneficial use by Iran.760 
 
Ziganshina and Barbara Janusz-Pawletta, ‘The Principle of No Significant Harm in the Central Asian Context’ 
[2020] 20 International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 713. 
756  James C McMurray and A Dan Tarlock, ‘The Law of Later-Developing Riparian States: The Case of 
Afghanistan’ [2003] 12 NYU Envtl LJ 711. 
757 Nagheeby “The Legitimacy of Dam Development” (n 247). 
758  A Dan Tarlock and Patricia Wouters, ‘Are Shared Benefits of International Waters an Equitable 
Apportionment’ [2007] 18 Colo J Int'l Envtl L & Pol'y 523. 
759 Helmand River Delta Commission (n 751) p. 111 where it asserts that “It is the judgment of the Commission 
that very little of this water serves a beneficial purpose.” 
760 See Annex I. 
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Legally speaking, one critical question is: Does Iran have the right to claim more water for the need of 
the Hamoun wetlands? Does Afghanistan have an absolute right to utilise water in any way “as it 
chooses” without taking care of “vital human needs” and the ecosystem of the international 
watercourse? The Helmand River Delta Commission on which the 1973 treaty is based aimed to provide 
“an equitable apportionment of the waters on the Helmand River”.761 However, the treaty does not 
explicitly address the principle of ERU, despite the fact that it plays “the lead role” in planned 
measures.762 It is, therefore, permissible to raise the question: To what extent does the 1973 treaty reflect 
the criteria of equitable and reasonable utilisation? 
Furthermore, some challenges e.g., climate change (as Afghanistan claims),763 new development plans 
along with poor water management, changing socio-economic pattern, and increasing environmental 
degradation on both sides of the Helmand River have complicated not only the management of 
transboundary waters with reference to the 1973 treaty but also the transformation of the conflict 
towards equitable and reasonable utilisation. While the 1973 Helmand River Water Treaty could 
possibly provide “positive” potential for bilateral cooperation, this study argues that the treaty alone 
does not meet the essential criteria of an equitable and reasonable utilisation regime. It seems that even 
such an agreement of fixed amount of water allocation (e.g., 14.5% of total water to downstream, Iran) 
is “questionable”, at least from the Iranian point of view which claims that it is too far from their socio-
economic demands and the need to protect vital ecosystems and their services. Such neglect alone, and 
in addition to the geopolitical and anarchic obstacles – that will be explained later, may also be one 
reason behind the non-cooperative nature of the Helmand River and a source of conflict, intensifying 
the symptoms of anarchy. In one sense, this in turn might also explain why long-term constant 
cooperation with regard to the treaty has not occurred between Afghanistan and Iran or why it remains 
ad hoc. The 1973 treaty lacks the potential to address the actual water problems within an integrated 
basin-wide framework,764 and is unable to reflect the interests and identities of both riparian states. In 
fact, ignoring the importance of vital human needs and ecological/environmental protection in 
particular, this study shows that the 1973 treaty does not have the strong legal, institutional and 
 
761 Helmand River Delta Commission (n 751) p. 10 (emphasis added). 
762 Quoted by Ziganshina and Janusz-Pawletta (n 755) p. 720 that McCaffrey states that “These principles [The 
no-harm and equitable and reasonable utilization] fit together synergistically, with the former taking the lead 
role in some situations (e.g., allocation) and the latter in others (e.g., planned measures, pollution)”. 
763 To respond Iran’s complaint about the decline of water in downstream, Afghanistan claims that it is because 
of climate change and not its development. However, some studies may reject Afghan’s claim, showing that 
massive irrigation extension in the upper Helmand in Afghanistan even during war has affected the water flow 
in the lower Helmand. See, for instance, Mohammadreza Hajihosseini and others, ‘Impacts of Land Use Changes 
and Climate Variability on Transboundary Hirmand River Using Swat’ [2020] 11 Journal of Water and Climate 
Change 1695; See also Ameneh Mianabadi and others, ‘International Environmental Conflict Management in 
Transboundary River Basins’ [2020] 34 Water Resources Management 3445. 
764 Thomas and Varzi (n 624). 
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conventional potential to balance the challenges between water control and development in upstream 
Afghanistan, and specifically the ecological demand downstream of the basin.765 Therefore, within this 
anarchic environment, the 1973 treaty seems, by itself, ill-equipped to cope with water conflicts over 
the Helmand River, and furthermore, it is ill-suited and subject to “a matter of misplaced faith in formal 
rules”,766 to guide relations between Afghanistan and Iran.     
In order to examine the effectiveness of a treaty in managing conflict and enhancing cooperation over 
international watercourses, Alistair Rieu-Clarke concluded a number of key factors that need to be taken 
into consideration.767 Rieu-Clarke pointed out that four factors are significant while analysing the role 
of treaties in promoting the ERU: a) content: “whether certain treaty provisions confer rights and 
obligation”, b) linkages between treaty provisions e.g., substantive and procedural principles, c) the 
relationship between treaty at various governance level, and d) the influence of law at global or regional 
level on treaty.768 Considering these factors, this section merely focuses on analysing the content of the 
1973 Helmand River Water Treaty according to the criteria as relevant to determining the equitable and 
reasonable utilisation. In doing so, as explained in Chapter 5, an indicative list of the key factors and 
circumstances is provided by Article 6 of the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention. 
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice769 outlines international conventions, 
international customary law and the general principles of law recognised as the main sources of 
international law. Keeping these sources in mind, the question of whether the existing formal treaty 
over the Helmand River addresses the rights and obligations under international law is particularly 
complex in this particular case. Neither of the riparian states to the Helmand River is a member of the 
UN Watercourses Convention. Furthermore, the 1973 treaty is an agreement only for issue-specific 
water division, i.e. irrigation, and it neither addresses all the demands in the basin, particularly for 
environmental protection, nor reflects a basin-wide view.770 Despite this, the ERU principle which 
 
765 As discussed before, see for more information, McIntyre (n 377) and Rieu-Clarke and Spray (n 14) that point 
out that among various factors to define equitable and reasonable utilisation regime, environmental protection 
of international watercourses has higher significance. 
766 Jutta Brunnée, Law and Politics in the Nile Basin (American Society of International Law Proceedings 2008) 
p. 361. 
767 Rieu-Clarke, ‘The Role of Treaties’ (n 198). 
768 Rieu-Clarke, ‘The Role of Treaties’ (n 198) p. 824. 
769 San Francisco, CA (US), 26 June 1945, in force 24 Oct. 1945, available at https://www.icj-cij.org/en/statute.  
770 Through quantitative analysis, Neda A. Zawahri and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell explain that fragmented 
governance is prevalent in multilateral basins like the Indus, Jordan, Euphrates, and Ganges rivers in which 
establishing a treaty is a by-product of state interest, transaction costs, and distribution of power. They show 
that most countries in such fragmented governance are reluctant to develop a basin-wide treaty and instead prefer 
more limited bilateral agreements. See Neda A Zawahri and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, ‘Fragmented 
Governance of International Rivers: Negotiating Bilateral Versus Multilateral Treaties’ [2011] 55 International 
Studies Quarterly 835. 
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forms part of customary law is binding upon all states, including Afghanistan and Iran over utilisation 
of water resources of the Helmand River Basin. However, there might be a legal priority over customary 
international law where a treaty exists between states.771 Since there are established treaty provisions 
over the Helmand River, this section will seek to analyse the treaty in light of the ERU criteria. 
As discussed in Chapter 5, the ERU principle is the overarching principle of international water law to 
balance the uses and the protection of international watercourses by considering all relevant factors.772 
In order to utilise a shared watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner, all relevant factors as 
listed in Article 6 of Watercourse Convention should be analysed diligently by taking into account the 
interests of other riparian states. Furthermore, grounded on a review of all factors, the principle of ERU 
not only includes the “blue” and “green” water of international watercourses and aquifers, but also 
addresses ecosystem and even “virtual” water.773 The ERU principle applies in a case of conflict of 
interest, which is observed in the Helmand River between Afghanistan and Iran, and “… where the 
quantity or quality of the water is such that all the reasonable and beneficial uses of all watercourse 
states cannot be fully realised”.774 Clarified by Article 6(1), “no use of an international watercourse 
enjoys inherent priority”, and “all relevant factors are to be considered together and a conclusion 
reached on the basis of the whole”.775  
To start with, among other factors, it is important to discuss the physical features of international 
watercourses e.g., hydrological and geographical characteristics first since they often arise in 
controversial debates on equitable water allocation, particularly in highly-anarchic geopolitical settings. 
Specific discourses of “our country contributes more waters in the flow” or “the river passes a longer 
way through our lands”776 are still used to bargain over the utilisation of waters within the modern 
“right-based” realm to legitimise the acts or claims – and are noticed in the case of the Helmand River, 
resulting in the confrontation of two outdated doctrines of “absolute sovereignty”. Generally, despite 
the fact that geographical and hydrological factors are the first to be listed in most codifications, it 
would appear from judicial and state practice that they rank low in the hierarchy of factors relevant to 
equitable utilisation.777 In relation to these factors, state practice suggests that “river frontage” has rarely 
been invoked as a basis for determining an equitable regime for the utilisation of an international 
 
771 Crawford and Koskenniemi (n 494). 
772 Rieu-Clarke and Spray (n 14). 
773 Wouters (n 33) p. 204. 
774 Quoted by Rieu-Clarke and Spray (n 14) p. 18. 
775 Articles 6(1) of the Watercourses Convention. 
776 See for more prevalent discourses, see Thomas and others (n 615) and Malyar (n 710). 
777 For more information, see Fuentes (n 453); See also McIntyre (n 452). 
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river.778 Also, the extent of the “drainage area” would appear to have a lack of significance similar to 
that of river frontage.779 
Considering some similar cases, such physical factors play only a secondary role in providing 
“equitable utilisation”.780 Regarding the Colorado River, for instance, which flows through Mexico for 
a mere 100 miles, or less than 10 percent, of its 1,300 mile length, the length of the river flowing through 
the respective territories of Mexico and the US was never considered as a basis for the allocation of 
waters.781 Similarly, Sudan has never been allocated a share in proportion to its 70 per cent of the length 
of that section of the Nile River vs. Egypt nor possibly Ethiopia in a possible future agreement. In fact, 
the allocation under the 1959 Agreement for the Full Utilisation of the Nile Waters provided for a ratio 
of allocation of 1:3 in favor of Egypt.782 In the 1959 Agreement between Egypt and the Sudan, it would 
have been very much in Sudan’s interest to seek to have this factor considered. Similarly, in the dispute 
concerning the Narmada River (in central India), the two states of Gujarat with 14 percent and Madhya 
Pradesh with 86 percent of drainage basin were allocated respectively 33 and 67 percent of water.783 
Thus, physical factors are undoubtedly accorded less weight in appropriate circumstances.784 
In the case of the Helmand River, about 85 percent of its length is in Afghanistan, and thus some 
Afghans strongly believe it is merely a “national” and “internal” river flowing totally in Afghan territory 
and take this as their bargaining position.785 Nevertheless, Iran claims that most of the utilisation of 
water had historically been in the downstream of the river (currently located at Sistan on the Iranian 
side and Nimrooz on the Afghan side, all around the Hamoun wetlands). However, from the legal 
aspect, none of these narratives are necessary to influence on the rights to water utilisation in an 
equitable and reasonable way. Thus, considering all court decisions on transboundary river cases around 
the world, the physical factors of shared water basins have mostly been the secondary aspects in 
 
778 See Fuentes (n 453). 
779 Fuentes (n 453). 
780 Fuentes (n 453); See also McIntyre (n 452). 
781 Fuentes (n 453) p. 398. 
782 Fuentes (n 453). 
783 Fuentes (n 453). 
784 In addition to what discussed in Chapter 5, Fuentes (n 453) p. 401 states: 
“The first thing that must be borne in mind is that the rule of equitable utilisation entails two important principles: 
the principle that the basin States do not have proprietary rights over the waters of international rivers and the 
principle of equality between the basin States. The result of the combination of these two principles is that basin 
States have an equal right to benefit from the waters of an international river traversing their territories regardless 
of the length of their frontage on the river. Equality of right does not mean that the water will be divided into 
equal portions, but it means that the ratio between the frontages of the riparian States on the river should not be 
used as a direct basis for the allocation of water. In other words, equitable utilisation is not a rule to ameliorate 
a division already effected by nature”. 
785 See Thomas and others (n 615) and Malyar (n 710); See also Agha Fahim (n 740). 
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comparison with other factors e.g., environmental, economic, and social needs. In other words, the 
primary considerations of equitable utilisation were those of dependence for vital human needs and 
ecosystem protection including social and economic needs, not the physical characters. 
Notwithstanding this, it might seem that Afghanistan with a lower development index than Iran may 
have the strongest argument based on social and economic factors as well. This causes a classic debate 
to balance the utilisation of water for development/economic prosperity in the upstream with the needs 
of the downstream, while protecting the ecosystem and vital human rights. 
Social and economic needs are prominent factors in determining ERU. The Helmand River plays a 
significant role in the water scarce region of both Afghanistan and Iran and has crucially contributed to 
the livelihood of the surrounding people. While Afghanistan, with the lower development index, sees 
its water resources as a strategic resource with which to foster its economy and help to lift the population 
out of poverty,786 Iran needs the same water to secure the population’s drinking demand and agricultural 
activity in Sistan with the fragile economy and no other available water. In this case, and considering 
that there is no cooperation, monitoring and reliable data to examine the social and economic criteria 
on both sides to determine how their utilisation reflects the ERU principle, it is difficult to reach a clear-
cut solution. The 1973 treaty which was established based on the calculation of the Delta Commission, 
and was merely limited to the irrigation aspect of the Helmand River, seems to be blind to other socio-
economic values in the basin, e.g. the importance of the river for fishing and navigation, excluding some 
parts of the dependent population. Having neglected such important issues, the treaty remains static and 
with stiff rules. 
In the assessment of the relevant factors concerning the ERU principle, although no use enjoys inherent 
priority, “special regard” is paid to “vital human needs” in Article 10(2) of the Watercourses Convention 
while the significance of environmental protection is stipulated “with a view to ensuring their long-term 
viability for future generations” in Article 20. 787  Therefore, if a use threatens the availability of 
sufficient water to sustain human life consistent with an individual’s right to water, it is considered as 
inequitable.788 In weighing up relevant factors concerning the ERU principle, the protection of an 
ecosystem finds increasing support. 789  Concerning the obligation to protect the ecosystems of an 
international watercourse, Article 20 of the Watercourses Convention, as “a simple, but potentially 
 
786 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Afghanistan National Development Strategy 1387 – 1391 (2008 – 2013): A 
Strategy for Security, Governance, Economic Growth & Poverty Reduction (Afghanistan National Development 
Strategy) available at http://www.af.undp.org/content/dam/afghanistan/docs/ANDS_Full_Eng.pdf accessed 26 
January 2021.  
787 Watercourses Convention: Article 6 and 10(1) and 10 (2). 
788 UNGA, Report of Sixth Committee convening as the Working Group of the Whole (11 April 1997), UN Doc 
A/51/869 www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/51/869 accessed 26 January 2021. 
789 McIntyre (n 377) and Rieu-Clarke and Spray (n 14). 
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powerful, provision”,790 states that a “watercourse states shall, individually and, where appropriate, 
jointly, protect and preserve the ecosystems of international watercourses”.791  
Looking at the case of the Helmand River through the lens of IWRM and RBM, Vincent Thomas and 
Manijeh Mahmoudzadeh Varzi in their article titled A legal licence for an ecological disaster: the 
inadequacies of the 1973 Helmand/Hirmand water treaty for sustainable transboundary water 
resources development, demonstrate how the 1951 Delta commission on which the 1973 treaty was 
established misunderstood the water demands of the Hamoun wetlands in its calculations.792 They 
showed that the treaty failed to address the integrity of the “agro-ecological system” in the Sistan Delta. 
They also illustrated how such a misconception of the overall demand could significantly jeopardise 
the socio-economic and ecological integrity of the Sistan Delta. Accordingly, the 1973 Helmand treaty 
was “wrongly conceptualised” by focusing merely on irrigation-water demand. The water to sustain the 
wetlands, on which the population of the Sistan (and the delta in both sides of the border) is critically 
dependent, was labelled “waste”.793 While the 1973 treaty preserves Afghanistan’s right to unilateral 
water development and provides determinate amount of water for Iran’s irrigation,794 it leaves the 
ecosystems of the Helmand River unprotected, the social and economic welfare of population 
surrounding the Hamoun wetlands vulnerable, and the sustainability of the whole basin at risk. 
Consequently, it could be strongly condemned as a breach of the ERU principle in particular concerning 
two key factors: protecting vital human needs and the ecosystems of the Helmand River. This is also 
substantiated by some scientific findings of other studies that investigate the contribution of 
development in upstream Afghanistan to the degradation of the Hamoun wetlands (not only dams but 
rather and more importantly massive irrigation expansion including opium cultivation even during 
war).795 However, it should be noted that the utilisation of the same water by Iran also needs to be 
considered when looking at the degradation of the ecosystems of the Helmand River and in particular 
the Hamoun wetlands. Under current circumstances where there is lack of cooperation, with 
Afghanistan reluctant to conduct a common study, such a conclusion may need more careful attention.   
The central questions for discussion are: Can the way in which Afghanistan exercises its rights be 
considered as complying with its obligations under the 1973 treaty and international law? If 
Afghanistan’s water development is lawful with reference to the provisions of the existing treaty, could 
 
790 Quoted in Rieu-Clarke and Spray (n 14) p. 20. 
791 Watercourses Convention: Article 20. 
792 Thomas and Varzi (n 624). 
793 Thomas and Varzi (n 624).  
794 Thomas and Varzi (n 624) p. 508 point out that the amount of water allocated merely to Iran’s irrigation water 
demand “represents less than 20% of the integrated system’s overall demand.” 
795 For extensive technical study, see for instance, van Beek (n 85) and Hajihosseini (n 763). 
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it be unlawful under customary international law, in particular the ERU principle? Can Afghanistan and 
Iran’s water uses be considered as equitable and reasonable? As already mentioned, neither of the 
Helmand River riparian states is a member of the Watercourses Convention; however, the ERU 
principle forms part of customary law and is therefore binding upon all states, including Afghanistan 
and Iran. The scientific studies, referenced above, show that the shared watercourse is not being utilised 
in a manner that can be considered equitable and reasonable. By unilaterally developing and utilising 
the Helmand River and imposing a threat to vital human needs and the ecosystems of the whole basin, 
Afghanistan’s uses, while they may be in line with the treaty, may not be considered as an equitable 
and reasonable share according to the criteria provided in the Watercourses Convention. By not 
assessing the impacts of its uses on the downstream ecosystem and dependent vital human needs 
(potentially causing involuntary displacement and resettlement, and environmental degradation), it 
could be concluded that Afghanistan has not respected the principle of equitable and reasonable 
utilisation. Such obligation also includes Iran’s water utilisation and its impact on the Hamoun 
Wetlands. The ERU principle is accompanied by a procedural obligation to cooperate and to conduct a 
transboundary EIA of projects before permitting them. Afghanistan argues that its water development 
is based on its right given by the bilateral treaty and complies with the ERU principle. However, by 
insisting on its unilateral act without having exchange of data with Iran and cooperation over the 
protection of the Hamoun wetlands, it is not clear if Afghanistan (and Iran) is committed to the treaty, 
nor complying with the ERU principle. More importantly, Afghanistan has violated the obligation to 
cooperate and the duty of notification. All in all, it seems that Afghanistan sees the relative benefits of 
such status quo of focusing on unilateralism whether it is lawful or not as being in its own favour, which 
again may reflect the anarchic nature and will be discussed in the next part. 
The essence of the ERU principle is dependent on the creation of shared understanding and a culture of 
communication between co-riparian states, which would have been possible if the duty of notification 
had been respected. Such a shared understanding and collective identity may lead to the joint 
management of the entire river basin and could potentially transform the situation from conflict to 
equitable and sustainable utilisation with respect to balancing all the interests of the riparian states. On 
the basis of the analysis presented here, the 1973 treaty, with its legal indications, is likely to remain an 
empty and false promise with regard to offering an effective remedy for water conflicts between 
Afghanistan and Iran over the Helmand River and providing a sustainable solution for the whole basin. 
The 1973 treaty is a by-product of anarchy and, in itself, inflames the anarchic symptoms over the 
Helmand River. It is very restricted by nature, and barely provides space for legal principles concerning 
equitable and sustainable utilisation. The treaty may address some aspects of the ERU principle, but its 
super narrow interpretation and lack of account for the environment causes confusion for “practice of 
legality” over the Helmand River Basin. The following section will discuss the role of the ERU principle 
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with regard to the Helmand River and the reasons for its failure to transform the hydropolitical relations 
from interactional international law perspective. 
6.5.2. The effectiveness of the ERU principle and the failure for change in the Helmand 
hydropolitical relations 
The assessment of the 1973 Helmand treaty in the light of the ERU principle showed the 1973 Helmand 
treaty to be very narrow in its focus. By ignoring the importance of ecosystem services, the treaty barely 
addresses the ERU principle, and with its limited scope to allow for modern legal norms, it impedes 
transformation in the hydropolitical relations, pushing merely for water conflict management. 
As outlined in Chapter 3, the question of change is considered to be one of the main conceptual 
challenges in the study of international relations and international law. Despite rationalist reading of 
law as subordinated to the interests of states, the study picks constructivist theory – i.e. norms can shape 
social interaction – to see law rather as “generated and molded through interaction and, in turn, as 
affecting actor behaviour by influencing actor identity, and thereby reconstructing interests.” 796 
Constructivism emphasises the normative or ideational structures as being as important as material 
structures, and that the identities and interests of states are shaped within the society and through 
interactions.797 From this perspective, “[l]aw is seen as an enterprise and a social practice–a continuing 
challenge rather than a finished product.”798 From the view of interactional theory of law, states are 
obligated to comply with law only if they perceive law-making to be legitimate. Such legal legitimacy 
is created through three interrelated elements: a) shared understandings, b) criteria of legality, and c) 
the practice of legality. 
Drawing upon the framework of interactional international law, therefore, the ERU principle effectively 
influences states’ behaviour and their interactions only if it is “broadly congruent with the practices and 
patterns in society”.799 The ERU principle has not been yet put into riparian states’ practice concerning 
the Helmand water utilisation, and just remained as a paper tiger. In this respect, shared understandings 
are the underpinnings of such effective influence in re-shaping states’ identity and promote the practice 
of legality. Interactionalism explains that the process of creation of shared understandings and 
construction of collective identity between riparian states about what they want to achieve through the 
ERU principle, even if it is very time-consuming, is vital to establish an effective regulatory 
 
796 Brunnée and Toope (n 298) p. 113. 
797 Reus-Smit (n 68) p. 199. 
798 Brunnée and Toope (n 298) p. 114. 
799 Brunnée and Toope (n 291) p. 56. 
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framework.800 In turn, the enforcement and effectiveness of the ERU principle depends on the extent to 
which those shared understandings are “intertwined with distinctive internal qualities of law and 
practices of legality”.801 Therefore, the effectiveness of the ERU principle is seen through the way in 
which it shapes collective identity and how it promotes compliance by producing persuasive 
international discourses about what is legitimate concerning water utilisation of international 
watercourses. 
As already shown, within the long history of negotiations between Afghanistan and Iran over the 
Helmand River, international law has played a significant role in shaping the respective arrangements 
and discourses while both sides have sought to impose their views and legitimise their behaviour. 
Clearly, the story of the Helmand River and its 1973 treaty has rather relied on the realist view in which 
law is used more as a tool of statecraft, mostly reflecting the interests of states. So far, Afghanistan and 
Iran have been engaged in a battle for legitimacy to take advantage of the legal norms in general and 
the ERU principle, in particular. In the highly anarchic geopolitical nature of the Helmand River Basin, 
where politics and sovereignty are crucial drivers for states’ behaviour in controlling transboundary 
waters, international law has been observed as a source of bargaining leverage for states to take 
advantage of in favour of their interest, in particular when water has been regarded as a matter of 
national security.  
Within the history of hydropolitical relations regarding the Helmand River, Afghanistan as a buffer 
state, and surprisingly as it has relatively less power, has successfully exploited its geopolitical 
advantage over Iran in the times of extreme events like droughts. However, it should be noted that 
Afghanistan has not yet achieved its “hydraulic mission” of complete control of water resources of the 
Helmand River. Therefore, what Iran has benefited from mostly so far is the uncontrolled waters in 
Afghanistan, particularly the natural floods. At times of water scarcity, caused by humans or nature, 
then, Afghanistan has the upper hand in legal bargaining, because it seems that the Helmand treaty gives 
Afghanistan full right to develop the upstream with no account for the impacts on the downstream 
ecosystem. Therefore, Afghanistan seeks to legitimise its non-cooperative behaviour by using the treaty 
as a legal bargaining chip, while Iran’s hands are tied by the treaty.  
The Helmand River Basin has demonstrated itself as a “hydropolitical security complex” through long 
historical complex relations in which, ultimately, both riparian states, upstream Afghanistan and 
downstream Iran, interestingly, have come up with a common discourse regarding equitable and 
reasonable utilisation and have declared their willingness to protect the Hamoun wetlands. Although 
such “improvement” might be potentially vulnerable due to the symptoms of existing and increasing 
 
800 Brunnée and Toope (n 291). 
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anarchic geopolitical circumstances, reaching a common view over the ERU principle, while they may 
have different interpretations, may introduce new ways of thinking and help create a shared 
understanding of their interests and identities. While the challenges and obstacles emerging from 
anarchy, i.e. struggle for survival, and fear of relative gains and uncertainties, may push both states to 
focus on merely the prevailing state-centrism in international law and negatively affects states’ 
commitment to ERU principle, they may also provide – from a broader geopolitical perspective – an 
opportunity to integrate Afghanistan and Iran to create a collective basin identity over their shared 
waters and trigger off a basin-wide water cooperation. In this respect, the ERU principle may play a 
constructive role as a mediator (Figure 1 – Conceptual Framework) to construct a forum for dialogue 
and shape their behaviour towards transforming water conflict by balancing the interests and addressing 
the identities of riparian states within the principle of state sovereignty.  
A collective identity already existed and was the basis of the “Great Sistan” in its historic sense for 
decade upon decade, and it served the people along the Helmand River and the Hamoun wetlands pretty 
well. This collective identity was noted by many scholars,802 and also acknowledged in the Delta 
Commission report: “Here on both sides of the river are kindred people of similar language and with 
the same customs and living conditions”.803 However, the already existing collective identity was not 
only damaged by the British arbitral boundary in 1800s and then almost faded by emerging post-colonial 
“nationalisation” movements in Afghanistan and Iran with the contested efforts to control waters 
associated with competitive legal nature along with long war in Afghanistan, but also a separate 
competitive and even egoistic identity has emerged. While there are still high commonalities in social 
and cultural aspects and even some extent of economic interdependencies, both riparian states “have 
allowed this artificial line to become a barrier to the simple operation in the joint irrigation of the Delta, 
which was mutually beneficial to the people in both countries for so long a time”.804 
As outlined in Part I, while hydropolitical relations seem to remain ad hoc, there has been a recent shift 
in behaviour and a consensus view on the ERU principle regarding the Helmand River and initiating 
cooperation to revive the Hamoun wetlands. The change in attitude toward cooperation is evidenced by 
changes in the two riparian states’ discourse concerning cooperation over transboundary waters and 
specifically the utilisation of the Helmand River.805 In addition, there have been several attempts that 
may support the idea of possible shift in Afghanistan’s attitude over transboundary water resources 
 
802 See form instance, Barzegar (n 743); See also Saeed Shokoohi and Morteza Hajiabadi, ‘Failure of Geopolitical 
and Geo-Cultural Commonalities to Integrate Iran and Central Asian Countries’ [2018] 14 Geopolitics Quarterly 
149. 
803 Helmand River Delta Commission (n 751) p. 92. 
804 Helmand River Delta Commission (n 751) p. 92. 
805 Thomas and others (n 615). 
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development: specifically the drafting of the Transboundary Water Policy in 2013 and other national 
regulatory policies like the National Development Strategy Framework, the Climate Change Adaptation 
Strategy, the Supreme Council of Land and Water, and the Transboundary Water Technical Unit.806 
The draft policy of transboundary waters was based on the principle of equitable and reasonable use. It 
should of course, as Thomas and others argue,807 be noted that such a change of attitude towards the 
ERU principle might be merely a change in strategy for legitimising unilateral and noncooperative 
resource capture and attracting international financial support for their development projects. However, 
although it might yet be too soon to ensure there is a significant change in behaviour of Afghanistan 
towards cooperation over transboundary waters, the role of ERU principle to produce persuasive 
discourse, even if it still emerges as a bargaining position in the battle for legitimacy, is unavoidable. 
Such change of discourse is also observed on Iran’s side. While Iran has struggled to persuade 
Afghanistan to cooperate over the Helmand River, a recent shift in discourse which is much more 
oriented towards the ERU principle is clear. Once again, although it might be seen as a policy of 
appeasement by de-emphasising the principle of “no significant harm” and focusing on the ERU 
principle – on which Afghanistan insists – in order to convince Afghanistan to cooperate, it 
demonstrates the inevitable role of legal norm and centrality of the ERU principle to influence the 
hydropolitical relations. The question should be asked as to how the ERU principle, as the core 
customary international water law, can transform the hydropolitical relations of the Helmand River.  
To answer this question, according to interactional international law reasoning, states observe a legal 
norm not because of their self-interest, but rather by internalising it in their identities. Once a legal norm 
emerges from shared understandings and is then legitimised, it can shape the identity of a state. The 
interests of states are ultimately shaped by such identities which themselves may be changed through 
the process of interaction. 808  Therefore, building upon constructivist reading, norms matter in 
international relations due to the indirect causes of states’ behaviour by “the construction of collective 
identities and collective definitions of interests by framing processes that foster mutual 
 
806 See Said Shakib Atef and others, ‘Water Conflict Management and Cooperation between Afghanistan and 
Pakistan’ [2019] 570 Journal of hydrology 875. 
807 Thomas and others (n 615) p. 70 “This [change of attitude] could particularly be the case for future projects 
due to the necessity of acquiring funding from international organisations that favour dialogue and mutual 
agreements prior to finalising the designs of projects.” Moreover, Vincent Thomas and Jeroen Warner state that 
initiating work on a transboundary water policy in 2013 by Afghanistan which was an effort to show signs of 
good will to donors was much more oriented towards the ‘equitable and reasonable’ principle, and the ‘no 
significant harm’ principle, “which in this case [the Harirud River; another tranboundary river between 
Afghanistan and Iran but almost same controversies] would give room to consider the negative impacts of 
Afghan dams on downstream Iran”, was removed. Vincent Thomas and Jeroen Warner, ‘Hydropolitics in the 
Harirud/Tejen River Basin: Afghanistan as Hydro-Hegemon?’ [2015] 40 Water International 593 p. 604. See 
Kai Wegerich, ‘The Afghan Water Law: “A Legal Solution Foreign to Reality”?’ [2010] 35 Water International 
298 that shows how the sections within the Afghan water law “mainly play into the hands of the national 
hydrocracy and please international donors”. 
808 Maxym (n 159).  
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understanding”.809 In one sense, “the social reality of a legal person is to be found in the collectivity: 
the socially binding self-description of an organised action system as a cyclical linkage of identity and 
action.”810  Actors can learn how they see each other through interactions, and their beliefs about 
themselves can be gradually changed through cooperation, and ultimately, their new, collective identity 
can be internalised.811 
Drawing upon interactional international law, while there are strong commonalities and high socio-
economic interdependencies with shared historical and cultural linkage between Iran and Afghanistan, 
on the issue of water a “constructive” process of interactions has failed to construct shared 
understandings over transboundary waters, particularly the Helmand River. Accordingly, the identity 
and interests that have been shaped through this faulty process of interactions – which has been severely 
affected by the highly-anarchic geopolitical setting – have been either damaged or not been constructed 
collectively with a strong ability to establish a legitimate legal norm. Therefore, the ERU principle has 
not yet been internalised through the interactions based on shared understandings but is rather subject 
to potential abuse through bargaining and ideational power over the Helmand River. With the same 
reasoning, the historical legal arrangements including the existing 1973 treaty are also grounded in a 
separate and contradictory understanding of the ERU principle and have thus constructed and reinforced 
rivalry and separate identities in the Helmand River. However, for Afghanistan the ERU principle 
appears to be a scapegoat for its unilateral and noncooperative development, while for Iran it may be a 
way to encourage Afghanistan to cooperate beyond the existing treaty and specifically for the Hamoun 
wetlands. Thus, as the treaty and the ERU principle have become politicised, the interpretation of them 
has too became contested. As examined in the previous section, the criteria of legality including clarity, 
constancy and predictability are not met by the 1973 treaty which is assumed to be grounded in the 
ERU principle. Moreover, the failure to create a shared understanding has raised serious doubts about 
the legitimacy of the 1973 treaty. While legal legitimacy depends upon “congruence with underlying 
social practice and internal characteristics of fair process”,812 the terms of the 1973 treaty and its fixed 
water allocation only for irrigation do not reflect the actual demands of the local population in the delta 
on both sides; instead, it emphasises their separate identities.   
In conclusion, drawing upon in–depth analysis of the hydropolitical relations from the legal and political 
perspectives, the study argues that historical and ongoing hydropolitical relations in the Helmand River 
Basin have been placed at the very lowest level of equity and in contested/unilateral ERU, while anarchy 
 
809 Brunnée and Toope (n 298) p. 145. 
810  Gunther Teubner, ‘How the Law Thinks: Toward a Constructivist Epistemology of Law’ [1990]  
Selforganization 87 p. 88. 
811 Brunnée and Toope (n 291). 
812 Brunnée and Toope (n 298) p. 147. 
CHAPTER 6                                                                             Anarchy and the Law of International Watercourse 
181 
 
dominates the environment, targeting the interests and identities of the riparian states in the context of 
“self-help” (Figure 17). Under such circumstances, the 1973 treaty is largely understood as an 
“imposed” or “zero-sum” regulation by both Afghanistan and Iran, and there is strong feeling that they 
have to adapt themselves to this treaty. The 1973 treaty, in fact, at best reflects a contested ERU – being 
highly in favour of one side concerning resolving the disputes over the Helmand River, and barely 
addresses the modern ERU customary principle. However, looking at the Universe of TWINS in Figure 
17 and the discouraging position of 150 years of interactions, it is clear that the Helmand River has 
enormous potential for progress towards higher equity. The lost opportunities in fact are better to be 
seen not unilaterally but rather from a basin-wide perspective, as it opens more opportunity to increase 
the possible benefits. Following on from the above analysis, one critical question beyond the legal 
aspect with must be asked is, why have the 150 years of relations over the Helmand River between 
Afghanistan and Iran with their strong commonalities and interdependency been doomed to failure? 
One could argue that there has been very limited chance for legal norms and specifically the ERU 
principle, among many other drivers,813 to influence and change the hydropolitical relations of the 
Helmand River under such anarchic circumstances. This will be discussed in depth in Part III. 
 
Figure 17. The Helmand River in the UHR (the hydropolitical relations remain at the 
lowest level of equity) 
 
813 Woodhouse and Zeitoun (n 239); Daoudy (n 196). 
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Part III: Anarchy 
6.6. Cooperation under the shadow of anarchy: unravelling the fear of riparian states814 
In order to search for the failure-causing problems of the 1973 treaty and in particular the ERU principle, 
as the basis of the Helmand legal arrangements and recently agreed term of MoU, the study argues that 
the historical and broader geopolitical context of an international river basin significantly matter.815 
Active cooperation and participation in law-making processes to be perceived legitimate are necessary. 
Any impediments to foster cooperation and initiate the first steps for shared understanding obstructs the 
constructive influence of the ERU principle. Accordingly, the anarchic geopolitical circumstances at 
the basin level matters to understand the failure of the ERU principle in transforming hydropolitical 
relations, and the rationale behind signing and maintaining the 1973 treaty by Afghanistan and Iran. In 
so doing, in the third episode will analyse the behaviour of Afghanistan and Iran under highly-anarchic 
geopolitical setting where riparian states competitively engage in a battle for power and legitimacy. 
For many years, the HRC, as a diplomatic tool with its almost yearly bilateral meetings, has been 
increasingly faced with technical, managerial, legal, and political challenges. These severely hamper its 
ability to perform its primary function of fostering water cooperation. It is therefore important to 
critically assess the role of the HRC and to identify obstacles that negatively affect its contribution. 
Thus, a fundamental question that will be addressed through this section is: Why has the dispute over 
the Helmand remained unchanged despite the establishment of the HRC? 
In seeking to examine the factors that hamper the effectiveness of the HRC, much attention in the 
literature has focused on technical and managerial factors. This focus has emphasised challenges to 
cooperation such as the conflicts of interest between Afghanistan and Iran over utilisation of shared 
waters, highly asymmetric socioeconomic patterns, local tensions over water utilisation, climatic and 
environmental risks, unilateral upstream dam development, mismanagement, and inefficient water 
uses.816 
However, two major factors have not been well captured in the literature related to the dispute: on the 
one hand, there is an existing strong potential from interdependency and broad cultural, socioeconomic, 
and political commonalities between Iran and Afghanistan (which requires further study), and on the 
other hand, problems caused by the geopolitical complexity of the basin (which is the focus of this 
 
814 This section has been reviewed and published in a book chapter. See, Nagheeby and Rieu-Clarke (n 638). 
815 Similarly, Hussein and Grandi (n 87) p. 173 also state that “[c]onsidering the broader context is necessary for 
understanding why the agreements were reached and also, to some extent, why they were not respected.” 
816 See, for instance, van Beek and others (n 85); Najafi and Vatanfada (n 85); Hajihosseini (n 763); Saleh Yousefi 
and others, ‘Interplay between River Dynamics and International Borders: The Hirmand River between Iran and 
Afghanistan’ [2017] 586 Science of the Total Environment 492. 
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section). The dispute may indeed reflect conflicting views over the river’s political and legal regime, 
and differing views on the utilisation of shared waters. However, the persistence of disputes over the 
Helmand waters between Iran and Afghanistan and the failure of transformation have been arguably 
more influenced by geopolitical factors in the region and the anarchic setting in Afghanistan.  
Only few scholarly peer-reviewed studies (in English) have sought to analyse the key characteristics of 
the hydropolitical relations between Afghanistan and Iran by illustrating the importance of “human 
security”,817 power relations and riparian states’ strategies,818 and in a similar way but focusing on the 
geopolitical overlay.819 In similar line of thought to the latest, an in-depth analysis of the impacts of 
anarchy and geopolitical nature on states’ behaviour concerning transboundary waters, which has 
received less attention, is the focus of this study. As argued in this chapter, the anarchic setting, which 
is a byproduct of protracted foreign intervention and military occupation by the British Empire, the 
Soviet Union (USSR), the United Sates, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), 
negatively influences the effectiveness of technical and managerial solutions; and as a consequence, 
limits the performance of the HRC and jeopardises the promotion of shared understanding.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, it is necessary to more fully account for the geopolitical shadow of the past 
and existing political forces in a specific basin when analysing why states get stuck in disputes over 
transboundary waters. While riparian states may have a chance to manage water conflicts and prevent 
them from becoming a high-level political concern, the question that remains is: Can they progress their 
hydropolitical relations from conflict management to conflict resolution, or a transformation in the 
highly-anarchic geopolitical setting? In analysing anarchy within the Helmand River Basin context, this 
section will focus on three main obstacles that negatively influence the transboundary water 
cooperation.  
It should be noted at the outset of this section that hydropolitical relations within the Helmand River 
Basin cannot be fully understood without considering the broader turbulent geopolitical context that 
was already explored in Episode I. Highly-anarchic geopolitical setting, as argued, casts a shadow over 
“everything” in Afghanistan and accordingly the Helmand River Basin. The relationship between major 
political milestones in the region and the adoption and evolution of cooperative arrangements 
concerning the Helmand River Basin, while meriting further analysis, is outlined in Table 3. 
 
817 Vahid Sinaee, ‘Hydropolitics and Human Security: Water Cooperation in Relations between Iran, Afghanistan 
and Turkmenistan’ [2012] 2 Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs 111; There are also some articles in Farsi, for 
instance, see Morad Kaviani Rad and others, ‘Identifying and Analyzing the Effects of Variables and Indicators 
Effectively on the Strategic Importance of Harirud for Iran with the Interaction Impact Analysis Approach’ 
[2019] 19 Journal of Applied researches in Geographical Sciences 1. 
818 Abidi ‘Irano-Afghan Dispute over the Helmand Waters’ (n 679); Thomas and Warner (n 807). 
819 Nagheeby and Warner (n 327). 
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Rarely has a river experienced such long wars, military invasions, and political swings as the Helmand. 
A recent UN report describes the political situation of Afghanistan as an “eroding stalemate.”820 The 
US intervention, now in its nineteenth year, also remains stuck in “strategic limbo.”821 Analysts describe 
the complex politics of Afghanistan as a country where “state collapse, civil conflict, ethnic 
disintegration and multisided intervention has locked it in a self-perpetuating cycle that may be simply 
beyond outside resolution.”822 Thus, the situation in Afghanistan, in which most of the Helmand River 
Basin is located, is reflected in the separation, contention, and fragmentation of authority and power 
either of the international community or national government. Authority belongs to whoever wins the 
latest battle. And conflict has deep social and political roots. National authority has limited control over 
both the behaviour of insiders and outsiders.823 Despite international efforts to bring peace and stability 
to the country, chaos and anarchy remain prevalent in Afghanistan, a state “where outsiders come and 
go without any records kept.”824 And, now, after more than four decades of invasions, civil war and 
America’s longest war, in which tens of thousands of people have been killed and millions have been 
displaced, the Afghan government has been excluded by the US in the “peace” negotiations with 
Taliban in 2020;825 a peace process of which justice is sacrificed.826 This anarchic nature of the political 
setting in Afghanistan, it is argued, undermines conflict transformation in the Helmand River Basin, 
and influences the behaviour of both riparian states.  
Like Afghanistan, known as a buffer state between superpowers, Iran, as a regional power in the Middle 
East, has also experienced severe pressure from outsiders, particularly the United States. The Anglo-
American coup in 1953 against a new democratic government, supporting Iraq’s 1979 invasion, and 
imposing economic sanctions during and after the negotiations on a nuclear deal, the recent act of war 
and terrorism by US against Iran by murdering senior military officials are just a few examples of the 
 
820 UN secretary-general, “Special Report on the Strategic Review of the United Nations Assistance Mission in 
Afghanistan,” UN doc. A/72/312–S/2017/696, 10 August 2017 
https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/1299019?ln=en accessed 26 January 2021. 
821  Michael H. Fuchs, ‘It’s Time to End America’s War in Afghanistan’ Guardian (19 August 2018) 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/aug/19/its-time-to-end-americas-war-in-afghanistan 
accessed 26 January 2021. 
822 Max Fisher and Amanda Taub, ‘Why Afghanistan’s War Defies Solutions’ New York Times (24 August 2017) 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/24/world/asia/afghanistan-intervention-state-collapse.html accessed 26 
January 2021. 
823 Khalilzad (n 728). 
824 Kimberly Zisk Marten, ‘Defending against Anarchy: From War to Peacekeeping in Afghanistan’ [2002] 26 
Washington Quarterly 35 p. 35. 
825 Mujib Mashal, Taliban and U.S. Strike Deal to Withdraw American Troops From Afghanistan’ The New York 
Times (29 Feb 2020) https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/29/world/asia/us-taliban-deal.html accessed 26 January 
2021. 
826 Ben Saul, ‘Exchanging killers for peace in Afghanistan is wrong — and could have lasting consequences’ The 
Conversation (11 September 2020)  https://theconversation.com/exchanging-killers-for-peace-in-afghanistan-
is-wrong-and-could-have-lasting-consequences-145927 accessed 26 January 2021. 
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attempts of superpowers to assert their influence over Iran. In this respect, the former US National 
Security Council officials Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett highlight that, “[h]egemonic 
strategies…are inherently expansionist: a state uses military, political, and economic power not just to 
defend its interests but to bend others into accommodating them.”827  
Notwithstanding these influences, Iran shares several key objectives toward Afghanistan with the UN, 
such as: supporting the peace-building process; reconstruction and development; sanctioning the opium 
trade; and hosting refugees from Afghanistan, which has the second largest refugee population in the 
world. 828  This becomes more significant when considering that poor water management and 
noncooperative water development in the Helmand Basin worsen violence, and increase opium 
cultivation and migration in Afghanistan—factors that all have a negative impact on not only 
neighbouring countries but also Western countries.  
6.6.1. The dominance rivalry: Competition for survival, power, and self-interest 
The purpose of this section is to illustrate how the struggle for power and self-interest—largely of non-
riparian states—overshadows transformation in the basin. The section focuses primarily on analysing 
the geopolitical nature and roles of outsiders, and their foreign policies toward Afghanistan. 
As already discussed, geopolitical competition in Afghanistan has been dominated by the strategic 
rivalry and confrontation between superpowers. Regional powers have also become enmeshed in the 
competition over “influence, power, hegemony and profits.”829 As a result, this anarchic setting has led 
all involved parties, including Iran and Afghanistan, to compete for power and self-interest in a way 
that protects their survival. This seemingly unbreakable cycle arguably casts a dark shadow over all 
economic and social developments in the basin and favours the interests and security of the outsiders, 
who have pursued different strategies for ruling Afghanistan.  
Within the nature of the Great Game, the strategies of the outsiders have highly politicised and 
securitised water, in line with their own geopolitical interests,830 and therefore hindered water conflict 
transformation. Not surprisingly, for instance, almost all of the legal arrangements between Iran and 
Afghanistan over the Helmand River have been negotiated with the support of superpowers. Such was 
the case with the British-instituted Goldsmid and McMahon arbitrations of 1872 and 1905 respectively. 
These were followed by the US-proposed Delta Commission of 1951, and, finally, the 1973 treaty. All 
 
827 Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett, Going to Tehran: Why the United States Must Come to Terms with 
the Islamic Republic of Iran (Metropolitan books 2013). 
828 Milani (n 693). 
829 Nagheeby and Warner (n 327). 
830 Nagheeby and Warner (n 327). 
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of these initiatives, and, in particular, the earlier ones, have been described as “the force of dictat” being 
applied to a local issue as a “bulwark” against Czarist or Russian expansion.831 During the Cold War 
the US government considered the conflict between Iran and Afghanistan over the Helmand River as a 
political opportunity to bring the countries under its influence in order to protect its broader geopolitical 
interests in the region, and protect its security against the threat of the USSR. This hegemonic strategy 
is illustrated by the following 1947 statement by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA):  
The United States and Great Britain are keenly aware of this Soviet interest, which 
may threaten the strong traditional British influence in Afghanistan and adjacent 
areas. It is an important part of American policy in the Middle East that no state in 
the area shall have its independence and integrity endangered and that American 
influence be maintained and strengthened wherever possible. A dispute such as the 
one between Iran and Afghanistan over the Helmand River threatens this policy.832 
Just as political rivalry between outside powers emerges from ideological dispositions, ranging from 
imperial capitalism to Marxism-Leninism, so too are water development projects influenced by 
competition between the power and self-interest of countries. As Arthur Schlesinger contended, “[d]ams 
were the American alternatives to Communist land reform.” The US policy, “wherever possible,” has 
therefore strategically proposed river authority schemes as solutions to the most stubborn international 
conflicts, such as in Palestine and Kashmir. An example can be seen in the case of the Helmand and 
HAVA in Afghanistan, which was established in 1952. HAVA was regarded by the US government as 
a means to “create a secure political base [against the US’s rival, the USSR].”833 Thus, the process of 
signing (or perhaps being forced to sign) the peace agreement over shared waters, the 1973 Helmand 
River Water Treaty, should be seen through this lens of geopolitical imperialist rivalry among the 
superpowers of that moment. This is well demonstrated by Asadollah Alam in maintaining that 
Americans forced the Iranian regime at the time to compromise and provide incentives to Afghanistan 
over the Helmand waters in order to control growing Soviet influence within the latter country.834 
 
831 CIA, The Helmand Waters Dispute between Iran and Afghanistan (The Central Intelligence Agency, CIA 
Library 1964) declassified report, “sanitized copy,” approved for release 16 November 2012, doc. no. CIA-
RDP08C01297R000100130005-4, 29 June 1964, 4, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-
RDP08C01297R000100130005-4.pdf. 
832 CIA, The Controversy between Iran and Afghanistan over the Helmand River Waters (The Central Intelligence 
Agency, CIA Library 1947) declassified report, “sanitized copy,” approved for release 6 September 2012, doc. 
no. CIA-RDP08C01297R000100130020-7, 24 October 1947, 25, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP08C01297R000100130020-7.pdf. The CIA also noted 
that “[w]hile the dispute is essentially local it has wider significance as a source of friction between two Middle 
Eastern states and as a possible means of weakening their ability to resist pressure by the Soviet Union.” See 
ibid., ii. 
833 Nick Cullather, ‘Damming Afghanistan: Modernization in a Buffer State’ [2002] 89 The Journal of American 
History 512. 
834 Alam ‘Yad’dashtha-ye Alam’ (n 690). 
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Therefore, it is expected that not only the riparian states’ rights to water but also the sustainability of 
water management within the whole basin, would be sacrificed in favour of superpowers’ geopolitical 
interests. 
This influence of outsiders is still exemplified in the 2017 “US Global Water Strategy,” which refers to 
water as at the core of the US foreign policy agenda in Afghanistan, with the aim of protecting “US 
national interests.”835 This kind of foreign policy agenda and intervention by outsiders over the longer 
term, creates what Alfred McCoy836 calls, a “black hole” of geopolitical instability. Similarly, the 2011 
NATO report to the UNSC concerning the construction of the Kamal Khan dam calls for “transnational 
water agreements.”837  
This demonstrates how outside powers have highly politicised water development in Afghanistan, 
potentially at the risk of threating long-term sustainable and equitable cooperation between the riparian 
states. This does not mean that national interests, and the agreements or differences between Iran and 
Afghanistan over the Helmand River – outlined in Section 6.4.5 – are without value, power, and 
influence, but the reality is that anarchy, and geopolitical rivalry, have severely overshadowed the 
priorities of the riparian states and led them to strategically focus on power, security, and self-interest 
for their survival, at least in the period of geopolitical vulnerability. Such anarchic nature also 
contributes to devastating the identity of states concerning the water cooperation, as seen in the case of 
Afghanistan. 
Thus, on the one hand, within the vulnerable political situation in Afghanistan, the government views 
development over water resources as a strategic resource, a symbol of nation-building and a way of 
monopolising power against its national rivals. On the other hand, within an anarchic geopolitical 
context, water related projects are not solely for socioeconomic development but rather for geopolitical 
reasons that serve the security interests of all the actors involved. In turn, this situation has seriously 
impacted transformation. Although there might not now be clear evidence to trace the interventions of 
 
835  US Department of State, Us Government Global Water Strategy (US Department of State 2017) 
https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1865/Global_Water_Strategy_2017_final_508v2.pdf. In 
similar approaches to that of the United States, countries like the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Sweden have 
included water as a core foreign policy issue in their national interest. See Swiss Federal Council, “Global 
Programme Water Division,” https://www.eda.admin.ch/deza/en/home/sdc/organisation/departments/global-
cooperation/global-programme-water-initiatives.html; Government of the Netherlands, “What does the Special 
Envoy for International Water Affairs do?” https://www.government.nl/topics/water-management/waterenvoy; 
and Government Offices of Sweden, “International development cooperation,” 
https://www.government.se/government-policy/multilateral-cooperation/. 
836 Alfred W. McCoy, ‘How the Heroin Trade Explains the US-UK Failure in Afghanistan’ Guardian (9 January 
2018) https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/jan/09/how-the-heroin-trade-explains-the-us-uk-failure-in-
afghanistan accessed 26 January 2021. 
837 UNSC, Quarterly Report to the Security Council on the Operations of the International Security Assistance 
Force, UN doc. S/2011/760, 7 December 2011, 11, 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2011/760 accessed 26 January 2021. 
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outsiders in the hydropolitical relations of the Helmand River Basin, the shadow of the outsiders’ past 
politics has its impact on the respective discourses, behaviour, and the atmosphere of negotiations 
within the HRC. 
6.6.2. The greater fears of relative achievements and cheating 
A fear of cheating exists in the Helmand River Basin, though, interestingly, the atmosphere of the 
negotiations inside the HRC is, according to Jabbar Vatanfada, the former Iranian commissioner, 
“amicable” most of the time.838 Yet, problems and disputes have persisted, in part because of points of 
contention such as disagreement over measuring water flow. While there is not a reliable study by the 
HRC or others to analyze the potential impacts of natural phenomena and human-made development in 
the Helmand River Basin, lack of common monitoring of the transboundary river by the HRC, a basic 
core function of any RBO the world over, has bred distrust between the riparian states.  
For instance, according to the 1973 treaty, one of the main sticking points concerns Article I(c), which 
defines a “normal water year.” 839  This depends on the measurements recorded by the Dehrawud 
hydrometric station located upstream near the Kajaki Dam. In years when the amount of water is less 
than a normal water year due to climatic variation, the water allocated to Iran is to be decreased 
proportionally. Thus, defining a “normal” water year and demonstrating the causes for a probable 
decline in water flow in upstream Afghanistan are crucial for proper implementation of the treaty. While 
Iranian officials have repeatedly requested visits to this station for verification of the Afghan reported 
water flow, particularly during periods of drought, the Afghans have always denied these requests based 
on “security” reasons.840 For their part, Afghans have always criticised Iran for having “hundreds” of 
water pumps on the river bank and therefore claiming that they are using “more” water than is their 
right according to the treaty. 841  While Iran claims that the water abstraction by these pumps is 
“negligible” compared to its 820 MCM water right, a specific project has been conducted to provide 
water to those river bank farmers in order to remove the pumps, and accordingly ensure compliance 
with the treaty’s obligation.842 However, the pumps still abstract water from the river, and Iran claims 
that its unsuccessful attempts to take out pumps are “the fault of local social resistance farmers.”843 
 
838 IRNA (n 717). 
839 Article I(c) identifies a “normal water year”—the year during which the total volume of water from the first of 
October to the end of the succeeding September, measured and calculated at the hydrometric station of 
Dehrawud, upstream of Kajakai Dam, is 5661.71 MCM. See Annex I. 
840 Mahmoudi ‘Historical Events after the Signing’ (n 616). 
841 Mahmoudi ‘Historical Events after the Signing’ (n 616). 
842 Tasnim News (n 614). 
843 Mahmoudi ‘Historical Events after the Signing’ (n 616). 
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These ongoing back-and-forth exchanges have not only damaged the trust between the riparian states, 
but have also severely heightened the fear of cheating.  
The behaviour and concerns of the riparian states of the Helmand River Basin in an anarchic context 
may also reflect the relative achievements over the utilisation of shared waters. For instance, the 
continued debate between the reluctant riparian states in relation to these issues of visiting monitoring 
stations and removing pumps might be understood in terms of a fear of relative gains. Considering the 
“black hole,” there is perhaps a serious question for the riparian states that: If there is not a minimum 
guarantee for the future, why would the countries make promises? This critical question forces them to 
behave very conservatively and cautiously. Perhaps this fear can also be observed in their misleading 
claims over the dichotomous issues of unilateral development and environmental protection. While Iran 
has expressed concern about the effects of Afghan dams on its future water utilisation, in particular the 
downstream ecosystem, 844  Afghanistan is worried by Iran’s international campaign to protect the 
Hamoun wetlands.  
On the one hand, Iran’s concern might be justified not only because of the fact that an upstream storage 
dam may potentially provide material power (Afghanistan could essentially control water flows), but 
also because a dam will give Afghans the upper hand and more capabilities in future negotiations over 
other issues. The anarchic condition of Afghanistan may also support this interpretation; namely it 
cannot give a guarantee to Iran about Afghanistan’s compliance with any agreement over water or not 
abusing the dams by outsiders against its security. Thus, even though dams in Afghanistan may be in 
line with Iran’s main interests in Afghanistan, such as security and development, Iran’s fear might be 
justified due to threatening its national security.  
On the other hand, Afghan fears over Iranian efforts to make an international campaign to protect the 
Hamoun wetlands might be interpreted as providing Iran with a greater capability to force 
Afghanistan—as a late-developing country 845 —to comply with environmental obligations or cut 
international support for its projects, before using waters for its development. It should, however, be 
noted that the protection of the Hamoun wetlands might also be beneficial for Afghanistan, but perhaps 
it is not the priority now; and therefore, Afghanistan might rather express concern about what Iran may 
achieve by this campaign. This fear may also be traced to Afghanistan’s reluctance to join the Ramsar 
Convention. As a result, both riparian states may express concern about relative gains, which, in an 
anarchic setting, may override the pursuit of individual absolute gains. 
 
844 Tasnim News (n 614). 
845 For discussion about the rights and obligations of late developing states in transboundary river basins, see 
McMurray and Tarlock (n 756). See also Zeitoun (n 484); Nagheeby (n 247). 
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Despite the presence of the HRC, there has been a serious lack of constructive dialogue between the 
two parties over relevant problems like the Hamoun wetlands.846 Consequently, and considering the 
absence of mutual trust and faith, the new emerging phase of cordial cooperation may also fade away. 
Such a fear of relative gains may be evidenced on the one hand by some Afghans, who possess apparent 
“feelings of inferiority” and have “often given the impression that their duty lay in preventing the 
devious Iranians from outsmarting them”, and on the other by some Iranians, who “have sometimes 
behaved as if the Helmand [R]iver were a spigot which the Afghans delight in turning on and off just 
to spite Iran”.847 
6.6.3. The uncertainties 
The uncertainty of one state over the future intentions of the other can lead to a focus not only on 
absolute but rather on relative gains from cooperation in order to protect security and survival. This 
complex security dilemma might be interpreted as explaining why Iran and Afghanistan, while not fully 
satisfied with the treaty’s provisions and with each other’s compliance with it, might nevertheless not 
exit. The reason may be arguably justified by a feeling of uncertainty about the future that is very murky 
and puzzling in an anarchic setting, leaving a state feeling vulnerable and fearful of the other achieving 
relatively greater gains by leaving the treaty. 
This is evident in the discussions related to the implementation of the 1973 treaty. On the one hand, 
while Iran has expressed concern over the quantity and the mechanisms for allocating water,848 an 
alternative solution has failed to present itself—and perhaps there is a recognition that the status quo, 
even though it is very far from the actual needs, at least provides some degree of certainty for Iran 
against Afghanistan, particularly during drought seasons. Thus, Iran’s behaviour might be observed to 
support the maintenance of the treaty in its own favour while adopting a strategy of persuading 
Afghanistan to cooperate over the protection of the Hamoun wetlands.  
On the other hand, while Afghanistan has not—at least until recently—been satisfied about the treaty,849 
it maintains it because of a similar fear of uncertainty. It might be interpreted that, first, Afghanistan is 
afraid that if it leaves the treaty, a new round of negotiations may lead to additional obligations; and, 
second, Afghanistan perhaps has found some degree of certainty that the treaty gives it the upper hand 
in current negotiations over the Helmand River. Considering also that withdrawal from the treaty may 
produce obstacles to attracting international financial support, Afghanistan also strives to influence the 
 
846 Tasnim News (n 614). 
847 Quoted in CIA (n 831) p. 12. 
848 Tasnim News (n 614). 
849 Mahmoudi ‘Historical Events after the Signing’ (n 616). 
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implementation of the treaty for its own interest while not responding to the call for cooperation on the 
Hamoun wetlands.  
Finally, the “black hole” is also observed in the HRC since there is no minimum guarantee of holding 
the next meeting or fulfilling commitments within the anarchic political turbulence. This is also 
observed in the lack of confidence in how the representatives of the HRC negotiate and commit. The 
vulnerability, complexity, and utmost political sensitivity of the issue, along with public pressure, make 
the respective negotiations for all representatives too risky. These sources of uncertainty affect the 
behaviour of the two states, influence the outcome of every round of negotiations overseen by the HRC, 
and form a barrier to equitable and sustainable cooperation and conflict transformation.  
6.7. Conclusion  
In conclusion, this chapter illustrated the obstacles in the way of conflict transformation in the Helmand 
River Basin. It shed light on the role of the ERU principle in shaping legal arrangements and influencing 
hydropolitical relations over time. The assessment of the Helmand treaty with regards to the ERU 
principle showed that it rarely reflects the notion of equity. The chapter also argued that the 1973 treaty 
has limited capacity to address the “life cycle of norms” through interactional international law, by its 
failure to foster shared understanding and meet the criteria of legality. Despite cooperation through the 
HRC, both riparian states of the Helmand River have continued to unilaterally utilise their shared 
waters. Within anarchic nature, the ERU principle serves rather for bargaining strategy. While 
Afghanistan has been developing dams, lack of a positive response to calls to consider environmental 
impacts and revive the Hamoun wetlands through cooperation reflect a situation that is reminiscent of 
the “tragedy of the commons.”850 Despite the fact that the disputes over the utilisation of the Helmand 
River between riparian states have been fundamentally of a technical and managerial nature, the 
disastrous politicisation of the disagreements influenced by the toxic nature of the Great Game has 
complicated the situation.  
A global geopolitical overlay can, therefore, easily be posited on top of a regional (hydro)security 
complex.851 The review of the geopolitical history of the Helmand River shows that there is a negative 
correlation between anarchy and water conflict transformation. Many Western countries, in particular 
the United Kingdom and United States, have demonstrated continued interest in the Helmand River 
Basin.852 This means that the Helmand River Basin dispute appears both as a symptom of the anarchy 
 
850 Quoted in Garrett Hardin, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’ [1968] 162 Science 1243. 
851 Nagheeby and Warner (n 327); See also See Schulz (n 43). 
852 The dams in the Helmand River are still protected by the British Army. The basin is under the study of the US 
Army and major funding is provided by these countries. For instance, the United Kingdom invested £2.8 million 
over three years (2011/12-2013/14) to the Helmand River Study and Master Plan. See UK Department for 
 
CHAPTER 6                                                                                                                     The Helmand River Basin 
192 
 
created by competition between non-riparians and as a tool used by outsiders for their own interests in 
a broader geopolitical context. The consequence is that progress toward transformation is constrained 
because the outsiders’ priorities have served their national interests, without sufficiently paying 
attention to the interests and identities of the riparian states and without an integrated vision of the whole 
river basin based on equity and sustainability.  
Yet, the continuing anarchy presses both Iran and Afghanistan to struggle for survival in the 
negotiations conducted through the HRC, which are essentially imbued with power-seeking, driven by 
self-interest, heated by the fears of cheating and relative gains, and weakened by uncertainties. Despite 
Iran’s call, Afghanistan may consider cooperation over shared water resources as being too risky within 
the present turbulent geopolitical setting. This confirms that policies and institutions within certain 
settings, such as the Helmand River Basin, must be applied by paying attention to the impacts of anarchy 
on states’ behaviour in order to better understand the root causes of water conflict.853 However, focusing 
on regional cooperation through broader geo-economic regional integration might not only overcome 
the symptoms of anarchy but also meet the interests and identity of the parties, that merits further line 
of research.854 If the national interests and identity over transboundary waters are not placed in regional 
collective identity, there seems little prospect of an water conflict transformation in long term. The 
recent progress in relations and the general consensus on promoting cooperation over water with 
reference to the ERU principle may initiate the first steps for creation of shared understanding and 
collective identity over the Helmand River and transform hydropolitical relation towards equitable and 
sustainable manner. 
 
International Development, Business Case Intervention Summary. Title: Helmand River Basin Study and Master 
Plan (Hrbmp)—200870. What Support Will the Uk Provide? (UK Department for International Development 
2011) http://iati.dfid.gov.uk/iati_documents/3755598.odt accessed 26 January 2021. The question is how much 
their policy and financial support are aligned with the idea of fostering mutual cooperation between riparians on 
a basin-wide view. 
853  Despite the fact that this section argues that the water-related institutions remain unable to effectively 
address the water disputes in anarchic settings, they play subsidiary roles. Therefore, this chapter does not 
suggest that the HRC is entirely toothless. In the geopolitical chaos of the basin where even a little dispute may 
escalate into full-blown conflict, the commission may provide a forum for both states to communicate in a 
legitimate way to at least manage, even if they cannot resolve, their water conflicts. 
854 See, for instance, Inomjon Bobokulov, ‘Central Asia: Is There an Alternative to Regional Integration?’ [2006] 
25 Central Asian Survey 75. 
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Concluding Summary: Water never dies 
“Look for the answer inside your question” (Molana - Jalal al-Din al-Rumi) 
How important is international law, and how can international law change state behaviour, are the key 
questions emerging not only from academic debates but also from states’ practices in the contemporary 
world. Today, worldwide water scarcity, the threat of climate change, global warming, and 
environmental degradation have led the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) to declare 2018-
2028 as the International Decade for Action on “Water for Sustainable Development”.855 With these 
complex water-related challenges and threats that globally target human security and future generations 
while possibly intensifying the competitive atmosphere concerning transboundary waters, 
implementation of international water law does not seem to have an easy task in promoting 
hydropolitical relations within the anarchic nature of world politics. 
International and regional laws and institutions have sought to address the complexity associated with 
international waters to resolve conflict and promote cooperation in an equitable and sustainable manner. 
However, the negotiation, adoption and implementation of the principles and rights of international 
water law inherently result from a broader (geo)political process, and therefore are subject to the power 
dynamics between states and other powerful actors and may be subject to the whims of political decision 
making. From this point of view, it is argued that international water law, as a source of structural, 
bargaining and ideational power, reflects the balance of power between riparian states. Just as anarchic 
geopolitical settings partly shape the hydropolitics of transboundary river basins (see Chapter 2), so too 
are the behaviour of riparian states and hydropolitical relations influenced by the various interpretations 
and narratives of international water law through political dynamics and power asymmetry. Thus, the 
interaction between international water law and political dynamics within local, regional, and 
international socio-political settings must be considered in order to improve hydropolitical relations. 
Yet, there has been little consideration of how international water law can be applied practically within 
the political context of the contemporary anarchic world and what the obstacles are. Considering the 
extensive development in international water law and the complexity surrounding the politics of 
transboundary waters, there is also a dearth of research on facilitating dialogue between different 
disciplines in order to synergise legal principles regarding international waters and hydropolitical 
dynamics. Drawing upon the integration theories of both law and politics, the overarching purpose of 
this thesis, therefore, has been to investigate the circumstances in which the evolution and 
 
855  See International Decade for Action on Water for Sustainable Development, 2018-2028 at 
http://www.un.org/en/events/waterdecade/index.shtml accessed 26 January 2021. 
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implementation of international water law could effectively contribute to resolving water conflict over 
an international watercourse to achieve equity. 
Furthermore, this offers a critical analysis of the role of equitable and reasonable utilisation, the core 
customary principle of international water law, in changing hydropolitical relations within the anarchic 
context of international waters to achieve “water conflict transformation”. Accordingly, the main 
research question, as defined in the introduction, was: How and to what extent does the equitable 
and reasonable utilisation principle (ERU) improve the hydropolitical relations of an 
international watercourse within anarchic geopolitical settings?” Seeking to answer this question 
by synergising anarchy, legal principles of equity and state behaviour, the study’s main original 
theoretical contribution is to develop the understanding of the link between hydropolitics and 
international water law. In addition, this study also provides an original contribution to the knowledge 
in relation to empirical context with its depth of analysis of hydropolitical and legal relations between 
Afghanistan and Iran in terms of the Helmand River Basin, as there is currently a lack of relevant 
scientific and qualitative research in this area. 
The overarching theoretical foundation supporting this study, as outlined in Chapter 3, was grounded 
in the constructivist reading of international law, of the kind introduced by Jutta Brunnée and Stephen 
J. Toope (2000) in their concept of “interactional international law”. This framework explains how 
international legal norms can shape the interests and identities of states by sustaining the “life cycle of 
norms”: shared understanding, criteria of legality and practice of legality. The overarching framework 
thus provided the means for this study to examine the relationship between anarchy, the ERU principle, 
and state behaviour – which is a by-product of its interest and identity. 
In sum, the research brings a significant contribution to knowledge at theoretical level by engaging in 
the literature of integration of IR and IL theories and by developing the understanding of the linkage 
between hydropolitics and international water law. The main original contribution of this thesis lies in 
its focus on the underlying anarchic geopolitical structure, and on the role of legal norms to shape the 
interests and identities of states within that structure. By creating a theoretical linkage, it also adds 
values and extends the TWINS framework and international water law analysis. In addition, the study 
provides an integrated framework that looks more pragmatic to grasp the realities on the ground and 
shows that: a) anarchic geopolitical setting matters in shaping state behaviour over international 
watercourses; b) identity matters in shaping hydropolitical relations; c) a change in relations is subject 
to both anarchic nature and the creation of collective identity among states; d) life cycle of norms is 
necessary for the effectiveness of the ERU principle to transform hydropolitical relations in the 
Universe. While the four points outlined above indicate the theoretical contribution of the research, 
empirical contribution to the existing knowledge of the understudied Helmand River Basin is also 
significant and valuable in this thesis. The study’s original contribution in analysing the role of the ERU 
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principle in shaping hydropolitical relations over an international watercourse and its application to the 
Helmand River are summarised in the following sections. 
7.1. Change is inevitable 
The underlying aim of the study was to understand how a change in hydropolitical relations may occur 
with the influence of the ERU principle. Relations with regard to utilisation of shared waters are not 
static, but are subject to change in bio-physical, socio-economic and (geo)political circumstances. Such 
dynamic changes may influence states’ interests and identities or be reflected in new interests and 
identities. Moreover, a change in the interest and identity of a state may result in a change in 
hydropolitical relations with other states. To illustrate the changes in hydropolitical relations, the 
starting point of the study was to define the underpinning assumption by distinguishing the notion of 
water conflict “transformation”, which is set as a benchmark for the improvement of hydropolitical 
relations between riparian states, from “resolution” and “management”. While the conflict management 
approach is often implemented to control conflict regardless of the equitability of the outcome, the 
conflict resolution approach aims to achieve a level of satisfaction by providing a fair balance between 
the parties’ different interests. However, water conflict transformation was understood by this study, as 
set out in the introduction, as an aspect of hydropolitical relations which is much more closely associated 
with the principles of equity, while reflecting a balance between equity and riparian states’ interests and 
identities together. Such interactions between states’ interests and identities and their attitudes, 
interpretation and practice of equity within an anarchic setting over international watercourse, this study 
argued, make changes in hydropolitical relations all the time. The change in relations is subject to both 
anarchic nature and the creation of collective identity among states. 
7.2. Anarchy and geopolitical setting matter in shaping states’ behaviour concerning 
transboundary waters 
One of the fundamental concepts of international relations theory and international law is anarchy, 
which has received less attention in the literature concerning international watercourses. By exploring 
how anarchy and the dominant nature of struggling for power shape the behaviour of states over 
international waters, Chapter 2 of this study presented a neorealist reading of anarchy and discussed the 
challenges and obstacles faced by water conflict transformation. The study showed how the complexity 
around international waters may be intensified by an anarchic environment. While anarchy influences 
the interests and identities of states and thus their behaviour, it may create circumstances under which 
states may be reluctant to commit to and comply with any law that they believe might decrease their 
security with potential future adversaries. Such a nature may provoke riparian states to focus on absolute 
understanding of sovereignty principle, while using the ERU principle as their own bargaining power. 
Therefore, the anarchic nature surrounding international waters matters in shaping hydropolitical 
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relations and might be the main barrier to conflict transformation, by creating chaos and vulnerability 
and intensifying the risks to “constructive” forms of conflict and cooperation. 
The study then went further to employ this concept in understanding the hydropolitical relations of the 
Helmand River Basin between Afghanistan and Iran. Through an in-depth discussion in Chapter 6, the 
study demonstrated that there is a negative correlation between anarchy and water conflict 
transformation – in which equity principle plays a key role – in the Helmand River Basin. By reviewing 
the geopolitical history of the Helmand River, the study illustrated how the anarchic geopolitical setting 
of the Helmand River Basin produces fears of relative gains and uncertainties, pressing Afghanistan 
and Iran to struggle for survival. While there are internal factors to influence the hydropolitical relation, 
anarchy which is the by-product of outsiders seriously hampers the efforts of the riparian states to 
improve their relation. Accordingly, to amend Wendt’s argument that “anarchy is what states make of 
it”, within such nature, one may argue that anarchy is what outsiders make of it at the cost of injuring 
the regional states.  
7.3. Identity matters in addressing equitable utilisation of international watercourses 
This study built on the critical hydropolitics literature and its focus on the coexistence of water conflict 
and cooperation shaped by power relations and argued that states’ identities are important in achieving 
equitable and reasonable utilisation of international watercourses. It therefore gave prominence to the 
often-ignored factor of the complexity of hydropolitical relations. It showed that it is necessary to 
sharpen the focus by examining equity and addressing the identity of riparian states in order to 
“effectively” transform hydropolitical relations. Water conflict and cooperation, in fact, are not only 
shaped by power asymmetry and anarchic settings; the identity of riparian states and their perceptions 
about equity may also influence the relevant hydropolitical relations. The complexity of the 
hydropolitical relations will be more understandable if the study examines what is behind identity of 
states concerning transboundary waters. Thus, this study suggested another aspect of approaching the 
subject by emphasising the important role of equity and identity and the need to bring these concepts 
into sharp focus in analysing hydropolitical relations. 
Within the empirical context and by analysing the geopolitical overlay of the Helmand River Basin, the 
study illustrated how hydropolitical relations have been shaped around coexistent conflict and 
cooperation. It employed the TWINS matrix and illustrated the actual reality of the hydropolitical 
relations surrounding the Helmand River. One significant finding, from both the theoretical and the 
practical points of view, was that the “frightening” future which has been highlighted in some reports 
and media may not be substantiated by the facts on the ground. However, the Helmand River Basin has 
experienced continuous fluctuations between politicised and securitised conflict, while the cooperation 
has been apparently stuck in ‘ad hockery’. Notwithstanding this, the study showed that recent efforts to 
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initiate strategic regional cooperation may advance the water cooperation between Afghanistan and 
Iran.  
In addition, by looking at the “shadow of the past”, the study examined how the behaviour of 
Afghanistan, in particular, as well as Iran, has been affected by their attitudes towards their identities 
and interests. While the identity of a state reflects its self-understanding constructed through its history, 
Afghanistan’s identity has been severely affected by long periods of war and invasion by “outsiders”. 
This identity, along with other factors, leads Afghanistan to symbolise “water nationalism” in order to, 
in part, recover its “damaged” identity. Therefore, the Afghans may consider that their interests are only 
met by taking a unilateral approach towards a complete “resource capture” within an anarchic context. 
This has resulted in Afghanistan’s overemphasis on absolute territorial sovereignty doctrine, probably 
filtering, and mis-interpreting the ERU principle through such a doctrine. Iran, on the other hand, sees 
its interests and identities through the historical value of Sistan which reflects ancient Persia and 
Zoroastrianism, socio-economic importance, and security issues of the region which has seriously 
suffered from the instability in Afghanistan over the last four decades. While the water of the Helmand 
river is significantly important for Iran’s Sistan where there is no alternative yet, water has often been 
sacrificed in relevant negotiations in favour of security issues and the priority of a stable Afghanistan, 
in view of the anarchic geopolitical turbulence of the region. With this view, Iran’s interests and 
identities have been approached more through “integration strategy” and proposing broader benefit-
sharing to encourage Afghanistan toward water cooperation. From the legal perspective, and with this 
observation of the complex circumstances and in line with the efforts to create shared understanding, 
the study showed that Iran has been supportive of the ERU principle without mentioning the “no-harm” 
principle in the bilateral MoU with Afghanistan, even though the latter may be assumed to be more in 
line with its interests. 
7.4. The Universe of Hydropolitical Relations (UHR): equity in TWINS 
In order to complete the different pieces of the puzzle of the main research question, the study placed 
the ERU principle in the political context of hydropolitical relations. As discussed in Chapter 5, the role 
of the ERU principle in enhancing water management has been researched, however the circumstances 
in which the ERU principle is employed by riparian states in an anarchic context remained undeveloped. 
The study, therefore, moved to analyse the interaction between the ERU principle and anarchy within 
dynamic power relations of hydropolitical relations, by developing the framework of TWINS based on 
the different identified degrees of equity. The study suggested an equity dimension to the framework of 
TWINS and introduced the Universe of Hydropolitical Relations (UHR). In so doing, the study 
considered the change of a hydropolitical relationship according to three different conditions: a) The 
ERU Contested/Unilateral, b) the ERU Basic Cooperation and, c) The ERU Advanced Cooperation. 
The realm of water conflict management, conflict resolution, and conflict transformation, with the goal 
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of promoting the implementation of the ERU principle could be observed through the different legal 
conditions of applying treaties and customary principles. Moreover, the study illustrated how each level 
of equity may manifest itself in three cultures of anarchy from constructivist perspectives. Therefore, 
the study showed how interactional international law and the “life cycle of norms” in relation with the 
ERU principle may appear in the UHR framework. To transform hydropolitical relations with the 
influence of the ERU principle, shared understanding is significant to support the criteria of legality and 
promote legal legitimacy. Such legal requirements for effective influence of the ERU principle as 
illustrated in the UHR are mostly expected to bring about water conflict resolution and transformation 
where there is “less” sense of anarchy. 
By analysing the three factors of interactional international law, the study demonstrated that the 
historical legal arrangements, and in particular the existing 1973 Helmand River Water Treaty, hardly 
reflect the ERU Basic or Advanced Cooperation. The study showed how the 1973 Helmand treaty 
neglects the consideration of the ecosystem services, and with its narrow focus on fixed water allocation 
and limited space to account for modern legal norms, impedes the transformation of hydropolitical 
relations, and may even intensify the anarchic nature of the Basin. The hydropolitical relations of the 
Helmand River and its 1973 treaty are observed to have been based on the realist view where law is 
used more a tool of statecraft. A battle for legitimacy to take advantage of the ERU principle is therefore 
evident in the hydropolitical relations of the Helmand River, which suffers from a lack of shared 
understanding and collective identity between Afghanistan and Iran. Despite the strong commonalities 
and high socio-economic interdependencies between the two countries, the study demonstrated that the 
ERU principle has failed to enhance their hydropolitical relations. The study also drew attention to the 
fact that the anarchic geopolitical setting in the Helmand River Basin is, in part, to blame for this long-
standing failure. 
7.5.  Policy recommendations and lessons learned  
The study demonstrated how anarchy, by producing chaos and vulnerability, negatively affects states’ 
commitment to the ERU principle. Furthermore, the ERU principle alone cannot be an effective legal 
remedy for anarchic symptoms, however, the study illustrated how it can make a significant 
contribution. In particular, by its criterion of flexibility and early promise for a degree of guarantee to 
benefit the riparian states’ rights over shared waters, the ERU principle can greatly diminish the fears 
of riparian states regarding cooperation over water and encourage them to initiate a step for a 
constructive process of collaboration. Through this, and by constructing persuasive discourse and 
generating shared understanding between the actors, the ERU principle contributes to providing a 
legitimate basis for constructive dialogue between riparian states and is a starting point from which to 
decrease/neutralise the threat of anarchic effects. Then, the ERU with its independent explanatory and 
normative force has a persuasive influence to correct actors’ interest assessment in water utilisation and 
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consequently prompt state behavioural change and produce shared understanding. Moreover, and 
significantly, the ERU principle as a customary law has exerted power to influence the identities of 
states and guide their legal and political discourse by illustrating what counts as persuasive argument. 
In addition, the ERU principle can make strict adherence to a shared set of legal norms in order to frame 
a fair, persuasive pattern of water utilisation in the processes of shaping hydropolitical relations. 
This study has advanced the understanding of the obstacles faced by international water law within the 
political context of international watercourses. However, due to some analytical limitations, its findings 
might be open to challenge. Though it might be argued that state identity may reflect the local norms 
and interest, the study only focused on hydropolitical relations at state level. While the study considered 
the international and regional context along with national level of anarchy, domestic politics are 
significant to draw a more accurate picture of the complexity around hydropolitical relations. In 
particular, in such cases as the Helmand River Basin, local people on both sides of the transboundary 
river – Nimrooz in Afghanistan and Sistan in Iran – who still have a strong potential for collective 
identity should be considered in future studies. 
Looking at the trajectory analysis of the hydropolitical and legal relations in the Helmand River Basin, 
the study’s important conclusion is that there is huge capacity for both Afghanistan and Iran to increase 
their potential benefits through broader geostrategic cooperation. Afghanistan and Iran with their 
historical shared identities can view the problem of water relations in the broader picture of regional 
integration by completing each other in their geopolitical and hydropolitical demand. This line of 
thought merits further research. Environmental degradation threatens the socio-economic resources of 
Afghanistan and Iran. While protection of vital human need is necessary for both states, environmental 
issues can serve as an effective platform to enhance dialogue. In current situation, there is serious lack 
of shared understanding and active participation between Afghanistan and Iran. A forum of constructive 
participation and dialogue is crucial to not only shared their interests but also, more importantly, reflect 
the inequity, the pains and harms that both sides are now suffering from them, leaving all of them 
untouched with many increasing misunderstandings. 
The concept of equitable and reasonable water utilisation, on which both Afghanistan and Iran have 
recently reached consensus, enables parties in principle to search for constructive options, leading to an 
optimal utilisation of the shared water resource. However, there are still gaps in the knowledge about 
the practical implementation of the ERU principle in the Helmand River Basin with reference to the 
interests and identities of Afghanistan and Iran to maximise the benefits and limit the harms. While the 
basin is experiencing significant changes in all hydrological, socio-economic and political aspects, the 
question arises, from a pragmatic view, how can the ERU principle adapt to the changes over time? 
Moreover, there is still an urgent need, particularly for policy makers, to analyse how the provisions of 
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the 1973 Helmand treaty could be revised and accordingly propose a new legally based agreement on a 
piece of paper. 
Finally, the recent efforts to promote comprehensive strategic collaboration on several issues has 
brought hope of shifting the unilateral utilisation of the Helmand River into a more integrated and basin-
wide perspective, addressing balancing the interests and identities of the whole. Therefore, in order to 
ensure the security and welfare of the people of the Basin, the strategies of both Afghanistan and Iran 
in various political, economic and social fields could be integrated based on geopolitical and 
hydropolitical capabilities, values and characteristics and in particular with the focus on water-energy-
food nexus. Both Iran and Afghanistan adopt complementary roles to fulfil their hydropolitical and 
geopolitical gaps, respectively. This line of thought could be further studied with a question of how the 
relations of the abovementioned countries could be redesigned through sustainable economic 
development and environmental protection in the whole region. In practice, political willingness from 
both Afghanistan and Iran is crucial factor to succeed. 
However, within such a turbulent anarchic environment, sustainable solutions will not be reached unless 
the geopolitical nature of the region and outside interventions can centre on a normative understanding 
of the regional interests, identities, and commonalities of all the riparian states. The complexities and 
dynamic nature of world politics show that anarchy is not the only organising category in world politics. 
Some other factors like hegemony, strategic interdependence and balance of power among actors are as 
important as anarchy. While ignoring the anarchic nature may cause some conceptual gaps, an exclusive 
focus on anarchy may also lead to underestimating the ambiguity of the concept. Analysing the 
relationships among such factors and their impact on hydropolitical relations is necessary. Future 
research might also be worthy to examine the role of outside-of-basin actors and their strategies in 
manipulating the hydropolitical relations within a broader political and security context. Similarly, 
another line of research that merits further consideration would be to examine the link between global 
hegemonic order and anarchy. How may the hidden liberal capitalism in the world, mainly led by 
industrial states, and their security and economic interests in other regions, particularly developing and 
underdeveloped states, affect the different aspects of hydropolitical relations? In particular, it is 
observed from current “peace-building” processes in Afghanistan that outsiders’ strategies to bring 
“peace” are doomed to fail, and yet it seems their approaches are far more in favour of their own 
interests. Changing the geopolitical nature of the region to more regional integration by itself has the 
inherently significant potential to overcome the geopolitical challenges which separate the people living 
in the Basin. Certainly, there is strong potential for normative movements to change the game towards 
water, security and of course, equity and justice for the people of the Helmand River Basin where “water 
never dies”. Something that needs to be heard particularly by outsiders, in the words of Molana (the 
famous poet originally from this region) is:  
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Annex I. 1973 Helmand River Water Treaty  
Following is the text of the Afghan-Iranian Helmand River water Treaty:  
Afghanistan and Iran, desiring to remove permanently all causes of controversy with respect to the 
water of the Helmand River and being moved by international comity and by brotherly and neighbourly 
feelings, and having resolved to conclude a treaty for this purpose, and having named as their 
Plenipotentiaries:  
Afghanistan: 
Mohammad Moussa Shaqfiq, 
Prime Minister of Afghanistan,  
and, 
Iran: 
Amir Abbas Hoveyda, 
Prime Minister of Iran:  
Who, after having communicated to one another their respective full powers, found in good and due 
form, have agreed upon the following Articles: 
ARTICLE I 
For the purposes of this Treaty,  
a) First of January corresponds to 11 Ma-ghoumay- 11 July- 11 Dey.  
First of February corresponds to 12 Salwagha- 12 Dalwa- 12 Bahman. 
First of March corresponds to 10 Kab-10 Hout- 10 Esfand. 
First of April corresponds to 12 Warray-12 Hamal- 12 Farwardin. 
First of May corresponds to 11 Ghwayay- 11 Sawr- 11 Ordibehesht. 
First of June corresponds to 11 Ghbargoly- 11 Jawza- 11 Khardad. 
First of July corresponds to 10 Chonash- 10 Saratan- 10 Tir. 
First of August corresponds to 10 Zamaray- 10 Asad- 10 Tir. 
First of September corresponds to 10 Wozhy- 10 Sonbola- 10 Shariwar. 
First of October corresponds to 9 Tala- 9 Mizan- 9 Mehr. 
First of November corresponds to 10 Larum- 10 Arqab- 10 Aban. 
First of December corresponds to 10 Linday- 10 Qaws- 10 Azar. 
In leap years the difference of one day shall be taken into consideration according to the Solar 




b) A “water year” means the period from October first to the end of the succeeding September. 
c) A “normal water year” means the year during which the total flow of water from the first of October 
to the end of the succeeding September, measured and calculated at the hydrometric station at 
Dehrawd located on the Helmand River upstream from the entrance to Kajaki Reservoir, is four 
million five hundred and ninety thousand (4,590,000) acre feet (5661,715 million cubic meters). 
The amount of monthly flow is norm of determining whether the flow year are indicated in Protocol 
No 1, annexed to this Treaty. 
d) The hydrometric station at Dehrawud is recognised solely as an instrument for the purpose is that 
of a normal water year. 
ARTICLE II 
The total amount of water from the Helmand River to be delivered by Afghanistan to Iran in a normal 
water year, is limited to an average flow of twenty two cubic meters per second, in accordance with 
table 10 of the Report of “Helmand River Delta commission”, dated February 28, 1951, with monthly 
distributions shown in Column 2 of the table in Article III of this Treaty, and an additional amount, 
which is being granted by Afghanistan to Iran as an expression of goodwill and brotherly relations of 
an average flow of four cubic meters per second with monthly distributions as shown in Column 3 of 
the table in Article III, which distributions are proportionate to those in column 2. 
ARTICLE III 
a) During a normal water year, or an above normal water year, Afghanistan shall deliver to Iran in the 
bed of the Helmand River at the places mentioned below, the specific amounts of Helmand River 
water described and determined in Article II of this treaty according to the monthly distributions 
specified in Column 4 of the following table: 
1 2 3 4 
Months Distribution of average 
flow of water in cubic 
meters per second on the 
basis of 22 cubic meters per 
second in accordance with 
the “Helmand River Delta 
Commission Report” 
Distribution of average 
flow of water in cubic 
meters per second on the 
basis of 4 cubic meters per 
second as an expression of 
goodwill 
Distribution of the average 
flow of water in cubic 
meters per second on the 
basis of the total of Column 
2 and 3 of this table, that is 
26 cubic meters per second 
Oct. 4.23 0.77 5.00 
Nov. 10.75 1.97 12.72 
Dec. 19.48 3.56 23.04 
Jan. 29.35 5.32 36.67 
Feb. 66.12 12.04 78.16 
March 61.90 11.23 73.13 
April 26.30 4.81 31.11 
May 7.64 1.39 9.03 
June 16.71 3.02 19.73 
July 11.61 2.11 13.72 
August 7.93 1.44 9.37 





The places of delivery shall be as follows:  
1. At the place where the boundary line crosses the Rude Sistan. 
2. At two other places, where the boundary line is located in the bed of the Helmand River, between 
boundary pillars number fifty-one and fifty-two. The places shall be fixed by the Commissioners 
of the two parties, who shall establish the distance and direction of each one of the places in relation 
to one of the above-mentioned boundary pillars within three months from the date of entry into 
force of this treaty. The establishment of the two places shall be effective after the approval of the 
two Governments. 
b) The two parties shall build suitable joint structures and install necessary devices in accordance with 
plans and specification agreed upon by the two parties, at the places mentioned in paragraph (a) of this 
Article, so that the amounts of water specified in the Articles of this Treaty may be measured and 
delivered effectively and accurately in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty. 
ARTICLE IV 
In years when due to climatic factors, that amount of flow is less than that of a normal water year, and 
the measured flow figures at the hydrometric station at Dehrawud indicate that the flow of the months 
previous to the month in question has been less than that of a normal water year, the amounts stated in 
the Column 4 of the Table in Article III shall be adjusted, for the succeeding months of that water year, 
in the ratio that the actual flow for the previous months of that water year (in this case from March to 
the month in question) bears to the same months of a normal water year, and the adjusted amounts shall 
be delivered to Iran at the places provided in Article III. In the event that in any succeeding month, after 
the month in question, the hydrometric station at Dehrawud indicates a flow equal to or greater than 
that of the same month of a normal water year water in that month shall be delivered according to 
Column 4 of the table of Article III. 
ARTICLE V 
Afghanistan agrees that it shall take no action to deprive Iran totally or partially of its water right to the 
water of the Helmand River as fixed and delimited by the provisions of Articles II, III and IV of this 
Treaty. Afghanistan shall retain all rights to the balance of the water of the Helmand River and may 
make such use or disposition of the water as it chooses. 
Iran shall make no claim to the water of the Helmand River in excess of the amounts specified in this 
Treaty, even if additional amounts of water may be available in the Helmand Lower Delta and may be 
put to a beneficial use by Iran.  




Afghanistan shall take no action to make the water to be delivered to Iran totally unsuitable for 
agriculture, or to cause it to be polluted by the industrial chemical effluent to such an extent that even 
after being purified by conventional modern technical methods, still its use remains to be impossible 
and harmful for domestic purposes. 
Article VII  
Any type of technical joint structures which are necessary for the purpose of stabilisation of the bed of 
the Helmand River at the places where the boundary line is located at the bed of the River, can be 
constructed only after the plans and specifications for such structures have been approved by the parties 
to this Treaty. 
Article VIII 
Each party shall appoint a Commissioner and a Deputy Commissioner from among its own nationals, 
who shall represent their respective countries in the implementation of the provisions of this Treaty. 
The scope of their authority and their duties and responsibilities are defined in Protocol No 1, annexed 
to this Treaty. 
Article IX  
In the event that a difference should develop in the interpretation or application of the provisions of this 
Treaty, the parties shall endeavor, first, to solve the difference through diplomatic negotiations, 
secondly through the use of the good offices of a third party. Should neither effort result in a solution 
the difference shall be submitted to arbitration pursuant to provisions of Protocol No. 2, annexed to this 
Treaty. 
Article X  
Afghanistan and Iran agree that this Treaty represents the complete and permanent agreement of the 
two Countries, that the provisions of this Treaty are valid only within the limitations contents that the 
Treaty shall not be subjected to any other present future principle or precedent.  
Article XI  
If extreme drought or force majeure should make the reaching of the water to the Helmand Delta 
temporarily impossible, the Commissioners of the two parties shall immediately enter into consultation 
and shall formulate and submit an urgent necessary plan for meeting or minimizing the emergency to 
their respective Governments. 




The Treaty shall enter into force on the day of exchange of instruments of ratifications. 
In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty. 
Done in duplicate at Kabul in the Pashto, Dari (Persian) and English languages, the three texts being 
equally authentic the English text, however, being the only text to which reference shall be made in the 
event of recourse to the good offices of a third party or arbitration this 13th day of March 1973. 
 For Afghanistan 
Mohammad Moussa Shaqfiq 
Prime Minister 
For Iran 
Amir Abbas Hoveyda 
Prime Minister 
Following are the texts of the two complementary protocols of the treaty on water from Helmand, signed 
between Afghanistan and Iran.  
PROTOCOL NO. 1 
Annexed to the Afghan-Iranian Helmand River Water Treaty relating to the authority and duties of the 
Commissioners. 
ARTICLE 1  
The treaty mentioned in this Protocol is the Afghan-Iranian Helmand River Water Treaty between 
Afghanistan and Iran signed on the 13th of March 1973. 
ARTICLE 2  
Each of the parties to the Treaty shall appoint a Commissioner and a Deputy Commissioner who shall 
be nationals of and represent their respective Governments in connection with the implementation of 
the provisions of the Treaty regarding the delivery to Iran of the amount of water of the Helmand River 
therein specified.  
ARTICLE 3  
(a) The Commissioners shall be appointed from among high ranking officials. 
(b) Each Commissioner in the performance of his duties may utilize the services of two advisers of his 
nationality. 
(c) The expenses of the Commissioners, their Deputies and their advisers shall be defrayed by their 
respective Governments. 




The Commissioners shall represent their respective Countries on matters related application of, and 
shall serve as liaison officers between the two countries on matters related to this Protocol. 
ARTICLE 5  
During any year that the flow of water is less than in a normal water year, as described in Article IV of 
the Treaty, and the Iranian Commissioner shall seek information as to the flow of water at the 
hydrometric station at Dehrawud, located on the Helmand River upstream from the entrance to Kajaki 
Reservoir, the Afghan Commissioner shall put at his disposal the related data registered at that station. 
Should the Iranian Commissioner so desire, the Afghan Commissioner shall put at his disposal the 
monthly flow records registered at that station. At the request of the Iranian Commissioner the Afghan 
Commissioner shall cooperate with him so the Iranian Commissioner may observe and measure the 
flow of water at Dehrawud station. 
Note: The distribution of the monthly flow in a normal year is as follows:  
October 154,000 Acre-feet  
November 172,000 Acre-feet 
December 176,000 Acre-feet 
January 178,000 Acre-feet 
February 208,000 Acre-feet 
March 597,000 Acre-feet 
April 1,158,000 Acre-feet 
May 1,033,000 Acre-feet 
June 441,000 Acre-feet 
July 211,000 Acre-feet 
August 137,000 Acre-feet 
September 125,000 Acre-feet 
Total 4,590,000 Acre-feet 
ARTICLE 6  
The Afghan and Iranian Commissioners shall act jointly in the measurement and delivery of the water 
at the places of delivery specified in Article III of the Treaty, according to the provisions of the Treaty 
and this Protocol. 
ARTICLE 7  
The Afghan and Iranian Commissioners shall constitute the “Joint Committee of Commissioners,” 
hereinafter, referred to as the “Joint Committee.” This Committee shall endeavor to solve expeditiously, 
and problem which may arise the performance of its duties under this Protocol. The decisions of the 
Joint Committee shall be binding within the limits of its authority. 




The Joint Committee shall hold regular meetings periodically, as the Joint Committee shall determine. 
In cases of emergency either Commissioner may call a special meeting of the Joint Committee. The 
Joint Committee shall hold its regular meetings in Kabul or Zaranj (in Afghanistan) or in Tehran or 
Zabul (in Iran), as the Joint Committee shall determine. The special meeting of the Joint Committee 
shall be held at any one of the places mentioned above named in the call for the meeting.  
ARTICLE 9  
The Commissioners shall submit a report of the activities of the Joint Committee during the preceding 
water year to their respective Governments prior to the first of November in each year. They may submit 
in term reports, within the limitation of their duties specified in this Protocol, to their respective 
Governments at such other time or times as they deem necessary.  
ARTICLE 10  
(a) Each of the parties to the Treaty shall appoint a delegation headed by the Minister in charge of 
matters pertaining to water utilization. The delegations of the two parties shall together constitute 
the “Committee of Ministers”. 
(b) The Committee of Ministers shall meet at the request of one of the Governments. The Committee 
of Ministers shall have jurisdiction to solve any problem that may arise in the application of this 
Protocol. The Joint Committee shall be bound to apply the decisions of the Committee of the 
Ministers. 
(c) Either Commissioner may request his Government to call a meeting of the Committee of Ministers, 
either in an emergency or when the members of the Joint Committee cannot reach agreement. 
(d) The Joint Committee and the Committee of Ministers shall each determine the procedure of their 
meetings. 
ARTICLE 11 
 In the event the Committee of Ministers do not reach agreement each party to the Committee shall 
submit a report to its respective Government in order that the two Governments seek for a solution 
through diplomatic channels. The decisions made by each committee or decisions reached through 
diplomatic channels shall not contravene any of the provisions of, and shall be within the limits of the 
Treaty and this Protocol. Any decision made or action taken by either Committee shall not in any 
manner whatsoever establish a precedent.  
ARTICLE 12  
No amendment to, change in, or revision of, this protocol agreed by the parties to the Treaty, shall in 




ARTICLE 13  
This protocol shall be regarded as an integral part of the Afghan-Iranian Helmand River Water Treaty 
signed in Kabul on the 13th day of March 1973 and shall be effective beginning with the day of the entry 
into force of the Treaty.  
In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed this Protocol. 
Done in duplicate at Kabul in the Pashto, Dari (Persian), and English languages, the three texts being 
equally authentic, the English text. However, being the only text to which reference shall be made in 
the event of recourse to the good offices of a third party or arbitration this 13th day of March 1973. 
For Afghanistan 
Mohammad Moussa Shafiq 
Prime Minister 
For Iran 
Amir Abbas Hoveyda 
Prime Minister 
PROTOCOL NO. 2 
Annexed to the Afghan-Iranian Helmand River Water Treaty relating to arbitration.  
ARTICLE 1  
The Treaty mentioned in this Protocol is the Afghan-Iranian Helmand River Water Treaty between 
Afghanistan and Iran signed on the 13th March of 1973. 
ARTICLE 2  
Any difference which may develop in the interpretation or application of the provisions of the Treaty, 
which cannot be solved in accordance with Article IX of the Treaty, through diplomatic negotiations or 
thereafter, through the good offices of a third party, shall be submitted to arbitration.  
ARTICLE 3  
In the event that either of the parties to the treaty, after having complied with the two procedures first 
stipulated in Article 2 of this Protocol, shall deem it necessary to refer its difference to arbitration. It 
shall so advise the other party by the delivery of a diplomatic note, stating the specific point or points 
of difference and requesting first, the establishment of an Arbitral (fact-finding) Mission in accordance 
with Article 4 of this Protocol and secondly, if necessary, an Arbitral Tribunal in accordance with the 




ARTICLE 4  
Within three months after the receipt of the diplomatic note referred to in Article 3 of this Protocol, the 
representatives of the two parties shall meet and attempt to agree on the composition of an Arbitral 
(fact-finding) Mission, and one the manner in which proceeding of the mission are to be conducted. If 
such mission is created and makes findings and recommendations which are agreed to by the two 
parties, the case will be considered resolved. 
ARTICLE 5  
In the event that the parties, pursuant to Article 4 of this Protocol, do not reach agreement on the findings 
and recommendations of the Arbitral (fact-finding) Mission, the point or points of difference shall be 
submitted to an Arbitral Tribunal which shall consist of three members and shall be constituted as 
follows: 
(a) Each party shall appoint one arbitrator, who shall be a national of the party making the appointment. 
(b) The third arbitrator, who shall be presid over the Arbitral Tribunal as Chairman, shall be chosen by 
agreement of the two parties, within three months of the appointment of the members appointed 
pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (a) of this Article, should be the third arbitrator not be 
chosen within three months, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, shall be requested by the 
parties or one of the parties, to appoint the third arbitrator. The Chairman of the Arbitral Tribunal 
appointed pursuant to the provisions of this paragraph shall be from nationals of a country with 
which both Afghanistan and Iran maintain friendly relations, but has no common interest with either 
Afghanistan or Iran. 
(c) The Arbitral Tribunal shall with the concurrence of the parties adopt such rules for its proceedings 
as may be deemed expedient and necessary. Such rules shall be in conformity with the provisions 
of the Treaty, Protocol No. 1, and this Protocol. 
(d) The Arbitral Tribunal shall submit to the two parties a copy of its decision when rendered. Each 
such decision shall be supported by reasons in writing. 
(e) The decisions of the Tribunal shall be paid by the Government.  
ARTICLE 6  
Should any member of the Arbitral (fact-finding) Mission under Article 4 or of Arbitral Tribunal under 
Article 5 of this Protocol, for any reason, ceases to serve; he shall be replaced in the same manner he 
was originally appointed or choses. In that event, further proceedings shall be resumed at such time as 
the appointed or chosen member shall have had such opportunity and time as he may reasonably require 
to acquaint himself with all proceedings which transpired prior to his appointment or choice. 




The expenses of each arbitrator shall be paid by the Government which chose the arbitrator and the 
expenses of the third arbitrator shall be shared equally by the two parties. 
ARTICLE 8  
No amendment to change in, or revision of this Protocol agreed by the parties to the Treaty, shall in any 
manner whatsoever affect the Treaty, or Protocol No. 1, Annexed thereto. 
ARTICLE 9  
This Protocol shall be regarded as an integral part of the Afghan-Iranian Helmand River Water Treaty 
signed in Kabul on the 13th day of March 1973 and shall be effective beginning with the day of entry 
into force of the Treaty. 
In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed this Protocol. 
Done in duplicate at Kabul in the Pashto, Dari (Persian) and English languages, the three texts being 
equally authentic, the English text, however, being the only text to which reference shall be made in 
event of recourse to the good offices of a third party or arbitration, this 13th day of March 1973. 
For Afghanistan 
Mohammad Mousa Shafiq 
Prime Minister 
For Iran 






ANNEX II. 1997 UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses 
The Parties to the present Convention, 
Conscious of the importance of international watercourses and the non-navigational uses thereof in 
many regions of the world, 
Having in mind Article 13, paragraph 1 (a), of the Charter of the United Nations, which provides that 
the General Assembly shall initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of encouraging 
the progressive development of international law and its codification, 
Considering that successful codification and progressive development of rules of international law 
regarding non-navigational uses of international watercourses would assist in promoting and 
implementing the purposes and principles set forth in Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter of the United 
Nations, 
Taking into account the problems affecting many international watercourses resulting from, among 
other things, increasing demands and pollution, 
Expressing the conviction that a framework convention will ensure the utilization, development, 
conservation, management and protection of international watercourses and the promotion of the 
optimal and sustainable utilization thereof for present and future generations 
Affirming the importance of international cooperation and good neighbourliness in this field, 
Aware of the special situation and needs of developing countries, 
Recalling the principles and recommendations adopted by the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development of 1992 in the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21, 
Recalling also the existing bilateral and multilateral agreements regarding the nonnavigational uses of 
international watercourses, 
Mindful of the valuable contribution of international organizations, both governmental and non-
governmental, to the codification and progressive development of international law in this field, 
Appreciative of the work carried out by the International Law Commission on the law of the non-




Bearing in mind United Nations General Assembly resolution 49/52 of 9 December 1994, Have agreed 
as follows: 
PART I. INTRODUCTION 
Article 1 - Scope of the present Convention 
(1) The present Convention applies to uses of international watercourses and of their waters for purposes 
other than navigation and to measures of protection, preservation and management related to the uses 
of those watercourses and their waters. 
(2) The uses of international watercourses for navigation is not within the scope of the present 
Convention except insofar as other uses affect navigation or are affected by navigation. 
Article 2 – Use of Terms 
For the purposes of the present Convention: 
(a) “Watercourse” means a system of surface waters and groundwaters constituting by virtue of their 
physical relationship a unitary whole and normally flowing into a common terminus; 
(b) “International watercourse” means a watercourse, parts of which are situated in different States; 
(c) “Watercourse State” means a State Party to the present Convention in whose territory part of an 
international watercourse is situated, or a Party that is a regional economic integration organization, in 
the territory of one or more of whose Member States part of an international watercourse is situated; 
(d) “Regional economic integration organization” means an organization constituted by sovereign 
States of a given region, to which its member States have transferred competence in respect of matters 
governed by this Convention and which has been duly authorized in accordance with its internal 
procedures, to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to it. 
Article 3 – Watercourse Agreements 
(1) In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, nothing in the present Convention shall affect the 
rights or obligations of a watercourse State arising from agreements in force for it on the date on which 
it became a party to the present Convention. 
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1, parties to agreements referred to in paragraph 1 may, 





(3) Watercourse States may enter into one or more agreements, hereinafter referred to as “watercourse 
agreements”, which apply and adjust the provisions of the present Convention to the characteristics and 
uses of a particular international watercourse or part thereof. 
(4) Where a watercourse agreement is concluded between two or more watercourse States, it shall define 
the waters to which it applies. Such an agreement may be entered into with respect to an entire 
international watercourse or any part thereof or a particular project programme or use except insofar as 
the agreement adversely affects, to a significant extent, the use by one or more other watercourse States 
of the waters of the watercourse, without their express consent. 
(5) Where a watercourse State considers that adjustment and application of the provisions of the present 
Convention is required because of the characteristics and uses of a particular international watercourse, 
watercourse States shall consult with a view to negotiating in good faith for the purpose of concluding 
a watercourse agreement or agreements.  
(6) Where some but not all watercourse States to a particular international watercourse are parties to an 
agreement, nothing in such agreement shall affect the rights or obligations under the present Convention 
of watercourse States that are not parties to such an agreement. 
Article 4 - Parties to watercourse agreements 
(1) Every watercourse State is entitled to participate in the negotiation of and to become a party to any 
watercourse agreement that applies to the entire international watercourse, as well as to participate in 
any relevant consultations. 
(2) A watercourse State whose use of an international watercourse may be affected to a significant 
extent by the implementation of a proposed watercourse agreement that applies only to a part of the 
watercourse or to a particular project, programme or use is entitled to participate in consultations on 
such an agreement and, where appropriate, in the negotiation thereof in good faith with a view to 
becoming a party thereto, to the extent that its use is thereby affected. 
PART II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
Article 5 - Equitable and reasonable utilization and participation  
(1) Watercourse States shall in their respective territories utilize an international watercourse in an 
equitable and reasonable manner. In particular, an international watercourse shall be used and 
developed by watercourse States with a view to attaining optimal and sustainable utilization thereof and 
benefits therefrom, taking into account the interests of the watercourse States concerned, consistent with 




(2) Watercourse States shall participate in the use, development and protection of an international 
watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner. Such participation includes both the right to utilize 
the watercourse and the duty to cooperate in the protection and development thereof, as provided in the 
present Convention. 
Article 6 - Factors relevant to equitable and reasonable utilization 
(1) Utilization of an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner within the 
meaning of article 5 requires taking into account all relevant factors and circumstances, including: 
(a) Geographic, hydrographic, hydrological, climatic, ecological and other factors of a natural character;  
(b) The social and economic needs of the watercourse States concerned;  
(c) The population dependent on the watercourse in each watercourse State; 
(d) The effects of the use or uses of the watercourses in one watercourse State on other watercourse 
States; 
(e) Existing and potential uses of the watercourse; 
(f) Conservation, protection, development and economy of use of the water resources of the watercourse 
and the costs of measures taken to that effect; 
(g) The availability of alternatives, of comparable value, to a particular planned or existing use.  
(2) In the application of article 5 or paragraph 1 of this article, watercourse States concerned shall, when 
the need arises, enter into consultations in a spirit of cooperation. 
(3) The weight to be given to each factor is to be determined by its importance in comparison with that 
of other relevant factors. In determining what is a reasonable and equitable use, all relevant factors are 
to be considered together and a conclusion reached on the basis of the whole. 
Article 7 - Obligation not to cause significant harm 
(1) Watercourse States shall, in utilizing an international watercourse in their territories, take all 
appropriate measures to prevent the causing of significant harm to other watercourse States. 
(2) Where significant harm nevertheless is caused to another watercourse State, the States whose use 
causes such harm shall, in the absence of agreement to such use, take all appropriate measures, having 
due regard for the provisions of articles 5 and 6, in consultation with the affected State, to eliminate or 




Article 8 - General obligation to cooperate 
(1) Watercourse States shall cooperate on the basis of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, mutual 
benefit and good faith in order to attain optimal utilization and adequate protection of an international 
watercourse. 
(2) In determining the manner of such cooperation, watercourse States may consider the establishment 
of joint mechanisms or commissions, as deemed necessary by them, to facilitate cooperation on relevant 
measures and procedures in the light of experience gained through cooperation in existing joint 
mechanisms and commissions in various regions.  
Article 9 - Regular exchange of data and information 
(1) Pursuant to article 8, watercourse States shall on a regular basis exchange readily available data and 
information on the condition of the watercourse, in particular that of a hydrological, meteorological, 
hydrogeological and ecological nature and related to the water quality as well as related forecasts. 
(2) If a watercourse State is requested by another watercourse State to provide data or information that 
is not readily available, it shall employ its best efforts to comply with the request but may condition its 
compliance upon payment by the requesting State of the reasonable costs of collecting and, where 
appropriate, processing such data or information. 
(3) Watercourse States shall employ their best efforts to collect and, where appropriate, to process data 
and information in a manner which facilitates its utilization by the other watercourse States to which it 
is communicated. 
Article 10 - Relationship between different kinds of uses 
(1) In the absence of agreement or custom to the contrary, no use of an international watercourse enjoys 
inherent priority over other uses. 
(2) In the event of a conflict between uses of an international watercourse, it shall be resolved with 
reference to articles 5 to 7, with special regard being given to the requirements of vital human needs. 
PART III. PLANNED MEASURES 
Article 11 - Information concerning planned measures 
Watercourse States shall exchange information and consult each other and, if necessary, negotiate on 




Article 12 - Notification concerning planned measures with possible adverse effects 
Before a watercourse State implements or permits the implementation of planned measures which may 
have a significant adverse effect upon other watercourse States, it shall provide those States with timely 
notification thereof. Such notification shall be accompanied by available technical data and information, 
including the results of any environmental impact assessment, in order to enable the notified States to 
evaluate the possible effects of the planned measures. 
Article 13 - Period for reply to notification 
Unless otherwise agreed: 
(a) A watercourse State providing a notification under article 12 shall allow the notified States a period 
of six months within which to study and evaluate the possible effects of the planned measures and to 
communicate the findings to it; 
(b) This period shall, at the request of a notified State for which the evaluation of the planned measures 
poses special difficulty, be extended for a period of six months. 
Article 14 - Obligations of the notifying State during the period for reply 
During the period referred to in article 13, the notifying State: 
(a) Shall cooperate with the notified States by providing them, on request, with any additional data and 
information that is available and necessary for an accurate evaluation; and 
(b) Shall not implement or permit the implementation of the planned measures without the consent of 
the notified States. 
Article 15 - Reply to notification 
The notified States shall communicate their findings to the notifying State as early as possible within 
the period applicable pursuant to article 13. If a notified State finds that implementation of the planned 
measures would be inconsistent with the provisions of articles 5 or 7, it shall attach to its finding a 
documented explanation setting forth the reasons for the finding.  
Article 16 - Absence of reply to notification 
(1) If, within the period applicable pursuant to article 13, the notifying State receives no communication 




implementation of the planned measures, in accordance with the notification and any other data and 
information provided to the notified States. 
(2) Any claim to compensation by a notified State which has failed to reply within the period applicable 
pursuant to article 13 may be offset by the costs incurred by the notifying State for action undertaken 
after the expiration of the time for a reply which would not have been undertaken if the notified State 
had objected within that period. 
Article 17 - Consultations and negotiations concerning planned measures 
(1) If a communication is made under article 15 that implementation of the planned measures would be 
inconsistent with the provisions of articles 5 or 7, the notifying State and the State making the 
communication shall enter into consultations and, if necessary, negotiations with a view to arriving at 
an equitable resolution of the situation. 
(2) The consultations and negotiations shall be conducted on the basis that each State must in good faith 
pay reasonable regard to the rights and legitimate interests of the other State. 
(3) During the course of the consultations and negotiations, the notifying State shall, if so requested by 
the notified State at the time it makes the communication, refrain from implementing or permitting the 
implementation of the planned measures for a period of six months unless otherwise agreed. 
Article 18 - Procedures in the absence of notification 
(1) If a watercourse State has reasonable grounds to believe that another watercourse State is planning 
measures that may have a significant adverse effect upon it, the former State may request the latter to 
apply the provisions of article 12. The request shall be accompanied by a documented explanation 
setting forth its grounds. 
(2) In the event that the State planning the measures nevertheless finds that it is not under an obligation 
to provide a notification under article 12, it shall so inform the other State, providing a documented 
explanation setting forth the reasons for such finding. If this finding does not satisfy the other State, the 
two States shall, at the request of that other State, promptly enter into consultations and negotiations in 
the manner indicated in paragraphs 1 and 2 of article 17. 
(3) During the course of the consultations and negotiations, the State planning the measures shall, if so 
requested by the other State at the time it requests the initiation of consultations and negotiations, refrain 
from implementing or permitting the implementation of those measures for a period of six months 




Article 19 - Urgent implementation of planned measures 
(1) In the event that the implementation of planned measures is of the utmost urgency in order to protect 
public health, public safety or other equally important interests, the State planning the measures may, 
subject to articles 5 and 7, immediately proceed to implementation, notwithstanding the provisions of 
article 14 and paragraph 3 of article 17. 
(2) In such case, a formal declaration of the urgency of the measures shall be communicated without 
delay to the other watercourse States referred to in article 12 together with the relevant data and 
information. 
(3) The State planning the measures shall, at the request of any of the States referred to in paragraph 2, 
promptly enter into consultations and negotiations with it in the manner indicated in paragraphs 1 and 
2 of article 17. 
PART IV. PROTECTION, PRESERVATION AND MANAGEMENT 
Article 20 - Protection and preservation of ecosystems 
Watercourse States shall, individually and, where appropriate, jointly, protect and preserve the 
ecosystems of international watercourses. 
Article 21 - Prevention, reduction and control of pollution 
(1) For the purpose of this article, “pollution of an international watercourse” means any detrimental 
alteration in the composition or quality of the waters of an international watercourse which results 
directly or indirectly from human conduct. 
(2) Watercourse States shall, individually and, where appropriate, jointly, prevent, reduce and control 
the pollution of an international watercourse that may cause significant harm to other watercourse States 
or to their environment, including harm to human health or safety, to the use of the waters for any 
beneficial purpose or to the living resources of the watercourse. Watercourse States shall take steps to 
harmonize their policies in this connection. 
(3) Watercourse States shall, at the request of any of them, consult with a view to arriving at mutually 
agreeable measures and methods to prevent, reduce and control pollution of an international 
watercourse, such as: 
(a) Setting joint water quality objectives and criteria; 




(c) Establishing lists of substances the introduction of which into the waters of an international 
watercourse is to be prohibited, limited, investigated or monitored. 
Article 22 - Introduction of alien or new species 
Watercourse States shall take all measures necessary to prevent the introduction of species, alien or new, 
into an international watercourse which may have effects detrimental to the ecosystem of the 
watercourse resulting in significant harm to other watercourse States. 
Article 23 - Protection and preservation of the marine environment 
Watercourse States shall, individually and, where appropriate, in cooperation with other States, take all 
measures with respect to an international watercourse that are necessary to protect and preserve the 
marine environment, including estuaries, taking into account generally accepted international rules and 
standards. 
Article 24 - Management 
(1) Watercourse States shall, at the request of any of them, enter into consultations concerning the 
management of an international watercourse, which may include the establishment of a joint 
management mechanism. 
(2) For the purposes of this article, “management” refers, in particular, to: 
(a) Planning the sustainable development of an international watercourse and providing for the 
implementation of any plans adopted; and 
(b) otherwise promoting the rational and optimal utilization, protection and control of the watercourse. 
Article 25 - Regulation 
(1) Watercourse States shall cooperate, where appropriate, to respond to needs or opportunities for 
regulation of the flow of the waters of an international watercourse. 
(2) Unless otherwise agreed, watercourse States shall participate on an equitable basis in the 
construction and maintenance or defrayal of the costs of such regulation works as they may have agreed 
to undertake. 
(3) For the purposes of this article, “regulation” means the use of hydraulic works or any other 





Article 26 - Installations 
(1) Watercourse States shall, within their respective territories, employ their best efforts to maintain and 
protect installations, facilities and other works related to an international watercourse. 
(2) Watercourse States shall, at the request of any of them which has reasonable grounds to believe that 
it may suffer significant adverse effects, enter into consultations with regard to: 
(a) The safe operation and maintenance of installations, facilities or other works related to an 
international watercourse; and 
(b) The protection of installations, facilities or other works from wilful or negligent acts or the forces 
of nature. 
PART V. HARMFUL CONDITIONS AND EMERGENCY SITUATIONS 
Article 27 - Prevention and mitigation of harmful conditions 
Watercourse States shall, individually and, where appropriate, jointly, take all appropriate measures to 
prevent or mitigate conditions related to an international watercourse that may be harmful to other 
watercourse States, whether resulting from natural causes or human conduct, such as flood or ice 
conditions, water-borne diseases, siltation, erosion, salt-water intrusion, drought or desertification. 
Article 28 - Emergency situations 
(1) For the purposes of this article, “emergency” means a situation that causes, or poses an imminent 
threat of causing, serious harm to watercourse States or other States and that results suddenly from 
natural causes, such as floods, the breaking up of ice, landslides or earthquakes, or from human conduct, 
such as industrial accidents.  
(2) A watercourse State shall, without delay and by the most expeditious means available, notify other 
potentially affected States and competent international organizations of any emergency originating 
within its territory. 
(3) A watercourse State within whose territory an emergency originates shall, in cooperation with 
potentially affected States and, where appropriate, competent international organizations, immediately 
take all practicable measures necessitated by the circumstances to prevent, mitigate and eliminate 




(4) When necessary, watercourse States shall jointly develop contingency plans for responding to 
emergencies, in cooperation, where appropriate, with other potentially affected States and competent 
international organizations. 
PART VI. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
Article 29 - International watercourses and installations in time of armed conflict 
International watercourses and related installations, facilities and other works shall enjoy the protection 
accorded by the principles and rules of international law applicable in international and non-
international armed conflict and shall not be used in violation of those principles and rules. 
Article 30 - Indirect procedures 
In cases where there are serious obstacles to direct contacts between watercourse States, the States 
concerned shall fulfil their obligations of cooperation provided for in the present Convention, including 
exchange of data and information, notification, communication, consultations and negotiations, through 
any indirect procedure accepted by them.  
Article 31 - Data and information vital to national defence or security  
Nothing in the present Convention obliges a watercourse State to provide data or information vital to 
its national defence or security. Nevertheless, that State shall cooperate in good faith with the other 
watercourse States with a view to providing as much information as possible under the circumstances. 
Article 32 - Non-discrimination 
Unless the watercourse States concerned have agreed otherwise for the protection of the interests of 
persons, natural or juridical, who have suffered or are under a serious threat of suffering significant 
transboundary harm as a result of activities related to an international watercourse, a watercourse State 
shall not discriminate on the basis of nationality or residence or place where the injury occurred, in 
granting to such persons, in accordance with its legal system, access to judicial or other procedures, or 
a right to claim compensation or other relief in respect of significant harm caused by such activities 
carried on in its territory.  
Article 33 - Settlement of disputes 
(1) In the event of a dispute between two or more Parties concerning the interpretation or application of 
the present Convention, the Parties concerned shall, in the absence of an applicable agreement between 




(2) If the Parties concerned cannot reach agreement by negotiation requested by one of them, they may 
jointly seek the good offices of, or request mediation or conciliation by, a third party, or make use, as 
appropriate, of any joint watercourse institutions that may have been established by them or agree to 
submit the dispute to arbitration or to the International Court of Justice. 
(3) Subject to the operation of paragraph 10, if after six months from the time of the request for 
negotiations referred to in paragraph 2, the Parties concerned have not been able to settle their dispute 
through negotiation or any other means referred to in paragraph 2, the dispute shall be submitted, at the 
request of any of the parties to the dispute, to impartial fact-finding in accordance with paragraphs 4 to 
9, unless the Parties otherwise agree. 
(4) A Fact-finding Commission shall be established, composed of one member nominated by each Party 
concerned and in addition a member not having the nationality of any of the Parties concerned chosen 
by the nominated members who shall serve as Chairman. 
(5) If the members nominated by the Parties are unable to agree on a Chairman within three months of 
the request for the establishment of the Commission, any Party concerned may request the Secretary-
General of the United Nations to appoint the Chairman who shall not have the nationality of any of the 
parties to the dispute or of any riparian State of the watercourse concerned. If one of the Parties fails to 
nominate a member within three months of the initial request pursuant to paragraph 3, any other Party 
concerned may request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to appoint a person who shall not 
have the nationality of any of the parties to the dispute or of any riparian State of the watercourse 
concerned. The person so appointed shall constitute a single-member Commission. 
(6) The Commission shall determine its own procedure.  
(7) The Parties concerned have the obligation to provide the Commission with such information as it 
may require and, on request, to permit the Commission to have access to their respective territory and 
to inspect any facilities, plant, equipment, construction or natural feature relevant for the purpose of its 
inquiry. 
(8) The Commission shall adopt its report by a majority vote, unless it is a single-member Commission, 
and shall submit that report to the Parties concerned setting forth its findings and the reasons therefor 
and such recommendations as it deems appropriate for an equitable solution of the dispute, which the 
Parties concerned shall consider in good faith.  
(9) The expenses of the Commission shall be borne equally by the Parties concerned  
(10) When ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to the present Convention, or at any time 




instrument submitted to the Depositary that, in respect of any dispute not resolved in accordance with 
paragraph 2, it recognizes as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement in relation to any 
Party accepting the same obligation: 
(a) Submission of the dispute to the International Court of Justice; and/or 
(b) Arbitration by an arbitral tribunal established and operating, ‘unless the parties to the dispute 
otherwise agreed, in accordance with the procedure laid down in the annex to the present Convention. 
A Party which is a regional economic integration organization may make a declaration with like effect 
in relation to arbitration in accordance with subparagraph (b). 
PART VII. FINAL CLAUSES 
Article 34 - Signature 
The present Convention shall be open for signature by all States and by regional economic integration 
organizations from ... until ... at United Nations Headquarters in New York.  
Article 35 - Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession 
(1) The present Convention is subject to ratification, acceptance, approval or accession by States and 
by regional economic integration organizations. The instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval 
or accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.  
(2) Any regional economic integration organization which becomes a Party to this Convention without 
any of its member States being a Party shall be bound by all the obligations under the Convention. In 
the case of such organizations, one or more of whose member States is a Party to this Convention, the 
organization and its member States shall decide on their respective responsibilities for the performance 
of their obligations under the Convention. In such cases, the organization and the member States shall 
not be entitled to exercise rights under the Convention concurrently. 
(3) In their instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, the regional economic 
integration organizations shall declare the extent of their competence with respect to the matters 
governed by the Convention. These organizations shall also inform the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations of any substantial modification in the extent of their competence. 
Article 36 - Entry into force 
(1) The present Convention shall enter into force on the ninetieth day following the date of deposit of 
the thirty-fifth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession with the Secretary-General 




(2) For each State or regional economic integration organization that ratifies, accepts or approves the 
Convention or accedes thereto after the deposit of the thirty-fifth instrument of ratification, acceptance, 
approval or accession, the Convention shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after the deposit by 
such State or regional economic integration organization of its instrument of ratification, acceptance, 
approval or accession. 
(3) For the purposes of paragraphs 1 and 2, any instrument deposited by a regional economic integration 
organization shall not be counted as additional those deposited by States. 
Article 37 - Authentic texts 
The original of the present Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and 
Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned plenipotentiaries, being duly authorized thereto, have 
signed this Convention. 
DONE at New York, this twenty-first day of May one thousand nine hundred and ninety-seven. 
ANNEX - ARBITRATION 
Article 1 
Unless the parties to the dispute otherwise agree, the arbitration pursuant to article 33 of the Convention 
shall take place in accordance with articles 2 to 14 of the present annex. 
Article 2 
The claimant party shall notify the respondent party that it is referring a dispute to arbitration pursuant 
to article 33 of the Convention. The notification shall state the subject matter of arbitration and include, 
in particular, the articles of the Convention, the interpretation or application of which are at issue. If the 
parties do not agree on the subject matter of the dispute, the arbitral tribunal shall determine the subject 
matter. 
Article 3 
(1) In disputes between two parties, the arbitral tribunal shall consist of three members. Each of the 
parties to the dispute shall appoint an arbitrator and the two arbitrators so appointed shall designate by 
common agreement the third arbitrator, who shall be the Chairman of the tribunal. The latter shall not’ 




nor have his or her usual place of residence in the territory of one of these parties or such riparian State, 
nor have dealt with the case in any other capacity. 
(2) In disputes between more than two parties, parties in the same interest shall appoint one arbitrator 
jointly by agreement. 
(3) Any vacancy shall be filled in the manner prescribed for the initial appointment. 
Article 4 
(1) If the Chairman of the arbitral tribunal has not been designated within two months of the 
appointment of the second arbitrator, the President of the International Court of Justice shall, at the 
request of a party, designate the Chairman within a further two-month period. 
(2) If one of the parties to the dispute does not appoint an arbitrator within two months of receipt of the 
request, the other party may inform the President of the International Court of Justice, who shall make 
the designation within a further two-month period. 
Article 5 
The arbitral tribunal shall render its decisions in accordance with the provisions of this Convention and 
international law. 
Article 6 
Unless the parties to the dispute otherwise agree, the arbitral tribunal shall determine its own rules of 
procedure. 
Article 7 
The arbitral tribunal may, at the request of one of the Parties, recommend essential interim measures of 
protection. 
Article 8 
(1) The parties to the dispute shall facilitate the work of the arbitral tribunal and, in particular, using all 
means at their disposal, shall: 
(a) Provide it with all relevant documents, information and facilities; and 




(2) The parties and the arbitrators are under an obligation to protect the confidentiality of any 
information they receive in confidence during the proceedings of the arbitral tribunal. 
Article 9 
Unless the arbitral tribunal determines otherwise because of the particular circumstances of the case, 
the costs of the tribunal shall be borne by the parties to the dispute in equal shares. The tribunal shall 
keep a record of all its costs, and shall furnish a final statement thereof to the parties. 
Article 10 
Any Party that has an interest of a legal nature in the subject matter of the dispute which may be affected 
by the decision in the case, may intervene in the proceedings with the consent of the tribunal. 
Article 11 
The tribunal may hear and determine counterclaims arising directly out of the subject matter of the 
dispute. 
Article 12 
Decisions both on procedure and substance of the arbitral tribunal shall be taken by a majority vote of 
its members. 
Article 13 
If one of the parties to the dispute does not appear before the arbitral tribunal or fails to defend its case, 
the other party may request the tribunal to continue the proceedings and to make its award. Absence of 
a party or a failure of a party to defend its case shall not constitute a bar to the proceedings. Before 
rendering its final decision, the arbitral tribunal must satisfy itself that the claim is well founded in fact 
and law. 
Article 14 
(1) The tribunal shall render its final decision within five months of the date on which it is fully 
constituted unless it finds it necessary to extend the time limit for a period which should not exceed five 
more months. 
(2) The final decision of the arbitral tribunal shall be confined to the subject matter of the dispute and 




participated and the date of the final decision. Any member of the tribunal may attach a separate or 
dissenting opinion to the final decision. 
(3) The award shall be binding on the parties to the dispute. It shall be without appeal unless the parties 
to the dispute have agreed in advance to an appellate procedure. 
(4) Any controversy which may arise between the parties to the dispute as regards the interpretation or 
manner of implementation of the final decision may be submitted by either party for decision to the 
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